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      language?”
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      Citations collected in 2012 
      (works listed above):
      “Since the Discourse, philosophy has fallen into the bondage of scientific 
      treatises, and no one seems able to tell whether or not there lies a truth 
      behind the scientific fabric we have made of the world. This pessimistic 
      view of the influence of Descartes’s philosophy is most clearly expressed 
      when Jaspers speaks of Descartes:
      
      ‘In him one can see the origin and beginning of what will later be the 
      enduring enemy of philosophizing, even in that place where one seeks his 
      own truth. Descartes is a historical fate, in the sense that everyone who 
      philosophizes has to decide about himself in the unavoidable appropriation 
      of Descartes, through the manner in which he appropriates him.’”
      Van Leeuwen, Evert. “Method, Discourse, and the Act of Knowing.” Pp. 
      224-241. From Essays on the Philosophy and Science of Rene Descartes. 
      1993. Oxford University Press. P.224. Subquote is from Jaspers, Karl. 
      Descartes und die Philosophie. 1956. Berlin. P. 102.
      
      
      “The triple-inheritance version of human gene-culture coevolution differs 
      from the earlier dual-inheritance versions in several respects. Two of the 
      inheritance systems ..., genetic and cultural inheritance, are the same 
      ... Now, however genetic inheritance is directed by natural selection 
      stemming from every kind of niche construction, and not just cultural 
      niche construction.” Odling-Smee, F. John, Kevin Laland & Marcus Feldman. 
      Niche Construction: The Neglected Process in Evolution. Princeton 
      University Press. 2003. P. 252.
      
      
      “Ecological inheritance is explicitly directed by niche construction, and 
      it potentially includes human artifacts. It follows that human cultural 
      inheritance may influence human genetic inheritance in two ways instead of 
      one: first, directly, by influencing differential survival and 
      reproduction, as already assumed by sociobiology, human behavioral 
      ecology, and evolutionary psychology, and second, indirectly, by 
      contributing to cultural niche construction, and thence to a human 
      ecological inheritance that includes culturally modified natural selection 
      pressures.” Odling-Smee, F. John, Kevin Laland & Marcus Feldman. Niche 
      Construction: The Neglected Process in Evolution. Princeton University 
      Press. 2003. P. 252.
      
      
      “The kind of scientific realism we have inherited from the seventeenth 
      century has not lost all its prestige even yet, but it has saddled us with 
      a disastrous picture of the world. It is high time we looked for a 
      different picture.” Putnam, Hilary. “Is There Still Anything to Say about 
      Reality and Truth?” Pp. 11-28. From McCormick, Peter. 1996. Starmaking: 
      Realism, Anti-Realism, and Irrealism. MIT Press. P. 15.
      
      
      “The problem, in a nutshell, is that thought itself has come to be treated 
      more and more as a ‘projection’ by the philosophy that traces its pedigree 
      to the seventeenth century. The reason is clear: we have not succeeded in 
      giving the theory that thought is just a primitive property of a 
      mysterious ‘substance,’ mind, any content.” Putnam, Hilary. “Is There 
      Still Anything to Say about Reality and Truth?” Pp. 11-28. From McCormick, 
      Peter. 1996. Starmaking: Realism, Anti-Realism, and Irrealism. MIT Press. 
      P. 19.
      
      
      “Modern Objectivism has simply become Materialism. And the central problem 
      for Materialism is ‘explaining the emergence of mind’.” Putnam, Hilary. 
      “Is There Still Anything to Say about Reality and Truth?” Pp. 11-28. From 
      McCormick, Peter. 1996. Starmaking: Realism, Anti-Realism, and Irrealism. 
      MIT Press. P. 20.
      
      
      “The overwhelming case against perception without conception, the pure 
      given, absolute immediacy, the innocent eye, substance as substratum, has 
      been so fully and frequently set forth–by Berkeley, Kant, Cassirer, 
      Gombrich, Bruner, and many others–as to need no restatement here. Talk of 
      unstructured content or an unconceptualized given or a substratum without 
      properties is self-defeating; for the talk imposes structure, 
      conceptualizes, ascribes properties.” Goodman, Nelson. “Words, Works, 
      Worlds.” Pp. 61-77. From McCormick, Peter. 1996. Starmaking: Realism, 
      Anti-Realism, and Irrealism. MIT Press. Pp. 64-5.
      
      
      “Whereas classical evolutionary theory sees the organism as the key that 
      has to fit into the environment’s lock, both ecological developmental 
      biology and niche construction see interactions between them. Niche 
      construction emphasizes the ability of the organism to alter its 
      environment; eco-devo emphasizes the ability of the environment to alter 
      the developing organism.” Laland, Kevin, J. Odling-Smee & S. Gilbert. 
      “EvoDevo and Niche Construction: Building Bridges.” 2008. Pp. 549-566. 
      Journal of Experimental Zoology (Mol Dev Evol) 310B:549-566. P. 550.
      
      
      “A subset of EvoDevo has given rise to ecological developmental biology, 
      which stresses the roles of developmental plasticity in evolution, 
      especially in the formation, preservation, and prevention of novelty. The 
      focus is the ability of the developing organism to sense cues from its 
      environment and to modify its development to become more fit in a 
      particular habitat.” Laland, Kevin, J. Odling-Smee & S. Gilbert. “EvoDevo 
      and Niche Construction: Building Bridges.” 2008. Pp. 549-566. Journal of 
      Experimental Zoology (Mol Dev Evol) 310B:549-566. P. 549.
      
      
      “From the niche-construction perspective, with its emphasis on reciprocal 
      causation, evolutionary change is not solely explained by changed 
      selection, but also requires consideration of what causes these changes in 
      selection pressures–and often the answer is the earlier niche construction 
      of ancestral populations. Accordingly, the niche-construction perspective 
      explicitly recognizes an additional process to natural selection, which 
      could potentially be the source of directionality in evolutionary 
      responses, namely the organism itself, and the changes it brings about in 
      its selective environment. This means that, in addition to chance and 
      natural selection, there is a third explicitly recognized source of 
      evolutionary innovation, which occurs when gene-informed, directed, 
      nonrandom, yet novel, acts of niche construction bring about consistent 
      chances in environments.
      
      “If individuals select or manufacture a novel environment, they and their 
      descendants will be exposed to novel selection and novel developmental 
      conditions.” Laland, Kevin, J. Odling-Smee & S. Gilbert. “EvoDevo and 
      Niche Construction: Building Bridges.” 2008. Pp. 549-566. Journal of 
      Experimental Zoology (Mol Dev Evol) 310B:549-566. Pp. 560-1.
      
      
      “The conceptual leap that niche construction theorists embrace is to 
      regard niche construction as an evolutionary process in its own right. In 
      other words, niche construction is viewed as an initiator of evolutionary 
      change rather than merely the end product of earlier selection.” Laland, 
      Kevin & M. O’Brien. “Niche Construction Theory and Archaeology.” 2010. 
      Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory. 17:303-322. Pp. 304-5.
      
      
      “However, Jones and his collaborators point out that many species of 
      ecosystem engineers can regulate energy flows, mass flows, and trophic 
      patterns in ecosystems to generate an ‘engineering web’–a mosaic of 
      connectivity comprising the engineering interactions of diverse species, 
      which regulates ecosystem functioning in conjunction with the well-studied 
      webs of trophic interactions.” Laland, Kevin & M. O’Brien. “Niche 
      Construction Theory and Archaeology.” 2010. Journal of Archaeological 
      Method and Theory. 17:303-322. P. 306. Reference is to Jones, C. G., 
      Lawton, G. & Shachak, M. 1994. “Organisms as ecosystem engineers.” Oikos. 
      69, 373-386.
      
      
      “Niche construction may be inceptive or counteractive and may occur 
      through perturbation of the environment or through relocation in space.” 
      Laland, Kevin & M. O’Brien. “Niche Construction Theory and Archaeology.” 
      2010. Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory. 17:303-322. P. 307.
      
      
      “The argument that human cultural niche construction has been a 
      co-director of recent human evolution is essentially the conclusion 
      reached by the geneticists analyzing the human genome, who observe that 
      many genes subject to recent selective sweeps are responses to cultural 
      activities.” Laland, Kevin & M. O’Brien. “Niche Construction Theory and 
      Archaeology.” 2010. Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory. 
      17:303-322. P. 308.
      
      
      “They [Laland, Odling-Smee, & Feldman] concluded that, because cultural 
      processes typically operate faster than natural selection, cultural niche 
      construction probably has more profound consequences than gene-based niche 
      construction.” Laland, Kevin & M. O’Brien. “Niche Construction Theory and 
      Archaeology.” 2010. Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory. 
      17:303-322. P. 310. Reference is to Laland, K, Odling-Smee, F & M. 
      Feldman. “Cultural niche construction and human evolution.” 2001. Journal 
      of Evolutionary Biology. 14: 22-33.
      
      
      “... rather than slipping into the assumption that the external 
      environment (e.g., climate change) triggers an evolutionary or cultural 
      response, NCT [niche construction theory] enthusiasts are from the outset 
      inclined to consider those additional hypotheses stressing 
      self-constructed (and other organism-constructed) conditions that 
      instigate change. In this respect, NCT can be viewed as more in accord 
      with the perspective of most archaeologists, who are highly attuned to the 
      active agency of their subjects, than standard evolutionary theory.” 
      Laland, Kevin & M. O’Brien. “Niche Construction Theory and Archaeology.” 
      2010. Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory. 17:303-322. P. 312.
      
      
      “Many counteractive niche-constructing behaviors regulate the environment 
      in such a way as to buffer against particular natural selection 
      pressures.” Laland, Kevin & M. O’Brien. “Niche Construction Theory and 
      Archaeology.” 2010. Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory. 
      17:303-322. P. 313.
      
      
      “First, it [niche construction theory] offers a broad, biologically and 
      culturally informed conceptual framework suited to the human sciences–one 
      that recognizes the active agency of humans as part causes of their own 
      development, history, and evolution. Second, it recognizes niche 
      construction as an evolutionary process and ecological inheritance as a 
      second general legacy that organisms inherit from their ancestors, thereby 
      providing researchers with additional explanatory mechanisms. Such 
      mechanisms are particularly relevant to archaeologists, given that human 
      niche construction is frequently a manifestation of acquired characters 
      and human ecological inheritance includes a rich material culture.” Laland, 
      Kevin & M. O’Brien. “Niche Construction Theory and Archaeology.” 2010. 
      Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory. 17:303-322. P. 318.
      
      
      “Our agent-based models of language games are beginning to show how 
      symbol-based communication systems with properties similar to human 
      natural languages can arise and be culturally transmitted. But a crucial 
      assumption we had to make in all these models so far is that the agents 
      are ‘ultrasocial’ instead of Darwinian. Sociality here means that agents 
      are programed to cooperate fully in order to make their verbal 
      interactions a success.” Steels, Luc. “Is sociality a crucial prerequisite 
      for the emergence of language?” Pp. 36-57. From Botha, Rudolf & C. Knight. 
      2009. The Prehistory of Language. Oxford University Press. P. 37.
      
      
      “Joint attention means (i) that speaker and hearer have a sufficiently 
      shared context so that the possible meanings of an utterance are highly 
      constrained, (ii) that they are engaged in a shared cooperative activity 
      so that both can gauge whether their communication was successful or not, 
      and (iii) that they have the means to correct miscommunication by 
      additional dialog or by motor behaviors such as pointing.” Steels, Luc. 
      “Is sociality a crucial prerequisite for the emergence of language?” Pp. 
      36-57. From Botha, Rudolf & C. Knight. 2009. The Prehistory of Language. 
      Oxford University Press. P. 50.
      
      
      “One thing is sure: that sociality is a crucial prerequisite for language 
      and that language in turn must have helped maintain sociality in our 
      species.” Steels, Luc. “Is sociality a crucial prerequisite for the 
      emergence of language?” Pp. 36-57. From Botha, Rudolf & C. Knight. 2009. 
      The Prehistory of Language. Oxford University Press. P. 57.
      
      
      “There is one kind of niche construction that we have not yet explicitly 
      considered, ‘social niche construction.’ The social niche is the subset of 
      natural selection pressures in an evolutionary niche that stem from 
      interactions with other organisms in their social groups. It constitutes 
      the resources (e.g. food), services (e.g. grooming), and other outputs 
      (e.g. threats) provided by organisms for each other. It also includes all 
      the ways in which individual organisms can actively defend themselves, 
      compete with, form alliances with, cooperate, exploit, or manipulate, 
      other organisms, and by doing so modify some of the natural selection 
      pressures they encounter in their niche.” Odling-Smee, John & K. Laland. 
      “Cultural niche construction: evolution’s cradle of language.” Pp. 99-121. 
      From Botha, Rudolf & C. Knight. 2009. The Prehistory of Language. Oxford 
      University Press. Pp. 106-7.
      
      
      “It concerns the construction of communication links and networks in 
      social groups, without which adaptive group living is probably impossible. 
      We call it communicative niche construction. In general, communicative 
      niche construction depends on the ability of organisms to convey 
      meaningful information to and from each other through their bodies, 
      products, or activities.” Odling-Smee, John & K. Laland. “Cultural niche 
      construction: evolution’s cradle of language.” Pp. 99-121. From Botha, 
      Rudolf & C. Knight. 2009. The Prehistory of Language. Oxford University 
      Press. P. 108.
      
      
      “The organization of animal societies, and their communication networks, 
      can be transmitted across multiple generations of a population as an 
      ecological inheritance. Thus, it is possible for communicative niche 
      construction to modify one or more natural selection pressures in 
      populations of social organisms repeatedly and consistently, and thereby 
      to affect their evolution in a directional manner. If that happens, 
      communication fully qualifies as another kind of niche construction.” 
      Odling-Smee, John & K. Laland. “Cultural niche construction: evolution’s 
      cradle of language.” Pp. 99-121. From Botha, Rudolf & C. Knight. 2009. The 
      Prehistory of Language. Oxford University Press. P. 109.
      
      
      “Humans transmit more learned information across generations than any 
      other species. Conversely, animals typically depend primarily on 
      horizontal transmissions based on simple forms of social learning. A 
      comparative perspective thus implies that the earliest forms of social 
      transmission were probably horizontal, and that the lineage leading to 
      Homo sapiens has been selected for increasing reliance on vertical and 
      oblique cultural transmission. The theoretical analyses of the evolution 
      of culture, described above, imply that a shift towards increased 
      transgenerational cultural transmission reflects a greater constancy in 
      the environment over time. Such a shift is difficult to reconcile with 
      culture being favored by variation in an autonomous external environment 
      because there is no evidence to suggest that environments have become more 
      constant over the last few million years, but rather the opposite, and if 
      they had, other protocultural species would also be expected to show more 
      transgenerational transmission than they do. Richerson and Boyd have 
      suggested that independent (e.g. climatic) sources of environmental 
      variation are the primary selection pressures favoring the human capacity 
      for cultural transmission, but these vary on entirely the wrong scale.
      
      “To us, a more compelling hypothesis is that our ancestors constructed the 
      environmental conditions that favored hominid reliance on culture, 
      building niches in which it paid them to transmit more information to 
      their offspring. The more an organism controls and regulates its 
      environment, and the environment of its offspring, the greater should be 
      the advantage of transmitting cultural information across generations. For 
      example, by tracking the movements of migrating or dispersing prey, 
      populations of hominids increase the chances that a specific food source 
      will be available in their environments, that the same tools used for 
      hunting will be needed, and that the skin, bones, and other materials from 
      these animals will be at hand to use in the manufacture of additional 
      tools. Such activities create the kind of stable social environment in 
      which related technologies, such as food preparation or skin processing 
      methods, would be advantageous from one generation to the next, with 
      methods repeatedly socially transmitted across generations. Once started, 
      cultural niche construction may become an autocatalytic process, with 
      greater culturally generated environmental regulation leading to 
      increasing homogeneity of the social environment as experienced by old and 
      young, favoring further transgenerational cultural transmission.” Odling-Smee, John & K. Laland. “Cultural niche construction: evolution’s cradle 
      of language.” Pp. 99-121. From Botha, Rudolf & C. Knight. 2009. The 
      Prehistory of Language. Oxford University Press. Pp. 118-9.
      
      
      “The response of a player redefines and/or limits another’s intent; thus, 
      the shared semantic understandings of objects, actions, and/or gestures 
      that signal, query, or motivate the next move emerge as a function of this 
      interaction. Co-constructed intentions are inherently shared, and salient 
      gestures, sounds, and ‘incipient acts’ evoke the meaning of moves that 
      have been played into existence. Because play actions, movements, and 
      gestures are often without their ‘real world’ consequences or instrumental 
      functions, these salient acts can become free to ‘stand for’ or re-present 
      their meaning in non-play contexts. In social play as in language, 
      participants negotiate hierarchically ordered moves and exchanges that can 
      be modified and rearranged through repetitive actions and shared goals 
      into normative, rule-governed behavior. We propose that these dialogic 
      structural and normative functions make social play a proper model for 
      understanding the emergence of language, as a negotiated, self-organizing 
      system rather than a system of communication limited to modern human 
      societies.” Ragir, Sonia & S. Savage-Rumbaugh. “Playing with meaning: 
      normative function and structure in play.” Pp. 122-141. From Botha, Rudolf 
      & C. Knight. 2009. The Prehistory of Language. Oxford University Press. P. 
      122.
      
      
      “Play is one of many forms of negotiated, self-organizing, dynamic systems 
      that emerge during ontogeny. This fundamentally communicative activity 
      dominates the developmental phase of performance-dependent neural and 
      muscular specialization in animal and human young and participates in the 
      structuring of neural networks, modularization of function, and cognitive 
      specialization. Form and meaning are co-constructed in play, and they 
      serve in public systems of representation and not simply as signs of 
      emotional states over which the individual has no control. Ape social play 
      and perhaps all social play is first and foremost a negotiation about what 
      is possible, what is permitted, and how to do it effectively with others. 
      The normative and reflexive qualities of social play suggest that play has 
      not only a proximal autoletic function but also the distal effect of 
      generating a neural substrate that support the shared fields of behavioral 
      and social understanding necessary for complex communication.” Ragir, 
      Sonia & S. Savage-Rumbaugh. “Playing with meaning: normative function and 
      structure in play.” Pp. 122-141. From Botha, Rudolf & C. Knight. 2009. The 
      Prehistory of Language. Oxford University Press. P. 140.
      
      
      “The theoretical frameworks of computationalism and connectionism are 
      often construed as a search for cognitive mechanisms, the specific 
      structures and processes from which cognitive phenomena arise. In 
      contrast, the framework of dynamicism is generally understood to be a 
      search for principles or laws–mathematical regularities that govern the 
      way cognitive phenomena unfold over time. In recent philosophical 
      discourse, this difference between traditional and dynamical cognitive 
      science has been framed as a difference in scientific explanation: whereas 
      computationalist and connectionist explanations are mechanistic 
      explanations, dynamical explanations take the form of covering-law 
      explanations.” Zednik, Carlos. “The Nature of Dynamical Explanation.” 
      2011. Philosophy of Science. Vol 78, No. 2. Pp. 238-263. P. 238.
      
      
      “Kelso’s explanation of bimanual coordination is not in fact 
      representative of dynamical explanation in general, and many dynamical 
      explanations actually resemble mechanistic explanations rather than 
      covering-law explanations.” Zednik, Carlos. “The Nature of Dynamical 
      Explanation.” 2011. Philosophy of Science. Vol 78, No. 2. Pp. 238-263. P. 
      245. Reference is to Kelso, J. 1995. Dynamic Patterns: The 
      Self-Organization of Brain and Behavior. MIT Press. 
      
      “Thelen et al. and Beer each offer a dynamical explanation of a 
      (minimally) cognitive phenomenon. In each case, the explanation proceeds 
      by identifying the component parts and operations of a mechanism and by 
      showing how the organized activity of these parts and operations produces 
      the phenomenon being explained.” Zednik, Carlos. “The Nature of Dynamical 
      Explanation.” 2011. Philosophy of Science. Vol 78, No. 2. Pp. 238-263. P. 
      255. References are: Thelen, E., G. Schoener, C. Scheier & L. Smith. 2001. 
      “The Dynamics of Embodiment: A Field Theory of Infant Perservative 
      Reaching.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 24:1-34. Beer, R. 2003. “The 
      Dynamics of Active Categorical Perception in an Evolved Model Agent.” 
      Adaptive Behavior. 11 (4): 209-43.
      
      
      “Coupling is a technical term that applies whenever two or more dynamical 
      systems mutually influence one another’s change over time. In the 
      philosophical literature, such mutual influence is more commonly known as 
      continuous reciprocal causation.” Zednik, Carlos. “The Nature of Dynamical 
      Explanation.” 2011. Philosophy of Science. Vol 78, No. 2. Pp. 238-263. P. 
      258.
      
      
      “The moral of the story is that the tools and concepts of dynamical 
      systems theory can be used to describe mechanisms that exhibit continuous 
      reciprocal causation. Although important questions do remain about the 
      degree to which Beer’s methods will scale up to larger and increasingly 
      realistic systems in which continuous reciprocal causation is increasingly 
      prevalent. Beer’s analysis shows that continuous reciprocal causation does 
      not necessarily preclude mechanistic explanation.” Zednik, Carlos. “The 
      Nature of Dynamical Explanation.” 2011. Philosophy of Science. Vol 78, No. 
      2. Pp. 238-263. P. 260. Reference is to Beer, R. 2003. “The Dynamics of 
      Active Categorical Perception in an Evolved Model Agent.” Adaptive 
      Behavior. 11 (4): 209-43.
      
      
      “... those dynamicist researchers who seek to provide mechanistic 
      explanations rather than covering-law explanations may be steering toward 
      reconciliation with proponents of representationalism. By describing 
      cognitive mechanisms rather than principles or laws, these researchers 
      describe structures that are amenable to what Chemero and Silberstein have 
      called representation hunting–characterizing the components of a mechanism 
      as representation producers and representation consumers and understanding 
      their operations in terms of the transfer and manipulation of 
      information.” Zednik, Carlos. “The Nature of Dynamical Explanation.” 2011. 
      Philosophy of Science. Vol 78, No. 2. Pp. 238-263. P. 261. Reference is to 
      Chemero, A. & M. Silberstein. 2008. “After the Philosophy of Mind: 
      Replacing Scholasticism with Science.” Philosophy of Science. 75: 1-27.
      
      
      “Culture, broadly conceived as all that individuals learn from others that 
      endures to generate customs and traditions, shapes vast swathes of human 
      lives. Cumulative cultural achievements, from technology to social 
      institutions, have allowed our species to invade and exploit virtually 
      every region of the planet. Accordingly, this special capacity for culture 
      is often thought to represent a qualitative distinction between our 
      species and the rest of nature, and our relative independence from the 
      Darwinian forces that shape the natural world.” Whiten, A., R. Hinde, K. 
      Laland C. Stringer. 2011. “Introduction: Culture evolves.” Philosophical 
      Transactions of the Royal Society: B. 366, 938-48. P. 938.
      
      
      “Our understanding of the cumulative cultural achievements of the Stone 
      Age has been transformed over the last dozen years or so by the integrated 
      exploitation of a diverse range of evidential sources, often depending on 
      extremely careful, painstaking and effortful work. These sources include (i) 
      the primary one of archaeology, which in this period has established much 
      earlier dates than known before, both for the emergence of lithic 
      tool-making and for skilled knapping; (ii) inferences drawn by highly 
      skilled re-creation by scientists of knapping techniques that produce the 
      kinds of artefacts recovered; (iii) linked observations of knapping and 
      other techniques used by peoples such as the Irian Jaya, who preserved a 
      complex lithic tool culture; and (iv) the careful refitting of recovered 
      sets of flakes to their cores, allowing the retro-construction of the 
      knapping sequences used by their makers. Here Stout builds on these 
      combined sources to generate a systematic analysis of the complexity of 
      manufacturing techniques, tentatively concluding from this that through 
      the whole Stone Age (extending beyond the Acheulian to later, more 
      sophisticated achievements such as the Levallois), there has been an 
      approximately exponential increase in quantifiable complexity of 
      techniques.
      
      “Intriguingly, such progress appears remarkably lacking in the Oldowan. 
      The above-listed sources of evidence applied to the oldest known Oldowan 
      artefacts show their manufacture to have relied on a good appreciation of 
      fracture processes in stone-working, which exceeded that apparent in the 
      efforts of great apes who have knapped sharp flakes in recent experimental 
      contexts. Over the next approximately 1 Myr, Oldowan artefacts showed 
      little if any progress beyond this–indeed, later ones often appear less 
      sophisticated.
      
      “However, Oldowan knapping itself may plausibly have represented a 
      cumulative step built on the prior use of stone tools for butchery, which 
      recent evidence dates back to about 3.4 Ma.” Whiten, A., R. Hinde, K. 
      Laland C. Stringer. 2011. “Introduction: Culture evolves.” Philosophical 
      Transactions of the Royal Society: B. 366, 938-48. Pp. 942-3. Reference is 
      to Stout, D. 2011. “Stone toolmaking and the evolution of human culture 
      and cognition.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: B. 366, 
      1050-1059.
      
      
      “Each of the last four phases, from around 120 Ka on, is marked by 
      accelerating cultural achievements (echoing the analysis of Stout 
      referring to even earlier times) and greater diversity.” Whiten, A., R. 
      Hinde, K. Laland C. Stringer. 2011. “Introduction: Culture evolves.” 
      Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: B. 366, 938-48. P. 944. 
      References are from Foley, R. & M. Mirazon Lahr. 2011. “The evolution of 
      the diversity of cultures.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
      Society: B. 366, 1080-89 and from Stout, D. 2011. “Stone toolmaking and 
      the evolution of human culture and cognition.” Philosophical Transactions 
      of the Royal Society: B. 366, 1050-1059.
      
      
      “... cultural change can occur through ‘cultural selection’ (for example, 
      people select the most efficient axes) and/or ‘natural selection’ in the 
      conventional sense (the reproductive success of the best axe makers 
      promotes the evolution of those axes).” Whiten, A., R. Hinde, K. Laland C. 
      Stringer. 2011. “Introduction: Culture evolves.” Philosophical 
      Transactions of the Royal Society: B. 366, 938-48. P. 944.
      
      
      “The critic wishes a word, ‘Are you trying to say that nothing exists 
      until there is some kind of relationship? There is no physical world, no 
      mountains, trees, a sun, and so on? This just seems absurd.’ In reply, 
      this is not precisely what is being proposed here. We should not conclude 
      that ‘nothing exists’ before the moment of co-action. Whatever exists 
      simply exists. However, in the process of co-action whatever there is 
      takes shape as something for us. It comes to be ‘mountains,’ trees,’ and 
      ‘sun’ in terms of the way we live.” Gergen, Kenneth. Relational Being: 
      Beyond Self and Community. 2009. Oxford University Press. P. 37.
      
      
      “As I converse with you, my utterances are candidates for meaning. 
      However, these candidates are not my possession, but the byproducts of a 
      relational history. Without this history of constraint, I would have 
      nothing to say. At the same time, provided we share in a tradition of 
      conversation, my utterances and actions carry a pre-figuring potential. 
      That is, they indicate a domain of what is possible for you to say and 
      do.” Gergen, Kenneth. Relational Being: Beyond Self and Community. 2009. 
      Oxford University Press. P. 40.
      
      
      “Why are deontic powers so important? They are the glue that holds human 
      society together. What is the power of the glue? The answer is that to the 
      extent that people recognize the validity of Status Functions, they 
      recognize them as having a deontic status, and for that reason, they 
      recognize them as giving reasons for action which are independent of their 
      immediate inclinations. I will abbreviate this idea by saying that Status 
      Functions provide desire independent reasons for action.” Searle, John. 
      “The Basic Reality and the Human Reality.” Pp. 19-44. Franken, Dirk, A. 
      Karakus & J. Michel, Eds. John R. Searle: Thinking about the Real World. 
      2010. Ontos Verlaag. P. 36.
      
      
      “Institutional facts = Status Functions –> deontic powers –> 
      desire-independent reasons for action –> possible motivations for action.
      
      “In plain English, all and only institutional facts are Status Functions, 
      Status Functions contain deontic powers, and deontic powers, where their 
      validity is recognized, provide desire-independent reasons for action, and 
      these in turn provide possible motivations for actions.” Searle, John. 
      “The Basic Reality and the Human Reality.” Pp. 19-44. Franken, Dirk, A. 
      Karakus & J. Michel, Eds. John R. Searle: Thinking about the Real World. 
      2010. Ontos Verlaag. P. 37.
      
      
      “Ethics is essentially concerned with desire-independent reasons for 
      action.” Searle, John. “The Basic Reality and the Human Reality.” Pp. 
      19-44. Franken, Dirk, A. Karakus & J. Michel, Eds. John R. Searle: 
      Thinking about the Real World. 2010. Ontos Verlaag. P. 39.
      
      
      “What we want to deny, however, is that what happens can be called a 
      speech act. A speech act or, to be more precise, an illocutionary act is 
      something that can be performed by a single speaker or a group of 
      speakers, simply by uttering linguistic expressions with the appropriate 
      meaning-intentions. To perform Searle’s ‘maneuver’, on the other hand, 
      speakers have to get all the others to accept their speech acts as well. 
      So, what speakers have to do goes far beyond performing an illocutionary 
      act.
      
      “Searle says that he wants ‘to introduce a very strong theoretical claim’ 
      in his new book: ‘All institutional facts [...] are created by speech acts 
      of a type that 1975 I baptized as ‘Declaration.’‘ But if we are right and 
      the ‘maneuver’ Searle describes cannot be understood as a speech act at 
      all, there is no strong theoretical claim any more, at least none that 
      goes beyond what is said in The Construction of Social Reality. If we are 
      right, Searle is entitled only to the claim: ‘All institutional facts 
      [...] are created by [a maneuver with certain analogies to] speech acts of 
      a type that 1975 I baptized as “Declaration.’‘
      
      “Moreover, the analogy to declarations suffers from the fact that one of 
      the relata of the two directions of fit is not the same in both cases. On 
      the one hand individual people represent an institutional fact with the 
      word-to-world direction of fit. On the other hand, it is the collective of 
      all people in the community representing the institutional fact that 
      creates it. In this case, the direction of fit is not between the 
      institutional fact and an intention of an individual, but between the 
      institutional fact and a collection of intentions.” Prien, Bernd, J. 
      Skudlarek & S. Stolte. “The Role of Declarations in the Construction of 
      Social Reality.” Pp. 163-171. Franken, Dirk, A. Karakus & J. Michel, Eds. 
      John R. Searle: Thinking about the Real World. 2010. Ontos Verlaag. P. 
      169.
      
      
      “Multicellularity has evolved many times along the history of eukaryotes 
      and, apparently, even in geologically recent times. For example, starting 
      from unicellular ancestors the green algae have recently given rise to the 
      multicellular Volvox lineage within the last 75 million years.
      
      “Arguably, multicellularity evolves easily, provided that cell-adhesion 
      molecules are available, but the eventual long-term stability of a 
      multicellular organism depends on the balance between the benefits 
      eventually obtained by the individual cells being part of a multicellular 
      assemblage and the decrease in individual fitness associated with the same 
      condition. In fact, cooperation among cells will easily benefit the group, 
      but can be costly to the individual cooperating cells....”
      
      “... the persistence of cell-to-cell competition helps to explain several 
      key features of metazoan organization, including the origin of tissues, 
      sexuality, cuticles, and others. Common to all these evolutionary events 
      is cell-cell signalling, which can be regarded as a mechanism that allows 
      one cell to gain control of the intracellular signalling of another cell. 
      Terminal differentiation of cells can thus be interpreted as a result of 
      metabolic control under the influence of successful neighbouring cells.” 
      Minelli, Alessandro. 2009. Perspectives in Animal Phylogeny & Evolution. 
      Oxford University Press. P. 19.
      
      
      “Selection will easily favour cells or cell lineages producing mutants 
      able to manipulate environmental conditions, for example by opening within 
      a multicellular assemblage new channels through which materials can 
      circulate (a kind of primitive angiogenesis). In this model, developmental 
      mechanisms evolve because of the immediate metabolic advantage they may 
      produce, not because of any morphogenetic effect eventually deriving by 
      the operation of the same mechanisms in future generations, something we 
      all too often assume when reconstructing the ‘origins’ of some feature in 
      modern animals.” Minelli, Alessandro. 2009. Perspectives in Animal 
      Phylogeny & Evolution. Oxford University Press. P. 20.
      
      
      “The evolutionary step from the unicellular condition of the 
      flagellate-grade ancestors of metazoans to the multicellular condition of 
      the latter involved extensive loss of genes.” Minelli, Alessandro. 2009. 
      Perspectives in Animal Phylogeny & Evolution. Oxford University Press. P. 
      23.
      
      
      “... fossil evidence, and molecular evidence all largely concur to confirm 
      metazoan monophyly.” Minelli, Alessandro. 2009. Perspectives in Animal 
      Phylogeny & Evolution. Oxford University Press. P. 30.
      
      
      “The issue of individuality–that is, of what actually defines the 
      spatiotemporal boundaries and the historical continuity of an 
      individual–emerges time and again in the analysis of living beings, at 
      different structural levels. In zoology, the most obvious grey area is 
      multinucleate units without cytoplasmic boundaries, whereas morphological 
      (junctions) and functional (electrical coupling, exchange of molecules) 
      ties between neighbouring epithelial cells are less permissive than the 
      links provided by the plasmodesmata in plant cells, to the extent that in 
      plants the very notion of cells is sometimes disputed.” Minelli, 
      Alessandro. 2009. Perspectives in Animal Phylogeny & Evolution. Oxford 
      University Press. P. 113.
      
      
      “Thus, rather than taking the cell, typologically, as a standard unit of 
      morphological organization, it seems advisable to regard it as a unit of 
      function, integrating a complex network of local dynamics, whose 
      independence as a distinct module of form, is not always granted, as the 
      widespread occurrence of syncytia amply demonstrates.” Minelli, 
      Alessandro. 2009. Perspectives in Animal Phylogeny & Evolution. Oxford 
      University Press. P. 113.
      
      
      “In 1934, Studnicka proposed a terminology that attempted to combine 
      origin and organization of these multinucleate structures, using 
      ‘symplasma’ for multinucleate systems whose cytoplasmic continuity results 
      from incomplete cytokinesis but which otherwise remain independent, 
      ‘syncytia’ for multinucleated structures whose cytoplasm is not organized 
      around centrioles, and ‘plasmodia’ for multinucleated tissues formed by 
      fusion of separate cells or by division of nuclei in a growing cell. 
      Irrespective of the merits of those distinctions, current literature has 
      increasingly adopted the term ‘syncytium’ for all these structures.” 
      Minelli, Alessandro. 2009. Perspectives in Animal Phylogeny & Evolution. 
      Oxford University Press. P. 113. 
      
      
      “Syncytial structures are present virtually everywhere that is, in the 
      most diverse body parts of the most different animal groups. Syncytia are 
      known, in fact, from groups as diverse as Silicea, Placozoa, Cnidaria, 
      Acoela, Gastrotricha, Syndermata, Gnathostomulida, Rhabditophora, Nematoda, 
      Arthropoda, Echinodermata, and Chordata. Clearly, this condition has been 
      obtained independently a great many times.” Minelli, Alessandro. 2009. 
      Perspectives in Animal Phylogeny & Evolution. Oxford University Press. P. 
      114.
      
      
      “A lot of effort was devoted for a while in the search for what (say, the 
      expression of a particular gene, or a particular metabolic condition) 
      might turn a ‘normal’ Dictyostelium amoeba into the founder of a 
      multicellular group. But it was eventually realized that no founder cell 
      may actual exist. Rather, aggregation starts wherever two amoebae touch, 
      and this happens simply because they were close enough to have a better 
      chance of one to be hit by the chemical signal produced by the other. That 
      is, no founder, no project.” Minelli, Alessandro. 2009. Perspectives in 
      Animal Phylogeny & Evolution. Oxford University Press. P. 138.
      
      
      “It has been suggested that multicellular organisms passed through a pre-Mendelian 
      phase where context-dependent properties of self-organization were much 
      more important than the canalization or determination of processes derived 
      from gene expression, as generally happens in today’s multicellular 
      organisms. According to this hypothesis, the morphological features of the 
      earliest multicellulars were mainly the outcome of epigenetic processes.” 
      Minelli, Alessandro. 2009. Perspectives in Animal Phylogeny & Evolution. 
      Oxford University Press. Pp. 138-9. Reference is to Newman, S. “The pre-Mendelian, 
      pre-Darwinian world: shifting relations between genetic and epigenetic 
      mechanisms in early multicellular evolution.” 2005. Journal of 
      Biosciences. 30: 75-85.
      
      
      “It has been poignantly remarked that even cells devoid of a nucleus, as 
      are mammalian red blood cells, can still regulate their behaviour as a 
      function of their environmental context.” Minelli, Alessandro. 2009. 
      Perspectives in Animal Phylogeny & Evolution. Oxford University Press. P. 
      139.
      
      
      “... the progression of a given developmental stage to one with very 
      different organization is likely to be accompanied by a dramatic shift in 
      the profile of the genes that are expressed. This has been shown by 
      Arbeitman et al in their longitudinal analysis of the expression of 4028 
      genes during the embryonic and post-embryonic development of Drosophila. 
      For some 80% of these genes, the lowest level of expression during the 
      whole span of the fly’s development is at least four times lower than the 
      highest level of expression of the same gene. The embryonic segment of the 
      life cycle was the most eventful, in terms of transcription, as 
      three-quarters of the studied genes were expressed then, and for 
      two-thirds of these the level of expression changed significantly during 
      embryonic life. But the beginning of post-embryonic life did not 
      correspond to the beginning of a transcriptionally stable period, as the 
      level of expression of a total of 445 genes changed during larval life, 
      646 during the pupal stage, and more than 100 during the first 5 days of 
      adult life. Thus, a complex life cycle is based on a subtly orchestrated 
      pattern of gene expression, in which dramatic switches occur.” Minelli, 
      Alessandro. 2009. Perspectives in Animal Phylogeny & Evolution. Oxford 
      University Press. P. 154. Reference is to Arbeitman, M., E. Furlong, & F, 
      Imam. 2002. “Gene expression during the life cycle of Drosophila 
      melanogaster.” Science. 297: 2270-2275.
      
      
      “It may thus be useful to revisit Anderson’s concept of ‘hybrid habitat’, 
      introduced (in botany) to describe the environmental conditions where a 
      population is likely to maintain an unusually elevated variation such as 
      deriving from recent hybridization. Similarly, I think that of the 
      environmental scenarios proposed as the theatre of singularly active 
      evolutionary change, those pointing to the ‘creative’ nature of 
      transitional or ecotonal environments are the most plausible, in principle 
      at least. Those environments are more likely to support the existence of 
      organisms that simultaneously present alternative ways to survive, such as 
      terrestrial as well as aquatic respiration, a peculiarity which can be 
      exploited sequentially during an animal’s life, as in dragonflies and 
      frogs, as long as these animals remain in the transitional environments, 
      but can also eventually be fixed in the condition opposite to the original 
      one.” Minelli, Alessandro. 2009. Perspectives in Animal Phylogeny & 
      Evolution. Oxford University Press. P. 232. Reference is to Anderson, E. 
      1948. “Hybridization of the habitat.” Evolution 2: 1-9.
      
      
      “Nowadays, cell differentiation is a typical example of a biological 
      process dependent on strictly controlled and spatiotemporally restricted 
      gene expression, but this is arguably an acquired condition, probably 
      preceded by a stage when alternative phenotypes within a multicellular 
      organism were just variants within an environmentally inducible 
      polyphenism.... In this scenario, what is new in the multicellular 
      organisms is the evolution of cell-cell interactions that allow the 
      coexistence of alternative phenotypes, while the production of the latter, 
      as such, was already manifested by their unicellular precursors.” Minelli, 
      Alessandro. 2009. Perspectives in Animal Phylogeny & Evolution. Oxford 
      University Press. P. 238.
      
      
      “In short for Darwin and his many followers, the evolution of species in 
      nature was also an evolution out of it, in so far as it progressively 
      liberated the mind from the promptings of innate disposition. Ever since, 
      Western science has cleaved strongly to the view that humans differ from 
      other animals in degree rather than kind. Darwin, it is said, finally 
      showed us that the idea of an absolute Rubicon separating the human 
      species from the rest of the animal kingdom is a myth. He did not, 
      however, dispense with the dichotomy between reason and nature, or between 
      intelligence and instinct; rather his whole argument was couched in terms 
      of it.” Ingold, Tim. 2006. “Against Human Nature.” Pp. 259-281. From Gontier, 
      Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary 
      Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, Systems 
      Theoretical Approach.  Springer. Pp. 264-5.
      
      
      “Darwin’s commitment, in The Descent of Man, to an imperialist doctrine of 
      progress according to which the morally and intellectually well-endowed 
      are bound to supplant their inferiors, not only ran counter to the whole 
      argument of The Origin of Species, but was also deeply racist. Whereas in 
      the Origin Darwin had shown that the mechanism of natural selection always 
      operates in such a way as to make species better adapted to their 
      particular environmental conditions of life, in the Descent he argued that 
      it would inevitably bring about absolute advance along a single, universal 
      scale–from the lowest of animals to the highest of men–regardless of 
      environmental conditions, leading from instinct to intelligence, and 
      reaching its ultimate conclusion in modern European civilisation. And in 
      bringing the rise of science and civilisation within the compass of the 
      same evolutionary process that had made humans out of apes, and apes out 
      of creatures lower in the scale, Darwin was forced to attribute what he 
      saw as the ascendancy of reason to hereditary endowment. For the theory to 
      work, there had to be significant differences in such endowment between 
      ‘tribes’ or ‘nations’–or between what we might today call populations....
      
      “We now recognise that the brains of hunter-gatherers are just as good, 
      and just as capable of handling complex and sophisticated ideas, as the 
      brains of Western scientists and philosophers....
      
      “What was self-evident to Darwin and most of his contemporaries–namely 
      that human populations differed in their innate intellectual capacities on 
      a scale from the primitive to the civilised–is no longer acceptable 
      today.” Ingold, Tim. 2006. “Against Human Nature.” Pp. 259-281. From Gontier, 
      Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary 
      Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, Systems 
      Theoretical Approach.  Springer. Pp. 266-7.
      
      
      “But this [Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 1, “All human 
      beings are endowed with reason and conscience.”] left the Darwinians with 
      a problem on their hands. How was the doctrine of evolutionary continuity 
      to be reconciled with the new-found commitment to universal human rights? 
      If all humans are alike in their possession of reason and moral 
      conscience–if, in other words, all humans are the kinds of beings who, 
      according to Western juridical precepts, can exercise rights and 
      responsibilities–then they must differ in kind from all other beings which 
      cannot. And somewhere along the line, our ancestors must have made a 
      breakthrough from one condition to the other, from nature to humanity.
      
      “Faced with this problem, there was only one way for modern science to 
      go—that is, back to the 18th century. Indeed the majority of contemporary 
      commentators on human evolution appear to be vigorously, if unwittingly, 
      reproducing the 18th century paradigm in all its essentials. One process, 
      of evolution, leads from our ape-like ancestors to human beings that are 
      recognisably of the same kind as ourselves; another process, of culture or 
      history, leads from humanity’s primitive past to modern science and 
      civilisation. Taken together, these two axes of change–the one 
      evolutionary, the other historical–establish by their intersection a 
      unique point of origin, without precedent in the evolution of life, at 
      which our ancestors are deemed to have crossed the threshold of true 
      humanity and to have embarked on the course of history.” Ingold, Tim. 
      2006. “Against Human Nature.” Pp. 259-281. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van 
      Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and 
      Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, Systems Theoretical Approach.  Springer. P. 268.
      
      
      “Following this line of argument, so far as their evolved capacities are 
      concerned there should be little or nothing to distinguish today’s 
      scientists and engineers from the hunter-gatherers of 50,000 or even 
      100,000 years ago. What makes them different, apparently, is a separate 
      process of history, or what many have taken to calling cultural (as 
      opposed to biological) evolution.” Ingold, Tim. 2006. “Against Human Nature.” 
      Pp. 259-281. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, 
      Editors. Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, 
      Systems Theoretical Approach.  Springer. P. 269.
      
      
      “Short of reverting to the racially stratified scenario of Darwin, with 
      its populations of more or less well-endowed men, the only way in which 
      humans can be made to appear different in degree, not kind, from their 
      evolutionary antecedents is by attributing the movement of history to a 
      process of culture that differs in kind, not degree, from the process of 
      biological evolution!” Ingold, Tim. 2006. “Against Human Nature.” Pp. 259-281. 
      From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. 
      Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, 
      Systems Theoretical Approach.  Springer. P. 270.
      
      
      “The search for absolute, defining attributes of common humanity does 
      indeed seem a hopeless endeavour, since whatever attribute you choose, 
      there will  bound to be some creature born of man and woman in which it is 
      lacking. Remember that for modern biology, reconstructed along Darwinian 
      lines, the criterion for species membership is genealogical. Basically, 
      this means that you are a human being if your parents are. If it is human 
      nature to walk on two feet, what of the congenitally crippled? Is he not 
      human? If it is human nature to communicate by means of language, what of 
      the child who is deaf and dumb? Is she not human? If it is human nature to 
      join in forms of social life based on a mutual awareness of self and 
      other, what of those individuals who suffer from autism? Are they not 
      human?
      
      “The argument can be turned around the other way as well. Whatever 
      attribute you choose, there is a possibility that some creature of 
      non-human ancestry may turn out to possess it–if not now, then at some 
      time in the future. The way a species evolves is not predictable in 
      advance. It is perfectly possible that the descendants of chimpanzees, a 
      million years hence, will have developed a fully linguistic capability and 
      be walking on two feet. They have already been shown to be capable of such 
      things up to a point, as well as of other things once thought 
      distinctively human, like making tools. Would they then have become human? 
      In genealogical terms that is an impossibility, yet if it is human nature 
      to walk and talk, then these chimpanzees of the future would have to count 
      as human too.
      
      “I have shown that the contemporary appeal to universal human nature, in 
      the name of evolutionary biology, is a defensive reaction to the legacy of 
      racist science left by Darwin’s account of the evolution of the moral and 
      intellectual faculties in The Descent of Man. But it is an appeal fraught 
      with contradictions. While insisting on the continuity of the evolutionary 
      process, it also reinstates the twin distinctions between biology and 
      culture, and between evolution and history, setting an upper limit to the 
      world of nature that humans alone appear to have breached. More than that, 
      it asserts that human nature is fixed and universal while attributing its 
      evolution to a theory–of variation under natural selection–that only works 
      because the individuals of a species are endlessly variable. That is why 
      evolutionists find themselves in the curious position of having to admit 
      that whereas in the non-human world, biology is the source of all 
      variability and difference, in the human world it is what makes everyone 
      the same!” Ingold, Tim. 2006. “Against Human Nature.” Pp. 259-281. From Gontier, 
      Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary 
      Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, Systems 
      Theoretical Approach.  Springer. Pp. 277-8.
      
      
      “Probably the most widely applicable mechanism for generating indirect 
      fitness benefits for cooperation is population viscosity, or limited 
      dispersal, leading to genetic structuring of populations. This means that 
      even indiscriminate altruistic behavior incurring a personal cost and 
      providing a benefit to neighboring individuals could enhance the actor’s 
      inclusive fitness because those neighbors are on average closely related 
      kin.” Gardner, Andy & K. Foster. “The Evolution and Ecology of Cooperation 
      – History and Concepts.” Pp. 1-36. From Korb, Judith & J. Heinze, Editors. 
      Ecology of Social Evolution. 2008. Springer. P. 17.
      
      
      “Nevertheless, considerations of kin structure and genes alone are often 
      not sufficient to explain the social phenotype and its inter- and 
      intraspecific variation. In fact, many features of insect societies appear 
      to be remarkably robust against variation in genetic colony structure. For 
      example, whether worker reproduction occurs or not appears to be much less 
      influenced by relatedness than predicted by theory and several recent 
      studies have documented sex ratio specializations without the expected 
      underlying variability in relatedness asymmetries.
      
      “Instead, variation in environmental factors, such as climate, resource 
      availability, the occurrence of competitors, predators, or parasites, 
      etc., appears to be as influential as variation of genetic composition at 
      least for some features of the insect society. The importance of ecology 
      in social evolution is clearly emphasized by factors b and c in Hamilton’s 
      rule, i.e., the benefits and costs of helping, and numerous researchers 
      have investigated ecological influences on the social phenotype. However, 
      the magnitude of environmental constraints is often difficult to measure 
      and many hypotheses about the interrelations of the social phenotype and 
      the environment are therefore not strongly supported by empirical data.” 
      Heinze, Juergen. “Social Plasticity: Ecology, Genetics, and the Structure 
      of Ant Societies.” Pp. 129-150. From Korb, Judith & J. Heinze, Editors. 
      Ecology of Social Evolution. 2008. Springer. Pp. 130-1.
      
      
      “This increase in dispersal as sexuals makes adaptive sense for log 
      dwelling termites like C. secundus because as the log diminishes, so too 
      does the probability they will be able to reproduce in the natal colony 
      before the wood runs out. A central component of this response is the 
      termites’ impressive ability to detect changes in the size of their log 
      and so predict colony longevity. In C. secundus the loss of wood from the 
      log occurs gradually by the termites own consumption of the wood but also 
      suddenly when cyclones or heavy thunderstorms fragment their trees. 
      Correspondingly, the termites cannot rely on extended excavations to 
      measure wood availability. Instead, the termites continually sense the 
      amount of wood from the vibrations generated during wood gnawing. These 
      vibrations constitute reliable and fast cues of food availability. This 
      predictable variation in food availability/colony longevity probably 
      selects for the flexible development of workers in OP termites [One-piece 
      termites “live in their food and spend their entire colony life in a 
      single piece of wood that serves as both food source and shelter”]. This 
      situation contrasts with the MP termites [Multiple-pieces type termites 
      which “live in a well-defined nest that is more or less separated from the 
      foraging grounds”] that leave their nest to exploit resources. They reduce 
      the long-term food variability but experience short-term variation in food 
      supply that lacks predictable cues allowing a plastic developmental 
      response.” Korb, Judith. “The Ecology of Social Evolution in Termites.” 
      Pp. 151-174. From Korb, Judith & J. Heinze, Editors. Ecology of Social 
      Evolution. 2008. Springer. Pp. 157-8, 152.
      
      
      “Accordingly, two prerequisites, which birds and mammals usually lack, are 
      necessary for the transition to eusocialiity: (a) a high fecundity and (b) 
      large numbers of offspring that can stay at the nest and are not ‘forced’ 
      to leave because there is no competition at the nest for food. Under most 
      conditions, offspring are selected to disperse from the nest to avoid 
      competition among siblings. Two mechanisms can overrule this: a high 
      abundance of food at the nest that lasts reasonably long (i.e., for at 
      least two generations that can co-exist) and/or high ecological 
      constraints which make dispersal difficult. The latter is commonly 
      included in many models on the evolution of sociality, while the former is 
      often only implicitly assumed. The comparison with termites, therefore, 
      suggests that the general lack of eusociality in vertebrates might be 
      because they can only achieve small families due to their low fecundity 
      and the difficulty to have enough food to overcome local resource 
      competition for more than two generations to coexist as individuals are 
      large and rather long-lived compared to their food source. Thus, the 
      finally limiting trait accounting for the rarity of eusociality in birds 
      and mammals would be their body size. Correspondingly, the only groups in 
      which eusociality occurs are rodents, which are comparatively small 
      mammals with a short generation time, high fecundity and long-lasting food 
      sources.” Korb, Judith. “The Ecology of Social Evolution in Termites.” Pp. 
      151-174. From Korb, Judith & J. Heinze, Editors. Ecology of Social 
      Evolution. 2008. Springer. P. 167.
      
      
      “In a curious sense the study of the organisms is really a study of the 
      shape of the environmental space, the organisms themselves being nothing 
      but the passive medium through which we see the shape of the external 
      world. They are the iron filings of the environmental field. Most 
      evolutionary biologists would reject such a description of their science 
      and would insist that it is the organisms themselves that are the primary 
      objects of interest–yet the structure of adaptive explanation of traits 
      points in the opposite direction.”
      
      “Adaptive explanations have both a forward and a backward form. In the 
      forward form, usually invoked for extant species, a problem for the 
      organism is described on the basis of knowledge of or supposition about 
      what is important to the organism. Then some anatomical, physiological, or 
      behavioral feature of the species is proposed as the organism’s solution 
      to the problem. The backward form, usually used for extinct species known 
      from fossil material, starts with a trait as a solution and searches for 
      the problem that it has solved.” Lewontin, Richard. The Triple Helix: 
      Gene, Organism, and Environment. 2000. Harvard University Press. Pp. 44-5.
      
      
      “But the claim that the environment of an organism is causally independent 
      of the organism, and that changes in the environment are autonomous and 
      independent of changes in the species itself, is clearly wrong. It is bad 
      biology, and every ecologist and evolutionary biologist knows that it is 
      bad biology. The metaphor of adaptation, while once an important heuristic 
      for building evolutionary theory, is now an impediment to a real 
      understanding of the evolutionary process and needs to be replaced by 
      another. Although all metaphors are dangerous, the actual process of 
      evolution seems best captured by the process of construction.
      
      “Just as there can be no organism without an environment, so there can be 
      no environment without an organism.” Lewontin, Richard. The Triple Helix: 
      Gene, Organism, and Environment. 2000. Harvard University Press. P. 48.
      
      
      “An environment is something that surrounds or encircles, but for there to 
      be a surrounding there must be something at the center to be surrounded. 
      The environment of an organism is the penumbra of external conditions that 
      are relevant to it because it has effective interactions with those 
      aspects of the outer world.” Lewontin, Richard. The Triple Helix: Gene, 
      Organism, and Environment. 2000. Harvard University Press. Pp. 48-9.
      
      
      “The concept of an empty ecological niche cannot be made concrete. There 
      is a non-countable infinity of ways in which the physical world can be put 
      together to describe an ecological niche, nearly all of which would seem 
      absurd or arbitrary because we have never seen an organism occupying such 
      a niche.” Lewontin, Richard. The Triple Helix: Gene, Organism, and 
      Environment. 2000. Harvard University Press. P. 49.
      
      
      “It is, in general, not possible to understand the geographical and 
      temporal distribution of species if the environment is characterized as a 
      property of the physical region, rather than of the space defined by the 
      activities of the organism itself.” Lewontin, Richard. The Triple Helix: 
      Gene, Organism, and Environment. 2000. Harvard University Press. P. 53.
      
      
      “The microclimate near the soil surface is quite different from that 
      between two lower leaves of a maize plant, which is again quite different 
      from the microclimate for leaves near the growing top of the plants. The 
      zones change as the plant grows taller and as the leaves grow longer and 
      touch the leaves of neighboring plants. These microclimatic variations 
      play an extremely important role in growth and production because it is 
      the intensity of solar radiation and the carbon dioxide concentration at 
      the surface of the leaves that determine the rate of photosynthesis and 
      thus the growth rate and productivity of the maize plant. So the rate of 
      growth determines the microenvironment, which determines the rate of 
      growth.
      
      “Not only the rate of growth but the exact morphological pattern of leaves 
      is an important variable. The spacing of leaves along the stem and their 
      position around the stem, the shape of each leaf, its angle of repose 
      against the stem, the hairiness of its surface determine how much light, 
      moisture, and carbon dioxide reach the leaves and how rapidly oxygen 
      produced by photosynthesis is carried away. And all of these affect the 
      plant in a way that is characteristic of the pattern of development.
      
      “The practical consequence of all this complexity is seen in the science 
      of plant engineering. In an attempt to increase the productivity of crops, 
      plant engineers make detailed measurements of microclimate around the 
      plant and then redesign the pattern of leaves to increase the light 
      falling on the photosynthetic surfaces and the available carbon dioxide. 
      But when these redesigned plants, produced by selective breeding, are 
      tested it turns out that the microclimatic conditions for which they were 
      designed have now changed as a consequence of the new design. So the 
      process must be carried out again, and again the redesign changes the 
      conditions. The plant engineers are chasing not only a moving target but a 
      target whose motion is impelled by their own activities. As we will see, 
      this process is a model for a more realistic understanding of evolution by 
      natural selection.” Lewontin, Richard. The Triple Helix: Gene, Organism, 
      and Environment. 2000. Harvard University Press. Pp. 56-7.
      
      
      “The notion that organisms are chasing a moving target during their 
      evolution has a wide currency. In 1973, Leigh Van Valen pointed out a 
      seeming paradox in evolutionary theory. If organisms are constantly 
      adapting to the outer world, then as evolution goes on species should be 
      better and better able to survive the rigors of the environment and so 
      they should endure for longer and longer periods. But when Van Valen 
      examined the fossil record he found that the time between first appearance 
      and disappearance of forms has not grown longer over evolutionary time. 
      His conclusion was that the environment is constantly changing so that 
      adaptation to yesterday’s environment does not improve the chance of 
      survival tomorrow. He called this the ‘Red Queen Hypothesis’ after the 
      chess queen in Through the Looking Glass who found that she had to keep 
      running just to stay in the same place because the ground was moving under 
      her feet. The Red Queen, however, is not the same as a constructionist 
      view of the organism and its environment. Even if the external world is 
      changing in ways that are completely independent of the organisms, 
      organisms will still have to run to keep up. The constructionist view is 
      that the world is changing because the organisms are changing. The Red 
      Queen’s running only makes the problem worse.” Lewontin, Richard. The 
      Triple Helix: Gene, Organism, and Environment. 2000. Harvard University 
      Press. Pp. 57-8. Reference is to Van Valen, L. “A new evolutionary law.” 
      1973. Evolutionary Theory 1: 1-30.
      
      
      “The common external phenomena of the physical and biotic world pass 
      through a transforming filter created by the peculiar biology of each 
      species, and it is the output of this transformation that reaches the 
      organism and is relevant to it. Plato’s metaphor of the cave is 
      appropriate here. Whatever the autonomous processes of the outer world may 
      be, they cannot be perceived by the organism. Its life is determined by 
      the shadows on the wall, passed through a transforming medium of its own 
      creation.” Lewontin, Richard. The Triple Helix: Gene, Organism, and 
      Environment. 2000. Harvard University Press. P. 64.
      
      
      “The growing environmentalist movement to prevent alterations in the 
      natural world that will be, at best, unpleasant and, at worst, 
      catastrophic for human existence cannot proceed rationally under the false 
      slogan ‘Save the Environment.’ ‘The environment’ does not exist to be 
      saved. The world inhabited by living organisms is constantly being changed 
      and reconstructed by the activities of all of those organisms, not just by 
      human activity.” Lewontin, Richard. The Triple Helix: Gene, Organism, and 
      Environment. 2000. Harvard University Press. Pp. 67-8.
      
      
      “Part of the success of naive reductionism and simplistic analysis comes 
      from the opportunistic nature of scientific work. Scientists pursue 
      precisely those problems that yield to their methods, like a medieval army 
      that besieges cities for a period, subduing those whose defenses are weak, 
      but leaving behind, still unconquered, islands of resistance.” Lewontin, 
      Richard. The Triple Helix: Gene, Organism, and Environment. 2000. Harvard 
      University Press. Pp. 72-3.
      
      
      “What developmental genetics has done is to substitute a question that it 
      can answer for one that it cannot, but without an explicit acknowledgment 
      of the switch.” Lewontin, Richard. The Triple Helix: Gene, Organism, and 
      Environment. 2000. Harvard University Press. P. 75.
      
      
      “A consequence of the intermediate size and internal heterogeneity of 
      living organisms is that they are the nexus of a very large number of 
      weakly determining forces.” Lewontin, Richard. The Triple Helix: Gene, 
      Organism, and Environment. 2000. Harvard University Press. P. 92.
      
      
      “An organism’s life consists of constant mid-course corrections.” Lewontin, 
      Richard. The Triple Helix: Gene, Organism, and Environment. 2000. Harvard 
      University Press. P. 93.
      
      
      “The meaning of words does not lie in their possible referential relation 
      to the world, but in their use [referring to (the later) Wittgenstein’s 
      understanding of language]. What matters is, how these words are being put 
      to use, by members of the same community that partake in different 
      language games. Therefore, language has a social function; it enables 
      social relations between members of the same community that make use of 
      the same language. Meaning, therefore, also is explained as being 
      intersubjective, excluding all possible forms of a private (inner, non- 
      or, pre-linguistic)-language: meaning and language hence are externalized 
      and are supposed to be part of a community.”
      
      “The concept meaning is, therefore, introduced for the first time, and 
      this notion is distinguished from truth.” Gontier, Nathalie. “Introduction 
      to evolutionary epistemology, language and culture.” Pp. 1-29. From 
      Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary 
      Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, Systems 
      Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. P. 5.
      
      
      “In short, evolutionary epistemology is an epistemological system which is 
      based upon the conjecture that cognitive activities are a product of 
      evolution and selection and that, vice versa, evolution itself is a 
      cognition and knowledge process.” Wuketits, F.M. “Evolutionary 
      epistemology: A challenge to science and philosophy.” Pp. 1-33. From 
      Wuketits, F (ed.). Concepts and approaches in evolutionary epistemology. 
      1984. D. Reidel Publishing. P. 2. Quoted in Gontier, Nathalie. 
      “Introduction to evolutionary epistemology, language and culture.” Pp. 
      1-29. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. 
      Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, 
      Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. P. 9.
      
      
      “Organisms (a) select their environment, (b) actively modify their 
      environment by their own activity, (c) define their environment in terms 
      of relevant variables, (d) create new environments for other organisms, 
      (e) transform the physical nature of an environment input as their effects 
      percolate through the developmental network, (f) determine by their 
      movements and physiological activity the effective statistical pattern of 
      environment, and (g) adapt to the environmental pattern that is partly of 
      their own creation. Further, each part of the organism is ‘environment’ to 
      the other parts. The conclusion of (d), (f) and (g) that organisms adapt 
      to and create statistical patterns of environment finally suggests that 
      the utilization of resources by populations not only uses up ecological 
      opportunities but also create new ones: The variability in resource level 
      may itself behave as a resource .... The traditional separation of the 
      world into organism and environment as mutually exclusive classes ... 
      leaves us with the task of then connecting them. A more dialectical 
      approach emphasizes the mutual interpenetration of organism and 
      environment.” Levins, Richard. Quoted in Hahlweg, K. 1989. “A systems view 
      of evolution and evolutionary epistemology.” From Hahlweg, K. & C. Hooker, 
      (eds). Issues in evolutionary epistemology. Pp. 45-78. SUNY Press. Then 
      quoted in Gontier, Nathalie. “Introduction to evolutionary epistemology, 
      language and culture.” Pp. 1-29. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem 
      & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture: A 
      Non-Adaptationist, Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. P. 15.
      
      
      “So, basically, until recently only two positions could be taken up by an 
      anthropologist, interested in culture: an emic position or an etic 
      position which correlate, respectively, with an insider and outsider 
      position....”
      
      “A third position to take has been developed recently, by Bourdieu and 
      Pinxten, called the praxiological position.”
      
      “It aims at combining the objectivist and the subjectivist approach: the 
      external knowledge of ‘the other’ is internalized by the researcher and 
      the introspective knowledge of the researcher is externalized into the 
      subject of research at the same time. The dialectic between both movements 
      allows for a full understanding of cultural phenomena.”
      
      “Now here is where evolutionary epistemology fits in. This is because of 
      the fact that we need to look at biological, neurological and cognitive 
      learning theories in order to understand how external knowledge is 
      internalized and how introspective knowledge is externalized.” Gontier, 
      Nathalie. “Introduction to evolutionary epistemology, language and 
      culture.” Pp. 1-29. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, 
      Editors. Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, 
      Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. Pp. 18-9. Subquote is from 
      Pinxten, R. When the day breaks: Essays in anthropology and philosophy. 
      1997. Peter Lang, Europaeischer Verlag der Wissenschaften. P. 68.
      
      
      “As mentioned above, the Modern Synthesis focuses on two steps: the sex 
      cells, where genes possibly are passed on from one generation to the next, 
      and possible random mutations that occur within these genes. Hence the 
      popular idea put forward by Neo-Darwinians that animals pass on their 
      genes from one generation to the next.”
      
      “This is not true: animals do not pass on their genes from one generation 
      to the next, they pass on their sex cells (that contain genes) from one 
      generation to the next, and here a horizontal element is involved: namely, 
      two members of the same species, of the opposite sexes, mate and if all 
      goes well a sperm cell penetrates an egg cell, resulting in the formation 
      of a cell with diploid chromosomes.” Gontier, Nathalie. “Evolutionary 
      epistemology and the origin and evolution of language: Taking 
      symbiogenesis seriously.” Pp. 195-226. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van 
      Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and 
      Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006. 
      Springer. P. 200.
      
      
      “This crucial horizontal step is taken for granted and even ignored by 
      Neo-Darwinian theory, because of their focus on genes. Every mating 
      process, however, is a crucial horizontal (temporary merging) process of 
      the parents, and every fertilization is a permanent merging and 
      recombining of different cells that contain (mostly already existing) 
      genes.” Gontier, Nathalie. “Evolutionary epistemology and the origin and 
      evolution of language: Taking symbiogenesis seriously.” Pp. 195-226. From 
      Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary 
      Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, Systems 
      Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. P. 201.
      
      
      “Essentialist thinking is always about distinguishing the accidental from 
      the essential. De Saussure for example developed his three laws. These 
      state that the primary concern of linguistics is about coming to terms 
      with the following three dichotomous relations within language: (a) the 
      relation between lexicon and grammar; (b) the relation between form and 
      meaning and (c) the relation between langue and parole. These dichotomous 
      relations indeed are instruments to distinguish the accidental from the 
      essential and hence are used to discover the core of ‘the’ language.” 
      Gontier, Nathalie. “Evolutionary epistemology and the origin and evolution 
      of language: Taking symbiogenesis seriously.” Pp. 195-226. From Gontier, 
      Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary 
      Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, Systems 
      Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. Pp. 206-7.
      
      
      “Since all languages are different manifestations of one language, all 
      languages are uniform, meaning that there is no directionality to language 
      change. If there were directionality, language(s) would evolve and there 
      would be ‘lesser’ and ‘more’ languages, but the essential, reified, ideal, 
      universal language is, once evolved, evolutionless.” Gontier, Nathalie. 
      “Evolutionary epistemology and the origin and evolution of language: 
      Taking symbiogenesis seriously.” Pp. 195-226. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. 
      Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and 
      Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006. 
      Springer. P. 207.
      
      
      “The universal symbiogenetic process can be implemented in the study of 
      language evolution in at least three ways: in the study of language 
      variation; language genes and within the study of conceptual blending.” 
      Gontier, Nathalie. “Evolutionary epistemology and the origin and evolution 
      of language: Taking symbiogenesis seriously.” Pp. 195-226. From Gontier, 
      Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary 
      Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, Systems 
      Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. Pp. 216-7.
      
      
      “The mechanisms at the base of language variation, however, can get 
      comprehended as a form of horizontal evolution; just as bacteria can 
      exchange genetic material freely within one generation, so languages can 
      exchange grammatical structures, vowels, phonological elements freely. 
      Languages, therefore, show more resemblance to bacterial types than to 
      rigid species.” Gontier, Nathalie. “Evolutionary epistemology and the 
      origin and evolution of language: Taking symbiogenesis seriously.” Pp. 
      195-226. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. 
      Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, 
      Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. P. 218.
      
      
      “However, conceptual blending can also be understood as a form of 
      symbiogenesis, so therefore, I have redefined conceptual blending just to 
      show how symbiotic this view really is: Conceptual blending is the 
      combining of two or more conceptual frames that results in a new 
      conceptual frame with meaning not seen in the different components.”
      
      “It is important to note that in this definition, the components 
      themselves are not static, unchangeable entities.” Gontier, Nathalie. 
      “Evolutionary epistemology and the origin and evolution of language: 
      Taking symbiogenesis seriously.” Pp. 195-226. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. 
      Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and 
      Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006. 
      Springer. P. 222. Reference is to conceptual blending per Fauconnier, G. & 
      M. Turner. The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind’s Hidden 
      Complexities. 2002. Basic Books.
      
      
      “It is an old understanding in evolutionary sciences that our cognitive 
      phenotype evolves in similar ways as the organic phenotype does.” 
      Diettrich, Olaf. “The biological boundary conditions for our classical 
      physical world view.” Pp. 67-93. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem 
      & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture: A 
      Non-Adaptationist, Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. P. 67.
      
      
      “But trial and error is a little bit too simple an explanation for complex 
      matters such as the organic or the cognitive phenotype. First of all, the 
      environment is not that dominant as people usually think. The selection 
      pressure which a certain habitat will exert on an organism living there 
      does not only depend on the structure of the habitat. It depends on the 
      structure of the organism itself as well. Horses and snakes, for example, 
      though they may have developed in exactly the same physical environment, 
      have entirely different organs of locomotion which have no structural 
      element in common. And, accordingly, entirely different will be the 
      selective pressure they have to meet. Horses have to improve the 
      elasticity of their limbs and the strength of their muscles. Snakes have 
      to improve the surface friction of their skin.” Diettrich, Olaf. “The 
      biological boundary conditions for our classical physical world view.” Pp. 
      67-93. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. 
      Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, 
      Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. P. 68.
      
      
      “Objects are defined by their properties and properties are defined as 
      invariants of measuring operators. So, objects too are defined by means of 
      operators. As we can neither measure a property nor act upon the object in 
      question without the preceding application of defining operations (i.e. 
      defining the properties which characterise the object in question), we can 
      conclude that all we see and do is a matter of interaction between three 
      different kinds of operators: defining, measuring and acting operators. In 
      other words, what a perception is going to tell us, or what an acting will 
      bring about depends on how the object perceived is defined.” Diettrich, 
      Olaf. “The biological boundary conditions for our classical physical world 
      view.” Pp. 67-93. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, 
      Editors. Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, 
      Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. Pp. 69-70.
      
      
      “The evolution of notated language has lessons that can help us understand 
      the origin and emergence of speech. In a study of notated language the 
      effects of the phonetic alphabet and literacy on the development of 
      deductive logic, abstract science, codified law, and monotheism were 
      revealed. We showed that these five developments, which emerged between 
      the Tigris-Euphrates Rivers and the Aegean Sea between 2000 and 500 BC, 
      formed an autocatalytic set of ideas that supported each other’s 
      development. The alphabet not only served as a convenient way to notate 
      speech it also taught the lessons of analysis (breaking up words into 
      their basic phonemes), coding (writing), decoding (reading) and 
      classification (alphabetization).
      
      “From this work emerged the notion that language is both a medium of 
      communication and an informatics tool since the structure of a language 
      influences the way in which people organize information and develop ideas. 
      This work led to the hypothesis that speech, writing, math, science, 
      computing and the Internet represented six independent languages each with 
      its own unique semantics and syntax. It was shown that these six forms of 
      language formed an evolutionary chain of languages with each new language 
      emerging from the previous forms of language as a bifurcation to a new 
      level of order a la Prigogine in response to an information overload that 
      the previous set of languages could not handle.” Logan, Robert. “The 
      extended mind model of the origin of language and culture.” Pp. 149-167. 
      From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. 
      Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, 
      Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. Pp. 149-150. References are: 
      McLuhan, M. & R. Logan. 1977. “Alphabet, mother of invention.” Etcetera 
      34: 373-383. Logan, R. 1995. The fifth language: Learning a living in the 
      computer age. Stoddart Publishing.
      
      
      “My earlier work with the evolution of notated language was based on the 
      premise that a new form of language evolved in response to the chaos 
      resulting from the information overload associated with the previous forms 
      of language. In light of this we should anticipate that the origin of 
      speech was also due to a response to chaos and information overload.” 
      Logan, Robert. “The extended mind model of the origin of language and 
      culture.” Pp. 149-167. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. 
      Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, 
      Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. P. 150.
      
      
      “When the complexity of hominid life became so great that perception and 
      learned reactions to perceptions alone could not provide enough requisite 
      variety to model or regulate the challenges of day to day life a new level 
      of order emerged based on concepts. Percepts arise from our impressions of 
      the external world that we apprehend with our senses and are mediated by 
      neural networks in our brains. Concepts, on the other hand, are abstract 
      ideas that result from the generalization of particular examples. Concepts 
      allow one to deal with things that are remote in both the space and time 
      dimension. If our first words were concepts then language allowed us to 
      represent things that are remote is both space and time and, hence, 
      provide language with what Hockett defines as displacement.” Logan, 
      Robert. “The extended mind model of the origin of language and culture.” 
      Pp. 149-167. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, 
      Editors. Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, 
      Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. P. 151. Reference is to 
      Hockett, C. 1960. “The origin of speech.” Scientific American. 203: 
      88-111.
      
      
      “Assuming that language is both a form of communication and an information 
      processing system it is conjectured that the emergence of speech 
      represented the actual transition from percept-based thought to 
      concept-based thought. The spoken word, as we shall see, is the actual 
      medium or mechanism by which concepts are expressed or represented.” 
      Logan, Robert. “The extended mind model of the origin of language and 
      culture.” Pp. 149-167. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. 
      Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, 
      Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. P. 152.
      
      
      “The use of a word transforms the brain from one state to another and 
      replaces a set of percepts with a concept. A word is a srange attractor 
      for all the percepts associated with the concept represented by that word. 
      A word, therefore, packs a great deal of experience into a single 
      utterance or sign. Millions of percepts of a linguistic community are 
      boiled down by the language to a single word acting as a concept and a 
      strange attractor for all those percepts.” Logan, Robert. “The extended 
      mind model of the origin of language and culture.” Pp. 149-167. From 
      Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary 
      Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, Systems 
      Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. P. 153.
      
      
      “Human beings as person can be thought of as co-ontogenetic creatures that 
      organize their lives and are mutually constituted with and by other 
      persons with whom they relate in multiple ways and roles.” Ramirez-Goicoechea, 
      Eugenia. “Cognition, evolution, and sociality.” Pp. 283-312. From Gontier, 
      Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary 
      Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, Systems 
      Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. P. 285.
      
      
      “Two processes that are lived experientially together may share some 
      common neural paths. Short-sighted people hear better with their glasses 
      on and people hear better when they can see people’s faces or their lips 
      moving (not because they know lip reading!), in what has been called the 
      McGurk effect.” Ramirez-Goicoechea, Eugenia. “Cognition, evolution, and 
      sociality.” Pp. 283-312. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. 
      Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, 
      Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. P. 287.
      
      
      “What J. Bruner called the scaffolded world we live in, full of 
      reifications and social artefacts, constitutes the scenario for children 
      to build up their own way into a selected environment, the frameworks they 
      will explore for meaning and (more or less) coherence, in a never-ending 
      process of reworking the legacy of their elders and the choices–within 
      constraints–of their generation-mates.
      
      “Caregivers bring forth and structure children’s abilities thanks to: (1) 
      the dialogy of care-giver/child relationships; (2) body language, indirect 
      communication, and emotional saliency; (3) infant direct speech (IDS, 
      babytalk, motherese), exploratory talk, proper speech styles, and 
      appropriate commentaries to the situation; (4) alternate participation as 
      in turn-taking; (5) guided, educated attention; and (6) anticipatory 
      cognitive and emotional stimulation as in inter-mental developmental zone 
      where children learn to become inter-thinkers.
      
      “Caregivers socialize providing the focus, the clues, the saliency, the 
      format and dynamic repetitive and standardized structures from which the 
      child will creatively build a shared world of his/her own. The education 
      of attention funds shared rules about ways, contexts, and relevance, of 
      what goes without saying, of what we trust our world to be about and of 
      which we have intuitive, self-evident knowledge.” Ramirez-Goicoechea, 
      Eugenia. “Cognition, evolution, and sociality.” Pp. 283-312. From Gontier, 
      Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary 
      Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, Systems 
      Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. Pp. 293-4. Reference is to Bruner, 
      Jerome. 1983. Child’s Talk: learning to use the language. Oxford Univ. 
      Press.
      
      
      “But emotions are important in decision making because they point towards 
      saliency, relevance, value, purposes, communication and directionality for 
      action. Emotions and feelings tell us about how things go in the world for 
      us and for others. Emotions are like an ‘information holding system’, 
      reverberating loops that keep information active for further mental 
      purposes. They allow us to concentrate attention and energy on certain 
      aspects of the situation so we can hierarchically organize and reorganize 
      it. Emotional deprivation and depression have been reported as having 
      consequences in nexploratory activity, social intelligence, and inability 
      to envisage mental tasks from a whole perspective. The attribution of 
      emotional and intentional states, as part of a theory of mind and social 
      cognition has been decisivie during hominization.” Ramirez-Goicoechea, 
      Eugenia. “Cognition, evolution, and sociality.” Pp. 283-312. From Gontier, 
      Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary 
      Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, Systems 
      Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. Pp. 297-8. Subquote is from 
      D’Andrade, R. 1981. “The cultural part of cognition.” Cognitive Science 5: 
      179-195.
      
      
      “Motivated knowledgeable human practices become objectified by means of 
      rutinization/ritualization, typification and institutionalization, that 
      introduce new dynamics and emergencies [emergences?] within the system. 
      Through this externalization, knowledge becomes objectified, communicable, 
      structured, knowable for others to evaluate, discuss, agree upon, and 
      rework. Objectifications could be understood as attractors that orient, 
      direct, and capture human activity in its gravitational space, in its 
      fluxes and exchanges as well as in its more consolidated and structured 
      forms.
      
      “The externalized reification processes were started by hominids through 
      their social relationship, embedded in environmental 
      selection/appropriation/transformation (i.e. object production, 
      technology), language, ritual enactments–including body work. 
      Externalization allowed for a new kind of recursivity that may have sped 
      up both cross-modality and especialization as seen in the exponential 
      cognitive and social complexity of homo sapiens sapiens.
      
      “Devices that were selected, biosocially created, exaptated [exapted?], 
      thanks to sociobiological cognitive abilities became self-organized and 
      relatively autonomous as new attractors that catalyzed some of these very 
      same capacities, giving them new strength and new direction. Once in 
      motion, as in Tomasello’s ratchet effect, or Vico’s history in spiral, 
      there is no way back.” Ramirez-Goicoechea, Eugenia. “Cognition, evolution, 
      and sociality.” Pp. 283-312. From Gontier, Nathalie, J.P. Van Bendegem & 
      D. Aerts, Editors. Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, 
      Systems Theoretical Approach. 2006. Springer. P. 300.
      
      
      “It is the function of religious practice in establishing essential shared 
      sentiments and ideas that Durkheim argues is a necessary foundation for 
      social life, not religious beliefs.” Rawls, Anne W. Epistemology and 
      Practice: Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. 2004. 
      Cambridge University Press. P. 3.
      
      
      “Durkheim argued in The Division of Labor, that a sense of unity and 
      well-being based on shared belief, while it is comforting to group 
      members, ultimately threatens the security and solidarity of an advanced 
      division of labor because it leads inevitably to exclusive groupings 
      within the larger collective.”
      
      “In arguing that religion played an essential role in establishing a 
      shared knowledge base, Durkheim was rejecting existing approaches to the 
      problem of knowledge, replacing explanations that began with the 
      individual with his own socially based argument that knowledge is created 
      by the shared experience of enacted practices.” Rawls, Anne W. 
      Epistemology and Practice: Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious 
      Life. 2004. Cambridge University Press. P. 3.
      
      
      “Durkheim’s epistemology argument, articulated in the central chapters of 
      The Elementary Forms, locates the origin of the fundamental categories of 
      human thought, or reason, not in individual perceptions, as Hume had 
      argued, nor as a transcendent and innate aspect of the mind, as Kant had 
      argued, but rather, in the shared emotional experience of those ritually 
      produced moral forces created by the enactment of concrete practices in 
      the midst of an assembled group.” Rawls, Anne W. Epistemology and 
      Practice: Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. 2004. 
      Cambridge University Press. P. 10.
      
      
      “Their ‘Major Transitions’ [Smith and Szathmary’s] identified 
      uncontroversially important episodes in evolutionary history, but each of 
      these episodes also changes some key evolutionary factor: the construction 
      of new individuals; the increasing bandwidth and fidelity of inheritance; 
      the establishment of new inheritance channels; the development of 
      open-ended sources of variation.” Calcott, Brett & K. Sterelny, Eds. 2011. 
      The Major Transitions In Evolution Revisited. MIT Press. P. 1. Reference 
      is to Smith, Maynard & E. 1995. “The major evolutionary transitions.” 
      Nature 374: 227-232. Also their book The Major Transitions in Evolution. 
      1995. Oxford University Press.
      
      
      “Among the major transitions are episodes of the creation of new kinds of 
      evolutionary agent: eukaryotic cells; multicelled animals; social insects. 
      These episodes of the evolution of individuality show that selection acts 
      on collectives of fitness-bearing agents, not just on those agents 
      themselves, and that higher-level selection drives evolutionary 
      trajectories.” Calcott, Brett & K. Sterelny, Eds. 2011. The Major 
      Transitions In Evolution Revisited. MIT Press. Pp. 3-4.
      
      
      “Instead of conceptualizing life as evolving through a fixed, though 
      immense, space of organic design, and asking how that space is explored 
      over time, Maynard Smith and Szathmary conceived of the space of 
      biological possibility as itself evolving.” Calcott, Brett & K. Sterelny, 
      Eds. 2011. The Major Transitions In Evolution Revisited. MIT Press. P. 4.
      
      
      “Life in this universe has an importance far beyond our understanding, 
      because it is life that created us from nothing. It is life that has given 
      us the ability to survive. It is life that has given so much beauty to 
      this earth. It is life through which God has given the ability to humans 
      to be guided by his prophets through the books that he has given to them.
      
      “Life is God’s natural gift to humanity. People owe their life to God. 
      Each minute of life is being counted and is valued as much as gold. Life 
      is a gift that nobody can take from another, not at any price. You should 
      take care, treat life the way you would treat the most precious object, 
      and be careful to use it the right way.” Zaeef, Abdul Salam. My Life with 
      the Taliban. 2010. Columbia University Press. P. xlvi.
      
      
      “The key to Gibson’s theory is that animals must actively explore and 
      attend to their environments to pick up the available information...
      
      “This active sampling allows animals to perceive not only the ‘invariant 
      structure’ we described above, but also ‘perspective structure.’
      
      “When an animal moves and transforms the optical array, this provides 
      information about its own locomotion–this is perspective structure. A 
      flowing perspective structure indicates movement, whereas an arrested 
      perspective structure indicates that the organism is at rest. In Gibson’s 
      theory, then, perception of the environment is always and simultaneously a 
      form of self-perception (nicely embedding the animal in its environment in 
      a mutualistic way). Barrett, Louise. Beyond the Brain: How Body and 
      Environment Shape Animal and Human Minds. 2011. Princeton University 
      Press. Pp. 106-7. Reference is to Gibson, J.J. The Ecological Approach to 
      Visual Perception. 1979. Erlbaum.
      
      
      “ ... behavior is not about producing the ‘right’ response given a 
      particular stimulus, but often means producing the ‘response’ that 
      subsequently leads to the ‘right’ stimulus.” Barrett, Louise. Beyond the 
      Brain: How Body and Environment Shape Animal and Human Minds. 2011. 
      Princeton University Press. P. 139.
      
      
      “Andrew Pickering, a sociologist of science, who has written a wonderful 
      book about the British ‘cyberneticians,’ including Grey Walter, suggests 
      that we should refer to the brain and what it does as ‘performative’ 
      rather than ‘representational ....’” Barrett, Louise. Beyond the Brain: 
      How Body and Environment Shape Animal and Human Minds. 2011. Princeton 
      University Press. P. 143. Reference is to Pickering, Andrew. The 
      Cybernetic Brain: Sketches of Another Future. 2010. University of Chicago 
      Press.
      
      
      “Polanyi makes the point that these three factors of production [labor, 
      land, and money] are not natural commodities because they are not produced 
      for sale. He called them ‘fictitious commodities’ for this reason.” 
      Jackson, Ross. Occupy World Street: A Global Roadmap for Radical Economic 
      and Political Reform. 2012. Chelsea Green Publishing. P. 57. Reference is 
      to Polanyi, Karl. The Great Transformation. 2001. Beacon Press.
      
      
      “Polanyi argues that prior to the emergence of capitalism, the economy was 
      embedded in society, i.e., subordinated to politics, religion, and social 
      relationships, whereas a truly self-regulating market–the ideal of the 
      merchant class–would essentially extricate the economy from society. 
      Polanyi considered the very idea of an unregulated, self-adjusting market 
      to be a utopia that could not exist for any time without destroying both 
      man and his environment. It should be eminently clear that no market 
      system can exist without government regulations, particularly regarding 
      the ‘fictitious commodities’ of land, labor, and money, which do not 
      behave as real commodities except in the abstract models of the 
      economists. So in practice it is not a question of regulation or no 
      regulation, but how much and what kind of regulation.
      
      “Since the emergence of capitalism in the nineteenth century, the dynamic 
      of what Polanyi called the ‘double movement’ has characterized the 
      struggle between the merchant-class supporters of this unobtainable utopia 
      on the one hand and needs of the citizens for a stable, secure, and 
      satisfying social life, and supportive natural environment, on the other. 
      The latter is, in its essence, a struggle for local democracy, which is 
      the opposite pole of a self-regulating market society.” Jackson, Ross. 
      Occupy World Street: A Global Roadmap for Radical Economic and Political 
      Reform. 2012. Chelsea Green Publishing. P. 58. Reference is to Polanyi, 
      Karl. The Great Transformation. 2001. Beacon Press.
      
      
      “In other words Darwinian evolution necessarily involves continued 
      diversification, but what if the outcomes are subject to repeated 
      channeling? It may then transpire that the tree has a quite specific 
      structure, and one that it is far from a random exploration of biological 
      space.” Morris, Simon Conway. “The predictability of evolution: glimpses 
      into a post-Darwinian world.” 2009. Naturwissenschaften. 96:1313-1337. P. 
      1317.
      
      
      “I have outlined the concept of evolutionary inherency, that is, the 
      notion that pre-existing configurations make subsequent evolutionary 
      outcomes far more likely.” Morris, Simon Conway. “The predictability of 
      evolution: glimpses into a post-Darwinian world.” 2009. 
      Naturwissenschaften. 96:1313-1337. P. 1323.
      
      
      “In a remarkable survey of the available mutational pathways that confer 
      bacterial resistance to an antibiotic by the employment of B-lactamase, 
      Weinreich et al. note that in their study that although more than a 
      hundred pathways exist, in practice, nearly all of them are dead-ends. 
      Thus, they conclude ‘that intramolecular interactions render many 
      mutational pathways selectively inaccessible, which implies the protein 
      tape of life ... might be surprisingly repetitive.’
      
      “It seems inevitable that many deeper organizational principles remain to 
      be discovered in biological systems.” Morris, Simon Conway. “The 
      predictability of evolution: glimpses into a post-Darwinian world.” 2009. 
      Naturwissenschaften. 96:1313-1337. P. 1326. Reference is to Weinreich, DM, 
      Delaney NF, DePristo MA, Hartl, DL. 2006. “Darwinian evolution can follow 
      only very few mutational pathways to fitter proteins.” Sciences. 
      312:111-114.
      
      
      “... the reality in biology is not that very many things work ‘after a 
      fashion,’ but to the contrary out of the unimaginably large possibilities 
      of design hyperspace almost nothing works but when it does it usually 
      works extremely well.” Morris, Simon Conway. “The predictability of 
      evolution: glimpses into a post-Darwinian world.” 2009. 
      Naturwissenschaften. 96:1313-1337. P. 1331.
      
      
      “The same stone, for example, may function as shelter for the crab that 
      hides beneath it, as an anvil for the thrush that uses it to break open 
      snail shells, and as a missile for an angry human to hurl at an adversary. 
      In Gibson’s terms, shelter, anvil and missile are all properties of the 
      stone that are available to be taken up. For von Uexkuell, by contrast, 
      they are qualities that are bestowed upon the stone by the need of the 
      creature in question and in the very act of attending to it. The stone 
      only becomes a shelter when the crab scuttles under it, an anvil when the 
      thrush smashes the shell against it, and a missile when the man picks it 
      up to throw. Outside of these activities, it was none of these things. 
      Thus, far from fitting into a given corner of the world (a niche), it is 
      the animal that fits the world to itself by ascribing functional qualities 
      to the things it encounters and thereby integrating them into a coherent 
      system of its own. To denote this system – the world as it is constituted 
      within the animal’s circuit of perception and action – von Uexkuell used 
      the term Umwelt. The life of every creature, von Uexkuell thought, was so 
      wrapped up in its own Umwelt that no other worlds were accessible to it. 
      It is as though each one were floating in its own particular ‘bubble’ of 
      reality.” Ingold, Tim. “Point, Line and Counterpoint: From Environment to 
      Fluid Space.” From: Berthoz, A. & Y. Christen (eds.). 2009. Neurobiology 
      of “Umwelt”: How Living Beings Perceive the World. Springer. P. 146. 
      References are to: Von Uexkuell, J. 1992. “A stroll through the worlds of 
      animals and men: a picture book of invisible worlds.” Semiotica 89(4): 
      319-391 (originally published in 1934).
      
      
      “The human practitioner is unique in inhabiting the world of the open. To 
      explain what he meant, Heidegger asked his listeners to compare an 
      inanimate object like a stone, an animal and a human being. How do they 
      differ? His answer took the form of three theses: ‘The stone ... is 
      worldless; the animal is poor in world; man is world-forming.” Ingold, 
      Tim. “Point, Line and Counterpoint: From Environment to Fluid Space.” 
      From: Berthoz, A. & Y. Christen (eds.). 2009. Neurobiology of “Umwelt”: 
      How Living Beings Perceive the World. Springer. P. 147. Reference is to 
      Heidegger, M. 1995. “The fundamental concepts of metaphysics: world, 
      finitude, solitude. Translated by W. McNeil, N. Walker. Indiana University 
      Press. [Based on a course presented in 1929-30, originally published in 
      1983.]
      
      
      “... an environment is that which surrounds the organism, yet you cannot 
      surround a bundle without wrapping it up, converting the very paths along 
      which life is lived into boundaries within which it is contained. Instead, 
      let us imagine ourselves, as did Charles Darwin in The Origin of Species, 
      standing before ‘the plants and bushes clothing an entangled bank.’ 
      Observe how the fibrous bundles comprising every plant and bush are 
      entwined with one another so as to form a dense mat of vegetation. What we 
      have been used to calling the environment reappears on the bank as an 
      immense tangle of lines.” Ingold, Tim. “Point, Line and Counterpoint: From 
      Environment to Fluid Space.” From: Berthoz, A. & Y. Christen (eds.). 2009. 
      Neurobiology of “Umwelt”: How Living Beings Perceive the World. Springer. 
      P. 150.
      
      
      “The acteur reseau was intended by its originators (if not by those who 
      have been beguiled by its translation as network) to be comprised of just 
      such lines of becoming. Their inspiration came, in large measure, from the 
      philosophy of Deleuze. As we have already seen, with acknowledgement to 
      Deleuze, the line of the web does not link the spider to the fly, neither 
      does the latter’s line of flight link it to the spider. Ensconced at the 
      centre of its web, the spider knows that a fly has landed somewhere on the 
      outer margins, as it sends vibrations down the threads that are picked up 
      by the spider’s super-sensitive, spindly legs. And it can then run along 
      the lines of the web to retrieve its prey. Thus the thread-lines of the 
      web lay down the conditions of possibility for the spider to interact with 
      the fly, but they are not themselves lines of interaction. If these lines 
      are relations, then they are relations not between but along. Of course, 
      as with the spider, the lives of organisms generally extend along not one 
      but multiple lines, knotted together at the centre but trailing 
      innumerable loose ends at the periphery. Thus each should be pictured, as 
      Latour has latterly suggested, in the shape of a star ‘with a center 
      surrounded by many radiating lines, with all sorts of tiny conduits 
      leading to and fro.’ No longer a self-contained object like a ball that 
      can propel itself from place to place, the organism now appears as an ever 
      ramifying web of lines of growth. This is the Deleuzeian haecceity, 
      famously compared to a rhizome. I personally prefer the image of the 
      fungal mycelium. Indeed as the mycologist Alan Rayner has suggested, the 
      whole of biology would be different had it taken the mycelium as the 
      protoypical exemplar of the living organism. For it could not, then, have 
      been built upon the presumption that life is contained within the absolute 
      bounds of fixed forms. We would rather have a biology that starts from the 
      fluid character of the life process, wherein boundaries are sustained only 
      thanks to the continual flow of materials across them.” Ingold, Tim. 
      “Point, Line and Counterpoint: From Environment to Fluid Space.” From: 
      Berthoz, A. & Y. Christen (eds.). 2009. Neurobiology of “Umwelt”: How 
      Living Beings Perceive the World. Springer. P. 152. References: Latour, 
      Bruno. 2005. Reassembling the social: an introduction to actor-network 
      theory. Oxford University Press. P. 177. Deleuze, G. & F.Guattari. 2004 A 
      thousand plateaus: capitalism and schizophrenia. Translated by B. Massumi. 
      Continuum. Originally published in 1980. P. 290. Rayner, Alan. 1997. 
      Degrees of freedom: living in dynamic boundaries. Imperial College Press.
      
      
      “Dividing an organism’s world into behavioral and biological factors has 
      created counterproductive explanatory problems, often presented as a 
      conflict between reductionism and explanation based on publicly accessible 
      external variables. The main purpose of this paper is to suggest that an 
      organism’s integrated repertoire of operant behavior has the status of a 
      biological system, similar to other systems, like the nervous, 
      cardiovascular, or immune systems.” Thompson, Travis. “Relations among 
      functional systems in behavior analysis.” Journal of the Experimental 
      Analysis of Behavior. 2007. 87, 423-440. P. 423.
      
      
      “The integrated repertoire of behavioral units (operants) that have been 
      acquired and maintained under the functional control of motivational or 
      establishing operations, discriminative stimuli, mediating events conjoint 
      with reinforced responses, and consequences, function as a biological 
      system.” Thompson, Travis. “Relations among functional systems in behavior 
      analysis.” Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior. 2007. 87, 
      423-440. P. 423.
      
      
      “Strictly speaking ‘Um-welt’ means the ‘world around’ in which animals and 
      humans live. It can be translated in French by ‘Milieu.’ However, for von 
      Uexkuell it includes the world of things in the environment, the perceived 
      world, the signals emitted by both the subject and the things, and the 
      actions that can be performed by each species. Above all, it includes the 
      significance or meaning of things for each animal, in that they are 
      potentially participating in the survival and social relations of the 
      animal.” Berthoz, Alain. “The Human Brain ‘Projects’ upon the World, 
      Simplifying Principles and Rules for Perception.” From: Berthoz, A. & Y. 
      Christen (eds.). 2009. Neurobiology of “Umwelt”: How Living Beings 
      Perceive the World. Springer. P. 18.
      
      
      “Perceptual and effector worlds together form a closed unit, the Umwelt.” 
      Von Uexkuell, Jakob. 1934. Streifzuege durch die Umwelten von Tieren und 
      Menschen. Springer. English translation by C. Schiller. “A stroll through 
      the worlds of animals and men. A picture book of invisible worlds.” in: 
      Coll., Instinctive Behavior. 1957. P. 6. Quoted in Fagot-Largeault, Anne. 
      “Anthropological Physiology: von Uexkuell, Portmann, Buytendijk.” From: 
      Berthoz, A. & Y. Christen (eds.). 2009. Neurobiology of “Umwelt”: How 
      Living Beings Perceive the World. Springer. P. 2.
      
      
      “As the spider spins its threads, every subject spins his relations to 
      certain characters of the things around him, and weaves them into a firm 
      web which carries his existence.” Von Uexkuell, Jakob. 1934. Streifzuege 
      durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen. Springer. English translation 
      by C. Schiller. “A stroll through the worlds of animals and men. A picture 
      book of invisible worlds.” in: Coll., Instinctive Behavior. 1957. P. 14. 
      Quoted in Fagot-Largeault, Anne. “Anthropological Physiology: von Uexkuell, 
      Portmann, Buytendijk.” From: Berthoz, A. & Y. Christen (eds.). 2009. 
      Neurobiology of “Umwelt”: How Living Beings Perceive the World. Springer. 
      P. 2.
      
      
      “Adolf Portmann (1897-1982) was a zoologist known for having developed the 
      idea that human beings were born premature, and that the extra-uterine 
      embryos we all were, found a second uterus in their social environment.” 
      Fagot-Largeault, Anne. “Anthropological Physiology: von Uexkuell, Portmann, 
      Buytendijk.” From: Berthoz, A. & Y. Christen (eds.). 2009. Neurobiology of 
      “Umwelt”: How Living Beings Perceive the World. Springer. P. 3.
      
      
      “Different sensory inputs may require the same motor output, and different 
      sensory inputs that require the same motor output are said to form 
      ‘categories’.” Mirolli, Marco & D. Parisi. “Language as a Cognitive Tool.” 
      Minds & Machines. 2009. 19:517-528. P. 521.
      
      
      “What are the consequences of this reciprocal functional linking of the 
      sensory-motor network and the linguistic network, i.e., of possessing a 
      language, for the organism’s categories? The answer is that categorization 
      is enhanced by language. When the child hears and understands the language 
      spoken by others, the child’s categories tend to become better categories, 
      i.e., smaller and more distant clouds of points in the child’s neural 
      network.” Mirolli, Marco & D. Parisi. “Language as a Cognitive Tool.” 
      Minds & Machines. 2009. 19:517-528. Pp. 522-23.
      
      
      “As Tomasello argues, the establishment of collaborative interaction, can 
      only be achieved by animals mutually perceiving each other’s visible 
      actions. It could not be achieved by way of vocalisations. A vocalisation 
      can draw the attention of a recipient to its source, to the originator of 
      the sound. But that sound cannot be used by itself to direct the attention 
      of a recipient to something else that is to constitute a specific object 
      for joint attention. One cannot point with a vocalisation. This can only 
      be done through a visible action that serves to link, in someway, the 
      actor to something in the environment in relation to which he is acting.” 
      Kendon, Adam. “Language’s matrix.” 2009. Gesture. 9:3, 355-372. P. 359.
      
      
      “A much better approach, it seems to me, and one that takes into 
      consideration how utterances are actually produced in modern speakers, 
      would be to start with the assumption that the transition into referential 
      or language-like expressions involved hands and body, face and voice and 
      mouth, all together, as an integrated ensemble. What so many writers on 
      this topic – ‘gesture firsters’ and ‘speech firsters’ both – pay little 
      attention to is the fact that modern humans, when they speak together in 
      face-to-face situations, especially in the informal settings of everyday 
      interactions, always mobilise face and hands and voice together in complex 
      orchestrations.” Kendon, Adam. “Language’s matrix.” 2009. Gesture. 9:3, 
      355-372. P. 363.
      
      
      “A more plausible approach would be to see that the diversification of 
      languages comes about as a consequence of the way in which linguistic 
      expressions serve to signify things in the world. They do this, not by 
      signifying things directly but by signifying the concepts in terms of 
      which the things in the world are construed. These concepts or conceptual 
      categories are not dictated by anything in the world, they are, rather, 
      the creations of communities of speakers....”
      
      “There are no cognitive categories that are ‘given’ (except possibly at 
      some very abstract level), so that the way one group may end up setting up 
      linguistic categories can be rather different from the way another group 
      may do this. The categorisations that language creates are the products of 
      socially shared agreements, and these are free to vary within a very wide 
      range....” 
      
      “Language differences can be (and are) exploited as sources of group pride 
      and identity, and people may work to create and exaggerate such 
      differences as part of the process of group differentiation, but the 
      fundamental reason for language differentiation lies in the fact that 
      languages are conceptual categorisation systems, freely created through 
      local historical processes.” Kendon, Adam. “Language’s matrix.” 2009. 
      Gesture. 9:3, 355-372. Pp. 368-69.
      
      
      “Technique thus places the subject at the centre of activity, whereas 
      technology affirms the independence of production from human 
      subjectivity.” Ingold, Tim. The Perception of the Environment: Essays in 
      livelihood, dwelling and skill. 2000. Routledge. P. 315.
      
      
      “... technical evolution describes a process not of complexification but 
      of objectification of the productive forces.” Ingold, Tim. The Perception 
      of the Environment: Essays in livelihood, dwelling and skill. 2000. 
      Routledge. P. 319.
      
      
      “Thus in hunting, it is commonly supposed that the animal gives itself to 
      be killed by the hunter who, as a recipient, occupies the subordinate 
      position in the transaction. The spear, arrow or trap serves here as a 
      vehicle for opening or consummating a relationship. If the arrow misses 
      its mark, or if the trap remains empty, it is inferred that the animal 
      does not as yet intend to enter into a relationship with the hunter by 
      allowing itself to be taken. In that way, the instruments of hunting serve 
      a similar purpose to the tools of divination, revealing the otherwise 
      hidden intentions of non-human agents in a world saturated with personal 
      powers of one kind and another. In short, whereas for farmers and 
      herdsmen, the tool is an instrument of control, for hunters and gatherers 
      it would better be regarded as an instrument of revelation.” Ingold, Tim. 
      The Perception of the Environment: Essays in livelihood, dwelling and 
      skill. 2000. Routledge. P. 320.
      
      
      “Each of these sorts of phenomena–a function, reference, purpose, or 
      value–is in some way incomplete. There is something not-there there. 
      Without this ‘something’ missing, they would just be plain and simple 
      physical objects or events, lacking these otherwise curious attributes. 
      Longing, desire, passion, appetite, mourning, loss, aspiration–all are 
      based on an analogous intrinsic incompleteness, an integral without-ness.
      
      “As I reflect on this odd state of things, I am struck by the fact that 
      there is no single term that seems to refer to this elusive character of 
      such things. So, at the risk of initiating this discussion with a clumsy 
      neologism, I will refer to this as an absential feature, to denote 
      phenomena whose existence is determined with respect to an essential 
      absence. This could be a state of things not yet realized, a specific 
      separate object of a representation, a general type of property that may 
      or may not exist, an abstract quality, an experience, and so forth–just 
      not that which is actually present. This paradoxical intrinsic quality of 
      existing with respect to something missing, separate, and possibly 
      nonexistent is irrelevant when it comes to inanimate things, but it is a 
      defining property of life and mind. A complete theory of the world that 
      includes us and our experience of the world, must make sense of the way 
      that we are shaped by and emerge from such specific absences. What is 
      absent matters, and yet our current understanding of the physical universe 
      suggests that is should not. A causal role for absence seems to be absent 
      from the natural sciences.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind 
      Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. Pp. 2-3.
      
      
      “Dynamical systems theories are ultimately forced to explain away the 
      end-directed and normative characteristics of organisms, because they 
      implicitly assume that all causally relevant phenomena must be 
      instantiated by some material substrate or energetic difference. 
      Consequently, they are as limited in their power to deal with the 
      representational and experiential features of mind as are simple 
      mechanistic accounts.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind 
      Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P. 5.
      
      
      “Teleology is like a mistress to a biologist: he cannot live without her 
      but he’s unwilling to be seen with her in public.” Haldane, J.B.S. Quoted 
      in: Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 
      2012. W.W. Norton. P. 107. Appears to be from: Bernal, J.D., (Ed). 1967. 
      The Origin of Life. World Publishing Co.
      
      
      “The concept of constraint is, in effect, a complementary concept to 
      order, habit, and organization, because it determines a similarity class 
      by exclusion.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from 
      Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. Pp. 191-2.
      
      
      “Constraints are what is not there but could have been, irrespective of 
      whether this is registered by any act of observation.” Deacon, Terrence. 
      Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P. 
      192.
      
      
      “This way of characterizing disorder is exemplified by an 
      information-theoretic means of measuring complexity termed Kolmogorov 
      complexity, after the theoretician who first promoted its use, the Russian 
      mathematician Andrey Nikolaevich Kolmogorov (1903-1987). It can most 
      easily be understood in terms of a method for analyzing or generating a 
      string of numbers. If the same string can be generated by an algorithm 
      that is shorter than that string, it is said to be compressible to that 
      extent. Such an algorithm effectively captures a form of redundancy that 
      is not superficially exemplified in its product.” Deacon, Terrence. 
      Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P. 
      196.
      
      
      “So what may appear chaotic may be merely the result of a simple operation 
      that tends to entwine with itself to the point that any regularity is 
      obscured. Alternatively, being impossible to simplify means that there are 
      only details to contend with, nothing simpler. Irrespective of whether all 
      real phenomena are maximally algorithmically complex–as extreme nominalism 
      would suggest–or are algorithmically compressible without residue–as 
      extreme realism would suggest–a constraint view of orderliness still 
      applies.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from 
      Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. Pp. 196-7.
      
      
      “Recasting the Realism/Nominalism debate in terms of dynamics and 
      constraints eliminates the need to refer to both abstract generals, like 
      organization, and simple particular objects or events lacking in 
      organization. Both are simplifications due to our representation of 
      things, not things in themselves. What exist are processes of change, 
      constraints exhibited by those processes, and the statistical smoothing 
      and the attractors that embody the options left by these constraints.” 
      Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. 
      W.W. Norton. P. 197.
      
      
      “For general purposes, then, it would be useful to distinguish between 
      changes that must be forced to occur through extrinsic intervention and 
      those that require intervention to prevent them from occurring....
      
      “I will call changes in the state of a system that are consistent with the 
      spontaneous, ‘natural’ tendency to change, irrespective of external 
      interference, orthograde changes. The term literally refers to going with 
      the grade or tilt or tendency of things, as in falling, or ‘going along 
      with the flow.’ In contrast, I will call changes in the state of a system 
      that must be extrinsically forced, because they run counter to orthograde 
      tendencies, contragrade changes.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How 
      Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P. 223.
      
      
      “Contragrade change is the natural consequence of one orthograde process 
      influencing a different orthograde process...” Deacon, Terrence. 
      Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P. 
      224.
      
      
      “It is simply because the world is highly heterogeneous that there can be 
      contragrade processes.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind 
      Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P. 224.
      
      
      “Since orthograde processes ensue spontaneously, they are ubiquitously 
      present, even during processes of contragrade (forced) changes. A 
      contragrade change must therefore derive from two or more orthograde 
      processes, each in some way undoing the other’s effects. To put this in 
      the terms introduced in the previous chapter, each must constrain the 
      other. The tendency of one orthograde process to realize the full range of 
      its degrees of freedom (e.g., the diffusion into all potential locations) 
      must diminish the tendency of another orthograde process to realize all 
      its potential degrees of freedom.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: 
      How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P. 225.
      
      
      “Rather than order or disorder, then, I suggest that we begin to think of 
      entropy as a measure of constraint. An increase in entropy is a decrease 
      in constraint, and vice versa.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How 
      Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P. 228.
      
      
      “We can thus describe the increase in entropy as a decrease in 
      constraints, and the second law can be restated as follows: In any given 
      interaction, the global level of constraint can only decrease.” Deacon, 
      Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. 
      Norton. P. 229.
      
      
      “Orthograde thermodynamic change occurs because it is an unperturbed 
      reflection of the space of possible trajectories of change for that 
      system. It is in this sense a consequence of the geometric properties of 
      this probability space. An orthograde change just happens, irrespective of 
      anything else, so long as there is any change occurring at all. I take 
      this to be a reasonable way to reinterpret Aristotle’s notion of a formal 
      cause in a modern scientific framework, because the source of the 
      asymmetry is ultimately a formal or geometric principle.” Deacon, 
      Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. 
      Norton. Pp. 230-1.
      
      
      “... Homeodynamics–coins a term that I think can more generally describe 
      this most basic orthograde dynamic wherever we encounter it. It is a 
      dynamic that spontaneously reduces constraints to their minimum and thus 
      more evenly distributes whatever property is being changed from moment to 
      moment and locus to locus.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind 
      Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. Pp. 232-3.
      
      
      “The second law of thermodynamics thus describes a tendency to 
      spontaneously reduce constraint, while thermodynamic work involves the 
      creation of constraint.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind 
      Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P. 247.
      
      
      “What does this tell us in terms of morphodynamic processes in general? 
      Using the Benard cell case as an exemplar, it demonstrates that if there 
      are intrinsic interaction biases available (buoyancy differences, 
      viscosity effects, and geometric distribution constraints in this case), 
      the persistent imposition of constraint (constant heating) will tend to 
      redistribute this additional constraint into these added dimensions of 
      potential difference. Moreover, these additional dimensions are boundary 
      conditions, to the extent that they are uniformly present across the 
      system. This includes the geometric constraint, which is not derived from 
      any material feature of the system or its components. Because these 
      additional dimensions are systemwide and ubiquitous, they are also of a 
      higher level of scale than the constraints of molecular interaction. So 
      this transfer of constraints from molecular-level differences to 
      global-level differences also involves the propagation of constraint from 
      lower- to higher-order dynamics.
      
      “The distinct higher-order orthograde tendency that characterizes the 
      morphodynamics of Benard cell formation thus emerges from the lower-order 
      orthograde tendency that characterizes fluid thermodynamics. This tendency 
      to redistribute constraint to higher-order dimensions is an orthograde 
      tendency of a different and independent kind than the spontaneous 
      constraint dissipation that characterizes simpler thermodynamic systems.” 
      Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. 
      W.W. Norton. Pp. 254-5.
      
      
      “Life is characterized by the use of energy flowing in and out of an 
      organism to generate the constraints that maintain its 
      structural-functional integrity. Since organisms are subject to the 
      incessant dissipative effects of the second law of thermodynamics, they 
      additionally need to constantly impede certain forms of dissipation. 
      Organisms take advantage of the flow of energy through them to do work to 
      generate constraints that block some dissipative pathways as compared to 
      others.” [An early description of teleodynamics] Deacon, Terrence. 
      Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P. 
      263.
      
      
      “... I will adopt the more descriptive term autogen for the whole class of 
      related minimal teleodynamical systems. This term captures what is perhaps 
      its most distinctive defining feature: being a self-generating system. In 
      this respect, it is closely related to Maturana and Varela’s autopoiesis, 
      though referring to a distinct dynamical unit process rather than a 
      process more generally, for which I have reserved the more general term 
      tel[e]odynamic. The term autogen is also easily modified to apply to a 
      broader class of related forms by describing any form of 
      self-encapsulating, self-repairing, self-replicating system that is 
      constituted by reciprocal morphodynamic processes as autogenic, and 
      describing the process, appropriately, as autogenesis.” Deacon, Terrence. 
      Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P. 
      307.
      
      
      “The term [autogenesis] is reserved for simple dynamical systems that 
      accomplish self-generation by virtue of harnessing the co-dependent 
      reciprocity of component morphodynamic processes.” Deacon, Terrence. 
      Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. Pp. 
      307-8.
      
      
      “One might then describe an autogen as a hierarchic hypercyclic system, 
      with each self-organizing component acting as supporting environment or 
      context for the other.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind 
      Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. Pp. 308-9.
      
      
      “Autogenic organization only exists with respect to a relevant supportive 
      environment. So autogenic individuation is also only defined with respect 
      to a particular type of environment. Identity and environment are thus 
      reciprocally defined and determined with respect to each other, because 
      the same molecular configuration in a non-supportive environment lacks any 
      of the defining properties of autogenesis. Indeed, the very possibility 
      for autogen existence can be described as one of the possible micro 
      configurations of a certain class of environments with the molecular 
      constitution conducive to autogen formation.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete 
      Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P. 310.
      
      
      “Morphodynamic processes are the only spontaneous processes that generate 
      and propagate constraints, and autogens demonstrate that reciprocity 
      between morphodynamic processes can preserve and replicate constraints.” 
      Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. 
      W.W. Norton. P. 315.
      
      
      “It should come as no surprise that an organism does not maximize the rate 
      at which it generates entropy or the throughput of energy. Instead, an 
      organism uses the flow of entropy to build constraints that ultimately 
      divert and slow this process, increasing the amount of local work it can 
      extract.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from 
      Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P. 318.
      
      
      “So, whereas morphodynamic processes merely propagate and amplify 
      constraints, teleodynamic processes additionally preserve them. This is 
      the common theme of both life and evolution.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete 
      Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P. 318.
      
      
      “Thus morphodynamic organization emerges due to the interaction of opposed 
      thermodynamic processes (e.g., perturbation and equilibration), and it 
      results in constraint amplification rather than constraint dissipation 
      (i.e., increase in entropy). Analogously teleodynamic organization emerges 
      due to reciprocally organized morphodynamic processes, and entropy 
      ratcheting rather than entropy production. In this respect, autogen 
      formation exemplifies the defining feature of an emergent phase 
      transition–the appearance of a new form of orthograde organization.” 
      Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. 
      W.W. Norton. P. 319.
      
      
      “Emergence is, in effect, defined by a polarity reversal in orthograde 
      dynamics with ascent in scale. Thus the orthograde signature of 
      thermodynamic change is constraint dissipation, the orthograde signature 
      of morphodynamic change is constraint amplification, and the orthograde 
      signature of teleodynamic change is constraint preservation and 
      correlation. The polarity reversal that defines the emergence of 
      teleodynamics from morphodynamics is what characterizes life and 
      evolution. A fit or interdependent correspondence between constraints in 
      different domains is the essence of both biological adaptation and the 
      relationship characterizing representational relationships.” Deacon, 
      Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. 
      Norton. P. 324.
      
      
      “So long as contragrade change persists, work is involved ...” Deacon, 
      Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. 
      Norton. P. 327.
      
      
      “Work is a spontaneous change inducing a non-spontaneous change to occur.” 
      Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. 
      W.W. Norton. P. 335.
      
      
      “Ultimately, the capacity of the perturbed system as a whole to be tapped 
      to perform work at the level above that of molecular collision is a 
      consequence of the distributional features of the incessant micro work, 
      not the energy of the component collisions, which as a whole can increase, 
      decrease, or remain unchanged. In other words, in thermodynamics the macro 
      doesn’t simply reduce to the micro, even though it is dependent upon it. 
      The macroscopic form of the distribution is the critical factor.” Deacon, 
      Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. 
      Norton. P. 336.
      
      
      “This allows us to propose an even more general definition of work: it is 
      simply the production of contragrade change.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete 
      Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P. 337.
      
      
      “That is, we can begin to discern a basis for a form of causal openness in 
      the universe. To frame these insights in somewhat more enigmatic and 
      cosmic terms, we might speculate that whereas the conservation laws of 
      science tell us that the universe is closed to the creation or destruction 
      of the amount of possible ‘difference’ (the ultimate determinate of what 
      constitutes mass-energy) available in the world, they do not restrict the 
      distributional possibilities that these differences can assume, and it is 
      distributional relationships which determine the forms that change can 
      take.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 
      2012. W.W. Norton. P. 342.
      
      
      “So to restate the closure or conservation laws a bit more carefully: the 
      universe is closed to gain or loss of mass-energy and the most basic level 
      of formal causality is unchanging, but it is open to organizational 
      constraints on formal cause and the introduction of novel forms of 
      efficient cause. Thus we have causal openness even in a universe that is 
      the equivalent of a completely isolated system. New forms of work can and 
      are constantly emerging.” Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind 
      Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. P. 368.
      
      
      “The vast power of evolvability thus is a consequence of the fact that 
      natural selection is a process that regularly transforms incidental 
      physical properties into functional attributes. An adaptation is the 
      realization of a set of constraints on candidate mechanisms, and so long 
      as those constraints are maintained, other features are arbitrary. But 
      this means that with every adaptation, there are innumerable other 
      arbitrary properties potentially brought into play.” Deacon, Terrence. 
      Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. Norton. Pp. 
      423-4.
      
      
      “Evolution is not imposed design, but progressive constraint.” Deacon, 
      Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. W.W. 
      Norton. P. 426.
      
      
      “... natural selection assumes the existence of processes of persistent 
      non-equilibrium thermodynamics, self-maintenance, reproduction, and 
      adaptation. It cannot therefore be the complete explanation for their 
      origins, particularly for the origins of their teleodynamic character.” 
      Deacon, Terrence. Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. 2012. 
      W.W. Norton. P. 429.
      
      
      “I define symbionomics as the study of the emergence of complex systems 
      through self-organization, self-selection, coevolution, and symbiosis.” De 
      Rosnay, Joel. The Symbiotic Man: A New Understanding of the Organization 
      of Life and a Vision of the Future. 2000. McGraw Hill. P. 31.
      
      
      “An evolutionary convergence is occurring: technology is invading the 
      biological world, and biology is invading the world of machines.” De 
      Rosnay, Joel. The Symbiotic Man: A New Understanding of the Organization 
      of Life and a Vision of the Future. 2000. McGraw Hill. P. 39.
      
      
      “The coevolution of a society and its environment, with each determining 
      the other, adds a new dimension in space and time.” De Rosnay, Joel. The 
      Symbiotic Man: A New Understanding of the Organization of Life and a 
      Vision of the Future. 2000. McGraw Hill. P. 39.
      
      
      “A similar phenomenon exists in the birth, growth, and development of a 
      city; the city is both a means of support and a consequence of the 
      activity of the collective organism that lives in it, builds, it, and 
      maintains its structure.” De Rosnay, Joel. The Symbiotic Man: A New 
      Understanding of the Organization of Life and a Vision of the Future. 
      2000. McGraw Hill. P. 39.
      
      
      “The digitization and circulation of information in networks is analogous 
      to the introduction of currency into the networks of the economy. Before 
      the introduction of currency, goods or services were bought and sold by 
      barter, which made exchanges slow and limited them considerably. By 
      creating additional space for expansion and by shrinking time and space, 
      the introduction of currency led to explosive growth in the world 
      economy.” De Rosnay, Joel. The Symbiotic Man: A New Understanding of the 
      Organization of Life and a Vision of the Future. 2000. McGraw Hill. P. 51.
      
      
      “The Internet is not a new technology; it is an integrated 
      resource-sharing system, an informational ecosystem made up of numerous 
      interdependent elements ...” De Rosnay, Joel. The Symbiotic Man: A New 
      Understanding of the Organization of Life and a Vision of the Future. 
      2000. McGraw Hill. Pp. 54-5.
      
      
      “From the point of view of macrobiology, the symbiosis between humans and 
      cars is particularly illuminating. Humanity maintains a fleet of 500 
      million vehicles, extracts the energy that feeds them, and builds roads 
      for their circulation, garages for their repair, and factories for their 
      ‘reproduction.’ In return for the maintenance and reproduction of the 
      automobile species, cars allow humans to travel at greater speeds, to act 
      more effectively, to conquer distance, and they provide pleasure and 
      social status. They are also, as we saw in the previous chapter, a source 
      of disease for the social organism and of danger and pollution for the 
      planetary organism. Like symbiotic partners that turn into parasites, they 
      are endangering the future of the ecosphere.” De Rosnay, Joel. The 
      Symbiotic Man: A New Understanding of the Organization of Life and a 
      Vision of the Future. 2000. McGraw Hill. P. 76.
      
      
      “... our environment is filled with biomechanical communications systems: 
      door and drawer handles, keys, faucets; the steering wheel, clutch, and 
      brake pedal of a car; the tiller of a boat; the control column and rudder 
      of an airplane.” De Rosnay, Joel. The Symbiotic Man: A New Understanding 
      of the Organization of Life and a Vision of the Future. 2000. McGraw Hill. 
      Pp. 78-9.
      
      
      “The marriage of virtual reality and biotics will lead to the ultimate 
      interface between the human brain and that of the cybiont. Humans will 
      then have access to a new inner universe. To the relationship between the 
      real and the imaginary will be added the relationship between the real, 
      the imaginary, and the virtual–a shared inner universe, the embryo of a 
      planetary coconsciousness leading its own life, notwithstanding the 
      limited existence of the symbiotic consciousnesses of which it is made 
      up.” De Rosnay, Joel. The Symbiotic Man: A New Understanding of the 
      Organization of Life and a Vision of the Future. 2000. McGraw Hill. P. 
      107.
      
      
      “The cybiont is to the social macroorganism what Gaia is to the planetary 
      ecosystem.” De Rosnay, Joel. The Symbiotic Man: A New Understanding of the 
      Organization of Life and a Vision of the Future. 2000. McGraw Hill. P. 
      113.
      
      
      “... at the present time it [the cybiont] has no need to move, since its 
      life as a parasite of Gaia provides it with the energy needed for 
      survival.” De Rosnay, Joel. The Symbiotic Man: A New Understanding of the 
      Organization of Life and a Vision of the Future. 2000. McGraw Hill. P. 
      114.
      
      
      “Like any living organism, the cybiont provides for its major basic 
      functions: self-preservation, self-regulation, and self-repair. Using 
      people and machines, it feeds itself, converts energy, digests, and 
      eliminates its waste.” De Rosnay, Joel. The Symbiotic Man: A New 
      Understanding of the Organization of Life and a Vision of the Future. 
      2000. McGraw Hill. P. 116.
      
      
      “In an age of globalization, as the division of labor advances around the 
      world, many problems are arising that Durkheim warned against. In 
      particular the social function of religious practices is being confused 
      with religious beliefs. If persons, in an attempt to overcome the 
      increasing contingency and insecurity of modern life, turn to traditional 
      religious communities that exclude nonbelievers, increased fragmentation 
      will result. Practices, on the other hand, have the potential to be 
      inclusive. It was Durkheim’s position that an international cult would 
      have to be based on shared practices that do not discriminate between 
      beliefs.” Rawls, Anne W. Epistemology and Practice: Durkheim’s The 
      Elementary Forms of Religious Life. 2004. Cambridge University Press. P. 
      26.
      
      
      “Durkheim also emphasizes the relationship between identical sounds and 
      movements and the development of reason. His argument in this regard is 
      essential to an understanding of his positions, because it places the 
      emphasis, in explaining the origin of the categories, on the experience of 
      enacting sounds and movements in common, not on learning words, or 
      mastering systems of belief.” Rawls, Anne W. Epistemology and Practice: 
      Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. 2004. Cambridge 
      University Press. P. 37.
      
      
      “For Durkheim, the possibility of shared knowledge and mutual 
      intelligibility depends entirely upon the collective enactment of those 
      shared practices which produce moral force and through the experience of 
      moral force the categories of the understanding. Without participation in 
      ritual assemblies, and the performance of ritual practices, the categories 
      would not be presented to experience, and all contact between minds would 
      be lost.” Rawls, Anne W. Epistemology and Practice: Durkheim’s The 
      Elementary Forms of Religious Life. 2004. Cambridge University Press. P. 
      39.
      
      
      “Durkheim treats symbols as a surface phenomena beneath which lie concrete 
      social relations. It is not a referential relationship, but a causal one. 
      The concrete social relations, that is, the practices, cause the feelings 
      that are ‘called up’ by the totemic symbol.” Rawls, Anne W. Epistemology 
      and Practice: Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. 2004. 
      Cambridge University Press. P. 40.
      
      
      “Rather, he [Durkheim] states the argument in a conditional form: 
      Societies cannot exist where sameness of thought does not exist to a 
      sufficient degree. Therefore, only groups that manage to develop religious 
      rites that are able to cause the ideas essential to this sameness and 
      unity of thought will become societies.” Rawls, Anne W. Epistemology and 
      Practice: Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. 2004. 
      Cambridge University Press. P. 47.
      
      
      “The internal coercion of the moral force of the categories is different 
      from the experience of sense perception. In arguing that the categories 
      have a social origin, Durkheim points out that they impose themselves on 
      persons from the outside with an authority that sense perceptions do not 
      have: ‘This is none other than the authority of society passing into 
      certain ways of thinking that are the indispensable conditions of all 
      common action.’ Moral force is what participants feel when the authority 
      of the group is enacted by the practices and experienced directly. The 
      point of the contrast between sense perception and moral force is that 
      sensations do not impose themselves on us in this way. Sense perceptions 
      can be doubted, moral forces cannot” Rawls, Anne W. Epistemology and 
      Practice: Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. 2004. 
      Cambridge University Press. Pp. 64-5. Quote is from Durkheim, Emile. 1912. 
      The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. Translated by Karen Fields. 
      The Free Press. P. 30.
      
      
      “... Durkheim maintains that participation in the enactment of ritual 
      social practices transforms the individual into a rational human being. 
      However, the animal pre-rational nature of the individual remains intact. 
      It is the tension between these two, the rational social being and the 
      pre-rational individual, that constitutes dualism, according to Durkheim, 
      not an inherent tension between the body and the mind, or between 
      spiritual and material reality, as Kant and Descartes had argued.” Rawls, 
      Anne W. Epistemology and Practice: Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of 
      Religious Life. 2004. Cambridge University Press. P. 74.
      
      
      “Society is a reality sui generis.” Durkheim, Emile. 1912. The Elementary 
      Forms of the Religious Life. Translated by Karen Fields. The Free Press. 
      P. 29. Quoted in: Rawls, Anne W. Epistemology and Practice: Durkheim’s The 
      Elementary Forms of Religious Life. 2004. Cambridge University Press. P. 
      79.
      
      
      “The sacred Durkheim identifies with the group, the social, and with moral 
      force. The profane he identifies with the individual (among other things). 
      Because collective concepts are shared and transcend the individual, they 
      are assigned by Durkheim to the realm of the sacred and not the profane.” 
      Rawls, Anne W. Epistemology and Practice: Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms 
      of Religious Life. 2004. Cambridge University Press. P. 100.
      
      
      “Durkheim argues that ‘since the role of the social being in our single 
      selves will grow ever more important as history moves ahead ... all 
      evidence compels us to expect our effort in the struggle between the two 
      beings within us to increase with the growth of civilization.’” Rawls, 
      Anne W. Epistemology and Practice: Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of 
      Religious Life. 2004. Cambridge University Press. P. 101. Quote from: 
      Durkheim, Emile. 1914 [1960] Montesquieu and Rousseau. University of 
      Michigan Press. P. 339.
      
      
      “Durkheim’s critique of religious anthropology parallels his critique of 
      epistemology. The animists and naturists generally attempt to explain the 
      sacred on the basis of sense perception and fail. They fall prey to Hume’s 
      dilemma; that general ideas cannot be derived from sense perception. The 
      Totemists, in an argument reminiscent of Kant, offer innate human 
      tendencies as the origin of the sacred. In both cases, Durkheim argues, in 
      a manner parallel to his criticisms of Kant and Hume, they have failed to 
      explain the origin of the idea of sacredness. The animists, in particular 
      Taylor, and the naturists, in particular Muller, must fail, Durkheim says, 
      because sense perception cannot explain the origin of an idea, like the 
      sacred, that has no counterpart in nature. Durkheim’s point here is 
      similar to Hume’s argument that the idea of causality could not be 
      empirically valid because no counterpart could be found for it in sense 
      experience. Sacredness, not being a natural phenomena, cannot present 
      itself to perception. The Totemists, and in this regard Durkheim, cite 
      Frazier, because they are innatists, assume the existence of the 
      phenomenon and therefore, like Kant, fail to provide any explanation at 
      all for its origin.” Rawls, Anne W. Epistemology and Practice: Durkheim’s 
      The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. 2004. Cambridge University Press. 
      P. 110.
      
      
      “Finally, in order to have an idea of a supernatural order of things, 
      Durkheim argues that a society must first have an idea of a natural order 
      of things. The idea of a supernatural order requires the explanation of a 
      disjuncture between two orders of things....
      
      “Consequently, he argues the origin of the belief in the supernatural 
      cannot be reduced to being awestruck in the face of the unforeseen forces 
      of nature, because events cannot be unexpected, unless there are 
      background expectations against which they take place.” Rawls, Anne W. 
      Epistemology and Practice: Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious 
      Life. 2004. Cambridge University Press. P. 114.
      
      
      “Durkheim then offers his final definition of religion: “A religion is a 
      unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is 
      to say, things set apart and forbidden-beliefs and practices which unite 
      into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to 
      them.’ This means that religion is by definition collective. It also, by 
      definition, relates to the sacred.” Rawls, Anne W. Epistemology and 
      Practice: Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. 2004. 
      Cambridge University Press. P. 123.
      
      
      “In other words, it is not the obligation that creates the collectivity, 
      but the collectivity that creates the obligation.” Rawls, Anne W. 
      Epistemology and Practice: Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious 
      Life. 2004. Cambridge University Press. P. 123.
      
      
      “Totemic symbols are not considered by Durkheim to be ideas. On the 
      contrary, he treats them as physical objects, or marks. Their significance 
      is not that they represent ideas either. What they signify are feelings 
      that were once shared between members of a group, or more exactly, 
      feelings that, once shared, made persons feel like members of a group. 
      They call up collective moments. Such shared moments can be called up be a 
      picture, things, or a word, and in so doing, the feelings that were once 
      felt together are renewed.” Rawls, Anne W. Epistemology and Practice: 
      Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. 2004. Cambridge 
      University Press. P. 149.
      
      
      “He [Durkheim] argues that the sacred and profane occur in phases. Short 
      periods that are considered sacred are followed by longer periods which 
      are considered profane.” Rawls, Anne W. Epistemology and Practice: 
      Durkheim’s The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. 2004. Cambridge 
      University Press. P. 163.
      
      
      “Viruses are by common definition neither organisms nor alive.” Brussow, 
      Harald. “The not so universal tree of life or the place of viruses in the 
      living world.” 2009. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B. 
      364: 2263-2274. P. 2265.
      
      
      “In the largest of the ocean studies, more than 91 per cent of the 
      sequences from the viral DNA fraction did not have a significant hit in 
      the sequence databases. From this observation, we have to conclude that 
      the viral DNA sequence sphere is very large. Microbial ecologists working 
      in the oceans provided data that independently support this conclusion. 
      The first big surprise was the discovery of large numbers of viruses in 
      coastal water. In eutrophic estuarine water, 107 viral particles were 
      counted per millilitre of water. This is 10 times the amount of bacteria 
      in this ecosystem. From the data of many ecological surveys, it was 
      calculated that viruses are by far the most abundant ‘biological entities’ 
      in the world’s oceans yielding a global level of more than 1030 viruses. 
      Viruses are not only numerous, they are also a major cause of microbial 
      mortality in the sea, rivaled only by grazing from protists.” Brussow, 
      Harald. “The not so universal tree of life or the place of viruses in the 
      living world.” 2009. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B. 
      364: 2263-2274. P. 2269.
      
      
      “Viruses play an important role in the ocean ecosystem by maintaining the 
      genetic diversity of microbes according to the ‘killing the winning 
      fraction’ concept. In addition, viruses power the microbial loop that 
      maintains nutrients in the microbial world, preventing their flow into the 
      marine food chain. Therefore, viruses play a major role in 
      biogeochemistry.” Brussow, Harald. “The not so universal tree of life or 
      the place of viruses in the living world.” 2009. Philosophical 
      Transactions of the Royal Society B. 364: 2263-2274. P. 2269.
      
      
      “If one combines the large number of ORFans in viral metagenome analyses 
      and the sheer number of viruses in the biosphere, it is possible that the 
      viral sequence space exceeds that of their prokaryotic hosts in size. 
      These data are simply not compatible with the older concept that the viral 
      genes escaped from cells.” Brussow, Harald. “The not so universal tree of 
      life or the place of viruses in the living world.” 2009. Philosophical 
      Transactions of the Royal Society B. 364: 2263-2274. P. 2270.
      
      
      “Two central themes in Maynard Smith and Szathmary’s book develop this 
      idea of change in the conditions that make evolutionary change possible. 
      One concerns the expansion of mechanisms of hereditary–where richer and 
      more accurate systems of the intergenerational flow of information evolve. 
      The other focuses on the evolution of new levels of biological 
      individuality; an evolutionary change after which previously independent 
      entities now reproduce together, sharing their evolutionary fate. Both 
      mark out core features of the Darwinian process. One is a radical change 
      in the kind of individual from which evolving populations and lineages are 
      built. The other is a change in the processes relating these individuals 
      across generations. A third, less well-explored theme, concerns the 
      generation of variation, which they touch on in their final chapter on 
      language.... Thus, we see three core features of the Darwinian process of 
      change–the subject of change, how change is passed on, and ways in which 
      further change is generated–are all themselves subject to modification.” 
      Calcott, Brett & K. Sterelny, Eds. 2011. The Major Transitions In 
      Evolution Revisited. MIT Press. Pp. 4-5. Reference is to Smith, Maynard & 
      E. 1995. “The major evolutionary transitions.” Nature 374: 227-232. Also 
      their book The Major Transitions in Evolution. 1995. Oxford University 
      Press.
      
      
      “... David Queller has pointed out that there seem to be two very 
      different transitions in individuality: ‘egalitarian’ and ‘fraternal’ 
      transitions. Perhaps these should not be lumped together. Eukaryote 
      evolution is the paradigm of an egalitarian transition, for the 
      partnership that became the new Darwinian individual did not begin with an 
      association between closely related individuals. In contrast, the 
      evolution of multicelled organisms (and eusocial animals) is a fused 
      alliance between close relatives. Explaining these two types of transition 
      poses quite different challenges. In egalitarian transitions, 
      differentiation between the partners, and hence the potential profits of 
      specialization, come for free. But there is no automatic overlap of 
      evolutionary interest, and no possibility of a division of reproductive 
      labor. And so there are potentially unmanageable problems of conflict. In 
      fraternal transitions, there is an overlap of evolutionary interest (in 
      clones, identity), so the problem of conflict is less pressing. But the 
      profit of cooperation is more elusive, as differentiation does not predate 
      partnership.” Calcott, Brett & K. Sterelny, Eds. 2011. The Major 
      Transitions In Evolution Revisited. MIT Press. P. 10. Reference is to 
      Queller, David. 2000. “Relatedness and the fraternal major transitions.” 
      Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B. 355: 1647-1656.
      
      
      “Multicelled organisms have evolved many times, but only in a few cases 
      have these lineages generated impressive disparity and diversity. The 
      evolution of complex multicellularity requires the evolution of a 
      higher-level unit with its own fitness values. But it requires more–the 
      evolution of a developmental cycle–and that in turn requires a major 
      advance in mechanisms of inheritance. Protist genes never have to 
      contribute to building afresh the critical inner cellular structures of 
      protists. The reproduction of these crucial intercellular structures can 
      largely be reduced to growth and fission. In contrast, organs and tissues 
      do not exist in miniature in fertilized ova. Complex multicelled organisms 
      exist only because there are developmental cycles in which key structures 
      of adult organisms are rebuilt from scratch in the new generation.” 
      Calcott, Brett & K. Sterelny, Eds. 2011. The Major Transitions In 
      Evolution Revisited. MIT Press. P. 11.
      
      
      “A number of factors stabilize cooperation: relatedness, iterated 
      interactions and reciprocity, mutualisms, and punishment or conflict 
      mediation.” Calcott, Brett. “Alternative Patterns of Explanation for Major 
      Transitions.” Pp. 35-51. From Calcott, Brett & K. Sterelny, Eds. 2011. The 
      Major Transitions In Evolution Revisited. MIT Press. P. 38.
      
      
      “Michod’s model explains the transition in V. carteri by showing that a 
      split between germ and somatic line prevents the accumulation of defectors 
      in the population. Without such a split, the defectors are more likely to 
      build up and displace any cooperators.” Calcott, Brett. “Alternative 
      Patterns of Explanation for Major Transitions.” Pp. 35-51. From Calcott, 
      Brett & K. Sterelny, Eds. 2011. The Major Transitions In Evolution 
      Revisited. MIT Press. P. 40.
      
      
      “Most critically, though, in multicell systems, development routinely 
      builds from scratch new structures in each generation. Tissues, organ 
      systems, support structures, and circulatory systems all have to be built 
      anew. That is not true when a prokaryote splits into two daughter cells. 
      Its cell walls and many intercellular structures are continuously present 
      and available through the process of gene replication and cell fission.” 
      Sterelny, Kim. “Evolvability Reconsidered.” Pp. 83-100. From Calcott, 
      Brett & K. Sterelny, Eds. 2011. The Major Transitions In Evolution 
      Revisited. MIT Press. P. 91.
      
      
      “Hence, the idea of a transition to a Darwinian world. Woese and his 
      allies think such protocell evolution precedes a Darwinian transition, for 
      the phenotype of a pretransition protocell depends more on its neighbors 
      and those neighbors’ immediate ancestors than on the protocell’s own 
      distant ancestors.” Sterelny, Kim. “Evolvability Reconsidered.” Pp. 
      83-100. From Calcott, Brett & K. Sterelny, Eds. 2011. The Major 
      Transitions In Evolution Revisited. MIT Press. P. 93. Reference is to 
      Woese, C. 2008. “The domains of life and their evolutionary implications.” 
      From Dunn, M, L. Jorde, P. Little & S. Subramaniam (Eds.). Encyclopedia of 
      Genetics, Genomics, Proteomics and Bioinformatics. John Wiley & Sons.
      
      
      “Explaining the evolution of evolvability turns into the project of 
      explaining the origin and distribution of special developmental 
      mechanisms, themselves novelties on which other novelties depend.” 
      Sterelny, Kim. “Evolvability Reconsidered.” Pp. 83-100. From Calcott, 
      Brett & K. Sterelny, Eds. 2011. The Major Transitions In Evolution 
      Revisited. MIT Press. P. 95.
      
      
      “The various hypotheses of the origin of life and the major transitions of 
      evolution currently on offer, henceforward referred to as origins and 
      transitions narratives–whether replicator-first, metabolism-first, RNA 
      world, lipid world, peptide world, virus world, communal, gene-swapping 
      progenotes, biological big bang, or panspermia–all share the assumption, 
      usually tacit, that somehow selfishness entered the world. Put another 
      way, they assume the emergence of the sort of self-preserving, 
      self-organized complexity that provides a minimal basis for attributing 
      selfishness to a system.” Lyon, Pamela. “To Be or Not To Be: Where is 
      Self-Preservation in Evolutionary Theory?” Pp. 105-125. From Calcott, 
      Brett & K. Sterelny, Eds. 2011. The Major Transitions In Evolution 
      Revisited. MIT Press. P. 105.
      
      
      “The evolution of traits adaptive at a given level of biological 
      organization requires the existence–at that level–of the necessary 
      prerequisites for Darwinian individuality. When the trait whose origin we 
      wish to explain is reproduction, we face a dilemma: Appeals to natural 
      selection would seem to presuppose the existence of collective 
      reproduction–the very trait whose evolution requires explanation.” Rainey, 
      Paul & BH. Kerr. “Conflicts among Levels of Selection as Fuel for the 
      Evolution of Individuality.” Pp. 141-167. From Calcott, Brett & K. 
      Sterelny, Eds. 2011. The Major Transitions In Evolution Revisited. MIT 
      Press. P. 144.
      
      
      “The absence of a means of collective reproduction does not mean that 
      selection cannot act on collectives, but its capacity to do so is limited 
      to selection at the level of collective viability.” Rainey, Paul & BH. 
      Kerr. “Conflicts among Levels of Selection as Fuel for the Evolution of 
      Individuality.” Pp. 141-167. From Calcott, Brett & K. Sterelny, Eds. 2011. 
      The Major Transitions In Evolution Revisited. MIT Press. P. 145.
      
      
      “Three phases can be identified in transitions in individuality. The 
      aggregate phase is the least individuated, the group phase intermediately 
      individuated, and the individual phase is the most. Each phase is 
      characterized by a dominant fitness component. Differential expansion is 
      the component associated with aggregates, differential persistence is 
      associated with groups, and differential reproduction is characteristic of 
      paradigm individuals. Evolutionary transitions to more individuated phases 
      require the accumulation of additional fitness components, but new levels 
      are attained once the expansive component of fitness is attained. This 
      allows us to know that organisms in each of the three phases of 
      individuality are at the same level if they share a common ancestor.” 
      Simpson, Carl. “How Many Levels Are There?” Pp. 199-225. From Calcott, 
      Brett & K. Sterelny, Eds. 2011. The Major Transitions In Evolution 
      Revisited. MIT Press. Pp. 200-1.
      
      
      “The obvious implication is that reduced material has been introduced to 
      the three surface zones at a rate that is closely related to the oxygen 
      and oxidised chemical increase in the environment.” Williams, R.J.P. & 
      J.J.R. Frausto da Silva. The Chemistry of Evolution: The Development of 
      our Ecosystem. 2006. Elsevier. P. 32.
      
      
      “... we know today that about 2% of the retained energy on the Earth is 
      used by life and it has increased continuously from the abiotic start, 
      ...” Williams, R.J.P. & J.J.R. Frausto da Silva. The Chemistry of 
      Evolution: The Development of our Ecosystem. 2006. Elsevier. P. 100.
      
      
      “We must recognise, as stated above, that the only way we can account for 
      evolution is if the chemicals produced became involved in a flow system 
      that did not produce an all inclusive cycle, which is a terminal condition 
      like that in the cyclic ozone layer.” Williams, R.J.P. & J.J.R. Frausto da 
      Silva. The Chemistry of Evolution: The Development of our Ecosystem. 2006. 
      Elsevier. P. 100.
      
      
      “We wish to consider how the simple original resultant cell could lead, 
      3.5 billion years later, to an animal as complex as man. I shall explain 
      why I do not consider it was due to pure chance alteration of a code. I 
      shall claim that it is a direct consequence of a system of chemical 
      reactions in coordinated flow and as such was inevitable as it was 
      dependent on the inevitable original environment and its change, no matter 
      how much the central line of progression of organisms is confused by the 
      multitudes of varieties, so-called species, that arise at any one time. 
      There is a main logical chemical progression of the whole of life.” 
      Williams, R.J.P. 2011. “Chemical advances in evolution by and changes in 
      use of space during time.” Journal of Theoretical Biology. 268: 146-159. 
      P. 151.
      
      
      “The evolutionary sequence was anaerobic, then aerobic prokaryotes, 
      unicellular then multicellular eukaryotes, the last three dependent on a 
      micro- then a macro-aerobic environment, with more and more compartments. 
      This is the main line of change to 0.4 Ga independent of species. Moreover 
      the last three coexist as the complex cells, alone, have not sufficient 
      separate survival strength due to their complexity. In fact the majority 
      of unicellular organisms supports the minority of multicelular organisms. 
      This symbiosis is just an extra way of utilising space efficiently as in 
      modern industrial practice where different locations provide different 
      components.” Williams, R.J.P. 2011. “Chemical advances in evolution by and 
      changes in use of space during time.” Journal of Theoretical Biology. 268: 
      146-159. P. 152.
      
      
      “The Cambrian Explosion seen in fossils is due to the surge in oxidation 
      to give cross-linked external matrices around 0.75-0.55 Ga, enabling the 
      evolution of numerous shells and skeletons.” Williams, R.J.P. 2011. 
      “Chemical advances in evolution by and changes in use of space during 
      time.” Journal of Theoretical Biology. 268: 146-159. P. 153.
      
      
      “At this point in the article I insert a general view of our holistic 
      approach to chemical evolution which is based on observing the changes 
      largely in the metal inorganic elements in the environment and those of 
      organic chemicals based on them in cells. The reasons for using this 
      approach are that the metal elements are common to both the environment 
      and organisms in exactly the same form. Their concentrations in both can 
      therefore be followed and compared, showing the mutual interaction and 
      energisations of the different spaces, the environment and the cell 
      compartments, including the cytoplasm.” Williams, R.J.P. 2011. “Chemical 
      advances in evolution by and changes in use of space during time.” Journal 
      of Theoretical Biology. 268: 146-159. P. 153.
      
      
      “The remarkable fact appears to be that there is only one limiting set of 
      free ion values in the cytoplasm, in all of the four classes of aerobic 
      cells suggesting that this particular chemical condition is a unique 
      solution to the problem of cell cytoplasmic activity.” Williams, R.J.P. 
      2011. “Chemical advances in evolution by and changes in use of space 
      during time.” Journal of Theoretical Biology. 268: 146-159. Pp. 154-5.
      
      
      “It is important to realise that the major changes of the chemistry of 
      evolution were completed by 0.4 Ga. Thereafter evolution is largely 
      diversity, not novelty, of chemistry.” Williams, R.J.P. 2011. “Chemical 
      advances in evolution by and changes in use of space during time.” Journal 
      of Theoretical Biology. 268: 146-159. P. 155.
      
      
      “The increase in complexity of cells from prokaryotes to unicellular, then 
      multicellular, organisms required more and more management. Staying with 
      our wish to refer to metal ions, Fe2+ and Mg2+ remained as major controls 
      of metabolic pathways in the cytoplasm in all cells, of both anaerobic and 
      aerobic organisms. Control systems responsive to external changes became 
      necessary for the vulnerable eukaryote cells. They evolved, using the 
      available metal ion gradients, especially of calcium, and later of the 
      pair of ions Na+/K+, for external/internal cell messages. The controls 
      using all three ions arose from the need of the earliest prokaryotes for 
      protection which created gradients of these ions with high concentration 
      of Ca2+ and Na+ in the sea and later in extracellular fluids to low values 
      in the cytoplasm. The flows of the two govern many cellular mechanical and 
      chemical metabolic switches.” Williams, R.J.P. 2011. “Chemical advances in 
      evolution by and changes in use of space during time.” Journal of 
      Theoretical Biology. 268: 146-159. P. 155.
      
      
      “Now complexity places great stress on the ability to organise. A 
      remarkable feature of evolution in the broadest sense is not survival of 
      the fittest, competition between individual organisms, but on survival of 
      the whole, cooperative, symbiotic system. The development of unicellular 
      eukaryotes is a major, little understood, symbiotic evolution. Utilising 
      symbiosis is a new use of space. It was greatly increased in multicellular 
      eukaryotes, plants and animals, as they come to rely on chemicals from 
      lower organisms living independently, attached outside or even inside 
      these eukaryotes. Plants depend on bacteria for nitrogen and on fungi for 
      minerals. Plants and animals depend on vitamins, including the many 
      essential coenzymes, and recent animals require additionally essential 
      amino acids and sugars from many sources. They are obtained by feeding. 
      The ensemble of organisms became a large cooperative network in an 
      environment/organism system in which the definition of species becomes 
      difficult. However, speciation is not important in main line chemical 
      evolution. Man is an extreme example. We do not know how many organisms 
      (species) man’s existence depends upon. The total complexity involves and 
      is relieved by ever increasing use of biological plus environmental 
      space.” Williams, R.J.P. 2011. “Chemical advances in evolution by and 
      changes in use of space during time.” Journal of Theoretical Biology. 268: 
      146-159. P. 156.
      
      
      “We have related symbiosis increases particularly to the difficulty of 
      carrying increasing complexity in single cells whenever chemistry in the 
      environment became more complicated and useful to cells but not directly 
      related to the original maintained chemistry of the basic cell cytoplasm.” 
      Williams, R.J.P. 2011. “Chemical advances in evolution by and changes in 
      use of space during time.” Journal of Theoretical Biology. 268: 146-159. 
      P. 156.
      
      
      “Recall Hutchinson’s definition of the fundamental niche of a species: a 
      hypervolume of environmental variables, ‘every point of which corresponds 
      to a state of the environment which would permit the species to exist 
      indefinitely.’ Most differences in niche concepts depend on the 
      formulation and relative importance given to three interrelated points, 
      considered in turn later: (1) the meaning of ‘exist indefinitely,’ (2) 
      what kinds of variables constitute the hypervolume, and (3) the nature of 
      feedback loops between a species and the variables composing the 
      hypervolume.” Peterson, A. Townsend, J. Soberon, R. Pearson, R. Anderson, 
      E. Martinez-Meyer, M. Nakamura & M. B. Araujo. Ecological Niches and 
      Geographic Distributions. 2011. Princeton University Press. P. 9.
      
      
      “Instead, we construct the multivariate environmental spaces for our 
      definitions based on variables that are not dynamically affected by the 
      species, like climate, topography, and perhaps some habitat features, in 
      contrast to variables that are dynamically modified (linked), such as 
      consumed resources or those that are subject to modification by niche 
      construction. We use the term ‘dynamically linked’ in the sense of terms 
      that appear as parameters in population equations versus appearing as 
      dynamic state variables ... We call nonlinked variables ‘scenopoetic.’” 
      Peterson, A. Townsend, J. Soberon, R. Pearson, R. Anderson, E. 
      Martinez-Meyer, M. Nakamura & M. B. Araujo. Ecological Niches and 
      Geographic Distributions. 2011. Princeton University Press. Pp. 11-2.
      
      
      “The main meaning [of ‘niche’ underpinning this book] is explicitly 
      geographic in nature, and is based on E-spaces composed of scenopoetic 
      variables taken as conditions or requirements. These niches have been 
      called ‘Grinnellian’ or ‘environmental.’” Peterson, A. Townsend, J. 
      Soberon, R. Pearson, R. Anderson, E. Martinez-Meyer, M. Nakamura & M. B. 
      Araujo. Ecological Niches and Geographic Distributions. 2011. Princeton 
      University Press. P. 16.
      
      
      “Of course, other extremes of niche meaning are possible and important; in 
      particular, as we saw, niche concepts exist that are oriented toward 
      community-ecology questions, defined at local scales, and including models 
      of resource consumption and impacts. We will refer to this scale and 
      meaning as ‘Eltonian niches.’” Peterson, A. Townsend, J. Soberon, R. 
      Pearson, R. Anderson, E. Martinez-Meyer, M. Nakamura & M. B. Araujo. 
      Ecological Niches and Geographic Distributions. 2011. Princeton University 
      Press. P. 17.
      
      
      “Grinnellian niches, defined as subsets of scenopoetic environmental 
      spaces, are entirely different entities in this sense than Eltonian 
      niches, defined in terms of zero-growth isoclines, impact vectors, and 
      supply points.” Peterson, A. Townsend, J. Soberon, R. Pearson, R. 
      Anderson, E. Martinez-Meyer, M. Nakamura & M. B. Araujo. Ecological Niches 
      and Geographic Distributions. 2011. Princeton University Press. P. 17.
      
      
      “In the classic niche literature, the only population interactions 
      considered are competitive and predator-prey interactions. The inclusion 
      of positive (mutualistic) interactors, however, represents an important 
      gap in niche theory. Although we acknowledge this gap, we restrict our 
      discussion to negative interactions, since available theory regarding 
      Eltonian niches has disregarded mutualism almost entirely.” Peterson, A. 
      Townsend, J. Soberon, R. Pearson, R. Anderson, E. Martinez-Meyer, M. 
      Nakamura & M. B. Araujo. Ecological Niches and Geographic Distributions. 
      2011. Princeton University Press. P. 27.
      
      
      “Water plays an indirect but crucial role in the story of life on earth 
      through geophysical and astrophysical processes of which Henderson could 
      have had not inkling. One of these is plate tectonics. Astrobiologists 
      believe that a healthy planet must continually recycle material if equable 
      conditions are to be maintained. For example, on earth, carbon becomes 
      sequestered in carbonate rocks and is released again in the form of carbon 
      dioxide when the rocks are subducted. Similarly, oxygen is prevented from 
      building up to dangerous levels by tectonic activity, which continually 
      exposes fresh material to be oxidized. Part of the reason Mars seems to be 
      a dead planet is because its tectonic processes have ground to a halt. 
      Water is a crucial ingredient in this story. If the earth’s crust were not 
      hydrated, the basalt would be brittle. The water content gives the rock 
      high plasticity that allows the plates to slide smoothly and material to 
      flow steadily through the mantle.” Davies, Paul. “Fitness and the cosmic 
      environment.” Pp. 97-113. From: Barrow, John, S.C. Morris, S. Freeland & 
      C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the Cosmos for Life: Biochemistry and 
      Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University Press. P. 106.
      
      
      “The central theme is the recognition of so-called ecomorphs. This term 
      refers to unrelated species that evolve similar morphologies in response 
      to equivalent functional demands within a given environment. As with other 
      examples of convergence, the degrees of similarity are seldom precise, but 
      can still be striking.” Morris, Simon C. “Tuning in the frequencies of 
      life.” Pp. 197-224. From: Barrow, John, S.C. Morris, S. Freeland & C. 
      Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the Cosmos for Life: Biochemistry and 
      Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University Press. P. 210.
      
      
      “Let us consider the situation at two levels: the sequence level (which is 
      the genotype because it is a direct translation from the evolving DNA 
      molecules) and the structure level (which we can think of as the 
      phenotype). As pointed out by Maynard Smith, as the sequence undergoes 
      mutation, the mutated sequences must traverse a continuous network without 
      passing through any intermediaries that are non-functioning. Thus, one 
      seeks a connected network in sequence space for evolution by natural 
      selection to occur. Considerable evidence accumulated since the pioneering 
      suggestion of Kimura and King and Jukes shows that much of evolution is 
      neutral. The experimental data strongly support the view that the ‘random 
      fixation of selectively neutral or very slightly deleterious mutants 
      occurs far more frequently in evolution than selective substitution of 
      definitely advantageous mutants.’ Also ‘those mutant substitutions that 
      disrupt less the existing structure and function of a molecule 
      (conservative substitutions) occur more frequently in evolution than more 
      disruptive ones.’ Thus, although one has a ‘random walk’ in sequence space 
      that forms a connected network, there is no similar continuous variation 
      in structure space.” Banavar, Jayanth & A. Maritan. “Life on earth: the 
      role of proteins.” Pp. 225-255. From: Barrow, John, S.C. Morris, S. 
      Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the Cosmos for Life: Biochemistry 
      and Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University Press. P. 243. References: 
      Maynard Smith, J. “Natural selection and concept of a protein space.” 
      Nature. 225 (1970), 563; Kimura, M. “Evolutionary rate at the molecular 
      level.” Nature. 217 (1968), 624; King, J. & T. Jukes. “Non-Darwinian 
      evolution.” Science. 164 (1969), 788.
      
      
      “There is increasing evidence that evolution along with natural selection 
      allows nature to use variations on the same theme facilitated by the rich 
      repertory of amino acids to create enzymes that are able to of catalyzing 
      a remarkable array of diverse and complex tasks in the living cell. The 
      key point, of course, is that a constant backdrop of folds not shaped by 
      sequence but determined by physical law is necessary for molecular 
      evolution to work in this manner. Were the folds not immutable and 
      themselves subject to Darwinian evolution, the possibility of creating 
      many subtle and wonderful variations on the same theme would not exist. 
      The pre-sculpted landscape is the crucial feature that leads to a 
      predetermined menu of immutable folds.” Banavar, Jayanth & A. Maritan. 
      “Life on earth: the role of proteins.” Pp. 225-255. From: Barrow, John, 
      S.C. Morris, S. Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the Cosmos for 
      Life: Biochemistry and Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University Press. P. 
      244.
      
      
      “Proteins, the workhorse molecules of life, are wonderful molecular 
      machines that carry out a variety of functions and speed up chemical 
      reactions by orders of magnitude. A single protein may have a variety of 
      capabilities, but the work it does, although efficient, is monotonous. The 
      situation changes dramatically when one has a collection of proteins 
      organized in a network. These proteins interact with one another, catalyze 
      chemical reactions, turn the gene on or off, and lead to the robust and 
      coherent behavior that we associate with life.
      
      The structure of the DNA molecule provides a beautiful explanation of how 
      it is able to encode information and the mechanism underlying its 
      replication. Proteins, on the other hand, are less well understood. One 
      could ask what kind of a phase of matter one would choose to house protein 
      structures in order to accommodate the important roles that these 
      molecules of life play. Our work suggests that a very special, previously 
      unstudied phase of matter is associated with the marginally compact phase 
      of short tubes with a thickness specially tuned to be comparable to the 
      range of attractive interactions promoting the compaction. This phase is a 
      finite-size effect and exists only for relatively short tubes; it is 
      poised near a phase transition of a new kind that lends itself to 
      flexibility in the structure; the structures that one finds in the 
      marginally compact phase are space-filling and modular in construction, 
      being made up of two principal building blocks – helices and sheets; the 
      total number of distinct folds is relatively small and only on the order 
      of a few thousand or so, and proteins are able to fold rapidly and 
      reproducibly into them. The price that nature pays for utilizing this 
      novel phase of matter is the relative ease with which aggregation of 
      multiple tubes can occur, leading to amyloid formation.
      
      “In his insightful book, The Fitness of the Environment, Henderson 
      extended the notion of Darwinian fitness to argue that ‘the fitness of 
      [the] environment is quite as essential a component as the fitness which 
      arises in the process of organic evolution.’ Strikingly, the chemistry of 
      proteins ensures that they are self-tuned to occupy the marginally compact 
      phase of short tubes. One cannot but marvel at how several factors – the 
      steric interactions; hydrogen bonds, which provide the scaffolding for 
      protein structures; the constraints placed by quantum chemistry on the 
      relative lengths of the hydrogen and covalent bonds; the near planarity of 
      the peptide bonds; and the key role played by water – all reinforce and 
      conspire with one another to place proteins in this novel phase of matter.
      
      “Proteins have proved to be difficult to understand because of (1) their 
      inherent complexity with twenty types of amino acids and the role played 
      by water; (2) their relatively short length compared with generic 
      human-made polymers, which means they are therefore likely to be 
      characterized by ‘non-universal’ behavior; and (3) the complexities 
      associated with the random process of evolution. Nevertheless, our work 
      suggests an underlying stunning simplicity. Although sequences and 
      functionalities of proteins evolve, the folds that they adopted, which in 
      turn determine function, seem to be determined by physical law and are not 
      subject to Darwinian evolution.” Banavar, Jayanth & A. Maritan. “Life on 
      earth: the role of proteins.” Pp. 225-255. From: Barrow, John, S.C. 
      Morris, S. Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the Cosmos for Life: 
      Biochemistry and Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University Press. Pp. 
      247-50. Reference is to: Henderson, L. 1913. The Fitness of the 
      Environment: An Inquiry into the Biological Significance of the Properties 
      of Matter. Macmillan.
      
      
      “As well as being essentially invariant, it became apparent during the 
      1970s, as more structures were determined, that the structure of the folds 
      is also basically hierarchical, consisting of secondary structural 
      elements such as the α helix and β sheet combined into more complex motifs 
      and that the same motifs (helix-turn-helix, β hairpin, etc.) recur in many 
      different proteins. The hierarchic nature of fold structure and the 
      recurrence of the same submotifs suggested that physical law is playing a 
      major role in the ordering of global fold structure and further supported 
      the notion that the folds might be a set of natural and lawful structures 
      rather than contingent assemblages of matter.” Denton, Michael. 
      “Protein-based life and protein folds.” Pp. 256-279. From: Barrow, John, 
      S.C. Morris, S. Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the Cosmos for 
      Life: Biochemistry and Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University Press. P. 
      263. 
      
      
      “A picture has emerged of a limited number of ahistorical forms that have 
      been secondarily modified to perform a vast number of adaptive functions. 
      A remarkable feature of these secondary adaptive substitutions is how few 
      seem necessary to cause adaptive shifts in protein function.” Denton, 
      Michael. “Protein-based life and protein folds.” Pp. 256-279. From: 
      Barrow, John, S.C. Morris, S. Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the 
      Cosmos for Life: Biochemistry and Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University 
      Press. P. 264.
      
      
      “The fact that the total number of theoretically possible protein 
      structures that an individual amino acid chain of 150 residues might adopt 
      – assuming that each peptide group has only three conformations – is 3150 
      or 1068 whereas the total number of permissible folds is of the order of 
      1000 graphically illustrates just how restrictive the laws of protein-fold 
      form are. Whatever the actual figure, the total number of folds is bound 
      to represent a tiny stable fraction of all possible polypeptide 
      conformations, determined by the laws of physics. This further reinforces 
      the notion that the folds, like atoms, represent a finite set of allowable 
      physical structures that would recur throughout the cosmos wherever 
      carbon-based life that utilizes the same twenty amino acids exists.” 
      Denton, Michael. “Protein-based life and protein folds.” Pp. 256-279. 
      From: Barrow, John, S.C. Morris, S. Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness 
      of the Cosmos for Life: Biochemistry and Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge 
      University Press. Pp. 267-8.
      
      
      “The discovery that the protein universe consists of a finite set of 
      natural forms in a sense completes the molecular biological revolution, 
      revealing finally – five decades after the nature and biological purpose 
      of DNA and RNA were first elucidated – the essential nature of the second 
      great class of biopolymers. It reveals that the purpose of the genetic 
      system is to turn out endless adaptive variants of a set of invariant 
      natural forms. The great complexity of the folds (among the most complex 
      material structures known) indicates, perhaps more clearly than any other 
      previous discovery in the biological sciences, that very great biological 
      complexity may be lawful and need not necessarily be contingent.” Denton, 
      Michael. “Protein-based life and protein folds.” Pp. 256-279. From: 
      Barrow, John, S.C. Morris, S. Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the 
      Cosmos for Life: Biochemistry and Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University 
      Press. P. 269.
      
      
      “Because each fold has been subjected to billions of years of selective 
      fine-tuning for specific biochemical functions, efficient folding, and so 
      forth, it is somewhat difficult to judge precisely which properties are 
      universal, generic properties of the folds and which are secondarily 
      evolved features. Nonetheless, as James and Tawfik point out, ‘An evolved 
      function can only evolve if it is already present to some extent,’ and 
      this presumably applies to all characteristics of the folds. Thus, four 
      characteristics that contribute to their fitness are likely to be basic, 
      intrinsic characteristics of the folds themselves: their architectural 
      diversity, marginal stability, robustness, and possession of a hydrophobic 
      core.
      
      “The underlying molecular architectures of the folds are, as we have seen 
      quite amazingly diverse. This architectural diversity is a major 
      contributor to their biological fitness, providing the basis for the vast 
      range of structural and functional molecular roles that they play within 
      the cell.
      
      “The folds exhibit a combination of robustness and marginal stability, 
      both characteristics that confer important elements of fitness. In terms 
      of marginal stability, the folds are nothing like the rigid conformations 
      conveyed in textbook depictions. In fact, the energy difference between 
      the native conformation of a fold and its denatured state is 
      extraordinarily small – about 5-15 kcal/mol – not much more than the 
      energy level of a single hydrogen bond, which is of the order of 2-5 
      kcal/mol. Studies by various groups, including those of Martin Karpus and 
      Hans Frauenfelder indicate that a protein’s native structure consists of a 
      large number of conformational substates. Instead of inhabiting a deep 
      free-energy minimum, a ‘V-shaped’ bowl with steep sides ending in a unique 
      deep pit, the folds inhabit a complex energy landscape that is more a 
      ‘shallow U-shaped bowl’ with multiple small depressions on its base. These 
      depressions are the substates, or alternative conformers, available to the 
      fold, each of near-equivalent stability. Marginal stability is critical 
      during folding, enabling the polypeptide chain to search conformational 
      space for increasingly stable conformations. Marginal stability and the 
      characteristic U-shaped energy landscape arise according to the ‘tube 
      model’ of Banavar and Maritan from a ‘novel phase of matter in the 
      vicinity of a phase transition’ in which the folds arise. The tube model 
      also implies that few other polymers may exist that will exhibit discrete, 
      stable, folded conformations associated with their characteristic marginal 
      stability.
      
      “It is this marginal stability and its consequences, the ability of folds 
      to adopt many slightly different conformations, that have permitted the 
      evolution of allosteric control mechanisms that link logical control 
      circuits with catalysis in the same molecular fabric – a phenomenally 
      sophisticated mechanism that Monod saw as the ‘second secret of life.’” 
      Denton, Michael. “Protein-based life and protein folds.” Pp. 256-279. 
      From: Barrow, John, S.C. Morris, S. Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness 
      of the Cosmos for Life: Biochemistry and Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge 
      University Press. Pp. 270-1. References: James, L. & D. Tawfik. 2003. 
      “Conformational diversity and protein evolution – a 60 year-old hypothesis 
      revisited.” Trends in Biochemical Science. 28, 361-8; Karpus, M. & G. 
      Petsko. 1990. “Molecular dynamics simulations in biology.” Nature. 347, 
      631-9; Frauenfelder, H., F. Parak & R. Young. 1988. “Conformational 
      substates in proteins.” Annual Review of Biophysics and Biophysical 
      Chemistry. 17, 451-79; Banavar, J. & A. Maritan. 2003. “Colloquium: 
      geometrical approach to protein folding: a tube picture.” Reviews of 
      Modern Physics. 75, 23-34; Banavar, J. & A. Maritan. 2003. “Comment on the 
      protein folds as platonic forms.” Journal of Theoretical Biology. 223, 
      263-5.
      
      
      “The rapid growth in understanding of biology, from structures to systems, 
      seems likely to expose many more sensitivities of life to details of 
      chemistry, physics, and history. The question has been posed as to whether 
      these advance Henderson’s interpretation of fine-tuning of the environment 
      or, more generally, what their anthropic significance is. In this chapter, 
      we examine features of intermediary metabolism, whose universality and 
      historical persistence suggest that they are not arbitrary products of 
      chance.” Smith, Eric & H. Morowitz. “Framing the question of fine-tuning for 
      intermediary metabolism.” Pp. 384-420. From: Barrow, John, S.C. Morris, S. 
      Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the Cosmos for Life: Biochemistry 
      and Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University Press. P. 384. Reference is 
      to: Henderson, L. 1913. The Fitness of the Environment: An Inquiry into 
      the Biological Significance of the Properties of Matter. Macmillan.
      
      
      “We argue that much of biological order comes from arrangement and 
      augmentation of near order in the underlying chemical world and that the 
      uniqueness of life is often found in this augmenting relation, rather than 
      in particular biological structures. What seems familiar and lawful to us 
      about life is often the lawfulness of the underlying physical and chemical 
      world, with which we have broad experience, as that order is expressed 
      transparently through the living process. We are seeing the environment 
      through life; the meaningful category distinctions are defined not by 
      specific molecular structures, but by specific relations to the 
      opportunities for structure formation in chemical and energetic 
      relaxation.” Smith, Eric & H. Morowitz. “Framing the question of fine-tuning 
      for intermediary metabolism.” Pp. 384-420. From: Barrow, John, S.C. 
      Morris, S. Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the Cosmos for Life: 
      Biochemistry and Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University Press. P. 385.
      
      
      “Living systems combine a strictness of regularity with a profusion of 
      innovation of structures, to a degree that seems unequaled in any other 
      single class of phenomenon we recognize. They are uniform in many ways, 
      but strikingly diverse in others. All organisms ever alive on earth, taken 
      together, account for a tiny fraction of the conceivable physicochemical 
      structures of comparable complexity, and their uniformity implies that, in 
      a statistical sense, the realized instances are drawn over and over from 
      that small subset of possibilities.” Smith, Eric & H. Morowitz. “Framing the 
      question of fine-tuning for intermediary metabolism.” Pp. 384-420. From: 
      Barrow, John, S.C. Morris, S. Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the 
      Cosmos for Life: Biochemistry and Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University 
      Press. P. 386.
      
      
      “Adaptation produces sensitive dependence in living forms quite generally 
      because it arises from growth with heritable variations. Differential 
      growth rates (including survival and fecundity effects) appear 
      exponentially with time in the population frequencies of inherited 
      features, leading to sensitive dependence of population samples of 
      phenotypes on small differences in their relations to environments. Under 
      situations of resource constraint, this can result in competitive 
      exclusion, through which not only the population mean, but all of its 
      instances, may be strongly biased by small differences in viability. The 
      relative growth rates themselves, which may not depend sensitively on 
      environment by any natural measure, are termed ‘fitness’ in Darwinian 
      population dynamics. Darwinian fitness is expressed through selection of 
      individuals – each one a relatively complex package of adaptations – in 
      response to the often complex characteristics of their environment. 
      Therefore, it frequently leads to sensitive dependence of complex wholes 
      on complex wholes.
      
      “Henderson appears to have appealed to this latter aspect of fitness in 
      characterizing the laws of chemistry and physics, as well as the earth’s 
      environmental composition, as ‘fit for life.’ The observed physico-chemical 
      environment is sensitive to his criterion that it be able to support 
      life’s complexity and also its need for homeostasis, rather than being the 
      result of any dynamic process that produces exponential dependence on 
      initial conditions, and in that respect is unrelated to Darwinian fitness.
      
      “Because of its variability, adaptability, and robustness, it seems likely 
      that life will admit relatively few easy category distinctions, such as 
      the carbaquist sensitivity to carbon abundance. Most of the ‘information’ 
      in the structure of life, about either its necessary circumstances or its 
      generating processes, will likely come from more specific structures, 
      which typically emerge at higher levels of complexity. Thus, in addition 
      to understanding the logic of anthropic argument and the flexibility in 
      its use of empirical sensitivities, we must understand the different kinds 
      of surprise carried by sensitivity in complex and simple systems.” Smith, 
      Eric & H. Morowitz. “Framing the question of fine-tuning for intermediary 
      metabolism.” Pp. 384-420. From: Barrow, John, S.C. Morris, S. Freeland & 
      C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the Cosmos for Life: Biochemistry and 
      Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University Press. Pp. 387-8. Reference is to: 
      Henderson, L. 1913. The Fitness of the Environment: An Inquiry into the 
      Biological Significance of the Properties of Matter. Macmillan.
      
      
      “Resilience and robustness can come from the same ability to track the 
      environment that leads to convergence or from a quite different ability to 
      absorb its variations, leading to a kind of antisensitivity. Such 
      antisensitivity is not exclusive to life; the atmosphere generates many 
      negative feedbacks that confer stability against geological and biogenic 
      shocks. Indeed, the pH stability of blood arises from its positioning at a 
      stable region of carbon dioxide solution chemistry in water. The fitness 
      of the environment for life may depend on its richness in such stable 
      regions, but not necessarily on the ability of natural selection to 
      exploit those regions.” Smith, Eric & H. Morowitz. “Framing the question of 
      fine-tuning for intermediary metabolism.” Pp. 384-420. From: Barrow, John, 
      S.C. Morris, S. Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the Cosmos for 
      Life: Biochemistry and Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University Press. P. 
      389.
      
      “Heterotrophy is possible because all organisms are composed of roughly 
      the same 300 small molecules (molecular mass < 500 Dal), into which all 
      food is broken down before being used directly or being reassembled into 
      several thousand kinds of polymer inside the organism. All major classes 
      of these biomolecules are synthesized from the eleven carboxylic acids of 
      the rTCA or TCA cycle, although sugars can also be photosynthesized from 
      3-phosphoglycerate by an alternate pathway.” Smith, Eric & H. Morowitz. 
      “Framing the question of fine-tuning for intermediary metabolism.” Pp. 
      384-420. From: Barrow, John, S.C. Morris, S. Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.) 
      Fitness of the Cosmos for Life: Biochemistry and Fine-Tuning. 2008. 
      Cambridge University Press. P. 390.
      
      
      “We thus characterize life as a collection of physical and chemical 
      processes of environmental constituents, augmented by biomolecules that 
      are rare or absent in abiotic environments. Different levels of living 
      structures, depending on their complexity, can behave more or less like 
      the common reaction networks in the abiotic environment. In particular, 
      those involving many reactions of small molecules that are strongly 
      distinguished by free energies of formation or kinetics of functional 
      groups may thoroughly and redundantly sample all allowed reactions with 
      one another (a kinetic generalization of the notion of ergodic sampling in 
      equilibrium statistical mechanics), selecting by familiar statistical 
      means the favored species and pathways. More complex structures such as 
      macromolecules – with a flatter energy landscape, more kinetically 
      equivalent combinations, and lower turnover in reactions – are both more 
      susceptible to accident and, as a result, more eligible to record 
      information within the organism about the environment to which it must 
      respond.
      
      “Genes, compartments, and catalysts are regulatory structures that must be 
      built from free energy and materials made available by metabolic 
      reactions. The metabolites are smaller and simpler than the regulators, 
      more of them are present in the ambient environment, and the possible 
      reaction networks among them are more densely sampled than the possible 
      networks producing complex structures. Thus, the reaction network of core 
      metabolism is expected to be more nearly a bulk chemical process than the 
      combinatorics of either nucleic acid or amino acid polymers.” Smith, Eric & 
      H. Morowitz. “Framing the question of fine-tuning for intermediary 
      metabolism.” Pp. 384-420. From: Barrow, John, S.C. Morris, S. Freeland & 
      C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the Cosmos for Life: Biochemistry and 
      Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University Press. Pp. 394-5.
      
      
      “Living processes contribute to thermochemical relaxation, but they are 
      not the only ones to do so. Many processes in convective weather, 
      chemistry, and engineered systems are examples of self-organized 
      production of conduits for the transport of energy and transport or 
      generation of entropy. Progression away from the unstable, unorganized 
      state is frequently exponential, giving rise to a physical form of 
      competitive exclusion similar to that seen in Darwinian population 
      dynamics at a higher level of complexity. (Indeed, it is natural from a 
      physical point of view to regard competition for bulk resources to build a 
      metabolic energy-transducing channel as the origin of directional 
      evolution in biology. Darwinian evolution is distinguished by the non-linearities 
      it injects into this bulk process, making the genome the unit of 
      inheritance and the individual the unit of selection.)
      
      “As we expect many biological structures to achieve stability by 
      exploiting statistical stability in the underlying chemical networks, so 
      we expect biological organization to be most likely where it follows 
      dynamically stable thermochemical relaxation pathways. Their stability can 
      be driven by the free energy stress they relieve, by their use of 
      near-equilibrium chemicals and reaction networks, or by the redundancy of 
      random relaxation pathways leading to them. Thus, a continuation exists 
      from physical self-organization to the energetically predictable biases to 
      Darwinian fitness.” Smith, Eric & H. Morowitz. “Framing the question of 
      fine-tuning for intermediary metabolism.” Pp. 384-420. From: Barrow, John, 
      S.C. Morris, S. Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the Cosmos for 
      Life: Biochemistry and Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University Press. P. 
      397.
      
      
      “All of these observations combined lead us to believe that the 
      development of modern life as a steady-state relaxation process in fact 
      took place through the sequential emergence of two separate channels. The 
      first in time, and the simple, was the emergence of reductive metabolism 
      through autocatalytic networks either identical or similar to the rTCA 
      [reductive tricarboxylic acid] cycle. All its reagents are small molecules 
      that are selected by simple kinetic and physical properties from the 
      complete set of CHO molecules of comparable size, and the reaction 
      networks involving them are relatively densely sampled, either within the 
      cycle or in the side-reactions that generate biomass from it.
      
      “The reductive metabolic core reactions are close enough to bulk physical 
      chemistry to be studied with the statistical mechanics of complete 
      reaction networks of small molecules, yet produce the biomass necessary to 
      support the full complement of compartments, catalysts, prosthetic groups, 
      and genes. The scenario requiring minimal happy accidents is one in which 
      most of the complexity of cellular life developed around this metabolism 
      over the first 0.5-2 Gy.
      
      “Reductive metabolism captures free energy ultimately produced by the 
      fission of uranium, thorium, and potassium-40 in the earth’s mantle, but 
      makes no use of the richer free energy stress from solar fusion reactions, 
      other than exploiting liquid water as a solvent in the habitable zone. 
      Photosynthesis captures this independent fusion energy source, but appears 
      to have become accessible only with the molecular complexity of modern 
      cells. It therefore evolved to be self-supporting by artificially 
      generating reductant to synthesize critical components such as the 
      porphyrins from molecules provided by the rTCA cycle.
      
      “It is a remarkable example of life’s robustness that the compounds in the 
      rTCA cycle survived the poisoning of the earth’s atmosphere by oxygenic 
      photosynthesis to remain the core of biosynthesis. Photosynthesis of 
      3-phosphoglycerate as well as reductant enabled the direction of the cycle 
      to be reversed, from self-generation to self-consumption, becoming the 
      oxidative Krebs cycle.” Smith, Eric & H. Morowitz. “Framing the question of 
      fine-tuning for intermediary metabolism.” Pp. 384-420. From: Barrow, John, 
      S.C. Morris, S. Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the Cosmos for 
      Life: Biochemistry and Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University Press. Pp. 
      402-3.
      
      
      “We have argued that metabolic pathways are statistically favored 
      relaxation channels in energetically stressed environments and that their 
      universality and stability result at least partly from this function. Yet 
      the only places we see these pathways capture a significant fraction of 
      element abundances is within organisms. Once modern organisms exist, their 
      greater efficiency than abiotic processes can scavenge useful reagents 
      from the environment, lowering the residual energetic stress below the 
      threshold to spontaneously induce life, so the dominance by organisms of 
      these relaxation structures may not in itself be surprising. However, the 
      essentially regulatory superstructure, which emerges with the complexity 
      of cellular life to enhance efficiency, distinguishes living from all 
      non-living relaxation phenomena that interact with the same reservoirs by 
      means of the same active chemical bond types.” Smith, Eric & H. Morowitz. 
      “Framing the question of fine-tuning for intermediary metabolism.” Pp. 
      384-420. From: Barrow, John, S.C. Morris, S. Freeland & C. Harper. (Eds.) 
      Fitness of the Cosmos for Life: Biochemistry and Fine-Tuning. 2008. 
      Cambridge University Press. P. 404.
      
      
      “All the regulatory structures we have discussed have at least a 
      qualitative category distinction from the reagents whose pathways we have 
      argued are most like those of abiotic chemical networks. To function, all 
      the regulators require polymerization of small molecules in the minimal 
      set of 300. Although cell membranes form spontaneously by surface energy 
      minimization, they are only stable with the addition of either amino-sugar 
      or cellulose cell walls or with the addition of membrane-dissolved 
      cholesterol and the cytoskeleton. Amino and nucleic acids are both 
      generated along short pathways from the TCA [tricarboxylic acid cycle] 
      core, but to be useful as catalysts and templates they must be polymerized 
      with particular sequences.
      
      “A qualitative difference arises between the somewhat sparse but orderly 
      sampling of the reaction network among all small metabolites and the much 
      sparser and more clearly contingent sampling of the space of synthesized 
      polymers. The reactivity of biomass, a consequence of its reduction 
      stoichiometry as shown in Figure 18.2, also induces small free energy 
      differences among different sequences, making the energetic landscape of 
      sequence space flat compared with that of the metabolites themselves.
      
      “Polymer sequences are therefore much more likely to be governed by 
      sampling bias in evolutionary history than are metabolites. One 
      consequence of this degeneracy under permutations of sequence is that 
      neutral models of population genetics can provide good first 
      approximations for the evolution of traits that depend on complex 
      syntheses, although this has also reduced most Darwinian arguments to 
      rationalizations and led to the complaint that Darwinian evolution is not 
      like other scientific theories. An important second point, however, is 
      that only such neutral molecules are eligible, by possessing a degenerate 
      configuration space with many states, to carry mutual information within 
      the cell about those characteristics of the environment that it needs to 
      anticipate. Although we have argued that it is an error to identify life 
      with polymer chemistry and sparse sampling, we agree that a qualitative 
      distinction of the informational and regulatory character of life emerges 
      with this class.
      
      “The regulatory structures have a universal relation to core metabolism 
      that appears to be a distinguishing feature of life. First, they are of 
      low metabolic load and can therefore exist in greater diversity than the 
      metabolites they regulate. Thus, a typical cell contains as many as tens 
      of thousands of kinds of polymers, most in small numbers, but only several 
      dozen metabolic reagents, in amounts that scale with the mass of the 
      organism, and perhaps 50 building blocks, cofactors, and prosthetic groups 
      that are shared among the polymers.
      
      “Second, whereas core metabolism generates net currents and an arrow of 
      time from non-equilibrium thermal boundary conditions, regulatory 
      structures inherit this arrow of time from metabolism, which generates 
      their building blocks as raw materials for combinatorics. Thus, the 
      plausible abstractions for metabolism are based on microscopically 
      reversible thermodynamics and chemistry, with non-equilibrium boundary 
      conditions. The more natural abstractions for regulatory structures are 
      cellular automata or the growth-and-culling models of Darwinian population 
      genetics. It is known that important prohibitions on the formation of 
      order, such as the absence of phase transitions in one-dimensional 
      systems, which apply to near-reversible processes, are not binding for 
      cellular automata because of their time-reversal asymmetry and 
      constructive dynamics. The opportunities for encoding stable information 
      are naturally larger in these driven structures for dynamical, as well as 
      sampling, reasons.
      
      “Finally, because regulatory structures usually do not flow between the 
      organism and its environment, and because they act catalytically within 
      the organism, selection of these structures takes place only through their 
      impacts on the rate of core metabolism and their ability to efficiently 
      draw energy and material from it for self-reproduction. (It is implicit 
      here that the fit participation of the organism in its living environment 
      is almost always a leading factor impacting the net core metabolism of the 
      ecology as a whole.) Those structures enabling greater bulk free energy 
      transduction, more efficient synthesis, or reduced thresholds to 
      autocatalysis either survive in expanded environments or exclude less 
      efficient solutions in existing niches.
      
      “We designate the reciprocal relation among components, having these three 
      properties, as ‘feed-down’ of regulation onto core metabolism. This is a 
      universal relational property of all living systems that provides an 
      energetic foundation for Darwinian fitness and governs the emergence of 
      complexity and innovation in evolution. Feed-down determines selection 
      bias on catalytic schemata competing intraspecifically to be the surviving 
      metabolic strategies of autotrophs and operates through material cycling, 
      as well as energy capture, at the level of ecologies. To us, these three 
      relational features of regulators to substrates – sparse sampling that 
      leads to history dependence, but also to the ability to carry information 
      about the environment; a limited gatekeeper role over the forms of 
      organisms; and selection through feed-down reciprocity that operates both 
      prior and subordinate to the gatekeeper role – are more fundamental to 
      life than any single chemical class or physical structure.” Smith, Eric & H. Morowitz. “Framing the question of fine-tuning for intermediary 
      metabolism.” Pp. 384-420. From: Barrow, John, S.C. Morris, S. Freeland & 
      C. Harper. (Eds.) Fitness of the Cosmos for Life: Biochemistry and 
      Fine-Tuning. 2008. Cambridge University Press. Pp. 406-8.
      
      
      “... the really impressive aspect of an enzyme is not that it is a good 
      catalyst for a given reaction but that it is an extremely bad catalyst–no 
      catalyst at all, in fact–for virtually every other reaction... Specificity 
      is what enzymes abundantly provide, and it is their specificity that ought 
      to impress us, because it is specificity that allows all the reactions of 
      life to proceed in an orderly fashion under the mild conditions that exist 
      in a living cell.” Cornish-Bowden, Athel. The Pursuit of Perfection: 
      Aspects of Biochemical Evolution. 2004. Oxford University Press. P. 4.
      
      
      “Like any other catalyst, an enzyme does not determine the direction in 
      which a reaction proceeds, nor even how far it will proceed given enough 
      time. These are questions that are decided by energetic considerations 
      that are independent of whether a catalyst is present or not; the catalyst 
      only determines how fast the reaction proceeds toward equilibrium.” 
      Cornish-Bowden, Athel. The Pursuit of Perfection: Aspects of Biochemical 
      Evolution. 2004. Oxford University Press. P. 31.
      
      
      “... most metabolic systems spend a large amount of their time in steady 
      states, and we can go some way toward understanding how biochemical 
      systems behave by restricting the discussion to steady states. In doing 
      this, however, we should keep in mind that it is only a beginning, because 
      many of the most interesting moments in the life of a cell involve 
      transitions from one steady state to another.” Cornish-Bowden, Athel. The 
      Pursuit of Perfection: Aspects of Biochemical Evolution. 2004. Oxford 
      University Press. P. 87.
      
      
      “... the appearance of metabolic steady states is a mathematical necessity 
      that does not require natural selection or any other special mechanism to 
      explain it ...” Cornish-Bowden, Athel. The Pursuit of Perfection: Aspects 
      of Biochemical Evolution. 2004. Oxford University Press. P. 90.
      
      
      “... negative feedback is very common in metabolism, positive feedback 
      rare almost to the point of nonexistence.” Cornish-Bowden, Athel. The 
      Pursuit of Perfection: Aspects of Biochemical Evolution. 2004. Oxford 
      University Press. P. 131.
      
      
      “Incidentally, in Rosen’s view evolution is secondary: one can imagine 
      life forms that did not evolve (e.g., fabricated ones), but evolution 
      without life is inconceivable.” Harold, Franklin. The Way of the Cell: 
      Molecules, Organisms and the Order of Life. 2001. Oxford University Press. 
      P. 223. Reference is to Rosen, R. Life Itself: A Comprehensive Inquiry 
      into the Nature, Origin and Fabrication of Life. 1991. Columbia University 
      Press.
      
      
      “More generally speaking, the essence of life as such does not only 
      concern the difference between a single living cell and its abiotic 
      surroundings, but also the self-regulating system-wide properties spanning 
      populations, ecosystems, or the entire biosphere. Thus, the emergence of 
      pre-macromolecular collective systems with life-like properties steps in 
      as the critical threshold for the origins of life.” Egel, Richard. 
      “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework for Origins of 
      Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A. 
      Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011. 
      Springer. P. 291.
      
      
      “The semantics of life would be incomplete without mention of information, 
      which is closely related to memory in any form. Evolutionary 
      self-organization always depends on some kind of memory to evade 
      stochastic equilibration in the flow of time. In modern life, the 
      biochemical memory is primarily based on DNA ...” Egel, Richard. 
      “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework for Origins of 
      Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A. 
      Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011. 
      Springer. P. 294.
      
      
      “Conceivably, self-organizing repositories of solely compositional and 
      structural information have preceded the emergence of genetic memory.” 
      Egel, Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework 
      for Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D. 
      Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal 
      Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 295.
      
      
      “Comparing rather diverse kinetic phenomena has uncovered far-reaching 
      similarities, as of tropical cyclonic depressions, orogenic island arcs, 
      continental drainage patterns, or living organisms. All of these dynamic 
      entities couple the dissipation of potential energy to collective flow and 
      concerted redistribution of matter. As such, they are part of superior 
      recycling systems at a global scale, which keep the entire Earth in a 
      gradually evolving state of quasi-equilibrium. At different levels, the 
      formation of stars and galaxies on the one hand, or socio-political 
      interactions on the other, can likewise be ascribed to energy-dissipating 
      aggregation.” Egel, Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a 
      Coherent Framework for Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, 
      Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal 
      Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 299.
      
      
      “... it is worth noting that living organisms have exaggerated the 
      roughness at the surface of the Earth enormously – starting at the 
      molecular scale of catalytic sites at micelles or membranes, and 
      culminating in the macroscopic appearance of forest communities or coral 
      reefs.” Egel, Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent 
      Framework for Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, 
      D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal 
      Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 301.
      
      
      “Certain macroscopic features of flow, energetics, and evolution in 
      cascading pond and drainage systems formally resemble other processes, 
      which at the molecular nanoscale have led to the organization of living 
      matter. Repeated retardation of flow at intermediate energy potentials, as 
      well as funneling of downward flow into conducting channels can be found 
      again at the biochemical level in diverse reaction pathways. The 
      retardation in reservoirs has an important buffer function, making energy 
      and matter available more evenly than following environmental fluctuations 
      directly.” Egel, Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a 
      Coherent Framework for Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, 
      Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal 
      Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 302.
      
      
      “Inasmuch as the prebiotic evolution towards life on Earth has likely been 
      governed by the structuring of catalytic surfaces in progressively greater 
      detail, the assumption of some kind of primordial surface metabolism is 
      quite valuable as a general evolutionary concept. Hence, this term as such 
      should not be solely associated with the particular kind of pyrite-driven 
      chemistry for which it was first proposed. In fact, the notion of 
      catalytic surface interactions has earlier roots in clay-driven models of 
      geochemical self-organization. Colloquially, the evolutionary potential of 
      surface metabolism models has been referred to as ‘primordial pizza’ 
      dynamics – in contrast with earlier notions of some ‘primordial soup’....” 
      Egel, Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework 
      for Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D. 
      Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal 
      Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 302.
      
      
      “In other words, the patchy environment where life can have started may 
      best be conceived as biofilm-like molecular associations in some kind of 
      geochemical reactor with many internal surfaces.” Egel, Richard. 
      “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework for Origins of 
      Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A. 
      Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011. 
      Springer. P. 303.
      
      
      “The cash flow of energetic coupling in endergonic metabolic reactions is 
      based on relatively few types of chemical bonds and compounds, as 
      characterized by quantized energy release on the one hand and mechanical 
      handles or anchor points on the other. The most readily convertable 
      currency of metabolic energy coupling is represented by ATP and other 
      pyrophosphate carriers. In the top-down ranking of universal metabolism, a 
      close second is the prototype coenzyme, CoA, where thioester linkage 
      activates carboxylic acid moieties for various transfer reactions.” Egel, 
      Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework for 
      Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & 
      A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011. 
      Springer. P. 311.
      
      
      “By and large, however, it is not unreasonable to assume a certain 
      congruence between metabolic networks in modern life and a prebiotic 
      protometabolism. In particular, the shell-like organization of metabolism 
      can be rationalized in evolutionary terms, assuming that the inner shells 
      assembled first in prebiotic, geochemical evolution.” Egel, Richard. 
      “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework for Origins of 
      Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A. 
      Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011. 
      Springer. P. 313.
      
      
      “Although modern biocatalysts are wonderful in many ways, they cannot 
      actually do miracles. Without proper substrates, all their marvelous 
      capabilities would have no effect. What really matters is which potential 
      substrates are present at a given moment in time, and which reactions can 
      possibly lead to other compounds. Primordial catalysts can increase the 
      rate of particular reactions over others and thereby influence the 
      availability of substrates for other catalysts nearby. Inasmuch as entire 
      ecosystems are capable of self-organization, it is the tenet of 
      metabolism-first scenarios that self-organizing molecular ecosystems 
      preceded the emergence and natural selection of cellular/genetic 
      organisms.
      
      “In terms of network analysis, emerging biocatalysts are both substrates 
      and mediating agents. Acting collectively in a communicative system, this 
      ultimately channelizes a flow of matter, as coupled to the conversion of 
      environmental energy for metabolic work. The effective coupling of 
      energy-rich compounds to endergonic reactions by emerging organic 
      catalysts is arguably the most far-reaching accomplishment in prebiotic 
      evolution ...” Egel, Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a 
      Coherent Framework for Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, 
      Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal 
      Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 314.
      
      
      “Under general growth conditions, providing that the overall rate of 
      covalent bond formation exceeds the rate of spontaneous degradation, the 
      variety of different multimers is rising. Formally, this entails a random 
      synthesizer function. Further feedback can then result from differential 
      breakdown; if unstructured, flexible, idling multimers are purged before 
      others that are tightly folded, substrate-bound, and stabilized. 
      Complementary systems properties have been proposed by Dyson and Kauffman, 
      assuming that, in a large set of different multimers, certain members will 
      catalyse the formation of others. In a process of autocatalytic network 
      closure, this provision will select for certain subsets where every member 
      is catalysed in its formation by one or more members of the same set. 
      Collectively, therefore, ‘selection at the chemical level can operate by 
      the preferential survival of useful molecules.’” Egel, Richard. 
      “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework for Origins of 
      Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A. 
      Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011. 
      Springer. P. 316. References are: Dyson, F. 1985. Origins of Life. 
      Cambridge University Press. Kauffman, S. 1993. The Origin of Order: 
      Self-organization and selection in evolution. Oxford University Press. 
      Subquote is from de Duve, C. 1987. “Selection by differential molecular 
      survival: a possible mechanism of early chemical evolution.” Proc Natl 
      Acad Sci USA. 84:8253-8256. 
      
      
      “As for activating free amino acids before their polymerization under 
      early-earth conditions by other means, a conceivable mechanism is by 
      reaction with isocyanic acid (HNCO), which supposedly entered the 
      primordial atmosphere from volcanic sources. In a bold and ingenious 
      revolving scheme, termed primary pump, this activation could have 
      facilitated the stepwise elongation of prebiotic peptides, while cycling 
      between tidal wetting at a flooded beach and intermittent desiccation.” 
      Egel, Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework 
      for Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D. 
      Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal 
      Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 317.
      
      
      “The thing primary pump and the SIPF [salt-induced peptide formation] 
      reaction have in common is that they rely on local energizing in a 
      generally anoxic atmosphere, as well as on the regular repetition of 
      wet/drying cycles. Also, they probably would not have worked if they only 
      had to rely on low average concentrations of amino acids in a primordial 
      soup scenario, comprising the bulk of the entire ocean. Yet, in a patchy 
      environment and in close association with a primordial geochemical reactor 
      that already was generating a local stock pile of carboxylic and amino 
      acids, the SIPF and/or primary pump reactions could have provided the 
      critical link to kick-start the tentative biogenic reactor to proceed to 
      the next level. Autonomous peptide formation should then take over, as 
      energized by a system-internal means of amino acid activation and 
      scaffold-guided polymerization of more and longer, yet still stochastic 
      peptides.
      
      “Neither the SIPF reaction nor the primary pump, however, have left 
      directly traceable relics in modern metabolism. So their potential impact 
      in kick-starting prebiotic peptide formation remains a matter of informed 
      speculation.” Egel, Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a 
      Coherent Framework for Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, 
      Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal 
      Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 317.
      
      
      “Metal chelation, such as phosphate binding in cups or nests can constrain 
      relatively small peptides into rigid conformations, presenting quite 
      specific binding epitopes for secondary interactions. In this pregenetic 
      phase of uncoded peptide evolution, selective fitness had a quite literal 
      dimension, dependent on physically fitting together complementary 
      configurations and eliminating other peptides that did not fit in with any 
      binding partner.
      
      “Together with phosphorylated metabolites and cofactors, this colloidal 
      community of peptides would further diversify by transpeptidation-like 
      splicing reactions and various kinds of cross-linking, resulting in 
      system-wide catalytic closure. To denote the relevance of this important 
      evolutionary stage, the guiding concepts of a peptide world and a cofactor 
      world can blend together in a tentative peptide-coenzyme world. At this 
      dreamtime stage of prebiosis, regular RNA as a replicative macromolecule 
      did not yet exist, and a prebiotic mode of ‘selection favored communities 
      of molecules that collectively were best able to catalyze synthesis of 
      their own constituents’. By this token, self-supportive – autotrophic – 
      molecular ecosystems developed before any proto-cellular organisms, no 
      matter whether the first of those would emerge as autotrophic or 
      heterotrophic entities later on.” Egel, Richard. “Integrative 
      Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework for Origins of Life on 
      Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, 
      Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. Pp. 
      318-9.
      
      
      “Unlike most other catalysts, the ribosome itself is not directly involved 
      in the chemical transpeptidation reaction as such; it does not form any 
      reactive intermediate with the substrate. To the contrary, for most of its 
      work cycle it actually forms a particularly unreactive intermediate, so as 
      to protect the energy-rich peptide-bearing ester bond from accidental 
      hydrolysis by ambient water molecules. Overall, the ribosome is 
      essentially a reciprocating ratchet feeder for repetitive transpeptidation, 
      from one ribonucleotide carrier to another. Assembled from many parts, it 
      forms an exquisitely refined and complicated molecular machine. The 
      processivity and quality controls that make it tick today must have gone 
      through many evolutionary steps.” Egel, Richard. “Integrative 
      Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework for Origins of Life on 
      Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, 
      Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 
      320.
      
      
      “Mineral surfaces appear suitable for the emergence of RNA polymerization, 
      and tidal cycling may have assisted in the periodic separation of template 
      and product in the primordial absence of efficient helicase activity. 
      Up-concentration in the pore space of freezing sea-ice is likewise 
      conducive of polymerization from activated monomers. With the emerging 
      ability to replicate a given parental sequence and producing self-similar 
      progeny molecules at higher frequencies than unrelated sequences, chemical 
      evolution has passed a pivotal threshold, so as to enter competition 
      between individual molecules for better reproducibility. Together with the 
      emergent tendency for self-similar replication, the prolific exploration 
      of sequence space to reach local or global optima should be greatly 
      accelerated by means of molecular recombination quite early on.” Egel, 
      Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework for 
      Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & 
      A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011. 
      Springer. Pp. 321-2.
      
      
      “Except for the involvement of tRNAs and ribosomes in amino acid 
      activation and trasnspeptidation reactions, all other natural ribozymes 
      engage in splitting and joining of phosphodiester bonds during processing 
      and maturation of RNA substrates. Among all the natural ribozymes, which 
      generally are embedded in ribonucleo-protein (RNP) complexes, only RNase P 
      and ribosomes facilitate more than a single reaction cycle, whereas others 
      are used up in their first and only reaction. Besides, ribosomes act more 
      as a mechanical shuttle and funneling aid than a genuine catalyst.” Egel, 
      Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework for 
      Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & 
      A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011. 
      Springer. P. 326.
      
      
      “The largest – and arguably most complicated – RNP machines are likewise 
      engaged in the processing of RNA. These are the spliceosomes of eukaryotic 
      cells, and there are two ancient kinds with only partly overlapping 
      composition. Since the overwhelming majority of eukaryotic proteins are 
      encoded by discontinuous bits and pieces in the genome, the corresponding 
      transcripts need to be spliced into functional mRNAs, prior to meaningful 
      translation by the ribosomes. It is the essential job of spliceosomes to 
      remove all those intervening sequences (introns) – forming a branched 
      byproduct (lariat) en route – and to join the adjacent coding parts (exons) 
      together.
      
      “There is a growing suspicion that spliceosomes indeed are ribozymes at 
      heart. Yet, like ribosomes, they foremost are formidable RNP machines at 
      large. In contrast with most other ribozymes, which esoterically engage in 
      single-shot reactions, spliceosomes are rechargeable in an intricate cycle 
      of dissociation and reassembly steps. Why this elaborate mechanism only 
      prevails in eukaryotes, but is absent in bacteria and archaea, has 
      intriguing implications for how to interpret the rooting of the universal 
      Tree of Life. As tentative relics from an ancient RNA world are 
      disproportionately more frequent in eukaryotic cells than in both bacteria 
      and archaea, it is not entirely unreasonable to consider that the basic 
      blueprint for eukaryotic cell organization, too, might be of more ancient 
      vintage than commonly believed.” Egel, Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: 
      In Quest of a Coherent Framework for Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 
      289-360. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins 
      of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 327.
      
      
      “The emergence of replicatable genes with particular metabolic functions 
      is one thing: their integration into genomes is yet another. There are 
      several modes of keeping functionally related genes together, all of which 
      are biologically relevant to various extent. Most directly, the nucleic 
      acid sequences of several genes can be connected into chromosomal 
      entities. Also, groups of genes or their concatenates can be anchored at 
      external scaffolds and/or be gathered in closed compartments. At the RNA 
      world stage already – with or without the help of uncoded peptides – the 
      RNA gene products had to be distinguished and separated from the 
      generative templates (the genes themselves), which likewise consisted of 
      RNA in the beginning. Furthermore, this principle had to cooperate with a 
      growing tendency to gather functionally related genes on a common plasmid 
      of chromosomal entity.” Egel, Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest 
      of a Coherent Framework for Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From 
      Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The 
      Primal Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 328.
      
      
      “The mutual entanglement of self-complication and self-simplification, 
      which characterizes Darwinian evolution, likely goes back to precellular 
      origins.” Egel, Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent 
      Framework for Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, 
      D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal 
      Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 332. Clarifying reference is: 
      Conrad, M. 1990. “The geometry of evolution.” Biosystems 24:6181.
      
      
      “As adaptive evolution gradually reduced the number of low-specificity 
      components and, in turn, increased the length of sequences, expressing 
      higher specificity and/or activity of system-supportive reactions, 
      complementary tendencies for simplification and complication went hand in 
      hand.” Egel, Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent 
      Framework for Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, 
      D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal 
      Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 333.
      
      
      “As redundancy is required for many components at various levels, a simple 
      genes-inside-vesicles model faces depletion by stochastic losses at each 
      division and would hardly be viable early on. Instead, before long multi-genic 
      plasmids and/or chromosomes had been established, together with effective 
      proof reading, damage repair systems and segregation mechanisms, extensive 
      masses of proto-cytoplasmic hydrogels had to remain connected in a state 
      of confluence, spanning volumes much larger than presently seen in 
      bacteria. Presumably, therefore, proto-cytoplasm and vesicular membranes 
      coevolved for a long period, irrespective whether most of the membranes 
      occurred inside or outside the proto-cytoplasm.” Egel, Richard. 
      “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework for Origins of 
      Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A. 
      Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011. 
      Springer. P. 333.
      
      
      “... I am led by the notion that precellular systems were highly organized 
      internally, before they could ever become miniaturized as genuine cells in 
      the modern sense. In this scenario, precellular life is more concerned 
      with sessile growth and spatial organization, than with periodic division 
      at the earliest possible time. Such priorities are more related to the 
      molecular ecology of biofilms, than to free-living, suspended individuals 
      and populations.” Egel, Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a 
      Coherent Framework for Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, 
      Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal 
      Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 334.
      
      
      “Seen from the vantage point of a coherent precellular molecular 
      ecosystem, a direct path to eukaryotic cell organization poses no 
      mystifying conundrum at any step.” Egel, Richard. “Integrative 
      Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework for Origins of Life on 
      Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, 
      Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 
      339.
      
      
      “A particular trait of eukaryotic cells is no longer contested by any 
      party – that mitochondria are of bacterial descent. In fact, modern 
      eukaryotes have attained other endosymbionts repeatedly in various 
      lineages, as commonly mediated by engulfment – phagocytosis without 
      digestion.” Egel, Richard. “Integrative Perspectives: In Quest of a 
      Coherent Framework for Origins of Life on Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, 
      Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal 
      Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 340.
      
      
      “Presumably, the long transition from geochemical origins to organismal 
      life has passed through several stages:
      
      • Carboxylic acids, aldol phosphates, amino acids, heterocyclics, and 
      other organic compounds accumulated in the multi-connected pore space of 
      mineral-catalytic, and probably photon-activated, geochemical reactors.
      • Self-stabilizing proto-metabolic networks coalesced as a 
      mineral-cofactor world scenario.
      • Peptide-like amino acid polymers added catalytic potential to 
      water-hydrophobic interfaces, at proto-membranes of hydrogels in a 
      peptide-cofactor world scenario.
      • From a dual role of ribose phosphates, acting both in amino acid 
      activation and in ribonucleotide polymerization, ribozymes and RNPd 
      (RNA-peptide) complexes took over in a cofactor-assisted RNPd world 
      scenario.
      • By speeding up the generation of stochastic peptides, as followed by the 
      adoption of sequence-specifying coding rules, the ever more sophisticated 
      protoribosomes ushered in the currently prevailing regimen of RNA-encoded 
      protein synthesis.
      • The initially self-sufficient RNP (RNA-protein) world regimen was subsequently backed 
      up by genomic DNA for higher genetic stability – the modern RNA- and 
      protein-assisted DNA world.
      • Presumably up to the RNP world level, a pervasive communal precellular 
      system organized itself as a primarily photoautotrophic molecular 
      ecosystem, mostly subject to K-selection.
      • With the generation of autonomously viable and propagative cell-like 
      systems (cellular escape), free-living populations of r-selected organisms 
      could enrich the evolutionary scene, which quickly differentiated into 
      multiple ecological niches, comprising both autotrophic producers and 
      heterotrophic recyclers of various kinds.
      
      “As for the sluggish, sessile, and communal precellular systems of the 
      LUCAS era, we have no phylogenetic indication that any complex 
      (non-bacterial) descendents survived on the bacterial side of the primal 
      dichotomy. Only the planctobacterial superphylum may come closest to such 
      an evolutionary relic. On the archaeal side, however, complex remnants 
      were not necessarily wiped out altogether by the newly appearing 
      r-selected prokaryotic cells. Instead, a mutual adjustment process let 
      other precellular remnants specialize in recycling of particulate organic 
      matter, including the engulfment of free-living cells. Eventually, some 
      complex communal remnants organized themselves as more slowly evolving 
      proto-eukaryotic macro-cells. The prokaryotic micro-cells, in turn, became 
      smaller in size but more prolific and ubiquitous by sheer numbers. Mainly 
      relying on phagocytosis of prokaryotic cells for a living, the complex 
      macro-cells had no need to miniaturize. Instead, they could retain and 
      perfect much higher degrees of cytoskeletal infrastructure and 
      compartmentalization at subcellular levels. At least once in such 
      engulfing cells, bacterial cells were retained as perpetuating 
      proto-mitochondrial endosymbionts. These compound cells gave rise to all 
      the eukaryotes of the modern era.” Egel, Richard. “Integrative 
      Perspectives: In Quest of a Coherent Framework for Origins of Life on 
      Earth.” Pp. 289-360. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, 
      Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. Pp. 
      342-4.
      
      
      “One of the consequences of the sharpening differentiation among domains 
      once suffused with the national, or the supranational, is that at the 
      limit this can enable a proliferation of temporal and spatial framings and 
      a proliferation of normative orders where once the dominant logic was 
      toward producing unitary spatial, temporal, and normative framings. Even 
      though this is a partial rather than all-encompassing development, its 
      character is strategic.” Sassen, Saskia. Territory, Authority, Rights: 
      From Medieval to Global Assemblages. 2006. Princeton University Press. P. 
      421.
      
      
      “In earlier periods, including Bretton Woods, that [organizing] logic was 
      geared toward building national states; in today’s phase, it is geared 
      toward building global systems inside national states. One consequence of 
      that difference in the economic arena, perhaps still the most legible 
      domain, is the fact that in the earlier period the development of the 
      world scale and the growth of international rivalry were directly related 
      while today they are inversely related....
      
      “The opposite dynamic was at work in the development of the earlier world 
      scale. Where today’s global systems seek to over-ride interstate military 
      conflict, those of the late 1800s and early 1900s fed such conflicts. 
      Further, as they grow stronger, today’s global systems succeed more and 
      more at diluting (or suppressing) rivalries among the major powers, while 
      in the earlier period interstate rivalries became sharper as each of the 
      major national powers grew stronger.” Sassen, Saskia. Territory, 
      Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages. 2006. Princeton 
      University Press. P. 16.
      
      
      “In turn, as the formation of the national state and capitalism proceeded 
      through the seventeenth century and onward through the twentieth century, 
      the practices and projects that constituted the world scale evolved and 
      reached considerable diversification of flows, institutionalization, and 
      development of formidable administrative capacities. However, the 
      organizing logics remained geared toward building national political 
      economies.” Sassen, Saskia. Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to 
      Global Assemblages. 2006. Princeton University Press. Pp. 20-1.
      
      
      “... globalization is not simply growing interdependence–its typical 
      definition–but the actual production of spatial and temporal frames that 
      simultaneously inhabit national structures and are distinct from national 
      spatial and temporal frames as these have been historically constructed.” 
      Sassen, Saskia. Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global 
      Assemblages. 2006. Princeton University Press. P. 23.
      
      
      “The crux of the argument is that, in hominins, the act of opposing 
      dominant individuals involves a form of cooperation. Thus, by tracking 
      evidence in favor of enhanced cooperation, we can indirectly find evidence 
      of hominins evolving the capacity to disrupt dominance hierarchies.” 
      Dubreuil, Benoit. Human Evolution and The Origins of Hierarchies: The 
      State of Nature. 2010. Cambridge University Press. P. 6.
      
      
      “I argue that the most significant turning point between nonstate and 
      state societies occurs when an individual is authorized to delegate to 
      others the power to sanction normative transgressions. This is the 
      beginning of political centralization and of the hierarchical integration 
      that characterize many state institutions: the military, juridical, 
      administrative, and (sometimes) religious systems.” Dubreuil, Benoit. 
      Human Evolution and The Origins of Hierarchies: The State of Nature. 2010. 
      Cambridge University Press. P. 8.
      
      
      “Indeed, humans have the ability to share attention not only to physical 
      objects but also to actions or events. Consequently, parents can draw the 
      attention of children to stereotypical actions and attach a negative or 
      positive sanction to them. This is basically what socialization is about: 
      children learn through repetitive social sanctions that some actions are 
      forbidden, permitted, or obligatory.” Dubreuil, Benoit. Human Evolution 
      and The Origins of Hierarchies: The State of Nature. 2010. Cambridge 
      University Press. P. 64.
      
      
      “For instance, low-ranking male chimpanzees quickly learn that getting too 
      close to a female in estrus can make high-ranking males quite angry. They 
      quickly understand that it is advantageous to sneak into the bushes to 
      avoid punishment. Non-human primates also have all kinds of ritual 
      gestures to signal their good intentions. Many of these gestures are the 
      outcome of social learning. Nonhuman primates develop expectations about 
      social actions, and these expectations contribute to shaping their social 
      preferences.
      
      “There is no question that similar learning process shapes human 
      expectations and social preferences. The difference, however, is that 
      humans also develop a subset of expectations about actions that are 
      sanctioned in the context of shared attention. This set of expectations 
      can be qualified as ‘normative.’ In everyday life, normative expectations 
      are frequently contrasted with other behavioral expectations. For 
      instance, women often expect their employers to be upset if they find out 
      that they are pregnant, but they generally do not expect to be blamed by 
      their employers for being pregnant.” Dubreuil, Benoit. Human Evolution and 
      The Origins of Hierarchies: The State of Nature. 2010. Cambridge 
      University Press. P. 65.
      
      
      “Philosopher John Searle has claimed that normative expectations in humans 
      are distinctive in that they are ‘socially constructed.’ In the framework 
      presented here, constructing normative expectations socially implies 
      sharing attention to the action while attaching a positive or negative 
      sanction to it. In the socialization process, basic norms take the form of 
      stereotypical actions and scenes to which sanction will be attached 
      overtly in the context of joint attention. In that sense, norms are 
      similar to other conventional concepts on which natural language is 
      based.” Dubreuil, Benoit. Human Evolution and The Origins of Hierarchies: 
      The State of Nature. 2010. Cambridge University Press. Pp. 65-6.
      
      
      “The mechanisms underlying normativity and sanction provide a solution to 
      the collective problem of dominance. However, because they are general 
      social mechanisms, they also secure cooperation in many other areas of 
      social life.” Dubreuil, Benoit. Human Evolution and The Origins of 
      Hierarchies: The State of Nature. 2010. Cambridge University Press. P. 67.
      
      
      “What emerges from Table 2.1 is a punctuate evolution with two major 
      behavioral transitions:
      
      “1. Early Homo erectus sensu lato presents strong evidence of increased 
      cooperation for two of the points that we examined: he was ecologically 
      more flexible than his predecessors, probably because of his modern body, 
      and he shifted to a higher quality diet.
      
      “2. Homo heidelbergensis presents strong evidence of increased 
      cooperation for all but one of the points discussed. There is no 
      unambiguous evidence of long-term support for incapacitated individuals 
      among these hominins, but this can easily be due to the scarcity of the 
      fossil record. Even the much better known Neanderthal record has provided 
      only a few indisputable specimens.”
      [Four other points of evidence for cooperation: “Habitual use of fire, 
      cooking, and reliance on large-game hunting; Prolonged infancy compared to 
      apes; Secondary altriciality and modern birth mechanism; Reduced sexual 
      dimorphism and restricted mating access”]
      Dubreuil, Benoit. Human Evolution and The Origins of Hierarchies: The 
      State of Nature. 2010. Cambridge University Press. Pp. 84-5.
      
      
      “I have argued in this chapter that, with regard to cooperation and social 
      norms, the archaeological record suggests that at least two major 
      behavioral transitions occurred since our last common ancestor with 
      chimpanzees. The first took place in early Homo erectus and can be related 
      to a change in social motivations that made cooperative feeding more 
      advantageous. It provoked a shift to a more versatile, higher quality 
      diet, as well as the colonization of a new ecological niche. The second, 
      which occurred in Homo heidelbergensis or slightly earlier, can be 
      explained by enhanced cognitive control that facilitated investment in 
      long-term public goods games such as cooperative breeding.
      
      “If my argument is correct and these changes really occurred, they must 
      have had a major impact on traditional dominance hierarchies. Had the 
      early Homo erectus been interested in sharing attention with its 
      conspecifics, it would have been more prone to engage in cooperative 
      resistance against aggressive and violent individuals. A few hundred 
      thousand years later, enhanced cognitive control could have given groups 
      of Homo heidelbergensis the capacity to turn down the aspirations of their 
      most aggressive members. We will never know exactly how our ancestors 
      lived or the specific tactics they used to resist dominance. Nevertheless, 
      the best guess as of now would be that a few hundred thousand years ago 
      hominins were living in nearly egalitarian foraging bands, successfully 
      resisting despotic individuals. Although dominance hierarchies were 
      eradicated, modern status hierarchies had not yet been created. Homo 
      erectus, Homo heidelbergensis, and Homo neanderthalensis had no more alpha 
      males, but not yet a chief, a priest, or a president.” Dubreuil, Benoit. 
      Human Evolution and The Origins of Hierarchies: The State of Nature. 2010. 
      Cambridge University Press. P. 90.
      
      
      “The African evidence suggests that, tens of thousands of years ago, 
      populations of modern Homo sapiens began to formally organize their social 
      life in building tribal networks in which local bands were embedded. In a 
      species capable of building such institutions, hierarchies could reappear, 
      given the right circumstances.” Dubreuil, Benoit. Human Evolution and The 
      Origins of Hierarchies: The State of Nature. 2010. Cambridge University 
      Press. P. 93.
      
      
      “If the categorization of an individual as a ‘mother’ or as a ‘child’ can 
      be based simply on behavioral cues, the successful construction of 
      concepts such as ‘president,’ ‘chief,’ or ‘priest’ depends on our capacity 
      to represent the point of view of other persons on the ascribed concept. 
      It makes no sense to say that someone is a priest or a president if she 
      has no idea what it means to be a priest or a president. At a minimum, I 
      need to consider the status from my point of view and from the point of 
      view of the other person. In sum, institution-making in humans builds on 
      our capacity to consider and coordinate alternative perspectives on 
      concepts. This capacity requires more than the faculty of language as it 
      is ordinarily understood.
      
      “1. It implies that we have the right affects and that we are interested 
      in sharing attention with our conspecifics. I proposed in the previous 
      chapter some reasons to believe that this ability was in place early in 
      the human lineage.
      
      “2. It implies executive functions such as inhibition and working memory, 
      located in large part in the prefrontal cortex. Given the relative stasis 
      of the frontal lobe during the last 500,000 years and the presence of 
      long-term cooperative ventures in Homo heidelbergensis, these abilities 
      were probably in place before the morphological and the behavioral 
      modernization of Homo sapiens.
      
      “3. Finally, it entails sufficient attentional flexibility to look 
      simultaneously at a a person as a man or as a president, or at an object 
      as a tool and as a ritual object. Such tasks rely heavily on the 
      temporoparietal areas, and as these areas underwent significant 
      reorganization in line with the globularization of the cranium, I propose 
      that the cognitive modernization of Homo sapiens began there.”
      Dubreuil, Benoit. Human Evolution and The Origins of Hierarchies: The 
      State of Nature. 2010. Cambridge University Press. P. 136.
      
      
      “Put briefly, my point is that the cognitive mechanisms underlying human 
      behavioral modernization also stand behind the reappearance of hierarchies 
      in our species. Hierarchies in modern humans are not of the same kind as 
      those found in our closer relatives, but build on our ability for 
      collective ascription of status. Humans can be bullies – there is no doubt 
      about that – but leaders or rulers cannot be equated with alpha males. 
      They can be violent and exploitative, but they do not need to be so.
      
      “I think that evidence in favor of uniquely human social organization 
      appears quite early in the archaeological record. As noted, the presence 
      of raw materials from distant sources (>100 km) in MSA [Middle Stone Age] 
      sites as old as 130,000 BP suggests that modern humans were already 
      engaged in long-distance exchange networks at that time. Among modern 
      foragers long-distance exchanges take place within tribal networks, in 
      which corporate groups (clans, lineages, etc.) are institutionalized and 
      are represented by specific individuals. It is tempting to see in 
      Paleolithic personal ornaments instruments that were used to signal one’s 
      place within such social systems.” Dubreuil, Benoit. Human Evolution and 
      The Origins of Hierarchies: The State of Nature. 2010. Cambridge 
      University Press. P. 137.
      
      
      “When people struggle to monitor who is who, punishing defectors becomes 
      more risky and less effective. People can thus go unpunished and break 
      social norms with near impunity. The risk to the group of fission 
      increases....”
      
      “My contention is that local groups that grow beyond the level of a few 
      dozen individuals have to find a cheaper strategy to monitor individual 
      behavior. One way to do this is to focus monitoring on salient individuals 
      and to take them as indicators of the trustworthiness of less salient 
      ones. It is not surprising that most functions of headmen in egalitarian 
      societies have to do with representing corporate groups (clans, lineages, 
      tribes, and other sodalities).” Dubreuil, Benoit. Human Evolution and The 
      Origins of Hierarchies: The State of Nature. 2010. Cambridge University 
      Press. P. 164.
      
      
      “Because normative violations have implications for collectives, certain 
      members of a corporate group are often made implicitly or explicitly 
      responsible for enforcing norms within the group. I term this second 
      relational mechanism the ‘social division of sanction.’ By that, I mean 
      that in such societies not everybody is equally responsible for 
      sanctioning normative violations. Rather, normative expectations are 
      created about who should sanction normative violations. In modern 
      societies, for instance, there are explicit rules that specify that the 
      right to sanction the burglar belongs to the judge and not to the victim.
      
      “Philosopher of law Herbert L. Hart has aptly captured this point with his 
      distinction between primary and secondary rules. To put it briefly, 
      primary rules are rules of conduct. They prescribe how people should 
      behave. In prelegal systems, their content is culturally defined by the 
      disapprobation that attaches to specific actions. Rules of etiquette are 
      probably the best examples of primary rules, but one can also think of 
      rules prohibiting violence or prescribing help. In legal systems, primary 
      rules can also be fixed by secondary rules; that is, rules that are 
      defined with respect to other rules.” Dubreuil, Benoit. Human Evolution 
      and The Origins of Hierarchies: The State of Nature. 2010. Cambridge 
      University Press. Pp. 166-7. Reference is to Hart, Herbert. The Concept of 
      Law. 1961. Clarendon Press.
      
      
      “My contention is that, although the range of possible arrangements can 
      vary indefinitely, growing group size depends on the ability to find 
      institutions that relieve the burden on cognition by focusing social 
      monitoring on a few salient individuals. If these individuals are turned 
      into reliable indicators of the trustworthiness of larger groups, the 
      costs of sanction may be prevented from rising.” Dubreuil, Benoit. Human 
      Evolution and The Origins of Hierarchies: The State of Nature. 2010. 
      Cambridge University Press. P. 169.
      
      
      “... higher theory of mind and perspective taking are essential for 
      creating both corporate groups and secondary rules. Consequently, only a 
      species in which these abilities are well established would be able to 
      generate the institutional arrangements that make it possible for human 
      groups to grow beyond the size of the band. If higher theory of mind and 
      perspective taking are unique to behaviorally modern humans, as I have 
      argued, then archaic humans could not have created either local groups 
      significantly larger than a few dozen individuals or tribal systems based 
      on the aggregation of corporate groups.” Dubreuil, Benoit. Human Evolution 
      and The Origins of Hierarchies: The State of Nature. 2010. Cambridge 
      University Press. P. 170.
      
      
      “The objective of this chapter was nevertheless to save one core 
      assumption underlying neoevolutionary approaches. I am not referring to 
      the idea of linearity or directionality of evolution, but to the 
      assumption that there is some functional link between large societies and 
      the emergence of hierarchies. I argued that this link can be explained by 
      the cognitive and motivational mechanisms that make punishing strangers 
      more expensive than punishing familiars. Growing group size thus depends 
      on the existence of institutions that control the costs of sanction. These 
      institutions can be corporate groups, indicating the trustworthiness of 
      their members, or secondary rules, allowing for a social division of 
      sanction.” Dubreuil, Benoit. Human Evolution and The Origins of 
      Hierarchies: The State of Nature. 2010. Cambridge University Press. P. 
      186.
      
      
      “In bacteriology, autotrophy has become determined by the growth of a pure 
      culture in a strictly inorganic growth media, devoid of any organic 
      compounds other than carbon dioxide (or carbonate) that serve as the sole 
      source of carbon. Subsequent studies have uncovered other one carbon 
      autotrophs that use carbon monoxide, carbon disulfide, methane and formic 
      acid as the sole carbon source.” Srinivasan, V. & H. Morowitz. “What is an 
      autotroph?” Arch Microbiology 2012 194:135-140. P. 135.
      
      
      “As several autotrophs seem to lie near the root of the phylogenetic tree, 
      the metabolist position suggests that the earliest organisms were 
      chemoautotrophs. The core anabolism shows great similarity among 
      chemoautotrophs indicating three possibilities: a single origin of 
      metabolism, a best solution to anabolism, an only solution to anabolism.” 
      Srinivasan, V. & H. Morowitz. “What is an autotroph?” Arch Microbiology 
      2012 194:135-140. P. 136.
      
      
      “The last 60 years have witnessed chemists developing an understanding of 
      organocatalysis and ligand field theory, both of which give demonstrable 
      low-molecular-weight catalysts. We assume that transition-metal-ligand 
      complexes are likely to have occurred in the deep ocean trenches by the 
      combination of naturally occurring oceanic metals and ligands synthesized 
      from the emergent CO2, H2, NH3, H2S, and H3PO4.” Morowitz, H., V. 
      Srinivasan & E. Smith. “Ligand Field Theory and the Origin of Life as an 
      Emergent Feature of the Periodic Table of Elements.” Biological Bulletin. 
      219:1-6. August 2010. P. 1.
      
      
      “They [transition elements] are characterized as having atoms or ions with 
      incomplete or complete shells of ‘d’ orbitals; the ones we are most 
      interested in are groups 5 to 12 in the fourth period and molybdenum and 
      tungsten in the next periods. They are part of a cluster of the periodic 
      table called the ‘d’ block elements/chemicals. In present day biology they 
      form a very small part of the mass of functioning cells, usually less than 
      1%, yet they play a central role as cofactors as well as essential 
      components in perhaps half of all proteins. The best studied for their 
      biological roles are vanadium, manganese, iron, cobalt, zinc, molybdenum, 
      copper, and nickel.”
      
      “As we noted, transition-metal complexes, or ‘d’ block complexes, consist 
      of a central transition-metal atom or ion surrounded by molecules and 
      ions, usually nonmetallic. When these surrounding structures are bonded or 
      otherwise attached to the metal, they are called ligands. This is a 
      restricted use of the word ligand used in ligand-field theory, which deals 
      with molecular orbitals and bonding of the metals and ligands. Ligand in 
      present-day biochemistry often refers to any molecular grouping that 
      attaches to a protein.” Morowitz, H., V. Srinivasan & E. Smith. “Ligand 
      Field Theory and the Origin of Life as an Emergent Feature of the Periodic 
      Table of Elements.” Biological Bulletin. 219:1-6. August 2010. P. 2.
      
      
      “In ligand field theory, orbitals are associated with the entire complex, 
      thus allowing for more chemical subtlety. The orbitals are still weighted 
      sums of atomic orbitals, but the s,p,d overlap renders the probability 
      functions more global over the entire complex.” Morowitz, H., V. 
      Srinivasan & E. Smith. “Ligand Field Theory and the Origin of Life as an 
      Emergent Feature of the Periodic Table of Elements.” Biological Bulletin. 
      219:1-6. August 2010. P. 3.
      
      
      “In a recent computational work, we sought to develop a broadly applicable 
      set of algorithms to ask whether and under what environmental condition 
      any two given species may be expected to display metabolic symbiosis.... 
      Surprisingly, we found that for most organism pairs, it is possible to 
      find a large number of putative environments that induce cross-feeding, 
      i.e. that support growth of the joint model, but not of individual 
      species. Hence, metabolism-based symbiotic interactions may be highly 
      abundant in communities, and highly dependent on environmental composition 
      and dynamics.” Klitgord, N. & D. Segre. “Ecosystems biology of microbial 
      metabolism.” Current Opinion in Biotechnology. 2011. 22:541-546. P. 542.
      
      
      “Genome-scale networks and algorithms are promising approaches toward 
      studying small natural or engineered microbial ecosystems. An outstanding 
      question is whether these approaches can be applied to the much larger 
      number of interacting species present in most ecosystems, and whether 
      large modular stoichiometric models are going to be useful and necessary. 
      One potential answer to this question comes from metagenomic sequencing 
      data, suggesting that while organism lineages fluctuate extensively 
      through time and conditions, the functional (and more specifically 
      metabolic) content of microbial communities displays dynamic stability and 
      correlations with environmental parameters. On the one hand, it does not 
      seem too surprising that the chemical make up of an environment (e.g. the 
      available redox couples) should, at evolutionary time scales, determine 
      what metabolic functions will be present in the microbial community. 
      However, if this ‘metabolic determinism’ has truly been shaping the 
      microbial world, this would have profound consequences on our 
      understanding of life and its evolutionary history on our planet. Given 
      this prospective of potential ecosystem-level principles of metabolic 
      organization, it may be useful to explore stoichiometric models that 
      consider a whole microbial community as a single ‘soup of enzymes’, 
      disregarding the boundaries of individual species.” Klitgord, N. & D. 
      Segre. “Ecosystems biology of microbial metabolism.” Current Opinion in 
      Biotechnology. 2011. 22:541-546. P. 543.
      
      
      “Indeed, in small-scale foraging social worlds, the cognitive problem of 
      effective coordination is more demanding than that of detecting 
      defection.” Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made 
      Humans Unique. 2012. Bradford Book, MIT Press. P. 10.
      
      
      “Fruits are designed to be eaten. But plants do not welcome herbivore 
      consumption of their storage organs, and hence they are protected both 
      mechanically and chemically. It takes a well-informed mind to find these 
      organs, extract them, and make them edible by soaking, cooking, and the 
      like.” Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans 
      Unique. 2012. Bradford Book, MIT Press. Pp. 13-4.
      
      
      “The idea, then, is that positive feedback links social foraging and 
      intergenerational social learning. Intergenerational learning provides 
      much of the informational fuel that makes social foraging successful, and 
      the rewards of social foraging support the life spans and expensive 
      metabolisms that make extensive intergenerational learning possible.” 
      Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique. 
      2012. Bradford Book, MIT Press. P. 14.
      
      
      “If specialists are more likely to successfully innovate in their field of 
      specialization, as seems likely, positive connections will develop between 
      elaborating social foraging, increased group size, and the rate of 
      innovation.
      
      “In sum, feedback loops form between individual cognitive capacity, social 
      organization, and the pace of environmental change.” Sterelny, Kim. The 
      Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique. 2012. Bradford Book, 
      MIT Press. P. 18.
      
      “The apprentice learning model has four important virtues. First, it 
      identifies a form of learning that can be assembled incrementally. The 
      reliable transmission of skill can begin as a side effect of adult 
      activity, without adult teaching and without adaptations for social 
      learning in the young. Once established, it then brings with it selection 
      for cognitive and social changes that increase the reliability or reduce 
      the cost of learning. Rudimentary but reliable skill transmission, 
      however, does not presuppose the presence of such adaptations. Second, 
      apprentice learning is known to support high-fidelity, high-bandwidth 
      knowledge flow. Until recently, much technical competence in industrial 
      society depended on apprentice learning. Virtually all technical 
      competence in preindustrial societies depended on it. Third, the model 
      fits ethnographic data quite well. Formal educational institutions and 
      explicit teaching are not prominent parts of traditional society. But many 
      forager societies organize and enhance children’s participation in 
      economic activity, and this approach supports the transmission of 
      traditional craft skills. Finally, the model can be shown to illuminate 
      the archaeological record, ...” Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: How 
      Evolution Made Humans Unique. 2012. Bradford Book, MIT Press. Pp. 35-6.
      
      
      “For those who think of culture in this way, the emergence of decoration, 
      public art, and ‘style’ is the archaeological signature of the transition 
      from mere group membership to consciousness of membership. According to 
      this view, the evolution of behavioral modernity is a cultural revolution, 
      a transition from mere coexistence with others to identifying oneself with 
      others. This transition is relatively recent; it took place (in this 
      picture) somewhere between 120,000 and 50,000 years ago.” Sterelny, Kim. 
      The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique. 2012. Bradford 
      Book, MIT Press. P. 49.
      
      
      “However, symbols that serve as insignia of social place and identify are 
      neither arbitrary nor displaced.” Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: 
      How Evolution Made Humans Unique. 2012. Bradford Book, MIT Press. P. 51.
      
      
      “In summary, then, the cultural learning characteristic of the Upper 
      Paleolithic transition and later periods of human culture–social 
      transmission with both a large bandwidth and sufficient accuracy for 
      incremental improvement–requires individual cognitive adaptations for 
      cultural learning, highly structured learning environments, and population 
      structures that both buffer existing resources effectively and support 
      enough specialization to generate a supply of innovation.” Sterelny, Kim. 
      The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique. 2012. Bradford 
      Book, MIT Press. P. 61.
      
      
      “Ecological cooperation selects for information sharing, and information 
      sharing makes cooperative foraging more profitable and less risky. The 
      critical premise of my argument was that cooperative foraging (of the 
      hominin variety) depends on technology and expertise and hence selects for 
      information sharing at and across generations.” Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved 
      Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique. 2012. Bradford Book, MIT 
      Press. P. 76.
      
      
      “We are obligate, habitual, inveterate, and adapted social information 
      pumps, sucking information and expertise from our social partners.” 
      Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique. 
      2012. Bradford Book, MIT Press. P. 76.
      
      
      “But an alloparenting world selects for more than cuteness. It will select 
      for (a) infant monitoring of mothers and others, (b) infant awareness of 
      the differences among the others, and (c) infant awareness of others’ 
      responses to its own action; awareness of joint attention and action. Once 
      care is a negotiable quantity, babies are under selection for social 
      skills, and that might help explain the recent results in developmental 
      psychology suggesting that infants have a surprisingly rich theory of 
      mind.” Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans 
      Unique. 2012. Bradford Book, MIT Press. Pp. 87-8.
      
      
      “But according to Marlowe, between perhaps 30,000 and 20,000 years ago, 
      humans added spear throwers, the bow and arrow, and poison darts to their 
      arsenal.
      
      “All of this matters because the ability to kill at a distance changes the 
      environment of cooperation. It became possible for individuals or small 
      groups to kill large animals in relative safety. Large groups that hunt 
      and kill together can share on the spot. The profit of joint activity is 
      accrued together and in full view of all, so no informational problems 
      arise in policing cooperation. Identifying and agreeing to a fair division 
      of a joint resource is much less problematic if everyone is a roughly 
      equal partner in a joint activity. Division becomes more problematic once 
      individual success becomes highly variable (as individuals hunt alone or 
      with favored partners), once the range of resources expands (making 
      commensurability an issue), once role specialization becomes important, 
      once reciprocation extends over time, and once individuals spend much of 
      their time, and enjoy much of their success and failure, away from the 
      eyes of the many. Cooperation is most stable in small, homogeneous 
      groups.” Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans 
      Unique. 2012. Bradford Book, MIT Press. P. 91. Reference is to Marlow, F.W. 
      2005. “Hunter-gatherers and human evolution.” Evolutionary Anthropology. 
      14:54-67.
      
      
      “Kaplan, Hooper, and Gurven argue that egalitarian, cooperative social 
      organization depends on four factors: (i) key resources cannot be 
      monopolized by one or a few agents; (ii) all adult economic activity is 
      highly skilled; (iii) female and male roles are complementary; and both 
      are important; and (iv) communities are small, so that bottom-up 
      mechanisms of norm enforcement, coordination, and decision work.” Sterelny, 
      Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique. 2012. 
      Bradford Book, MIT Press. P. 92. Reference is to Kaplan, H., P. Hooper & 
      M. Gurven. 2009. “The evolutionary and ecological roots of human social 
      organization.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 
      Series B: Biological Sciences. 364:3289-3299. 
      
      
      “We are intelligent because cooperation is at once risky and too 
      profitable to abandon.” Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: How 
      Evolution Made Humans Unique. 2012. Bradford Book, MIT Press. P. 101.
      
      
      “In short: if agents can commit–if commitment devices are available–agents 
      can enhance fitness by constraining future choice. Constraining future 
      choice enhances an agent’s capacity to deter. Credible threats secure 
      resources that enhance fitness. Constraining future choice also enhances 
      trustworthiness. Trustworthy agents can enter extended, profitable 
      partnerships that cannot be stabilized by mutual surveillance.” Sterelny, 
      Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique. 2012. 
      Bradford Book, MIT Press. P. 105.
      
      
      “Internal mechanisms [those dependent on the “agent’s own psychology” and 
      not on institutional support], in this view, were foundational to the 
      solution of commitment dilemmas and hence to the evolution of human 
      ultrasociality. In particular, Frank argues that our distinctive social 
      and moral emotions are commitment devices....”
      
      “As it happens, in hominin social worlds, the economic rewards of being 
      trustworthy are important. Agents who care about keeping commitments tend 
      to optimize their long-run economic welfare. As increasing resource take 
      tends to increase fitness, there is selection for being trustworthy. 
      Agents are trusted only if they can credibly commit; agents who can 
      credibly commit gain an advantage thereby, and that explains the evolution 
      of the commitment emotion complex. Commitment dilemmas were important to 
      hominin social life. And so we evolved emotions that are motivationally 
      powerful, emotions that are triggered by perceived violations of trust and 
      fairness, emotions whose motivational saliences are relatively insensitive 
      to utilitarian calculation, emotions whose occurrence are easily 
      recognized and difficult to fake.” Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: 
      How Evolution Made Humans Unique. 2012. Bradford Book, MIT Press. P. 107. 
      Reference is to Frank, R. 1988. Pp. 57-77. “Cooperation through emotional 
      commitment.” Evolution and the Capacity for Commitment. Editor, Nesse, R. 
      Russell Sage Foundation.
      
      
      “... commitment mechanisms do depend on costs, in three ways.”
      
      “First, costs amplify effects of arousal. Some commitment signals are 
      motivation bending rather than information carrying; they are 
      Krebs-Dawkins signals. Their function is to change the motivational 
      psychology of both sender and receiver rather than to reveal antecedently 
      existing characteristics of the sender. Singing, for example, is a signal. 
      But it has an affective impact on both sender and audience. Signal costs, 
      I suggest, up-regulate the effects of such mood- and emotion-altering 
      signals....
      
      “By amplifying the salience of both reward and punishment, reinforcement 
      is more effective in highly aroused situations. So joint action in 
      emotionally amplified situations reinforces mutual bonds more powerfully 
      than collective action in calmer emotional waters....
      
      “Second costs are investments. We commit through niche alteration. But 
      changing the world is not free.... Tattoos and facial scars are not (just) 
      signals but interventions. They make cooperation within the group the 
      right option in almost all circumstances, for the tattoos make shifting 
      social networks much more difficult. In advertising your origins and 
      affiliations, you inherit your allies’ enemies, whether or not you keep 
      your allies’ support....
      
      “Third, honesty has a by-product advantage. Honest signals can take 
      advantage of by-products that increase their credibility for free. A 
      dishonest signaler has to manufacture the evidence that makes a signal 
      credible as well as produce the signal itself.” Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved 
      Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique. 2012. Bradford Book, MIT 
      Press. Pp. 110-1.
      
      
      “Investment in building and maintaining relationships is a commitment 
      device, because such relationships change the payoffs in triggering 
      situations. If a triggering temptation arises, the costs of defection have 
      been driven up. Defection will risk fracturing trust and hence forfeiting 
      the profit from the investment necessary to build trust.” Sterelny, Kim. 
      The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique. 2012. Bradford 
      Book, MIT Press. P. 117.
      
      
      “But manipulation was a threat even in the small-scale, intimate social 
      worlds of most human evolutionary history. But though real, this threat is 
      not uniform. Other factors contribute to the robustness of honest 
      signaling. The kind of information that flows, the nature of the channel, 
      and the shape of the sender-receiver network are all relevant to honesty 
      and deception. In sections 6.2 and 6.3, I argue that some forms of 
      informational cooperation are much less prone to deceptive exploitation. 
      In particular, I argue that the transmission of expertise is relatively 
      immune to the problem of deception. That fact is important. It shows that 
      some forms of informational cooperation can evolve and elaborate without 
      requiring the prior or simultaneous evolution of complex cognitive tools.” 
      Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique. 
      2012. Bradford Book, MIT Press. Pp. 128-9.
      
      
      “The Condorcet Jury Theorem makes the value of information-pooling in the 
      face of uncertainty vivid. If each juror votes independently and has a 
      better than 0.5 chance of being right, as the size of the jury goes up, 
      the probability of a majority vote being right rises rapidly to near 
      certainty. So agents gain access to reliable information about their 
      environment if they have mutual knowledge of each agent’s assessment of 
      noisy signals, together with trust in consensus. Imagine a foraging party 
      trying to decide whether a swollen river is too dangerous to ford, which 
      animal in a pack to target, how to interpret the ambiguous behavior of a 
      neighboring group. There is no temptation to defect here. By voting 
      honestly and accepting consensus, each agent trades an unreliable 
      assessment of a relevant feature of the world for a much more reliable 
      assessment. Information pooling protects not just against deception but 
      against noise.” Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made 
      Humans Unique. 2012. Bradford Book, MIT Press. P. 137.
      
      
      “This shows that in some respects, information sharing is less subject to 
      defection problems than some forms of ecological and reproductive 
      cooperation. When cooperation has a physical product, conflict and 
      defection can arise over fair division of the product. A jointly produced 
      informational product–for example, a more reliable assessment of the risks 
      of a river crossing–is automatically available to all who have pooled 
      their individual estimates. In this respect, it is more like successful 
      collective defense than successful collective hunting.” Sterelny, Kim. The 
      Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique. 2012. Bradford Book, 
      MIT Press. P. 137.
      
      
      “It follows that in a heterogeneous and changing environment, no one 
      individual is personally exposed to all he or she needs to know about 
      resources and dangers, threats and opportunities. Unless early hominins 
      foraged together in a single convoy, differing individuals and teams 
      experienced differing spatiotemporal patches of their home range. Together 
      with a fission-fusion social organization, heterogeneity creates an 
      informational gradient and thus a potentially advantageous division of 
      epistemic labor.” Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution 
      Made Humans Unique. 2012. Bradford Book, MIT Press. P. 138.
      
      
      “Many-to-many networks combined with sharing information in advance of 
      action impose a veil of ignorance between a potentially Machiavellian 
      agent and potential targets.... The upshot, then, is that in public 
      signaling contexts, the chance that an attempted manipulation will be 
      detected is quite high. Its rewards will rarely be both high and certain. 
      Since the individual and collective benefits of local knowledge pooling 
      are significant, we can expect a default for honest signaling.” Sterelny, 
      Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique. 2012. 
      Bradford Book, MIT Press. P. 139.
      
      
      “They [plausible candidate early evolving forms of information sharing] 
      are low-risk forms of information sharing. Skill transmission, fast-fading 
      ecological information, and long-shelf-life ecological information are all 
      likely candidates for being early evolvers. The establishment of these 
      early evolving forms of informational cooperation in hominin social worlds 
      changed the nature of those social worlds, leading to selection for 
      individual cognitive adaptations. Those extended the range of cultural 
      learning, improved its fidelity and bandwidth, and managed the risks of 
      deception. Moreover, the interaction of informational and ecological 
      cooperation increased information gradients in hominin social groups and 
      thus increased the potential profits of information sharing and 
      communication. As forager skill levels increased, so did life expectancy, 
      intensifying an intergenerational information gradient. Specialization and 
      the division of labor likewise contribute to informational gradients, for 
      specialization results in agents exploring different aspects and areas of 
      their common range. These steeper gradients amplify the potential profits 
      of communication, thus contributing to the positive feedback between 
      cooperation, communication, and technical intelligence.” Sterelny, Kim. 
      The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique. 2012. Bradford 
      Book, MIT Press. Pp. 148-9.
      
      
      “One group can be fitter than another if it pumps more individual hominins 
      into the next generation (multilevel selection 1). Or it can be fitter 
      because it is more apt to produce descendant groups (multilevel selection 
      2). Sterelny, Kim. The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans 
      Unique. 2012. Bradford Book, MIT Press. P. 178.
      
      
      “Conventionally, Darwinian fitness is thing-based, measured in terms of 
      replication of discrete things. In ‘traditional’ Darwinism, for example, 
      the replicate is the offspring, while to a Neo-Darwinist, it is the atom 
      of heredity, the gene. One can take a more physiological view of fitness 
      as process, however, and here is where the future begins to creep back 
      into our thinking about evolution. Processes have a dimension of 
      timeliness that objects lack: they are properly quantified as rates. 
      Processes are traditionally the purview of physiology, but they take on 
      evolutionary import if they come to embody heritable memory. There is no 
      real reason why they could not. Replicable genes qualify as heritable 
      memory largely because they bias the future toward a particular state. The 
      fitter gene is the one whose bias reaches further into the future. A 
      physiological process can also bias the future, and by this criterion 
      could also qualify as heritable memory. In this instance, the forward 
      reach in time is embodied in persistence of the process: how likely it is 
      that the orderly stream of matter and energy that embodies the process 
      will persist in the face of whatever perturbations are thrown at it? A fit 
      process is therefore a persistent process: if a particular catalytic 
      milieu, or a particular embodied physiology, can more persistently 
      commandeer a stream of energy and matter than can another, the more 
      persistent stream will be the fitter. Homeostasis, therefore, is the rough 
      physiological equivalent of genetic fitness: a more robust homeostasis 
      will ensure a system’s persistence over a wider range of perturbations and 
      further into the future than will a less robustly regulated system.
      
      “A truly comprehensive theory of evolution, it seems, should be able to 
      accommodate both thing-based and process-based fitness. One way to meld 
      the two might be to define a new class of process-based heritable memory. 
      Allow me to put forward a candidate: persistent environments created and 
      managed by systems of Bernard machines. To differentiate these from 
      thing-based replicators, I shall designate these persistent living 
      environments as persistors. We place persistors and replicators at 
      opposite ends of a spectrum of forms of heritable memory: object-oriented 
      memory at one end and process oriented memory at the other.” Turner, J. 
      Scott. The Tinkerer’s Accomplice: How Design Emerges from Life Itself. 
      2007. Harvard University Press. Pp. 218-9.
      
      
      “Variation without persistence would mean that changes could not be 
      maintained and built upon during evolution. And persistence without 
      variation would bring evolution to a standstill.” Coen, Enrico. Cells to 
      civilizations: The Principles of Change that Shape Life. 2012. Princeton 
      University Press. P. 22.
      
      
      “A vast range of arrangements can be produced simply by joining a few 
      elements in different ways. I call this the principle of combinatorial 
      richness.” Coen, Enrico. Cells to civilizations: The Principles of Change 
      that Shape Life. 2012. Princeton University Press. P. 41.
      
      
      “Our seven principles–population variation, persistence, reinforcement, 
      competition, cooperation, combinatorial richness, and recurrence–and their 
      interactions provide the driving force for these journeys, leading to the 
      remarkable variety of organisms we see today. I have called this 
      collection of seven principles and how they work together life’s creative 
      recipe.” Coen, Enrico. Cells to civilizations: The Principles of Change 
      that Shape Life. 2012. Princeton University Press. P. 60.
      
      
      “Plant behavior is defined as the response to signals, and a plethora of 
      external signals are sensed and acted upon by green plants. Resources 
      (light, minerals, and water) figure strongly in a signals list that also 
      includes numerous mecahanical influences such as wind, rain, and touch; 
      gases such as ethylene and nitric oxide; soil compaction and particle 
      structure; and numerous biotic features, such as identity of neighbors and 
      disturbance, among many others.” Trewavas, Anthony. “Aspects of Plant 
      Intelligence: Convergence and Evolution.” Pp. 68-110. From Morris, Simon 
      C. The Deep Structure of Biology: Is Convergence Sufficiently Ubiquitous 
      to Give a Directional Signal? 2008. Templeton Foundation Press. P. 69.
      
      
      “Plants and animals differ fundamentally in the way they express behavior 
      in response to signals. In plants, it is phenotypic plasticity; in 
      animals, it is movement.” Trewavas, Anthony. “Aspects of Plant 
      Intelligence: Convergence and Evolution.” Pp. 68-110. From Morris, Simon 
      C. The Deep Structure of Biology: Is Convergence Sufficiently Ubiquitous 
      to Give a Directional Signal? 2008. Templeton Foundation Press. P. 69.
      
      
      “... unlike many animals, plants grow and develop throughout their life 
      cycle. Embryogenesis continues throughout the life cycle, and the 
      embryogenic meristems eventually form flowers. Environmental history can, 
      thus, pass directly into reproduction. The Weismann proscription that the 
      environment does not directly affect animal inheritance, because sexual 
      cells are protected from environmental variation, is inapplicable to 
      plants, strengthening the likelihood of neo-Lamarckian inheritance in 
      plant evolution.” Trewavas, Anthony. “Aspects of Plant Intelligence: 
      Convergence and Evolution.” Pp. 68-110. From Morris, Simon C. The Deep 
      Structure of Biology: Is Convergence Sufficiently Ubiquitous to Give a 
      Directional Signal? 2008. Templeton Foundation Press. Pp. 75-6.
      
      
      “Light reflected from vegetation is richer in far-red wavelengths compared 
      to red. Plants use that information along with its direction to predict 
      not actual shade but to foresee the likelihood of shading at some stage in 
      the future from a competitor. When a change in the balance of red to 
      far-red radiation is perceived, an integrated adaptive response in 
      phenotype structure results. New branches grow away from the putative 
      competitor, stem growth is increased; the rate of branching diminishes, 
      and such branches assume a more vertical direction; leaf area increases in 
      anticipation of reduced incident flux; and the number of layers of leaf 
      cells containing chlorophyll diminishes.” Trewavas, Anthony. “Aspects of 
      Plant Intelligence: Convergence and Evolution.” Pp. 68-110. From Morris, 
      Simon C. The Deep Structure of Biology: Is Convergence Sufficiently 
      Ubiquitous to Give a Directional Signal? 2008. Templeton Foundation Press. 
      P. 89.
      
      
      “There are a number of organizational similarities between plants (trees, 
      in particular) and social insect colonies.
      
      • “Both trees and colonies contain large numbers of replaceable foragers: 
      in the hive, for example, individual bees, in the tree leaf or branch 
      root, meristems.
      • “In both cases, reproductive and other functions are differentiated from 
      the same uniform genetic line.
      • “The hive colony is aggressive to invading outsiders, and entry points 
      are guarded. Trees use allelopathy to damage local competitive species and 
      possess induced defense reactions, such as natural pesticides, to kill 
      herbivores or invading fungi. These defense reactions can be complex, 
      involving chaotic pesticide production in different leaves so that the 
      herbivore is uncertain whether the next leaf is edible or whether 
      consumption kills.
      • “A good source of food attracts more insect workers through positive 
      feedback mechanisms and communication. Tree branches and leaves grow to 
      exploit light patches, and roots proliferate in mineral-rich zones 
      involving positive feedback mechanisms and communication.
      • “Just as entry guards to hives and other foraging individuals in hives 
      will altruistically sacrifice themselves to maintain the whole colony and, 
      in particular, the queen, trees will altruistically abscise their foraging 
      organs when parasitized by disease or damaged by herbivores. The 
      abscission zone, a layer of a few cells at the base of the petiole and 
      able to secrete cell wall weakening hydrolytic enzymes, will do so when 
      signals are received from elsewhere in the plant and the leaf blade to 
      commence abscission. The aim is maintenance of the whole individual for 
      later reproduction. Again, leaves and roots can altruistically abscise if 
      resources of minerals and water are short to ensure the future integrity 
      of the individual plant.
      • “Hive and tree behaviors are dependent on complex communication, 
      assessment of external status, and behavioral (plasticity) change. If one 
      is regarded as intelligent, so must the other.” 
      Trewavas, Anthony. “Aspects of Plant Intelligence: Convergence and 
      Evolution.” Pp. 68-110. From Morris, Simon C. The Deep Structure of 
      Biology: Is Convergence Sufficiently Ubiquitous to Give a Directional 
      Signal? 2008. Templeton Foundation Press. P. 92.
      
      
      “However, other organisms have developed intelligence in a very different 
      way from animals. Here, intelligence does not localize in a defined place 
      like a brain but is a property of the whole system. Animals learn by 
      exchanging dendritic connections between different cells, constructing new 
      neural pathways and changing information flow. Analogously, bacteria learn 
      by exchanging genes from other bacteria, altering information flow. Cells 
      learn by changing directions of information flow through signal 
      transduction pathways. Plants learn by changing information flow via 
      chemical communication much as social insects do.” Trewavas, Anthony. 
      “Aspects of Plant Intelligence: Convergence and Evolution.” Pp. 68-110. 
      From Morris, Simon C. The Deep Structure of Biology: Is Convergence 
      Sufficiently Ubiquitous to Give a Directional Signal? 2008. Templeton 
      Foundation Press. P. 94.
      
      
      “I argue that we do better to conceptualize functions as effects of 
      systemic components that contribute to more-general capacities of the 
      larger system. Emphasis falls upon the structure and organization of 
      natural systems and the work accomplished by components of such systems. 
      The function of the mammalian heart is to pump blood because pumping 
      contributes in significant ways to certain capacities of the circulatory 
      system. Functions are essentially systemic; history is not essential. 
      Functions typically have a history, to be sure, including a selective 
      history, but pumping would have been the function of the heart even if 
      some other device had beaten it out early in the evolution of mammals. 
      Functions are contributions to systemic capacities and, while selection 
      can preserve or eliminate those functions, selection is not their source.” 
      Davies, Paul Sheldon. Norms of Nature: Naturalism and the Nature of 
      Functions. 2003. MIT Press. P. xiii.
      
      
      “Thus, although systemic functions are not defined by reference to 
      historical success, they are defined in terms of capacities to contribute 
      to the exercise of some higher-level capacity. They are defined in terms 
      of the capacity for systemic success. Thus, when the capacity to 
      contribute is absent, so too is the systemic function.” Davies, Paul 
      Sheldon. Norms of Nature: Naturalism and the Nature of Functions. 2003. 
      MIT Press. P. 212.
      
      
      “For a finite-size flow system to persist in time (to live), its 
      configuration must evolve in such a way that provides easier access to the 
      currents that flow through it.” Bejan, Adrian & J.P. Zane. Design in 
      Nature: How the Constructal Law Governs Evolution in Biology, Physics, 
      Technology, and Social Organization. 2012. Doubleday. P. 3.
      
      
      “Flow systems have two basic features (properties). There is the current 
      that is flowing (for example, fluid, heat, mass, or information) and the 
      design through which it flows.” Bejan, Adrian & J.P. Zane. Design in 
      Nature: How the Constructal Law Governs Evolution in Biology, Physics, 
      Technology, and Social Organization. 2012. Doubleday. P. 3.
      
      
      “Where the second law commands that things should flow from high to low, 
      the constructal law commands that they should flow in configurations that 
      flow more and more easily over time.” Bejan, Adrian & J.P. Zane. Design in 
      Nature: How the Constructal Law Governs Evolution in Biology, Physics, 
      Technology, and Social Organization. 2012. Doubleday. P. 19.
      
      
      “Determinacy is a condition common to many (but not all) animals, in which 
      the body boundaries of ‘individuals’ are localized: these individuals 
      cannot be in two or more places at once and they inevitably die within a 
      fairly fixed span of time. Such individuals may be free to move about, but 
      they have little freedom to remodel their own body boundaries other than 
      by moulting or adding on extra segments as they get older. Although 
      animals which accomplish the latter, e.g. snakes and worms, are sometimes 
      described as indeterminate, they generally repeat rather than remodel 
      their previous boundary and so are better thought of as ‘modular.’
      
      “Since determinate individuals have a more or less fixed life span, they 
      have to reproduce if their genes are to survive. This situation may, 
      fundamentally, be related to the abilities of animals to ingest food and 
      to locate further supplies using various means of locomotion. It contrasts 
      with the indeterminacy of many plants, fungi, actinomycetes and colonial 
      animals such as hydroids, which are not fully motile and which receive 
      and/or absorb energy sources. These indeterminate organisms have at least 
      the potential to grow indefinitely, until or unless they encounter some 
      external limit to their expansion. Reproduction therefore provides them 
      with the scope to disperse and reassort their genetic information in the 
      long term, rather than being an absolute necessity for individual 
      furtherance in the short term.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees of Freedom: Living 
      in Dynamic Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College Press. P. 69.
      
      
      “A general property of relatively indeterminate systems is that they 
      branch, having first become ‘polarized’ by producing an elongating 
      structure that typically extends at its tips....” 
      
      “These important processes in indeterminate development, namely 
      polarization, branching, integration and degeneration correspond with 
      patterns that are common to all kinds of fluid-dynamical systems.” Rayner, 
      Alan. Degrees of Freedom: Living in Dynamic Boundaries. 1997. Imperial 
      College Press. Pp. 78-9.
      
      
      “The intuitive appeal of the idea that at least some human thought 
      processes are indeterminate is evident in such widely used phrases as 
      ‘streams of consciousness’ and ‘lateral thinking.’ Most people, when asked 
      how it feels to think about a complex, unfamiliar problem might well 
      describe something akin to a foraging fungal mycelium. Thoughts radiate 
      out from some inner space, as though searching out easier passages and 
      circumventing obstacles, eventually cross-connecting with one another and 
      becoming focused along particular channels. This kind of thinking has 
      sometimes been described as ‘water logic,’ and often yields varied 
      solutions that depend sensitively on circumstances....
      
      “There therefore seem to be two contrasting kinds [of] problem solving–the 
      one prescriptive and precise but inflexible, the other innovative and 
      versatile but prone to wander.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees of Freedom: Living 
      in Dynamic Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College Press. Pp. 89-90.
      
      
      “At the outset, I want to recall that there are two basic kinds of 
      approaches to explaining the existence of biological phenomena–adaptational 
      and organizational.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees of Freedom: Living in Dynamic 
      Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College Press. P. 94.
      
      
      “One way of proliferating involves expanding in all directions (isotropic 
      expansion). Any system which continues to expand in this way retains its 
      original shape and symmetry; i.e, it just gets larger. However, the 
      surface area of its boundary relative to its volume is inevitably reduced 
      as the distance between the boundary and the core of the system increases. 
      This makes it harder and harder to keep the interior adequately supplied 
      with resources brought in from outside.
      
      “These limitations on isotropic expansion are the compelling reasons 
      usually given for why living systems in general and cells in particular 
      cannot just get larger, and therefore have to divide. Further reasons lie 
      in the fact that without division it is impossible to produce specialized 
      components or to disperse to new locations.
      
      “Where the products of division do not dissociate, prospects open up for 
      them to follow distinctive developmental paths–to differentiate–whilst 
      still being able to be interconnected and so divide labour efficiently.” 
      Rayner, Alan. Degrees of Freedom: Living in Dynamic Boundaries. 1997. 
      Imperial College Press. P. 97.
      
      
      “Depending on the degree of freedom of genetic transfer, the ultimate 
      consequence of gene flow may be envisaged to be either the formation of 
      gene pools or the formation of genetic networks. The concept of a gene 
      pool basically assumes that genes have complete freedom to move around 
      within a population boundary, so that their distribution amongst 
      individuals is random....”
      
      “In genetic networks, genes are distributed locally amongst interbreeding 
      individuals. No individual is capable of containing all the genetic 
      information available in the population as a whole, and so each individual 
      can be regarded as a differentiated component of the system, capable of 
      occupying a distinctive niche.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees of Freedom: Living 
      in Dynamic Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College Press. P. 117.
      
      
      “The three known mechanisms of genetic transfer between bacteria are 
      conjugation, transduction and transformation. Conjugation involves a 
      sex-like process in which one cell, often described as ‘male’ acts as a 
      donor, attaching by means of ‘sex pili’ to a ‘female’, recipient cell.
      
      “Tranduction involves the intervention of a third party, a virus or ‘bacteriophage’, 
      as the agent of transfer....”
      
      “Transformation involves the uptake of ‘foreign’ DNA by a bacterial cell 
      from its immediate environment rather than directly from another cell or 
      virus particle.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees of Freedom: Living in Dynamic 
      Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College Press. Pp. 118-9.
      
      
      “... it is debatable whether fungal mycelia should be regarded as 
      multicellular because although they can be compartmented by septa, the 
      latter allow considerable protoplasmic communication. In some sense, 
      therefore, mycelia represent the most extreme result of the 
      diversification and integration of a single cell,...” Rayner, Alan. 
      Degrees of Freedom: Living in Dynamic Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College 
      Press. P. 131.
      
      
      “The way that this re-organisation [in developing embryos] occurs 
      contrasts markedly between most higher plants and animals, presumably 
      reflecting the relative indeterminacy and determinacy of these organisms.
      
      “Basically, in higher plants, the embryo becomes polarized and new cells 
      are added at the apices of the resultant elongated structure either by 
      proliferation of a single apical cell, or of sets of dividing cells known 
      as ‘meristems’. The apical meristems occur at the tips of shoots and roots 
      and are responsible for the production of cells which give rise to all the 
      tissues of what is known as the ‘primary plant body’. In woody plants, 
      secondary lateral meristems known as ‘cambria’ then give rise to the 
      conductive tissues within bark (‘phloem’) and wood (‘xylem’), thickening 
      the roots and stems in the process. The localization of cell division 
      within apical meristems also occurs in colonial Cnidaria and Bryozoa and 
      is a basic feature of indeterminate multicellular structures, analogous to 
      the extending tips of hyphae and other cellular filaments.
      
      “By contrast, in the majority of animal embryos the production of new 
      cells for the body as a whole occurs within all the developing organs and 
      tissues and so is not localized.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees of Freedom: Living 
      in Dynamic Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College Press. P. 133.
      
      
      “For this programme [the “precise sequence” of development of an animal 
      embryo] to operate successfully, it is important for the developing embryo 
      to be buffered, as far as is possible, from the effects of a variable 
      external environment. With some important exceptions, and in marked 
      contrast to indeterminate forms, the programme is therefore followed 
      without reference to external conditions.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees of 
      Freedom: Living in Dynamic Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College Press. P. 
      135.
      
      
      “Higher plants typically consist of two complementary, potentially 
      competitive, but ultimately interconnected and interdependent 
      systems–roots and shoots. Root systems consist both of highly branched, 
      short-lived, absorptive components (‘short roots’) and indefinitely 
      extending, explorative and conductive components (‘long roots’). The 
      absorptive roots gather and the conductive roots distribute soil solution. 
      Shoot systems likewise consist both of indefinitely extending axes which 
      explore the aerial environment and assimilative offshoots (typically, 
      leaves) which harvest sunlight by means of photosynthesis.” Rayner, Alan. 
      Degrees of Freedom: Living in Dynamic Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College 
      Press. P. 146.
      
      
      “For there can be no doubt about it; drawing on the energy assimilated by 
      individual human beings, our infrastructures are evolving in the 
      characteristic patterns of indeterminate systems.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees 
      of Freedom: Living in Dynamic Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College Press. P. 
      152.
      
      
      “In versatile systems, degeneracy provides means for recycling and renewal 
      rather than demise. Death, the abandonment of old contextual boundaries, 
      becomes a way of life.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees of Freedom: Living in 
      Dynamic Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College Press. P. 156.
      
      
      “Determinate systems diversify from outside-in, i.e differentiation occurs 
      within an external boundary that ceases to expand with the passage of 
      time. Indeterminate systems diversify from inside-out, with the external 
      boundary continuing to expand and change its form.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees 
      of Freedom: Living in Dynamic Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College Press. 
      Pp. 159-60.
      
      
      “Indeterminate organisms are versatile both in the variety of functionally 
      distinctive offshoots–leaves, flowers, polyps, fungal fruit bodies 
      etc–that they can produce, and in the form of the interconnections between 
      these offshoots.
      
      “The offshoots are commonly composed of tissues, and are often referred to 
      as ‘organs’ equivalent to those of determinate organisms. However, they 
      are generally produced externally and at varied places and/or times–not 
      internally and once-and-for-all. They therefore correspond more with 
      alternative phenotypes than with organs, although the fact that they 
      remain interconnected makes it easy to view them as components of the same 
      system.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees of Freedom: Living in Dynamic Boundaries. 
      1997. Imperial College Press. P. 168.
      
      
      “... through the interplay of differentiation, integration and degeneracy, 
      all living systems undergo cyclic patterns of change. These patterns are 
      brought about by four fundamental processes that vary the flow of energy 
      within and across contextual boundaries in different but complementary 
      ways: conversion, regeneration, distribution and recycling.
      
      “Conversion processes characteristically follow a phase during which 
      energy has been gathered in (‘assimilated’) from the external environment. 
      They both immobilize and seal the boundary of a system, or segment of a 
      system, so conserving energy and producing ‘dormant’ survival capsules. 
      Seeds, spores, cysts and storage organs of various kinds all result from 
      conversion processes....
      
      “Distribution involves the sealing but not the immobilization of parts of 
      the boundary of a system which are connected, directly or indirectly, to 
      assimilative regions. Resources taken in through the assimilative regions 
      can then drive expansion of the sealed components which are thereby able 
      to negotiate restrictive environments that would not otherwise sustain 
      growth. Explorative structures of all kinds are driven in this way....
      
      “Regeneration allows the resumption of energy-gathering processes, through 
      the production of open, mobile boundaries, when supplies of available 
      resources are either renewed outside a survival structure or encountered 
      by an explorative or dispersal structure....
      
      “Recycling occurs when internal partitioning allows resources to be 
      redistributed from locations that no longer participate in 
      energy-gathering or exploration to sites where these processes are being 
      sustained. It is therefore associated with the degeneration of former 
      boundaries, such as occurs during metamorphosis, fairy ring-formation and 
      amnesia.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees of Freedom: Living in Dynamic Boundaries. 
      1997. Imperial College Press. Pp. 181-2.
      
      
      “They [“‘self-organization’ and ‘complexity’ theories”] do not recognize 
      the role played by dynamic boundaries both in the emergence and the 
      sustainment of ordered structures. Indeed, they imply that, due to 
      dissipation, life cannot persist for any length of time in 
      resource-restricted environments.
      
      “However, processes of boundary-fusion, boundary-sealing and 
      boundary-redistribution all provide means for reducing dissipation, 
      allowing energy to be maintained within the system rather than lost to the 
      outside. Since they lead to more coherent, more persistent organizations 
      in which the discreteness of individual units is blurred, these processes 
      may be referred to as ‘self-integrational’.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees of 
      Freedom: Living in Dynamic Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College Press. P. 
      184.
      
      
      “The thesis I will start off with is that a fallacy is a form of reasoning 
      that for some applications is bad and for others is good; roughly 
      speaking, it is bad for logic but, for instance, good for surviving.” 
      Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality to Distributed 
      Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 1.
      
      
      “From the perspective of classical logic, a fallacy is a pattern of poor 
      reasoning which appears to be a pattern of good reasoning.” Bardone, 
      Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality to Distributed 
      Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 2.
      
      
      “... practical agents operate in cognitive economies, where the agent 
      access to cognitive resources encounters limitations such as:
      • bounded information
      • lack of time
      • limited computational capacity.”
      Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality to Distributed 
      Cognition. 2011. Springer. Pp. 4-5.
      
      
      “Abduction is defined by Magnani as the process in which a hypothesis is 
      created/selected and then evaluated.” Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: 
      From Biased Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 12. 
      Reference is to Magnani, L. Abduction, Reqason, and Science. Processes of 
      Discovery and Explanation. 2001. Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers.
      
      
      “Abduction – considered as the process of hypothesis generation and 
      evaluation – plays an important role in the evaluation of arguments 
      (whether a real shift has occurred or not): insofar as an alleged 
      ignoratio elenchi is evaluated and then accepted by the audience – in a 
      dialectical and rhetorical context – it becomes a good argument.
      
      “In the three cases of ignoratio elenchi illustrated above, the abductive 
      skills involved concern the ability of turning information about people, 
      and the social characters they represent, into relevant knowledge 
      supporting one view rather than another. In the argumentum ad hominem this 
      ability is related to the formulation of those abductive inferences, which 
      successfully employ and evaluate the information discrediting your 
      opponent. In the argumentum ad verecundiam the abductive process involved 
      is connected to the selection of experts and authorities who may be 
      recognized as such by a certain audience. Finally, the case of the 
      argumentum ad populum involves the selection of the majority to be heeded, 
      taking its composition into account.” Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: 
      From Biased Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 13.
      
      
      “The three fallacies can be easily considered in the light of 
      group-serving behaviors as well. For instance, discrediting your opponent 
      – the argumentum ad hominem – can be considered as a means of controlling 
      ideas and behaviors, which do not fit within the group.” Bardone, Emanuele. 
      Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011. 
      Springer. P. 16.
      
      
      “Fallacies are part of a kind of rationality that in the following I will 
      call biased rationality.” Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased 
      Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 21.
      
      
      “In other terms, to use Simon’s own definition, ‘rationality is bounded 
      when it falls short of omniscience’.” Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: 
      From Biased Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 23. 
      Reference is to Simon, H.A. 1979. “Rational decision making in business 
      organizations.” American Economic Review. 69, 493-513.
      
      
      “The idea of homo heuristicus stems from the rejection of two main 
      assumptions about accuracy and effort. The first is that a heuristic 
      always involves a trade-off to be reached between accuracy and effort, as 
      they are basically conflicting concepts....
      
      “The second assumption can be called the ‘principle of total evidence’. 
      The principle of total evidence – introduced by Carnap and explicitly 
      mentioned by Gigerenzer and colleagues – states that it is always better 
      to take into account the total evidence available in order to determine 
      whether or not a certain hypothesis or course of action is justified or 
      rational: that is, having more information is always better than having 
      less information. Or, to put it simply, more is always more, and less is 
      always less.
      
      “Contrary to these two beliefs, Gigerenzer and colleagues argued, and 
      managed to provide empirical evidence to support the idea, that heuristics 
      are not always accuracy-effort trade-offs. On certain occasions, one can 
      attain higher accuracy with less effort.” Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking 
      Chances: From Biased Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. 
      P. 31. Reference is to, among others: Gigerenzer, G. 2000. Adaptive 
      thinking: Rationality in the Real World. Oxford University Press.
      
      
      “The availability bias means seizing the first impression one comes up 
      with about a person, an object or a situation....”
      
      “The primacy bias consists in interpreting certain clues in light of those 
      presented earlier....”
      
      “The halo effect is further specification of the availability bias and the 
      primacy bias. Basically, it occurs when a person judges a situation, an 
      object or another person relying only one good trait. An example is a 
      script presented in good handwriting.” Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: 
      From Biased Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. Pp. 
      32-3.
      
      
      “Ecological validity is the term introduced by Brunswik to refer to the 
      situation in which a given proximal stimulus acts as a valuable indicator 
      of a certain distal state or event; ecological validity is a normative 
      measure about how diagnostic certain proximal stimuli are with respect to 
      a given distal event.” Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased 
      Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 40. Reference is 
      to Brunswik, Egon. 1952. The Conceptual Framework of Psychology. 
      University of Chicago Press. 
      
      
      “As people follow the so-called ‘wisdom of the crowd’, the bandwagon has 
      the cognitive effect of diminishing the total level of information 
      available to the group. If at an individual level conformity allows people 
      to make a decision when lacking competence and knowledge, at a group level 
      this could be catastrophic especially when facing change and/or 
      difficulties.” Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality 
      to Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 44.
      
      
      “Conformity enhances the probability that a given behavior or trait will 
      become common in a group or population. In doing so, it reduces 
      eco-cognitive variation within a group and consequently makes learning by 
      imitation less profitable. In fact, as reported by Castro et al. imitators 
      ‘do poorly when they are common and individual learners are rare’.” 
      Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality to Distributed 
      Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 44. Reference is to Castro, L., M. Toro & F. 
      Ayala. 2004. “The evolution of culture: from primate social learning to 
      human culture.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the 
      United States of America. 101(27), 10235-10240.
      
      
      “... humans like other creatures do not simply live their environment, but 
      they actively shape and change it looking for suitable chances. In doing 
      so, they construct cognitive niches through which the offerings provided 
      by the environment in terms of cognitive possibilities are appropriately 
      selected and/or manufactured to enhance their fitness as chance seekers.” 
      Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality to Distributed 
      Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 49.
      
      
      “I call the entire cycle the ‘externalization process,’ and it can be 
      summarized as follows: human beings overcome their internal limitations by 
      (1) externalizing and disembodying thoughts, ideas, solutions, and then 
      (2) re-projecting internally that occurring outside in the external 
      invented structure to find new ways of thinking.” Bardone, Emanuele. 
      Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011. 
      Springer. P. 50.
      
      
      “Basically, composite intentionality refers to situations in which the 
      intentionality resulting from an action we take is made up of our own in 
      coordination with that emerging from the interaction with an artefact. The 
      intentionality resulting from interaction in smart environments is indeed 
      highly composite,...” Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased 
      Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 65.
      
      
      “... I define behaviors such as altruism as group-projecting behaviors, 
      meaning that groups are projections of an higher unit of evolution. That 
      is, every time an individual behaves altruistically it acts as if the 
      group actually exists....”
      
      “The relevance of group-projecting behavior introduces quite a speculative 
      issue, that is however useful in order to better understand the allegedly 
      evolutionary meaning of groups. According to Stearns we are ‘stalled part 
      way through a major evolutionary transition from individual to groups’.” 
      Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality to Distributed 
      Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 72. Reference is to Stearns, S. 2007. “Are 
      we stalled part way through a major evolutionary transition from 
      individual to group?” Evolution 61(10), 2275-2280.
      
      
      “... I may claim that affordances are chances that are ecologically 
      rooted. They are ecological[ly] rooted because they rely on the mutuality 
      between an agent (or a perceiver) and the environment.” Bardone, Emanuele. 
      Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011. 
      Springer. P. 79.
      
      
      “They [Zhang and Patel] maintain that affordances can be also related to 
      the role of distributed representations extended across the environment 
      and the organism. These kinds of representation come about as the result 
      of a blending process between two different domains: on one hand the 
      internal representation space, that is the physical structure of an 
      organism (biological, perceptual, and cognitive faculties); on the other 
      the external representation of space, namely, the structure of the 
      environment and the information it provides. Both these two domains are 
      described by constraints so that the blend consists of the allowable 
      actions.” Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality to 
      Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. Pp. 79-80. Reference is to Zhang, J 
      & V. Patel. 2006. “Distributed cognition, representation, and affordance.” 
      Cognition & Pragmatics. 14(2), 333-341.
      
      
      “Patel and Zhang’s idea tries to clarify that affordances result from a 
      hybridizing process in which the environmental features and the agent’s 
      ones in terms of constraints are blended into a new domain which they call 
      affordance space. Taking a step further, Patel and Zhang define 
      affordances as allowable actions.”  Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased 
      Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 80. Reference is 
      to Zhang, J & V. Patel. 2006. “Distributed cognition, representation, and affordance.” Cognition & Pragmatics. 14(2), 333-341.
      
      
      “As argued by these authors, hidden affordances are those affordances 
      specified by the information not available at the time of the interaction, 
      but drawn from past experiences. The same event or place can have 
      different affordances to different organisms but also multiple affordances 
      to the same organism. Following D. Normal’s perspective, affordances 
      suggest a range of chances: ...”  Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality 
      to Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 80. References are: Rader, N. 
      & L. Vaughn. 2000. “Infant reaching to a hidden affordance: evidence for 
      intentionality.” Infant Behavior and Development. 23, 531-541. Norman, 
      Donald. 1988. The Design of Everyday Things. Addison Wesley.
      
      
      “Indeed, we may be afforded by the environment, if we can detect those 
      signs and cues from which we may abduce the presence of a given 
      affordance. [relating to semiotics]”  Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased 
      Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 89.
      
      
      “My idea is that the human agent abductively regulates his relationship 
      with the environment. That is, the human agent is constantly engaged in 
      controlling his own behavior through continuous manipulative activity. 
      Such manipulative activity (which is eco-cognitive one) hangs on to 
      abductive anchors, namely, affordances that permit the human agent to take 
      some part of the environment as local representatives of some other. So, 
      the human agent operates in the presence of abductive anchors, namely, 
      affordances, that stabilize environmental uncertainties by directly 
      signaling some pre-associations between the human agent and the 
      environment (or part of it).”  Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality to 
      Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 89.
      
      
      “The idea that an affordance is not a resource but rather, something that 
      offers information about one, allows it to be seen as anything involving 
      some eco-cognitive dimension.”  Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality to 
      Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 89.
      
      
      “From a theoretical perspective we may argue that human beings function as 
      a kind of adapting task-transforming representation. The term 
      ‘task-transforming representation’ was introduced by Hutchins to refer to 
      the fact that external artifacts shape the structure of a task – its 
      representation – helping people solve the problem they are facing. A tool 
      may transform the structure of a task:
      
      1. Redistributing the cognitive load;
      2. Rearranging constraints and action possibilities;
      3. Unearthing additional computational abilities;
      4. Increasing the number of operations while reducing mental costs.
      
      “In the case of adapting affordances the cognitive load is reduced by 
      means of a transformation, which adapts the structure/representation of 
      the task to allow a person to detect latent environmental chances. 
      Caregivers and the intentional gaze are fair examples, as they show how 
      people adaptively manipulate the representations their fellows have of the 
      environment to favor or facilitate the exploitation of latent 
      affordances.”  Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality to Distributed 
      Cognition. 2011. Springer. Pp. 92-3. Reference is to Hutchins, E. 1995. 
      Cognition in the Wild. MIT Press.
      
      
      “Adapting affordances are those affordances that help the agent exploit 
      latent environmental possibilities providing additional clues.”  Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking 
      Chances: From Biased Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. 
      P. 93.
      
      
      “... docility is thought to be the concept able to connect a pro-social 
      attitude like altruism to human cognition. Docility will be described as 
      the attitude or tendency underlying those learning processes, which 
      involve various forms of reliance on social channels.”  Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: 
      From Biased Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. P. 101.
      
      
      “Going beyond Simon, docility can be considered as a kind of adaptation 
      that facilitates the process of distributing cognitive functions to the 
      environment, and makes that a major basis for decision making. From our 
      birth we operate this kind of delegation, first to our parents, and then 
      to other people. After that we begin to select and distinguish between 
      people from whom to learn something important or insignificant,...” 
       
      Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality to Distributed Cognition. 2011. 
      Springer. P. 106. Reference is to Simon, H. 1993. “Altruism and 
      economics.” The American Economic Review. 83(2), 156-161.
      
      
      “As I put it, docility has both an active and passive side. Developing 
      this line of thought, the active side can be further articulated into 
      three main elements; thus, docility can be viewed also as the tendency
      
      1. To share one’s own information;
      2. To give a public and social dimension to one’s thought/work;
      3. To render communication easier by creating, maintaining, and developing 
      standards, or standard-fidelity.”  Bardone, Emanuele. Seeking Chances: From Biased Rationality 
      to Distributed Cognition. 2011. Springer. Pp. 107-8.
      
      
      “We would like to emphasize that formation and maintaining of increasingly 
      complex biopolymers could proceed only if supported by a constant flow of 
      utilizable energy. This consideration severely constrains otherwise 
      plausible hypotheses of origin of life under impact bombardment that tend 
      to treat emergence of life as a one-time event.” Mulkidjanian, Armen & 
      Michael Galperin. 2007. “Physico-Chemical and Evolutionary Constraints for 
      the Formation and Selection of First Biopolymers: Towards the Consensus 
      Paradigm of the Abiogenic Origin of Life.” Chemistry & Biodiversity. Vol. 
      4. Pp. 2003-2015. P. 2005.
      
      
      “An important chemical constraint, which often remains unrecognized, is 
      the reversibility of most (bio)chemical reactions. Therefore, any scheme 
      that explains biopolymer formation under certain environmental conditions 
      should also be able to explain why the synthesis of the given biopolymers 
      would not be followed by their immediate hydrolysis. One cannot help 
      noting that, in virtually all papers describing origin of life, the 
      corresponding schemes contain unidirectional arrows, instead of 
      bidirectional ones. However, the mechanisms that underlie that 
      unidirectionality are almost never described.” Mulkidjanian, Armen & 
      Michael Galperin. 2007. “Physico-Chemical and Evolutionary Constraints for 
      the Formation and Selection of First Biopolymers: Towards the Consensus 
      Paradigm of the Abiogenic Origin of Life.” Chemistry & Biodiversity. Vol. 
      4. Pp. 2003-2015. P. 2005.
      
      
      “The rule of chemical conservation implies that the chemical composition 
      of living beings is more conservative than the chemical composition of 
      their environment. Therefore, the conserved organismal chemistry can 
      retain information about the ancient environmental conditions. The most 
      popular manifestation of this principle is the similarity between the 
      chemical composition of sea water and the internal liquids of 
      multicellular animals. The latter are characterized by high sodium content 
      even if organisms live in fresh water or on the land. In this case, high 
      sodium content appears to reflect the emergence of the first multicellular 
      organisms in the sea waters. Less broadly acknowledged example of chemical 
      conservation is the highly reduced state of the cell interior even in 
      those organisms that inhabit oxygenated environments.” Mulkidjanian, Armen 
      & Michael Galperin. 2007. “Physico-Chemical and Evolutionary Constraints 
      for the Formation and Selection of First Biopolymers: Towards the 
      Consensus Paradigm of the Abiogenic Origin of Life.” Chemistry & 
      Biodiversity. Vol. 4. Pp. 2003-2015. P. 2006.
      
      
      “Alternatively, we have argued that the UV irradiation might play a 
      positive role upon the very origin of life by serving both as energy 
      source and a principal selective factor in the formation of pre-biological 
      structures. Indeed, the above noted extremely efficient deactivation of 
      the UV quanta by nitrogenous bases allows them to protect the compounds to 
      which they are attached from the UV-induced breakage. In particular, the 
      UV-damage to the sugar-phosphate bond was shown to decrease in the 
      presence of adenine entity; due to this phenomenon, the backbone breaks in 
      RNA and DNA seem to happen 103 – 104 times less frequent than the 
      UV-damage to the nitrogen bases proper....
      
      “It seems quite unlikely that the extremely effective UV-quenching by all 
      five major nucleobases is just incidental. Therefore, we suggested that 
      the nucleobases were initially recruited as UV protectors.” Mulkidjanian, 
      Armen & Michael Galperin. 2007. “Physico-Chemical and Evolutionary 
      Constraints for the Formation and Selection of First Biopolymers: Towards 
      the Consensus Paradigm of the Abiogenic Origin of Life.” Chemistry & 
      Biodiversity. Vol. 4. Pp. 2003-2015. P. 2008.
      
      
      “In the UV-illuminated primordial world the probability of a UV-breakage 
      was more than real for any compound. Correspondingly, those that succeeded 
      to bind (trap) a UV-quencher got a selective advantage. Hence, the 
      primordial polymerization could be driven by a mechanism that resembled 
      natural selection with the most UV-resistant polymers living longer.” 
      Mulkidjanian, Armen & Michael Galperin. 2007. “Physico-Chemical and 
      Evolutionary Constraints for the Formation and Selection of First 
      Biopolymers: Towards the Consensus Paradigm of the Abiogenic Origin of 
      Life.” Chemistry & Biodiversity. Vol. 4. Pp. 2003-2015. P. 2012.
      
      
      “In sum, only at continental geothermal springs, the formation of organic 
      nitrogen-, phosphor-, and sulfur-containing compounds could be supported 
      by two different fluxes of reducing equivalents resulting from the abiotic 
      photosynthesis and the hydrothermal alteration of the iron-containing 
      rocks. In addition, only continental environments could be characterized 
      by wet-dry cycles, favorable for condensation reactions.” Mulkidjanian, 
      Armen. “Energetics of the First Life.” Pp. 3-27. From Egel, Richard, D. 
      Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal 
      Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 11.
      
      
      “In a previous work four rules of metabolic evolution were stated as 
      follows:...
      
      “1. Any enzymatic reaction is also chemically possible without the enzyme, 
      although in that case it would occur much more slowly and without a 
      well-defined specificity.
      
      “2. All the intermediates of a chain of reactions to be used ultimately in 
      a metabolic sequence must resist rapid decomposition. The strongest reason 
      for this assumption is evolutionary; at the beginning of the pathway 
      design every rudimentary enzymatic reaction occurred very slowly, so 
      unstable intermediates could not have been used.”
      
      “3. Material availability (Opportunism): Any material to be used by the 
      new pathway must exist in another metabolic process which was originally 
      developed for a different purpose. Design of this new pathway must 
      preserve the function of the previous one whose material has been used. An 
      inverse chronological application of this rule would eventually lead to 
      the origin of metabolism; on the primordial Earth the first available 
      compounds had to have been made through spontaneous chemical processes.
      
      “4. Kinetic and thermodynamic compatibility: The new pathway cannot have a 
      reaction involving any thermodynamic or kinetic incompatibility with a 
      previous one that is operating simultaneously in the same space.”
      Melendez-Hevia, Enrique, N. Montero-Gomez & F. Montero. “From prebiotic 
      chemistry to cellular metabolism–The chemical evolution of metabolism 
      before Darwinian natural selection.” 2008. Journal of Theoretical Biology. 
      252(2008) 505-519. P. 506. 
      
      
      “Life evolved through Darwinian natural selection, and its earliest form 
      appeared when natural selection became possible. Thus, the appearance of 
      the minimal material necessary for natural selection to work could not be 
      produced by natural selection itself, but by a previous selection that we 
      shall call ‘chemical selection’. This consists of an increase and 
      enlargement of certain specific chemical processes based on specific 
      kinetic and thermodynamic features that can increase the reaction rate. 
      Yet without considering the existence of enzymes as catalysts specific for 
      particular reactions, there are a number of different mechanisms that can 
      enhance the reaction rates based only on the stoichiometry of the 
      pathways, i.e., without ‘external’ catalysts: (a) stoichiometric 
      catalysis, which occurs in all metabolic cycles, as the feeder (or 
      starter) does as a catalyst itself; (b) stoichiometric autocatalysis, 
      which occurs in some cycles when the global reaction yields more amount of 
      the feeder than its entrance, so promoting the enlargement of the 
      reaction; (c) thermodynamic cooperativity, which is a property of a 
      process in which physical or chemical positive interactions among the end 
      products enhance the stability of the final structure promoting their 
      production. This effect is typical in the construction of polymers, as 
      these processes imply an initiation step, which is usually difficult, as 
      it is delayed by a positive energy change, followed by another of 
      elongation that is much easier; and (d) thermodynamic push of certain 
      specific processes by products originated in others; e.g., ATP production 
      will promote biosynthetic reactions, and NADPH production will promote 
      reductive processes.” Melendez-Hevia, Enrique, N. Montero-Gomez & F. 
      Montero. “From prebiotic chemistry to cellular metabolism–The chemical 
      evolution of metabolism before Darwinian natural selection.” 2008. Journal 
      of Theoretical Biology. 252(2008) 505-519. Pp. 508-9.
      
      
      “The formose reaction and the structure of the metabolic map can explain 
      that metabolism could start from glucose, but it was obviously necessary 
      to develop a pathway capable of producing it from mineral material (CO2 
      and H2O), as a necessary step to divorcing metabolism from prebiotic 
      chemistry.” Melendez-Hevia, Enrique, N. Montero-Gomez & F. Montero. “From 
      prebiotic chemistry to cellular metabolism–The chemical evolution of 
      metabolism before Darwinian natural selection.” 2008. Journal of 
      Theoretical Biology. 252(2008) 505-519. P. 514.
      
      
      “The materials necessary for natural selection had to be achieved 
      beforehand, by ‘chemical selection’. As this process operates through 
      selecting the reagents and reactions independent of their Darwinian 
      selective value, it can only be driven by increasing the rate of the 
      reactions as a consequence of their own chemical features. Thus, in this 
      process, catalytic, autocatalytic and cooperative effects, as well as 
      thermodynamic driving by available substrates or forces, such as energy 
      currency and reductive power that can favour certain reactions, could have 
      played a critical role, enhancing their probability.” Melendez-Hevia, 
      Enrique, N. Montero-Gomez & F. Montero. “From prebiotic chemistry to 
      cellular metabolism–The chemical evolution of metabolism before Darwinian 
      natural selection.” 2008. Journal of Theoretical Biology. 252(2008) 
      505-519. P. 516.
      
      
      “Chemolithotrophic microbes are faced with the problem of extracting 
      energy from narrow redox zones in marine environments. The free-living 
      species typically occur in biofilms on sulfidic rocks or in filamentous 
      mats like Beggiatoa spp., absorbing reduced gases from the substrate below 
      and oxygen from the ambient water above. Symbiotic microbes, however, can 
      span broader oxic-anoxic boundaries by exploiting the behavior, physiology 
      and morphology of their animal hosts....
      
      “The sessile vestimentiferan tubeworm, Riftia pachyptila, grows up to 1.5 
      m in length. It absorbs dissolved sulfide and oxygen from the ambient 
      bottom water with a feathery plume (the obturaculum) and delivers the 
      gases through its circulatory system to the trophosome, a specialized 
      organ housing thiotrophic endosymbionts. Riftia has a leathery tube that 
      allows it to flex and relocate its plume among water masses that are 
      variably sulfidic or oxygenated. Other species have rigid tubes that 
      penetrate deeply into anoxic sediments, allowing absorption of sulfides 
      through the worm’s posterior end.” Vrijenhoek, Robert. “Genetics and 
      Evolution of Deep-Sea Chemosynthetic Bacteria and Their Invertebrate 
      Hosts.” Pp. 15-49. From The Vent and Seep Biota: Aspects from Microbes to 
      Ecosystems. 2010. Edited by Kiel, Steffen. Springer Verlag. P. 16.
      
      
      “The global average of human density for ice-free land is not a very 
      meaningful measure. Cultivated area is the proper denominator: it now 
      supplies about 85% of all food, and the global anthropomass now amounts to 
      almost 200 kg/ha of arable land and permanent plantations; China’s mean is 
      almost 500 kg/ha, and the country’s most intensively cultivated provinces 
      support 600-700 kg of humanity per hectare of arable land. This means that 
      in densely populated regions, human biomass is now more abundant than that 
      of all soil invertebrates. In contrast, the average densities of the two 
      large African primates, chimpanzees and gorillas, are mostly less than 1 
      kg/ha of their now so limited habitats.” Smil, Vaclav. The Earth’s 
      Biosphere: Evolution, Dynamics, and Change. 2002. MIT Press. Pp. 186-7.
      
      
      “Completely transformed surfaces include all arable land and areas under 
      permanent crops, whose total the Food and Agriculture Organization puts at 
      15 million km2, and the surface claimed by settlements, industries, 
      transportation links, and water reservoirs. Urbanized areas, so vividly 
      outlined by nighttime satellite sensing of lights, now amount to about 5 
      million km2, and water reservoirs cover about 500,000 km2. Human 
      activities have thus entirely refashioned at least 20 million km2, or 15% 
      of all ice-free land surface....
      
      “Permanent pastures, totaling about 34 million km2, are thus the largest 
      area that has been modified to different degrees by human actions. Tree 
      plantations and forests actively managed for goods and services total 
      about 6.5 million km2. Road building, logging, and fires have degraded 
      large areas of remaining forests....
      
      “Adding up these impacts reveals that the total area strongly or partially 
      imprinted by human activities is about 70 million km2, or no less than 55% 
      of all nonglaciated land.” Smil, Vaclav. The Earth’s Biosphere: Evolution, 
      Dynamics, and Change. 2002. MIT Press. Pp. 239-40.
      
      
      “Yet another way to look at the extent and the intensity of the recent 
      transformation of the biosphere is to estimate the share of GPP consumed 
      or otherwise processed, managed, or destroyed by human actions. Vitousek 
      et al. put this ‘appropriation’ of the global terrestrial NPP at as much 
      as 40%, but even their lower-bound estimate of about 25% illustrates the 
      intensity of the biosphere’s transformation.” Smil, Vaclav. The Earth’s 
      Biosphere: Evolution, Dynamics, and Change. 2002. MIT Press. P. 240.
      
      
      “The aggregate mass of machines already greatly exceeds that of humans. 
      The dry-matter anthropomass is about 100 Mt, whereas the mass of motor 
      vehicles (cars, buses, and trucks) alone is now an order of magnitude 
      larger, in excess of 1Gt. And machines now need more carbon every year 
      than humans do. The global food harvest now amounts to about 1.3 Gt C per 
      year, whereas almost 1 Gt of fossil carbon (mostly metallurgical coke and 
      hydrocarbon feedstocks) is used annually to produce metals and plastics 
      from which machines are assembled, and about 4 Gt C are used each year to 
      power them, either directly with coal, oil, and natural gas, or indirectly 
      with electricity generated in thermal stations.” Smil, Vaclav. The Earth’s 
      Biosphere: Evolution, Dynamics, and Change. 2002. MIT Press. P. 269.
      
      
      “Isenhower and colleagues demonstrated that individuals are able to 
      distinguish the boundaries between an affordance for oneself and an 
      affordance for a dyad, ie the point at which an individual action must 
      become a joint action in order to accomplish the goal.” Davis, Tehran, M. 
      Riley, K. Shockley & S. Cummins-Sebree. 2010. “Perceiving affordances for 
      joint actions.” Perception. Vol. 39, Pp. 1624-44. P. 1625. Reference is 
      Isenhower, R.W., M. Richardson, C. Carello, R. Baron & K. Marsh. 2010. 
      “Affording cooperation: Embodied constraints, dynamics, and action-scaled 
      invariance in joint lifting.” Psychonomic Bulletin & Review. 17: 342-347.
      
      
      “While being able to perceive what actions another person is capable of 
      performing may be useful when predicting what the other person is about to 
      do, perceiving affordances for another may also provide information 
      relative to the constraints on possible interactions and joint action. A 
      major issue when considering joint action is how the action planning of 
      two distinct individuals becomes integrated to guide shared behavior. One 
      possible explanation is that individuals’ perception of a shared 
      affordance may facilitate the ‘embodying’ of other agents. That is, 
      perception of the shared affordance acts as a medium through which 
      individuals gain information relative to social perception – action 
      processes involved in a joint action.” Davis, Tehran, M. Riley, K. 
      Shockley & S. Cummins-Sebree. 2010. “Perceiving affordances for joint 
      actions.” Perception. Vol. 39, Pp. 1624-44. P. 1642. 
      
      
      “From a computational viewpoint, shared representations help solving 
      interaction problems in that they afford an interactive strategy for 
      coordination that makes action selection and understanding easier.” 
      Pezzulo, G. & H. Dindo. 2011. “What should I do next? Using shared 
      representations to solve interaction problems.” Exp Brain Res. 211: 
      613-630. P. 616.
      
      
      “Our analysis suggests that agents engaged in joint actions do not solve 
      their problems individually, but ‘distribute’ some of them externally; in 
      this sense, the agent-environment dynamics and the agent-agent dynamics 
      are part of the problem-solving strategy. Indeed, our graphical model 
      formulation emphasized that the two agents are coupled at the level of 
      cognitive variables as well as at the physical level of interaction.” 
      Pezzulo, G. & H. Dindo. 2011. “What should I do next? Using shared 
      representations to solve interaction problems.” Exp Brain Res. 211: 
      613-630. P. 626.
      
      
      “Theories of common ground formation propose similar arguments as those 
      that we made regarding shared representations, in that common ground is a 
      facilitator of interactions. However, these theories typically assume that 
      both agents know what is shared, which is not essential in our model. 
      Despite so, theories of common ground can be considered as complementary 
      to our proposal, as they emphasize interactive dynamics and the 
      coordination of co-actors at the level of cognitive processing, not only 
      of overt behavior. Furthermore, these theories have provided illuminating 
      analyses of important elements for coordination that should be 
      incorporated in any model that aims to scale up to the complexity of human 
      interactions.” Pezzulo, G. & H. Dindo. 2011. “What should I do next? Using 
      shared representations to solve interaction problems.” Exp Brain Res. 211: 
      613-630. P. 626.
      
      
      “It is noteworthy, however, that there has been little study of the 
      interaction between the chemistry of life and cognitive or adaptive 
      behavior. In general, models that focus on the self-organization of 
      chemical systems work with a set of fixed boundary conditions, making 
      adaptive behavior unnecessary for system survival. And conversely, models 
      that study behavior tend to abstract away everything except the sensory, 
      control, and motor mechanisms.
      
      “This is, perhaps, starting to change. There has been a series of recent 
      models that explore the interaction between processes that determine how a 
      system is constituted (metabolism) and mechanisms through which the system 
      influences its interaction with its environment (behavior). These models 
      include computer simulations as well as real chemical systems, and they 
      have led to some interesting reconceptualizations: Metabolic processes can 
      be thought of as robust or even adaptive, able to intelligently modulate 
      behavioral strategies; remarkably simple chemical reactions can perform 
      chemotaxis; and in a range of bacteria, metabolism-based behavior appears 
      to be more common than previously thought.” Egbert, Matthew, X. 
      Barandiaran & E. Di Paolo. 2012. “Behavioral Metabolution: The Adaptive 
      and Evolutionary Potential of Metabolism-Based Chemotaxis.” Artificial 
      Life. 18: 1-25. P. 2.
      
      
      “In parallel with the omission of behavior in the study of the origin of 
      life, studies of minimal adaptive behavior have almost completely ignored 
      the role of metabolism as sustaining or modulating behavioral patterns. 
      Adaptive behavior is generally understood and modeled as optimizing some 
      value function or as maintaining essential variables under viability 
      constraints. However, there is generally no reference to the dynamics of 
      the biological organization (e.g., metabolism) that serves as the basis of 
      these viability constraints ....” Egbert, Matthew, X. Barandiaran & E. Di 
      Paolo. 2012. “Behavioral Metabolution: The Adaptive and Evolutionary 
      Potential of Metabolism-Based Chemotaxis.” Artificial Life. 18: 1-25. P. 
      3.
      
      
      “However, recent experimental data provides counterevidence for the 
      metabolism-independence assumption. Many bacteria display clear cases of 
      what is called metabolism-dependent chemotaxis, including E. coli, 
      Azospirillum brasilense, Rhodobacter sphaeroides, and Pseudomonas putida. 
      Such cases have attracted renewed attention to the interplay between 
      metabolism and behavior. Experiments have shown that nonmetabolizable 
      structural analogues of metabolizable attractants (i.e., molecules that 
      bind to chemoattractant receptors but are not metabolizable) do not 
      produce a positive behavioral response in bacteria. It has also been shown 
      that inhibition of the metabolism of a chemical attractant completely 
      abolishes chemotaxis to and only to this attractant. And, in a slightly 
      more complex scenario, when a sufficient quantity of a metabolizable 
      compound is present in the environment, bacteria cease to be attracted to 
      other attractants. The most-studied cases of metabolism-dependent 
      chemotaxis are those concerning energy-taxis, which involve the modulation 
      of behavior in a manner that is sensitive to the energetic needs of the 
      bacteria.” Egbert, Matthew, X. Barandiaran & E. Di Paolo. 2012. 
      “Behavioral Metabolution: The Adaptive and Evolutionary Potential of 
      Metabolism-Based Chemotaxis.” Artificial Life. 18: 1-25. P. 3.
      
      
      “Figure 1 illustrates the three different types of relationship between 
      metabolism and chemotaxis that we have mentioned: metabolism-independent 
      chemotaxis (long thought to be the default case); metabolism-dependent 
      chemotaxis, where different aspects of metabolic dynamics (e.g., in the 
      electron transport system) modulate existing sensorimotor pathways; and 
      metabolism-based chemotaxis, where metabolites directly modulate motor 
      activity.” Egbert, Matthew, X. Barandiaran & E. Di Paolo. 2012. 
      “Behavioral Metabolution: The Adaptive and Evolutionary Potential of 
      Metabolism-Based Chemotaxis.” Artificial Life. 18: 1-25. P. 4.
      
      
      “The type of interactions shown in the experiments above, between 
      behavior, metabolism, and evolution, we have termed behavioral 
      metabolution, which we define as the evolution of behavior and metabolism 
      in such a way that: (a) behavior drives the evolution of metabolism (by 
      exploring, selecting, and/or climbing chemical environments that are 
      beneficial to metabolism), and (b) changes in metabolism affect behavior 
      and the evolution of behavioral patterns (e.g., changes in metabolism 
      could lead to the improvement and fixation of the adaptive response).” 
      Egbert, Matthew, X. Barandiaran & E. Di Paolo. 2012. “Behavioral 
      Metabolution: The Adaptive and Evolutionary Potential of Metabolism-Based 
      Chemotaxis.” Artificial Life. 18: 1-25. P. 16.
      
      
      “In the standard approach, variation is internal and selection is 
      considered as an environmental feature, but in behavioral metabolution it 
      is the environment that provides a variety of chemicals to be selected by 
      the behaving protocell and retained by its metabolism and/or recurrent 
      chemotactic patterns. If the environment is sufficiently stable in its 
      provision of a specific chemical species, the retention of a reactant 
      beneficial to the protocells’ metabolism can be inherited through 
      continued interaction with that environment. Metabolism-based chemotactic 
      protocells can therefore be considered to instantiate the evolutionary 
      principles in this nontraditional way: Variation can be both internal (the 
      result of behavioral encounters / collisions giving rise to new molecular 
      species) and external (the result of behavioral encounters in a rich 
      environment), and selective retention can also be internal (by 
      contribution to autocatalysis) or external (by repetitive gradient 
      climbing or behavioral selection of an environmental compound).” Egbert, 
      Matthew, X. Barandiaran & E. Di Paolo. 2012. “Behavioral Metabolution: The 
      Adaptive and Evolutionary Potential of Metabolism-Based Chemotaxis.” 
      Artificial Life. 18: 1-25. P. 19.
      
      
      “The process of evolution has generated an enormous diversity of 
      behavioral and physiological interactions, far surpassing the diversity of 
      interactions possible in chemical and physical systems.” Camazine, S., 
      J-L. Deneubourg, N. Franks, J. Sneyd, G. Theraulaz & E. Bonabeau. 
      Self-Organization in Biological Systems. 2001. Princeton University Press. 
      P. 3.
      
      
      “Most self-organizing systems use positive feedback. This may be 
      surprising since most biologists probably are more familiar with negative 
      feedback, a mechanism commonly used to stabilize physiological processes 
      (homeostasis) and avoid undesirable fluctuations.” Camazine, S., J-L. 
      Deneubourg, N. Franks, J. Sneyd, G. Theraulaz & E. Bonabeau. 
      Self-Organization in Biological Systems. 2001. Princeton University Press. 
      P. 15.
      
      
      “In other words, information from the local environment and work-in-progress 
      can guide further activity. As a structure such as a termite mound 
      develops, the state of the building process continually provide new 
      information for the builders.
      
      “In the study of social insects, the term stigmergy has been used to 
      describe such recursive building activity. ‘In stigmergic labor it is the 
      product of work previously accomplished, rather than direct communication 
      among nestmates, that induces the insects to perform additional labor.’” 
      Camazine, S., J-L. Deneubourg, N. Franks, J. Sneyd, G. Theraulaz & E. 
      Bonabeau. Self-Organization in Biological Systems. 2001. Princeton 
      University Press. P. 23. Subquote is from Wilson, E. O. 1971. The Insect 
      Societies. Harvard University Press. P. 229.
      
      
      “... self-organized pattern-formation relies on positive feedback, 
      negative feedback, and a dynamic system involving large numbers of actions 
      and interactions.
      
      “With such self-organization, environmental randomness can act as the 
      ‘imagination of the system,’ the raw material from which structures arise. 
      Fluctuations can act as seeds from which patterns and structures are 
      nucleated and grow.” Camazine, S., J-L. Deneubourg, N. Franks, J. Sneyd, 
      G. Theraulaz & E. Bonabeau. Self-Organization in Biological Systems. 2001. 
      Princeton University Press. P. 26.
      
      
      “The one characteristic that rodents and other mammals do not share with 
      primates is heavy reliance on vision. The expansion and specialization of 
      this sense has resulted in the other changes that immediately identify 
      animals as primates, even for novices in natural history. A mammal is 
      readily recognizable as a primate if it has a relatively small snout, eyes 
      that face forward, and a fairly large head that encloses a fairly large 
      brain. The primate brain has become larger in part to accommodate the 
      expansion of the visual system, even to the extent of influencing parts of 
      the cerebral cortex that are not the main visual areas in the brain.” 
      Isbell, Lynne. 2009. The Fruit, the Tree, and the Serpent: Why We See So 
      Well. Harvard University Press. P. 10.
      
      
      “Many hypotheses for the origin of primates have been proposed over the 
      years. Most have focused on reconstructing a lifestyle that included a 
      unique diet or a unique way that proto-primates moved about in their 
      environment. These include the Arboreal theory, the (Nocturnal) Visual 
      Predation hypothesis, the Angiosperm/Omnivore hypothesis, and the 
      Camouflage-Breaking hypothesis.” Isbell, Lynne. 2009. The Fruit, the Tree, 
      and the Serpent: Why We See So Well. Harvard University Press. P. 36.
      
      
      “According the the Arboreal theory, the sense of smell is not particularly 
      useful in the trees and so primates lost much of their olfactory ability. 
      It was replaced by expansion of the visual system, which, in the 
      three-dimension, complex environment of tropical forests, also required 
      coordination of hands with eyes to maneuver along the branches.” Isbell, 
      Lynne. 2009. The Fruit, the Tree, and the Serpent: Why We See So Well. 
      Harvard University Press. P. 37.
      
      
      “He pointed out that there are many arboreal mammals that survive and 
      reproduce quite well without grasping hands, nails, orbital convergence, 
      and forward-facing eyes. Tree squirrels are one familiar example. Cartmill 
      also pointed out that many arboreal mammals still retain excellent 
      olfactory capability, and so life in the trees cannot alone explain 
      primates’ weakened olfactory sense. Again using a comparative approach, 
      Cartmill proposed an alternative model he originally called the Visual 
      Predation hypothesis. Cartmill proposed that stalking and grabbing insects 
      at close range while on small-diameter branches at lower levels of 
      tropical forests favored the entire suite of primate characteristics.” 
      Isbell, Lynne. 2009. The Fruit, the Tree, and the Serpent: Why We See So 
      Well. Harvard University Press. P. 38. Reference is to Cartmill, M. 1974. 
      “Rethinking primate origins.” Science 184: 436-443.
      
      
      “... Sussman suggested that the first primates were not committed 
      insectivores but were omnivores, primarily eating fruits and other plant 
      foods while taking insects more opportunistically. Sussman hypothesized 
      that the first primates were able to take advantage of the appearance of 
      angiosperms (flowering plants), which had begun to spread throughout the 
      world. Angiosperms today include grasses, herbs, small shrubs, and 
      enormous tropical trees, but he suggested that the first primates lived 
      and ate among early angiosperms, which were small shrubs with 
      small-diameter branches. The new foods offered by angiosperms included 
      fruits and flowers, many of which were small and located in the dim light 
      of forest understories.” Isbell, Lynne. 2009. The Fruit, the Tree, and the 
      Serpent: Why We See So Well. Harvard University Press. Pp. 39-40. 
      Reference is to Sussman, R. 1991. “Primate origins and the evolution of 
      angiosperms. American Journal Primatology. 23:209-223.
      
      
      “Crompton argued that orbital convergence would be useful for 
      discriminating between any number of small targets. For arboreal animals, 
      such targets would also include branches used during locomotion. He thus 
      offered what I call here the Camouflage-Breaking hypothesis. He argued 
      that orbital convergence and grasping hands would have been useful not 
      only for capturing insects and finding and eating small fruits but also 
      for aiming for and leaping to small branches in the complex 
      three-dimensional environments that are typical of tropical forests.” 
      Isbell, Lynne. 2009. The Fruit, the Tree, and the Serpent: Why We See So 
      Well. Harvard University Press. P. 41. Reference is to Crompton, R. 1995. 
      “‘Visual predation,’ habitat structure, and the ancestral primate niche.” 
      Pp. 11-30. In Alterman, L., G. Doyle, & M. Izard. Eds. Creatures of the 
      Dark: The Nocturnal Prosimians.” Plenum Press.
      
      
      “I use visual system to refer to all the parts of the brain that give us 
      the ability to see. It is the broadest term of all, but it can be 
      separated into the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) visual system and the 
      superior colliculus-pulvinar (SC-pulvinar) visual system. I use pathway to 
      describe a distinct set of neural connections going from the eye to 
      various other parts of the brain. There are three of them: the 
      magnocellular (M) pathway, the parvocellular (P) pathway, and the 
      koniocellular (K) pathway. Finally, I use stream to describe the 
      conceptual idea that several functions related to vision in the primate 
      brain, e.g., object recognition/assessment and spatial 
      localization/self-movement, can be separated to some degree.” Isbell, 
      Lynne. 2009. The Fruit, the Tree, and the Serpent: Why We See So Well. 
      Harvard University Press. P. 46.
      
      
      “Although all mammals have a retina in each eye, the primate retina is a 
      bit different. Only primates (but not all prosimians) have a retinal 
      fovea. This is a pit, or depression, in the retina that allows clear 
      central vision for distinguishing between exceedingly small objects,...” 
      Isbell, Lynne. 2009. The Fruit, the Tree, and the Serpent: Why We See So 
      Well. Harvard University Press. P. 47.
      
      
      “Visual processing streams appear to be unique to primates because of the 
      great increase in number of areas in the primate brain that are involved 
      in vision.” Isbell, Lynne. 2009. The Fruit, the Tree, and the Serpent: Why 
      We See So Well. Harvard University Press. P. 49.
      
      
      “These differences in the complexity of the LGN reveal that the P pathway 
      has not only expanded more in primates than in other mammals but also has 
      expanded more in anthropoid primates than in prosimians, and more in 
      catarrhines than platyrrhines [New World primates]. The P pathway is 
      largely responsible for our own excellent central vision, fine visual 
      acuity, and our ability to see rich color, all of which help us to 
      perceive objects in our environment.” Isbell, Lynne. 2009. The Fruit, the 
      Tree, and the Serpent: Why We See So Well. Harvard University Press. P. 
      50.
      
      
      “Compared with prosimians, the anthropoid LGN visual system is even more 
      expansive and orbital convergence is even closer. We know this because the 
      number of P layers varies within primates, and as Barton showed, the 
      degree of orbital convergence is positively correlated with the number of 
      neurons in the P layers in primates. This suggests that there was some 
      greater selective pressure on anthropoids that favored even more acute 
      vision for identifying objects and even better stereopsis for 
      distinguishing between relative depths of objects also in the lower visual 
      field and for cutting through camouflage of objects in the lower visual 
      field. The presence of a fovea in anthropoids but not in all prosimians is 
      also consistent with the idea that anthropoids uniquely benefited from 
      clearly seeing and identifying objects that were close by and in front of 
      them.” Isbell, Lynne. 2009. The Fruit, the Tree, and the Serpent: Why We 
      See So Well. Harvard University Press. P. 64.
      
      
      “Visual systems simply cannot expand much in mammals that cannot afford to 
      weaken their reliance on olfaction (or echolocation).” Isbell, Lynne. 
      2009. The Fruit, the Tree, and the Serpent: Why We See So Well. Harvard 
      University Press. P. 112.
      
      
      “When angiosperms evolved they did something that was different from the 
      gymnosperms. Instead of using abiotic forces such as fire, water, or the 
      wind to help them reproduce, they began to use animals. These angiosperms 
      evolved flowers, nectar, and fleshy fruits enclosing still-protected seeds 
      to entice some animals to pollinate other flowers and to disperse their 
      seeds. The plants gained because animals are more accurate and efficient 
      than abiotic forces such as wind in placing pollen among flowers, and more 
      predictable than abiotic forces such as fire in casting seeds away from 
      the parent tree.” Isbell, Lynne. 2009. The Fruit, the Tree, and the 
      Serpent: Why We See So Well. Harvard University Press. P. 115.
      
      
      “Visual expansion became possible with both the evolution of pleasantly 
      scented, tasty fruits and flowers and the exploitation of these foods by 
      some vertebrates, including birds and mammals. Unlike animal and plant 
      predators, however, those non-flying mammals that took advantage of this 
      new food source could afford a weaker olfactory system without 
      jeopardizing their ability to find food. Since there was no foraging cost 
      associated with olfactory reduction, their visual systems were no longer 
      constrained. Today, the mammals with the best vision tend to be those with 
      diets heavily weighted toward fruits. These include primates, the most 
      frugivorous order of mammals in existence today, and bats, coming in at a 
      distant second.” Isbell, Lynne. 2009. The Fruit, the Tree, and the 
      Serpent: Why We See So Well. Harvard University Press. Pp. 115-6.
      
      
      “The neuroprotectant property of glucose might help explain the permissive 
      influence of frugivory on visual and brain expansion. The hypothesis is 
      that as females began to eat fruits, and plants began to make fruits more 
      attractive, a diet richer in glucose could have initiated a positive 
      feedback loop in which greater consumption and more rapid metabolism of 
      sugars by mothers both allowed greater CO activity to occur during 
      development of fetal visual systems and other parts of the brain because 
      more glucose provides more energy, making it possible for metabolic and 
      glutamatergic activity to increase, and was required because glucose is a 
      neuroprotectant against increased glutamate exposure. Over evolutionary 
      time, this could have resulted in greater neural growth, resulting in more 
      complex visual systems and larger brains.” Isbell, Lynne. 2009. The Fruit, 
      the Tree, and the Serpent: Why We See So Well. Harvard University Press. 
      P. 119.
      
      
      “To summarize, I am suggesting that frugivory made it possible for visual 
      systems (and brains) to expand in primates because the glucose in fruits 
      protected the K and P pathways from glutamate excitotoxicity as the 
      pathways expanded. The K pathway expanded under selection to better detect 
      snakes preconsciously while the P pathway expanded in concert, to evaluate 
      the K pathway’s initial response, to help fuel visual expansion, and to 
      protect it during expansion. The addition of trichromatic color vision to 
      the P pathway was a later contribution that enabled frugivorous primates 
      to find the more glucose-rich foods more efficiently.” Isbell, Lynne. 
      2009. The Fruit, the Tree, and the Serpent: Why We See So Well. Harvard 
      University Press. P. 121.
      
      
      “‘it may well be necessary, as Professor Gregory has recommended, to 
      discontinue the use of the word symbiosis, substituting for it the more 
      appropriate term ‘functional field.’ ... If this were done, questions 
      could profitably be raised regarding the degree of integration of 
      symbiotic associations considered as a function of the intensity of the 
      field established and of the internal and external resistances surmounted 
      in its establishment.’” Sapp, Jan. 2010. “On the Origin of Symbiosis.” Pp. 
      5-18. From Seckbach, Joseph & M. Grube, Eds. Symbioses and Stress: Joint 
      Ventures in Biology. Springer Verlag. P. 16. Reference is to Gregory, F., 
      F. Baker, P. Fildes, A. Felix, G. Bond, R. Synge & S. Elsden. 1952. “A 
      discusion on symbiosis involving micro-organisms, general discussion.” 
      Proc. Royal Society London B. 139: 202-207.
      
      
      “While neo-Darwinian evolutionists continue to trivialize significance of 
      symbiosis as a mode of evolutionary innovation, others argue that the 
      concept of the organism needs to be enlarged to embrace the symbiotic 
      complex, or ‘symbiome.’” Sapp, Jan. 2010. “On the Origin of Symbiosis.” 
      Pp. 5-18. From Seckbach, Joseph & M. Grube, Eds. Symbioses and Stress: 
      Joint Ventures in Biology. Springer Verlag. P. 16. 
      
      
      “The concepts of function and semiosis are intertwined. Both are 
      teleological concepts in the sense of being determined with respect to an 
      end (or other than itself)–a specifically correlated absent content. 
      Although it is unclear whether these two properties of living processes 
      are exactly co-extensive, it is clear that although time-asymmetrical, 
      irreversible physical processes are found in the prebiotic 
      physical-chemical world, teleological processes that are specially 
      organized with respect to specific ends or referents are unique to living 
      processes.
      
      “If we conceive of a function as a process organized around an implicitly 
      represented end, then these two classes of phenomena must be considered 
      entirely co-extensive.” Kull, Kalevi, T. Deacon, C. Emmeche, J. Hoffmeyer 
      & F. Stjernfelt. “Theses on Biosemiotics: Prolegomena to a Theoretical 
      Biology.” Pp. 25-41. Emmeche, Claus & K. Kull, Eds. 2011. Towards a 
      Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of Signs. Imperial College Press. P. 
      27.
      
      
      “Another way to put this is to say that hemoglobin function is not 
      intrinsic to its molecular structure. Rather it is relational – hemoglobin 
      may be seen as a carrier of contstitutive absence, in the sense that the 
      molecule’s properties are constituted not only by intrinsic features, but 
      by extrinsic features of its historical and physical functional contexts. 
      In effect, the missing oxygen with respect to which hemoglobin structure 
      has evolved has become its defining characteristic. In this respect, one 
      can understand the structure of hemoglobin as a ‘representation’ of both 
      oxygen and its role in the cellular molecular processes of metabolism. The 
      function of hemoglobin is in this way also what affords the possibility of 
      it having representational character. This function relates to the ‘needs’ 
      or self-maintenance conditions of some agent.” Kull, Kalevi, T. Deacon, C. 
      Emmeche, J. Hoffmeyer & F. Stjernfelt. “Theses on Biosemiotics: 
      Prolegomena to a Theoretical Biology.” Pp. 25-41. Emmeche, Claus & K. Kull, 
      Eds. 2011. Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of Signs. 
      Imperial College Press. Pp. 29-30.
      
      
      “The difficulty of making predictions about biological phenomena is that 
      the functions are plurally realizable and thus subject to considerable 
      variation. As a result, the physical-chemical details necessarily provide 
      an incomplete account. Functional requirements do, however, constrain the 
      physical-chemical substrates that can be recruited.” Kull, Kalevi, T. 
      Deacon, C. Emmeche, J. Hoffmeyer & F. Stjernfelt. “Theses on Biosemiotics: 
      Prolegomena to a Theoretical Biology.” Pp. 25-41. Emmeche, Claus & K. Kull, 
      Eds. 2011. Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of Signs. 
      Imperial College Press. P. 31.
      
      
      “A semiotic niche is defined as the totality of signs or cues in the 
      surroundings of an organism–signs that it must be able to meaningfully 
      interpret to ensure its balance and welfare. The semiotic niche includes 
      the traditional ecological niche factors, but now the semiotic dimension 
      of these factors is also emphasized.” Kull, Kalevi, T. Deacon, C. Emmeche, 
      J. Hoffmeyer & F. Stjernfelt. “Theses on Biosemiotics: Prolegomena to a 
      Theoretical Biology.” Pp. 25-41. Emmeche, Claus & K. Kull, Eds. 2011. 
      Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of Signs. Imperial College 
      Press. P. 38.
      
      
      “Volumes have been produced to solve the problem of how to justify the 
      concept of function inside a non-teleological frame of understanding. And 
      this is where natural selection comes in, for natural selection will tend 
      to optimize the capacity of species to meet the functional challenges of 
      their ecological niche conditions. Functionality is exactly what natural 
      selection is supposed to produce.
      
      “The term ‘function’ in biology is understood as the answer to a question 
      about why some object or process has evolved in a system. In other words, 
      what is it good for? A function thus refers forward in time from the 
      object or process, along some chain of causation to the goal or success. 
      This inversed arrow of time (future directedness) immediately sets 
      functions apart from other kinds of mechanisms that always refer backward 
      along some chain of causation explaining how the feature occurred. 
      Darwinists, however, are not worried about the teleological character of 
      functions because they believe that natural selection will ultimately 
      account for them through ordinary mechanistic causation. Thus, as often 
      noted by Darwinists, adaptive traits are not explained by the consequences 
      the will or can have but by the consequences they already have had in 
      ancestor populations. The consequences in other words precede the effect 
      they explain, and selection does not therefore challenge the mechanistic 
      paradigm of traditional biology. So, as the explanation goes, the 
      teleology implied by the concept of function is only an ‘as if’ teleology, 
      i.e., a teleonomy.” Hoffmeyer, Jesper. “Biology is Immature Biosemiotics.” 
      Pp. 43-65. Emmeche, Claus & K. Kull, Eds. 2011. Towards a Semiotic 
      Biology: Life is the Action of Signs. Imperial College Press. P. 44.
      
      
      “... contrary to physically based interactions, semiotic interactions do 
      not depend on any direct causal connection between the sign vehicle and 
      the effect. Instead the two events are connected through the intervention 
      of an interpretative response. The point is that in semiotic interactions 
      the causal machinery of the receptive system is itself in charge of 
      producing the behavior, and it thus only needs to acquire a sensitivity 
      towards the sign as an inducing factor. The biochemical machinery 
      underlying the response is not, therefore, restricted by any bonds 
      deriving from the chemistry of the releasing sign.” Hoffmeyer, Jesper. 
      “Biology is Immature Biosemiotics.” Pp. 43-65. Emmeche, Claus & K. Kull, 
      Eds. 2011. Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of Signs. 
      Imperial College Press. Pp. 60-1.
      
      
      “... open-ended evolution includes then two distinct properties. (1) An 
      immense number of potential forms, and (2) a basic unpredictability of the 
      paths evolution will take.” Pattee, Howard & K. Kull. “Between Physics and 
      Semiotics.” Pp. 213-233. Emmeche, Claus & K. Kull, Eds. 2011. Towards a 
      Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of Signs. Imperial College Press. P. 
      214. Kull speaking.
      
      
      “The physical basis of the immense number of forms is a consequence of the 
      immense number of linear sequences of material units that laws cannot 
      distinguish because of their similar energy or similar stability. This is 
      the genetic memory. Only some forms of ‘frozen accident’ or higher level 
      selection process affects which memory sequences survive over time. Not 
      only are the initial sequences unpredictable, but their physical structure 
      appears to be largely arbitrary. Natural selection is also unpredictable 
      because of its complexity and the indefinite time period over which 
      selection continues to work.” Pattee, Howard & K. Kull. “Between Physics 
      and Semiotics.” Pp. 213-233. Emmeche, Claus & K. Kull, Eds. 2011. Towards 
      a Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of Signs. Imperial College Press. 
      P. 214. Pattee speaking.
      
      
      “The inexorable character of physical law is often misunderstood to imply 
      determinism. This is not the case. There are innumerable structures in the 
      universe that physical laws do not determine. It is also important to 
      understand why lawfully indeterminate does not mean physically 
      indistinguishable.
      
      “Since all the basic laws of physics are expressed in terms of energy, 
      systems with two or more states with the same energy are lawfully 
      indeterminate. However, in many cases we can distinguish these states by 
      measurements of their initial conditions. These law-equivalent states are 
      often called degeneracies or symmetries.
      
      “A common example is chirality, or left and right handedness. Chemically, 
      amino acids and proteins can be left or right handed, and they cannot be 
      distinguished by the laws that they both obey.” Pattee, Howard & K. Kull. 
      “Between Physics and Semiotics.” Pp. 213-233. Emmeche, Claus & K. Kull, 
      Eds. 2011. Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of Signs. 
      Imperial College Press. P. 215. Pattee speaking.
      
      
      “The concept of absolute determinism as envisioned by Laplace and 
      philosophers like Dennett, has turned out in physics to be an 
      unsupportable and unproductive way of thinking. Determinism is an 
      untestable metaphysical concept. First of all, measurement processes are 
      irreversible and therefore dissipative and subject to error, so 
      determinism is not empirically verifiable. All the fundamental laws are 
      consistent only with a probabilistic universe. We have enough ‘freedom’ 
      just because of the undeterminable or equivalent probabilities of many 
      structures, like polymer sequences.” Pattee, Howard & K. Kull. “Between 
      Physics and Semiotics.” Pp. 213-233. Emmeche, Claus & K. Kull, Eds. 2011. 
      Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of Signs. Imperial College 
      Press. P. 217. Pattee speaking.
      
      
      “In physics a constraint is a local structure that limits the motions of 
      otherwise ‘free’ particles that are governed only by the laws of motion. 
      However, the concept of constraint is also used to describe levels of 
      hierarchical organizations. Generally speaking, each higher level requires 
      a constraint that is described by fewer observables than the lower level 
      description. More precisely, a constraint is an alternative simplified 
      description of structures that are not usefully described by the behavior 
      at a more detailed lower level.
      
      A simple example is a closed box that limits the detailed motions of the 
      gas molecules inside. The box itself is also made of molecules, but they 
      are constrained by chemical bonds to form a solid structure. So we 
      simplify the description of the box by describing only its geometric 
      boundaries, and we ignore the detailed molecular structure of the box 
      itself. Such constraints are also called ‘boundary conditions.’” Pattee, 
      Howard & K. Kull. “Between Physics and Semiotics.” Pp. 213-233. Emmeche, 
      Claus & K. Kull, Eds. 2011. Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action 
      of Signs. Imperial College Press. Pp. 217-8. Pattee speaking.
      
      
      “To be more precise, you never have ‘freedom from laws’ but only freedom 
      from initial or boundary conditions. You have to make a clear distinction 
      between laws and constraints. Laws are universal and inexorable. Nothing 
      is free of laws. Constraints are local structures that obey laws but are 
      not determined or predictable by laws. Memory is a special type of 
      constraint that can alter or control the lawful course of local events. 
      Polanyi’s phrase ‘harnessing the laws’ is apt.” Pattee, Howard & K. Kull. 
      “Between Physics and Semiotics.” Pp. 213-233. Emmeche, Claus & K. Kull, 
      Eds. 2011. Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of Signs. 
      Imperial College Press. P. 220. Pattee speaking. Reference is to Polanyi, 
      Michael. 1968. “Life’s irreducible structure.” Science 160:1308-1312.
      
      
      “A thing in the physical world is just one, whereas in the semiotic world 
      it is always many, it just cannot be one until it has a meaning. Semiosis 
      makes the world plural. Like, for instance, a painting – physically, it is 
      a concrete pattern of pigments, but semiotically it is many things that 
      can be recognized (or to what it refers).” Pattee, Howard & K. Kull. 
      “Between Physics and Semiotics.” Pp. 213-233. Emmeche, Claus & K. Kull, 
      Eds. 2011. Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of Signs. 
      Imperial College Press. P. 226. Kull speaking.
      
      
      “Physics and semiotics have two very different cultures, and biochemistry 
      is a third culture. The problem is even worse because all these areas have 
      subcultures with their special foci and terminologies.
      
      “I’m sure you are aware of this culture problem. The two of us are both 
      motivated to try to resolve our different language problem by discussions 
      like this one. Unfortunately this is not the common motivation of most 
      biochemists. When they are confronted with the biosemiotics perspective, 
      they often resist semiotic expression of the problems of life as nothing 
      but restatements of what they describe in their well-developed material 
      language, which they regard as a more scientific description of life.
      
      “It is not clear to me what biosemiotics wants to be. All I can suggest is 
      that if its practitioners want it to be accepted as science rather than as 
      philosophy, they must focus more on empirically decidable models, rather 
      than emphasizing its linguistic and philosophical foundations. In other 
      words, if biosemiotics claims that symbolic control is the distinguishing 
      characteristic of life, and if it also claims to be a science, then it 
      must clearly define symbols and codes in empirical scientific terms that 
      are more familiar to physicists and molecular biologists.” Pattee, Howard 
      & K. Kull. “Between Physics and Semiotics.” Pp. 213-233. Emmeche, Claus & 
      K. Kull, Eds. 2011. Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life is the Action of 
      Signs. Imperial College Press. P. 230. Pattee speaking.
      
      
      “... in Costa Rica, the tropical biologist and conservationist Dan Janzen 
      had argued that the biggest fruits, those that now sit unmoved beneath 
      their shady mothers, evolved to be dispersed by the now-extinct megafauna, 
      species that disappeared along with the pronghorn’s predators. Janzen’s 
      idea arose from his observations in 1979 of the three-foot-long pods of 
      the Cassia grandis tree. Thirty years later, Janzen seems just as right 
      and those fruits remain just as unmoved. To paraphrase the paleontologist 
      Paul S. Martin, we live in a time of ghosts, their prehistoric presence 
      hinted at by the largest sweet-tasting fruits. Many of the fruits that 
      humans have come to favor seem to have evolved to be carried from one 
      place to another in the temporary vehicle of a giant mammal’s guts–papayas 
      make the list, as do avocados, guava, cherimoya, osage oranges, and the 
      foul-smelling but delicious durian.” Dunn, Rob. 2011. The Wild Life of Our 
      Bodies: Predators, Parasites, and Partners that Shape who we are Today. 
      Harper Collins. P. 29.
      
      
      “Let’s call it the pronghorn principle. The pronghorn principle has two 
      elements: First, all species have physical characteristics and genes that 
      relate to the ways in which they interact with other species. Second, when 
      those other species are removed, such features become anachronistic or 
      worse....
      
      “Pick any organism on Earth and as much of its biology is defined by how 
      it interacts with other species as is influenced by the basics of living, 
      eating, breathing, and mating. Interactions among species are part of the 
      tangled bank to which Darwin referred. What the Byerses newly understood 
      in the context of the pronghorn was the consequences of removing the 
      species our bodies evolved to interact with, be they predators (as in the 
      case of the cheetah), mutualists like the animals that once dispersed the 
      giant American fruits, or even parasites and disease.” Dunn, Rob. 2011. 
      The Wild Life of Our Bodies: Predators, Parasites, and Partners that Shape 
      who we are Today. Harper Collins. P. 30. Reference is to Byers, John. 
      Built for Speed, A Year in the Life of Pronghorn. 2003. Harvard University 
      Press.
      
      
      “They [microbes in our guts especially for early humans] provided vitamin 
      K where it was once scarce, but just as importantly, they allowed us to 
      extract extra calories from our food, up to 30 percent extra.” Dunn, Rob. 
      2011. The Wild Life of Our Bodies: Predators, Parasites, and Partners that 
      Shape who we are Today. Harper Collins. P. 81.
      
      
      “For much of our primate history, we spent hours a week picking and 
      savoring wild fruits. The fruits benefited us. We also benefited their 
      seeds by ‘depositing them’ wherever we relieved ourselves. Some plant 
      species spread around the world in this way, using latrines as 
      stepping-stones. In this regard our ancestors were like toucans, emus, 
      monkeys, and the many other species that serve plants as seed dispersers. 
      We ate other things, of course. We searched out some insects–the queens of 
      ants, for example, or the grubs of large beetles–but, for most of our 
      story, the plants were the mainstay of our vessel. Today when we look out 
      at our evolutionary partners, the ones not in our bodies, we see a very 
      different scene. No less than half of all wild forests and grasslands have 
      been replaced by agricultural and other intensively managed land uses. On 
      these managed lands, we nurture a tiny minority of Earth’s species, our 
      domesticates, whether corn, rice, wheat, or more rarely, something else. 
      These species are still our mutualists, but in a very different way from 
      the papaya tree growing like a phoenix out of the outhouse. In making the 
      transition from gathering thousands of species to farming far fewer, we 
      caused both our favored species and our disfavored species to evolve, but 
      they were not the only ones. We evolved too.” Dunn, Rob. 2011. The Wild 
      Life of Our Bodies: Predators, Parasites, and Partners that Shape who we 
      are Today. Harper Collins. Pp. 111-2.
      
      
      “The answer Tishkoff found in East Africa was that the ability of human 
      adults to digest lactase evolved more than once. It evolved once in 
      Europeans, around 9,000 to 10,000 years ago, at about the time that 
      archaeological evidence and cow genes point to the domestication of cows 
      in Europe. It then evolved again, at least three times, in Africa, 
      beginning around 7,000 years ago, again just about when evidence suggests 
      cows were domesticated for the second time. At least twice (and probably 
      more like four times) upon a time, aurochsen were domesticated.” Dunn, 
      Rob. 2011. The Wild Life of Our Bodies: Predators, Parasites, and Partners 
      that Shape who we are Today. Harper Collins. Pp. 126-7. Reference is to 
      Scheinfeldt, L., S. Soi & S. Tishkoff. 2010. “Working Toward a Synthesis 
      of Archaeological, Linguistic, and Genetic Data for Inferring African 
      Population History.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 107: 
      8931-8938.
      
      
      “In fact, it seems possible that in each place that agriculture arose, our 
      bodies changed, independently and differently. Our great human variety 
      reflects, in no small part, the great variety of ways in which we came to 
      depend on individual species, a new less diverse set of species, to make 
      it through the toughest years.
      
      “In the villages of our descent, we turned to these new species and 
      latched on, the way a baby first latches on to its mother. We had been 
      brave and independent, but in those moments, we gave in. We would live, 
      for each day after, where and how those species needed us to live in order 
      to benefit from what they offered. We made an evolutionary contract from 
      which we have never since been separated. It is far easier to divorce your 
      spouse than to divorce agriculture.” Dunn, Rob. 2011. The Wild Life of Our 
      Bodies: Predators, Parasites, and Partners that Shape who we are Today. 
      Harper Collins. Pp. 127-8.
      
      
      “Imagine a crab that proceeds through four acts in its performance–finding 
      a mollusk, picking it up, breaking in, and then actually killing and 
      eating it. At some tasks, it rarely fails. It finds prey without trouble. 
      It kills with deadly certainty once it has broken through the shell. What 
      it most often fails to do is to get through the shell. Breaking in is hard 
      to do, and so what mollusks have done over time is to change most in those 
      features that prevent the crabs from breaking in. This was Vermeij’s law: 
      prey respond to predators’ weaknesses, the ways they fail rather than the 
      ways they succeed. The main caveat is that the prey must vary genetically 
      in traits related to the predators’ weakness, but in most cases they do. 
      Now that crabs are everywhere, almost all shells in the ocean are thick 
      and hard ....” Dunn, Rob. 2011. The Wild Life of Our Bodies: Predators, 
      Parasites, and Partners that Shape who we are Today. Harper Collins. Pp. 
      172-3.
      
      
      “Each year we have farmed more sugarcane and sugar beets. Now they are 
      joined by corn farms. On such farms, a useful food is farmed to produce 
      nutritionally useless sweet high-fructose corn syrup. In 2010, more than 
      400,000 square kilometers of Earth were dedicated to the farming of sugar 
      beets and sugar-cane, an area the size of California. A similar quantity 
      of land is dedicated to the corn used to produce corn syrup.
      
      “When millions of humans continue to starve each year, the fact that we 
      have allotted an area this large to a substance for which none of us has 
      any real need is a sign of just how beholden we are to our taste buds....
      
      “Back in East Africa, no one follows the honeyguide anymore. It has 
      stopped coming to villages. The children who once chased it pursue 
      lollypops instead.” Dunn, Rob. 2011. The Wild Life of Our Bodies: 
      Predators, Parasites, and Partners that Shape who we are Today. Harper 
      Collins. Pp. 187-8.
      
      
      “Our senses, coupled with our power, changed the world so quickly and 
      universally that it is easy to forget what the world used to be like. 
      Today, roughly 60 percent of the earth’s surface is managed by humans for 
      production, and most of that land is devoted to one or another kind of 
      grass. Nearly all humans on Earth live by water. Many of us tend to live 
      by water because we need it, but also because we tend to prefer it. It 
      pulls at us like gravity and makes us feel good. Once upon a time, though, 
      before modern humans, there were more forests and larger animals. Rats 
      were rare, as were mice and roaches. Even grasslands were not nearly so 
      common, and the flowering plants that have arisen around us had not yet 
      called to our senses. In many places, the coastlines along which we now so 
      easily walk were hidden beyond dunes tens of feet high, dunes that while 
      useful to us in protecting our shores, obscured our views. The views won, 
      and so in general the dunes are gone, reduced to a minor row of hills that 
      does little ....” Dunn, Rob. 2011. The Wild Life of Our Bodies: Predators, 
      Parasites, and Partners that Shape who we are Today. Harper Collins. Pp. 
      197-8.
      
      
      “Preutz and Bertolani reported the first habitual use of tools by 
      chimpanzees to secure vertebrate prey. The apes of Fongoli, Senegal, used 
      sharpened sticks as skewers to hunt lesser bushbabies from their nests in 
      tree cavities. Making these instruments involved a hierarchically 
      organized sequence of up to five steps, flexible enough to allow some 
      steps to be omitted and others repeated. Some of the observed episodes 
      involved more than one tool being used to probe a single cavity.” Wynn, 
      Thomas, R. Adriana Hernandez-Aguilar, L. Marchant & W. McGrew. 2011. “‘An 
      Ape’s View of the Oldowan’ Revisited.” Evolutionary Anthropology. 
      20:181-197. P. 182. Reference is to Preutz J. & P. Bertolani. 2007. 
      “Savanna chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes verus, hunt with tools.” Current 
      Biology 17:412-417.
      
      
      “Hernandez-Aguilar, Moore, and Pickering reported for the first time that 
      chimpanzees use tools to excavate the underground storage organs (USOs) of 
      plants.” Wynn, Thomas, R. Adriana Hernandez-Aguilar, L. Marchant & W. 
      McGrew. 2011. “‘An Ape’s View of the Oldowan’ Revisited.” Evolutionary 
      Anthropology. 20:181-197. P. 183. Reference is to Hernandez-Aguilar, RA, 
      J. Moore & TR Pickering. 2007. “Savanna chimpanzees use tools to harvest 
      the underground storage organs of plants. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 
      104:19210-19213.
      
      
      “A tool set is ‘two or more tools [used] in an obligate sequence to 
      achieve a single goal. Brewer and McGrew first described a tool set. In 
      that case, a female chimpanzee used four types of tools in series to 
      extract honey. Since then, tool sets have been seen in wild communities 
      for obtaining honey, sap, and social insects. The largest known tool set 
      comprises five tools used to get honey. A specific order in the use of 
      each tool of the set is needed to reach the goal.” Wynn, Thomas, R. 
      Adriana Hernandez-Aguilar, L. Marchant & W. McGrew. 2011. “‘An Ape’s View 
      of the Oldowan’ Revisited.” Evolutionary Anthropology. 20:181-197. P. 183. 
      Reference is to Brewer, S. & W. McGrew. 1990. “Chimpanzees use of a 
      tool-set to get honey.” Folia Primatology. 54:100-104.
      
      
      “Based on long-term studies, these white-faced capuchins show notable 
      parallels with chimpanzees, such as social hunting, meat-sharing, and 
      interpopulational behavioral variation. However, in the last 10 years, it 
      is C. libidinosus (bearded capuchin) that has leapt to prominence...
      
      “Overall, the tool kits of capuchin monkeys rival or even exceed those of 
      chimpanzee populations in scope and complexity, if not yet in size.” Wynn, 
      Thomas, R. Adriana Hernandez-Aguilar, L. Marchant & W. McGrew. 2011. “‘An 
      Ape’s View of the Oldowan’ Revisited.” Evolutionary Anthropology. 
      20:181-197. P. 187.
      
      
      “Since 1989, the picture of non-human primate technology-based adaptations 
      has broadened dramatically. From termite fishing at Gombe and nut cracking 
      at Tai, which formed the core of the 1989 analysis, the known tool-based 
      activities of chimpanzees have expanded to encompass a much greater 
      variety of tools, including tool sets, composite tools, and compound 
      tools, and a greater variety of foods accessed and processed. Moreover, it 
      is clear that much of this activity depends on sequentially and 
      hierarchically organized actions that allow flexibility in task 
      completion. Chimpanzees represent the high end of a range of reliance on 
      tool-assisted activities now documented for other apes, and also monkeys.” 
      Wynn, Thomas, R. Adriana Hernandez-Aguilar, L. Marchant & W. McGrew. 2011. 
      “‘An Ape’s View of the Oldowan’ Revisited.” Evolutionary Anthropology. 
      20:181-197. P. 187.
      
      
      “In nut cracking, Carvalho and colleagues reported that a large flake 
      detached from an anvil was then reused as a hammer. They stressed that 
      although such fracturing may have been accidental, the result was a tool 
      produced by another tool. Unintentional products of chimpanzee percussion 
      activities were also identified in the excavated archeological assemblages 
      at Tai. Although accidental stone tool-making by apes is not the same as 
      intentional knapping of stones by hominins, it is an important occurrence 
      and allows for the hypothesis that the unintentional fracture of anvil 
      margins was the first step in the evolution of stone knapping.” Wynn, 
      Thomas, R. Adriana Hernandez-Aguilar, L. Marchant & W. McGrew. 2011. “‘An 
      Ape’s View of the Oldowan’ Revisited.” Evolutionary Anthropology. 
      20:181-197. P. 192. Reference is to Carvalho, S, E. Cunha, C. Sousa & T. 
      Matsuzawa. 2008. “Chaines operatoires and resource exploitation strategies 
      in chimpanzee nut-cracking (Pan troglodytes).” Journal of Human Evolution. 
      55:148-163.
      
      
      “These authors found that normal participants were better able to report a 
      target when it was presented in interaction with a partner object but only 
      under conditions in which the stimuli could be perceptually integrated 
      (e.g., with a short interval between the objects). Green and Hummel 
      proposed that objects placed in co-locations for action could be grouped 
      together and attended as a single ‘unit.’” Yoon, EY, G. Humphreys & MJ 
      Riddoch. “The Paired-Object Affordance Effect.” 2010. Journal of 
      Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance. 36, 4:812-824. 
      P. 813. Reference is to Green, C., & J. Hummel. 2006. “Familiar 
      interacting objects are perceptually grouped.” Journal of Experimental 
      Psychology: Human Perception and Performance. 32, 1107-1119.
      
      
      “In order for a structure to evolve there must be a reasonable probability 
      that genetic variation carries it from one adaptive peak to another; at 
      the same time the structure should not be overly unstable to phenotypic 
      perturbations, as this is incompatible with occupying a peak. 
      Organizations that are complex in terms of numbers of components and 
      interactions are more likely to meet the peak-climbing condition, but less 
      likely to meet the stability condition. Biological structures that are 
      characterized by a high degree of component redundancy and multiple weak 
      interactions satisfy these conflicting pressures.” Conrad, Michael. “The 
      geometry of evolution.” 1990. BioSystems, 24:61-81. P. 61.
      
      
      “The picture is that a very special class of structures is particularly 
      amenable to evolution, and that these are themselves selected through the 
      Darwinian mechanism of variation and selection. The chief characteristic 
      of this special class of structures is that it must satisfy at one and the 
      same time two conflicting conditions. The first is that the organism be 
      stable, that it sit in a developmental basin of attraction. This is more 
      likely as the number of components in the organism and the number of 
      interactions among them decreases, on the simple grounds that the chance 
      of a valley occurring in the phase space of a system decreases with its 
      dimensionality. The second condition is that the adaptive peaks 
      corresponding to these basins of attraction should be close enough 
      together to be connected by single genetic changes. But this is more 
      likely as the number of components and interactions increases, since 
      pathways between peaks in the adaptive peak space correspond to pathways 
      between valleys in the basin space. The only way for a system to satisfy 
      both conditions is to have many redundant components with multiple weak 
      interactions. In this case the developmental system can have many 
      genetically related homomorphic images. The extra components and weak 
      interactions that allow for this special situation are costs to the 
      individual organism; the structure that is more amenable to evolution will 
      be functionally less effective from the thermodynamic point of view. 
      Nevertheless the amenability-increasing structural features inevitably 
      hitchhike along with the advantageous traits whose evolution they 
      facilitate.” Conrad, Michael. “The geometry of evolution.” 1990. 
      BioSystems, 24:61-81. P. 62.
      
      
      “Clearly we have arrived at a contradiction. A genetic-developmental 
      organization must be slightly unstable to allow for evolution, but this is 
      incompatible with the stability required for fitness. The resolution is 
      not too difficult. It is only necessary to organize the phenotypic 
      dynamics to be unstable to mutation and other genetic perturbation, but 
      stable to the physiological class of perturbations.” Conrad, Michael. “The 
      geometry of evolution.” 1990. BioSystems, 24:61-81. P. 69.
      
      
      “At the level of the gene and organism the principle [of 
      self-complication] may be stated thus: the complexity of biological 
      organization increases because (buffered) dynamic instability in response 
      to genetic variations is advantageous to evolutionary 
      self-organization....
      
      “The principle of self-complication contrasts with what has been termed 
      the principle of self-simplification. Some authors have argued that 
      complex systems, because they are unstable, will self-simplify. This is a 
      reasonable assumption, except for those special cases in which the 
      structure of complexity confers extra stability. Our analysis suggests 
      that complication in terms of redundant components and weak interactions 
      will in general facilitate the achievement of stability and that 
      biological organization is a consequence of self-complicating as well as 
      self-simplifying processes.” Conrad, Michael. “The geometry of evolution.” 
      1990. BioSystems, 24:61-81. Pp. 78-9.
      
      
      “Actually our whole discussion has used a rather naive definition of 
      complexity Many other definitions exist. According to the algorithmic 
      definition of Chaiten and Kolmogoroff, the complexity of a pattern can be 
      represented by the length of the shortest computer program that can 
      generate the pattern. A truly random (not pseudorandom) pattern is thus 
      the most complex. Redundancy means that some of the features of the 
      pattern are related to each other by a rule. Thus our principle of 
      self-complication has a self-simplifying aspect when looked at from the 
      point of view of the Chaiten-Kolmogoroff definition. The 
      Chaiten-Kolmogoroff complexity of an evolutionary system would increase 
      less in the course of evolution than would the complexity as measured by 
      the number of components and interactions. Evolutionary systems would move 
      toward some situation intermediate between order and randomness. From the 
      point of view of constructing scientific theories this is of course the 
      most complex (difficult) region. Pure randomness, no matter how complex 
      from the standpoint of Chaiten-Kolmogoroff, lends itself to probabilistic 
      models; while highly ordered situations lend themselves to group theory. 
      The organizations that are best suited to evolution are precisely those 
      that are most ill suited to the classical standards of scientific 
      description.” Conrad, Michael. “The geometry of evolution.” 1990. 
      BioSystems, 24:61-81. P. 79.
      
      
      “... a different and completely valid scenario is that the entities that 
      gave rise to the lineages of the three different domains of life were 
      actually the result of independent cellularisation events in an evolving 
      population of precells. However, the concept of a distinct LUCA becomes 
      ambiguous in this case, and as a consequence it is more appropriate to 
      speak of the Last Universal Common Ancestral State (LUCAS).” Guzman, 
      Marcelo. “Abiotic Photosynthesis: From Prebiotic Chemistry to Metabolism.” 
      Pp. 85-105. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. 
      Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 86.
      
      
      “While metabolism supplies the monomers from which the replicators (i.e., 
      genes) are made, replicators alter the kinds of chemical reactions 
      occurring in metabolism. Only then can natural selection, acting on 
      replicators, power the evolution of metabolism.” Guzman, Marcelo. “Abiotic 
      Photosynthesis: From Prebiotic Chemistry to Metabolism.” Pp. 85-105. From 
      Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The 
      Primal Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 87.
      
      
      “Here are only three such models [to explain the origin of life]: (1) the 
      RNA-first world, (2) the compartmentalistic approach, and (3) the proposal 
      of nonenzymatic metabolism.... Among the many other models to explain the 
      origin of life is the thioester world and the glyoxylate scenario.” 
      Guzman, Marcelo. “Abiotic Photosynthesis: From Prebiotic Chemistry to 
      Metabolism.” Pp. 85-105. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, 
      Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 90.
      
      
      “Universal metabolism rationalizes that all the possible metabolic cycles 
      are partially common and converge in the r-TCA cycle through at least one 
      of the intermediates. In consequence, this cycle is proposed to be 
      fundamental to the origin of life. Enzymes, specialized proteins able to 
      catalyze all these metabolic reactions, appeared later in metabolism, 
      speeding up the reactions, and eventually took over the complete control 
      of these networks. The deep consequence is that metabolic networks arose 
      before the origin of macromolecules with highly specialized catalytic 
      properties or enzymes.
      
      “The model is not absolutely accepted, least so by supporters of the 
      RNA-first world scenario, whose main concern relates to the catalytic 
      properties of the minerals involved in the organization of the chemical 
      system.” Guzman, Marcelo. “Abiotic Photosynthesis: From Prebiotic 
      Chemistry to Metabolism.” Pp. 85-105. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A. 
      Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011. 
      Springer. P. 92.
      
      
      “Nonenzymatic metabolism requires overcoming the high activation energies 
      (Ea) for the chemical reactions involved. Enzymes have the ability of 
      catalyzing those reactions by decreasing Ea and making possible many 
      energetically unfavorable reactions. In addition, the active sites where 
      the reactions take place in enzymes have a tridimensional geometry of high 
      order where the actual concentration of reactants is considerably larger 
      than in the surroundings. Cairns-Smith explored an idea first suggested by 
      Bernal. Cairns-Smith showed that clay mineral surfaces, in an aqueous 
      environment, can adsorb organic molecules, enhancing their concentration. 
      Clay surfaces also behave as a mold for polymerization reactions to take 
      place.” Guzman, Marcelo. “Abiotic Photosynthesis: From Prebiotic Chemistry 
      to Metabolism.” Pp. 85-105. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A. 
      Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011. 
      Springer. P. 93.
      
      
      “To date, there are six known carbon fixation pathways used by living 
      organisms. One of them, the r-TCA cycle is often proposed as the leading 
      candidate to be the first carbon fixation mechanism because it operates in 
      ancient green sulfur bacteria. Additionally, all six mechanisms share at 
      least a common intermediate ....” Guzman, Marcelo. “Abiotic 
      Photosynthesis: From Prebiotic Chemistry to Metabolism.” Pp. 85-105. From 
      Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of Life: The 
      Primal Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. P. 96.
      
      
      “The photocatalytic principle consists in the absorption of a photon in 
      the wave-length band of absorption of the mineral. The most extensively 
      studied mineral for this application is sphalerite, the cubic form of zinc 
      sulfide.... The novelty of this mechanism is to provide complementary 
      oxidation and reduction reactions that occur at the same time in the tiny 
      nano- to micro-meter diameter scale colloidal particles.” Guzman, Marcelo. 
      “Abiotic Photosynthesis: From Prebiotic Chemistry to Metabolism.” Pp. 
      85-105. From Egel, Richard, D. Lankenau & A. Mulkidjanian, Eds. Origins of 
      Life: The Primal Self-Organization. 2011. Springer. Pp. 98-9.
      
      “In the early terrestrial environment, the genetic information that was 
      embedded in the RNA sequences could lead to self replication and to 
      phenotypes with catalytic properties. In the case of the proto-ribosome, 
      it is likely that the more efficient and more stable RNA dimers that 
      functioned as proto-ribosomes by positioning the substrates in a spatial 
      arrangement similar to the modern one, could have autoreplicated. Thus, 
      the surviving ancient pockets became the templates for the ancient 
      ribosomes. In a later stage these molecular entities underwent 
      optimization from non-genetic peptide bond formation towards performing 
      genetically driven translation.” Davidovich, Chen, M. Belousoff, A. Bashan 
      & A. Yonath. “The evolving ribosome: from non-coded peptide bond formation 
      to sophisticated translation machinery.” Resarch in Microbiology. 2009. 
      160: 487-492. P. 489.
      
      
      “The emergence of Life required an apparatus for synthesizing polypeptides 
      capable of performing catalytic or other life supporting tasks, i.e. the 
      ribosome. The proto-ribosome, which served as the precursor for the modern 
      translation machinery by its capacity to autonomously catalyze peptide 
      bonds forming non-coded amino acid oligo- or polymers, is suggested to 
      have appeared by spontaneous dimeric assembly of two self-folding RNA 
      chains. These pocket-like dimers offered a catalytic site for favorable 
      positioning of the substrates involved in peptide bond formation and 
      simple elongation. Our studies show that it is likely that the 
      proto-ribosome is still embedded in the core of the modern ribosome, and 
      that the tendency for dimerization of the proto-ribosome, a prerequisite 
      for obtaining the catalytic center, is intrinsically linked to the 
      sequences and the folds of its two components, thus indicating functional 
      selection at the molecular level in the prebiotic era.” Davidovich, Chen, 
      M. Belousoff, A. Bashan & A. Yonath. “The evolving ribosome: from 
      non-coded peptide bond formation to sophisticated translation machinery.” 
      Resarch in Microbiology. 2009. 160: 487-492. P. 491.
      
      
      “An important consequence of this view is that the agent and the 
      environment constitute a single system, i.e. the two aspects are so 
      intimately connected that a description of each of them in isolation does 
      not make much sense.” Nolfi, Stefano. “Behaviour as a Complex Adaptive 
      System: On the Role of Self-Organization in the Development of Individual 
      and Collective Behaviour.” ComPlexUs. 2005. 2:195-203. P. 196.
      
      
      “The various forms of learning have traditionally been treated as separate 
      creations, much as species were treated by pre-Darwinian biologists. This 
      long-standing position is indefensible, however. Just as systematists, 
      comparative zoologists, biochemists, and ethologists have reconstructed 
      evolutionary hierarchies showing the origins of species, structures, 
      proteins, and instincts, so also comparative psychologists (or others) 
      should in principle be able to find hierarchical relationships linking 
      most or all known forms of learning. The present work addresses this 
      question, and offers a cladogram linking ninety-seven processes.” Moore, 
      Bruce. “The evolution of learning.” 2004. Biological Reviews. 79:301-335. 
      P. 302.
      
      
      “Habituation has been defined as a response decrement ‘occurring as the 
      result of repeated [or prolonged] stimulation,’ and not attributable to 
      fatigue or sensory adaptation.” Moore, Bruce. “The evolution of learning.” 
      2004. Biological Reviews. 79:301-335. P. 303. Quote is from Harris, J. 
      1943. “Habituatory response decrement in the intact organism.” 
      Psychological Bulletin. 40:385-422.
      
      
      “Dishabituation, in which abrupt stimuli reduce habituation, is rather 
      like sensitization. But it brings habituated reactions back to normal, or 
      near-normal, whereas sensitization enhances normal reflexes.” Moore, 
      Bruce. “The evolution of learning.” 2004. Biological Reviews. 79:301-335. 
      P. 305. Quote is from Harris, J. 1943. “Habituatory response decrement in 
      the intact organism.” Psychological Bulletin. 40:385-422.
      
      
      “Sensitization is ordinarily an after-effect of negative reinforcement. It 
      occurs when mere presentation of a reinforcing stimulus, typically an 
      aversive one, potentiates reactions from the species-typical repertoire.” 
      Moore, Bruce. “The evolution of learning.” 2004. Biological Reviews. 
      79:301-335. P. 305. Quote is from Harris, J. 1943. “Habituatory response 
      decrement in the intact organism.” Psychological Bulletin. 40:385-422.
      
      
      “While conditioning and sensitization are similar, they differ in at least 
      two ways. Conditioning is associative, while sensitization is not, and it 
      is a long-term (semi-permanent) effect, unlike simple sensitization.” 
      Moore, Bruce. “The evolution of learning.” 2004. Biological Reviews. 
      79:301-335. P. 305. Quote is from Harris, J. 1943. “Habituatory response 
      decrement in the intact organism.” Psychological Bulletin. 40:385-422.
      
      
      “Here we present evidence from a diversity of sources supporting the 
      hypothesis that a fuller answer [to how hominin evolution could compete 
      with a guild of specialist carnivores] lies in the evolution of a new 
      socio-cognitive niche, the principal components of which include forms of 
      cooperation, egalitarianism, mindreading (also known as ‘theory of mind’), 
      language and cultural transmission, that go far beyond the most comparable 
      phenomena in other primates.” Whiten, Andrew & D. Erdal. “The human 
      socio-cognitive niche and its evolutionary origins.” 2012. Philosophical 
      Transactions of the Royal Society: B. 367: 2119-2129. P. 2119.
      
      
      “Under thermodynamic criteria, any biological system is no more ordered 
      than a piece of rock of equivalent weight. The difference between them is 
      in the kinetics and ability to remember favorable structurization 
      scenarios.” Ivanitskii, G.R. “21st century: what is life from the 
      perspective of physics?” 2010. Uspekhi Fizicheskikh Nauk. 180 (4) 337-369. 
      P. 334.
      
      
      “In other words, biological evolution proceeds in two distinct modes: as 
      the existence of short-living organisms, and via mutations in the 
      long-lived genetic code.” Ivanitskii, G.R. “21st century: what is life 
      from the perspective of physics?” 2010. Uspekhi Fizicheskikh Nauk. 180 (4) 
      337-369. P. 342.
      
      
      “It can be concluded that the greatest event in the course of natural 
      evolution was the appearance of primitive memory for at least one cycle of 
      environmental changes.” Ivanitskii, G.R. “21st century: what is life from 
      the perspective of physics?” 2010. Uspekhi Fizicheskikh Nauk. 180 (4) 
      337-369. P. 344.
      
      
      “The main point is that variations in the random process of environmental 
      changes enabled living organisms to develop a memory strategy for the 
      selection of advantageous mutations and modifications at different 
      hierarchical levels from macromolecules to the biospshere as a whole; 
      simultaneously, they learned how to survive in the course of evolution. In 
      other words, the mechanism of selection consists in a gradual alteration 
      of living matter responsiveness in time and space using memory of 
      preceding results. This mechanism was realized in different modes at 
      different stages of evolution by changing the pitch and the length of the 
      genetic code, a set of biochemical reactions, inner links, exchange 
      operation of learning for reproduction rate, etc. Selection gave 
      advantages to the best forms of living matter and enabled them to build up 
      new hierarchical levels of regulation by combining simultaneously arising 
      elements, which promoted the transformation of both chaotic and 
      deterministic environmental processes into the symbiotic 
      deterministic-chaotic process inside the living organism.” Ivanitskii, G.R. 
      “21st century: what is life from the perspective of physics?” 2010. 
      Uspekhi Fizicheskikh Nauk. 180 (4) 337-369. P. 352.
      
      
      “It is worth noting that the mass of living matter on our planet is still 
      rather small (2.4 - 3.6 x 1012 metric tons, dry weight), or 
      less than 10-6 of Earth’s mass. But the load it exerts on the 
      planet is determined by kinetics, not mass, of living matter, i.e., by the 
      energy being exhausted as it is consumed. According to different but close 
      estimates, a few billion species have disappeared from Earth during the 
      4.5 billion years of organic evolution. All these organisms had to let the 
      entire matter contained in the envelope of Earth (the atmosphere, 
      hydrosphere, lithosphere) pass many times through their organs, tissues, 
      and cells. Thereby, they not only reproduced themselves, but also 
      transformed atmospheric air, oceanic waters, and a huge mass of mineral 
      substance into the products of their vital functions.” Ivanitskii, G.R. 
      “21st century: what is life from the perspective of physics?” 2010. 
      Uspekhi Fizicheskikh Nauk. 180 (4) 337-369. P. 353
      
      
      “Much of evolution is coevolution—the process of reciprocal evolutionary 
      change between interacting species driven by natural selection. Most 
      species survive and reproduce only by using a combination of their own 
      genome and that of at least one other species either directly or 
      indirectly. Species evolve to a large degree by co-opting and manipulating 
      other free-living species or by acquiring the entire genomes of other 
      species through parasitic or mutualistic symbiotic relationships. The 
      evolution of biodiversity is therefore largely about the evolution of 
      interaction diversity.” Thompson, John. The Geographic Mosaic of 
      Coevolution. 2005. University of Chicago Press. Pp. 3-4.
      
      
      “We are also beginning to understand better the profound effects of 
      coevolution on human societies. Human history is partly a history of 
      coevolution with the parasites and pathogens that have shaped the spread 
      of our species and our cultures worldwide. The story of human agriculture 
      is to a great degree the story of human-induced coevolution between crop 
      plants and rapidly evolving parasites and pathogens.” Thompson, John. The 
      Geographic Mosaic of Coevolution. 2005. University of Chicago Press. Pp. 
      4-5.
      
      
      “In the past, discussions of the relevance of science for the 
      interpretation of reality, including human existence, were based on the 
      simplifications of physics. However, the close relationship of alternative 
      interpretations of living matter (in terms of either simplifying 
      generality or complex specificity and its extensive network of conceptual 
      continuity) suggests that the understanding of living, rather than 
      inanimate systems, would be of greater use in reconciling the simplifying 
      and complex qualities of reality. With its emphasis on specificity, 
      biology becomes a focal point in the discussion of the simple/complex 
      relationship, a pivotal area in bridging the gap between the abstract 
      realities of mechanistic physics and the concrete realities of human 
      society. It legitimizes biological systems as models for establishing 
      conceptual continuity as a way of understanding complexity.” Hermann, 
      Heinz. From Biology to Sociopolitics: Conceptual Continuity in Complex 
      Systems. 1998. Yale University Press. Pp. 7-8.
      
      
      “Inherent in the scientific thought of past centuries has been the resolve 
      to create a representation of reality that is free of complexity. 
      Examination and discussion of complexity as a noteworthy concept in its 
      own right was to be avoided. Phenomena that could not be reduced to the 
      simplicity of ideal systems were to be disregarded. Ignoring complexity 
      seemed quite plausible, as long as some mathematical formalization could 
      be regarded as the only necessary and sufficient requirement for 
      understanding of nonideal systems. This tendency became particularly 
      frequent in dealing with biological systems. Physiology texts published at 
      the turn of the century could boast that their mathematical correlations 
      of physiological parameters gave physiology a status comparable to that of 
      physics.” Hermann, Heinz. From Biology to Sociopolitics: Conceptual 
      Continuity in Complex Systems. 1998. Yale University Press. Pp. 125-6.
      
      
      “This hope for relieving the burdensome and frustrating complexity of 
      human existence through a simplified representation of reality, to be able 
      to make complexity tolerable by subsuming it under a unifying system of 
      thought, has been a pervasive goal of Western culture since the days of 
      ancient Greece to the present....
      
      “These developments [demonstrations of necessary complexity in “nonideal 
      systems of physics, biology, or sociopolitics”] suggest that humanity may 
      have to abandon its dreams of simple realities and at last come to terms 
      with the overriding complexity of both individual and social existence. 
      The response to this change, the way we perceive reality, will very likely 
      become an initial determining condition and characteristic of our future.
      
      “Three types of responses to complexity can be distinguished: resignation; 
      escape of denial; acceptance and attempted mastery.” Hermann, Heinz. From 
      Biology to Sociopolitics: Conceptual Continuity in Complex Systems. 1998. 
      Yale University Press. Pp. 204-6.
      
      
      “I shall try to show that our major trouble, and the reason why it is 
      taking the Kuhnian revolution so long to complete itself, is that we have 
      no theory of the cell or organism that explains how either of these [the 
      environment or genes] manages to constrain or collapse an enormously 
      complex realm of possibility to a given adaptive reality. Until we do, if 
      Kuhn was right, we will have to go on repairing a defective genetic 
      paradigm that looks for answers in simplistic genetic programs of one sort 
      or another.” Strohman, Richard. “Epigenesis and Complexity: The coming 
      Kuhnian revolution in biology.” 1997. Nature Biotechnology. Volume 15: 
      194-200. Pp. 194-5.
      
      
      “Normal science is an approach that reveals genetic maps related to 
      biological function, but the directions for reading the maps are not 
      included in the package. And the real secrets of life are obviously in 
      those missing directions–in the rules and constraints that organize 
      genetic agents into functional arrays. These rules and constraints are 
      more than likely embedded in the organization of life rather than in the 
      catalogue of the organization’s agents, and we have mistaken the former 
      for the latter.” Strohman, Richard. “Epigenesis and Complexity: The coming 
      Kuhnian revolution in biology.” 1997. Nature Biotechnology. Volume 15: 
      194-200. P. 197.
      
      
      “The Kuhnian revolution in which we are now embedded is all about the 
      special qualities of living matter and of discoveries, now underway, and 
      still to come, of the very special boundary conditions that harness the 
      material forces to the purposeful pursuits of organisms. The evidence that 
      these boundary conditions must be present is everywhere. Their absence 
      from our current theories of life is at the root of confusion coming from 
      genetic determinism.” Strohman, Richard. “Epigenesis and Complexity: The 
      coming Kuhnian revolution in biology.” 1997. Nature Biotechnology. Volume 
      15: 194-200. P. 197.
      
      
      “The entire landscape of theory in biology is changing before us. We are 
      trying to fit dynamic nonlinear change into a linear theory of the gene, 
      and it will not fit there. And this lack of fit has also been forecast for 
      years by organismal biologists and by population geneticists like Richard 
      Lewontin.” Strohman, Richard. “Epigenesis and Complexity: The coming 
      Kuhnian revolution in biology.” 1997. Nature Biotechnology. Volume 15: 
      194-200. P. 199.
      
      
      “The biosphere is dominated, in terms of both physical abundance and 
      genetic diversity, by primitive life forms, prokaryotes and viruses. These 
      ubiquitous organisms evolve in ways unimaginable and unforeseen in 
      classical evolutionary biology.” Koonin, Eugene. 2009. “The Origin at 150: 
      is a new evolutionary synthesis in sight?” Trends in Genetics. V. 25. No. 
      11. Pp. 473-5. P. 473.
      
      
      “We now think of the entire world of prokaryotes as a single, huge network 
      of interconnected gene pools, and the notion of the prokaryotic pangenome 
      is definitely here to stay.” Koonin, Eugene. 2009. “The Origin at 150: is 
      a new evolutionary synthesis in sight?” Trends in Genetics. V. 25. No. 11. 
      Pp. 473-5. P. 473.
      
      
      “In general, the species concept does not apply to prokaryotes and is of 
      dubious validity for unicellular eukaryotes as well.” Koonin, Eugene. 
      2009. “The Origin at 150: is a new evolutionary synthesis in sight?” 
      Trends in Genetics. V. 25. No. 11. Pp. 473-5. P. 474.
      
      
      “Equally outdated is the (neo-) Darwinian notion of the adaptive nature of 
      evolution; clearly, genomes show very little if any signs of optimal 
      design, and random drift constrained by purifying in all likelihood 
      contributes (much) more to genome evolution than Darwinian selection.” 
      Koonin, Eugene. 2009. “The Origin at 150: is a new evolutionary synthesis 
      in sight?” Trends in Genetics. V. 25. No. 11. Pp. 473-5. P. 474.
      
      
      “Whereas emergence seems to be required to explain numerous biological 
      phenomena, fundamentalist reductionism flatly denies its existence: in all 
      cases the whole is no more than the sum of its parts. Thus, biology of the 
      20th century was in the strange position of having to contort itself to 
      conform to a world view (fundamentalist reductionism) that 20th century 
      physics was simultaneously in the process of rejecting.” Woese, Carl. 
      2004. “A New Biology for a New Century.” Microbiology and Molecular 
      Biology Reviews. 68(2):173-186. P. 174.
      
      
      “Our task now is to resynthesize biology; put the organism back into its 
      environment; connect it again to its evolutionary past; and let us feel 
      that complex flow that is organism, evolution, and environment united. The 
      time has come for biology to enter the nonlinear world.” Woese, Carl. 
      2004. “A New Biology for a New Century.” Microbiology and Molecular 
      Biology Reviews. 68(2):173-186. Pp. 179-80.
      
      
      “The genes in a genome thus fall into fairly discrete categories depending 
      upon these HGT [prevalence of horizontal gene transfer] characteristics. 
      One category could be called ‘cosmopolitan genes.’ These would be 
      specialty genes, genes that come and go as environmental circumstances 
      change. Cosmopolitan genes are special life style genes; they allow 
      adaptation to unusual environments....
      
      “Then there are the genes whose functions are central to general cellular 
      metabolism and so are crucial for the cell’s existence under any (natural) 
      condition. For the majority of the main metabolic pathways, alternatives 
      appear to exist, i.e., different enzymes catalyzing the same reaction, 
      different pathways from one compound to another, etc....
      
      “Finally there are the genes that define the organizational fabric of the 
      cell, those that give the cell its basic character. By and large genes of 
      this type are highly and idiosyncratically woven into the cellular 
      fabric.” Woese, Carl. 2004. “A New Biology for a New Century.” 
      Microbiology and Molecular Biology Reviews. 68(2):173-186. P. 181.
      
      
      “In all likelihood primitive cells were loosely connected conglomerates, 
      in which the connections among the parts were relatively few in number and 
      imprecise in specification, and primitive cellular organization was likely 
      minimal and largely horizontal in nature.” Woese, Carl. 2004. “A New 
      Biology for a New Century.” Microbiology and Molecular Biology Reviews. 
      68(2):173-186. P. 181.
      
      
      “The aboriginal processes of DNA replication and transcription could not 
      be as complex and, so, as precise as are their modern equivalents because 
      both of these mechanisms today are dependent upon large proteins. 
      Imprecise primitive genome replication implies that primitive genomes 
      could comprise relatively few (unique) genes. This in turn argues for 
      simplicity of primitive cell designs and a general looseness and 
      imprecision in those designs.” Woese, Carl. 2004. “A New Biology for a New 
      Century.” Microbiology and Molecular Biology Reviews. 68(2):173-186. P. 
      182.
      
      
      “The world of primitive cells feels like a vast sea, or field, of 
      cosmopolitan genes flowing into and out of the evolving cellular (and 
      other) entities. Because of the high levels of HGT [horizontal gene 
      transfer], evolution at this stage would in essence be communal, not 
      individual.” Woese, Carl. 2004. “A New Biology for a New Century.” 
      Microbiology and Molecular Biology Reviews. 68(2):173-186. P. 182.
      
      
      “... I assert that it was one such transition that took the cell out of 
      its initial primitive state in which HGT dominated the evolutionary 
      dynamic (and evolving cells had no stable genealogical records and 
      evolution was communal) to a more advanced (modern) form (where vertical 
      inheritance came to dominate and stable organismal lineages could exist). 
      The obvious choice of a name for this particular evolutionary juncture 
      would be Darwinian threshold or Darwinian transition, for it would be only 
      after such a saltation had occurred that we could meaningfully speak of 
      species and of lineages as we know them.” Woese, Carl. 2004. “A New 
      Biology for a New Century.” Microbiology and Molecular Biology Reviews. 
      68(2):173-186. P. 182.
      
      
      “The order in which the three cell designs crossed their respective 
      Darwinian thresholds is, then, the bacterial first, the archaeal second, 
      and finally the eucaryotic.” Woese, Carl. 2004. “A New Biology for a New 
      Century.” Microbiology and Molecular Biology Reviews. 68(2):173-186. P. 
      184.
      
      
      “[In the 19th and 20th centuries] Physics provided the ultimate 
      explanations. Biology, as no more than complicated chemistry, was at the 
      end of the line, merely providing baroque ornamentation on the great 
      edifice of understanding that was physics–the hierarchy 
      physics–>chemistry–>biology is burned into the thinking of all scientists, 
      a pecking order that has done much to foster in society the (mistaken) 
      notion that biology is only an applied science.” Woese, Carl. 2004. “A New 
      Biology for a New Century.” Microbiology and Molecular Biology Reviews. 
      68(2):173-186. P. 185.
      
      
      “This article has touched on only some of the conflicts between the 
      Luhmannian and emergentist traditions. But these divisions are so 
      fundamental that we are justified in seeing these two systems of thought 
      as competing paradigms of social systems theory. First, they have 
      radically different understandings of the core concept of system; for 
      Luhmann, the fundamental units of social systems are communicative events, 
      whereas for emergentists, systems are entities and are composed of 
      entities, and events are produced by their causal interaction. Second, 
      while contemporary emergentism sees higher level properties as products of 
      mechanisms that depend on the properties of lower level parts and the 
      relations between them, a central element of Luhmann’s theory is 
      autopoiesis–a model of systems that denies the influence of lower level 
      properties on the behavior of the higher level system. Third, the two 
      traditions are primarily concerned with quite different core problems that 
      imply very different styles of theory: for emergentists, the resolution of 
      the core problem of reductionism provides resources for developing causal 
      theory, whereas for Luhmann, the resolution of the core problem of 
      self-reference entails the analysis of the meaning of communications.” 
      Elder-Vass, Dave. “Luhmann and Emergentism: Competing Paradigms for Social 
      Systems Theory.” 2007. Philosophy of the Social Sciences. 37:408-432. Pp. 
      428-9.
      
      
      “At the most basic level, the parameters describing human society are the 
      same as those for any other vertebrate group. The most obvious of these is 
      the tendency to be social itself, namely to live in groups made up of 
      known individuals. Other basic parameters that appear to be common across 
      humans and non-humans are more prolonged parental relationships, which 
      might be either sex or both, kin-based relationships among resident 
      adults, sex-based patterns of dispersal, more or less prolonged 
      relationships between adult males and females, with one or more partners, 
      some degree of tolerance of the presence of other members of the 
      ‘society’, a lack of presence of equivalent tolerance for members of 
      another group (or at least a different pattern of behaviour) and some 
      degree of structured or repeated style of relationship between individuals 
      (e.g., dominance, submission, friendliness, aggression, etc.).” Foley, 
      Robert & C. Gamble. “The ecology of social transitions in human 
      evolution.” 2009. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: B. Pp. 
      3267-79. Pp. 3267-8.
      
      
      “The ability to focus attention so single-mindedly on the making of an 
      object, and its constant repetition across three continents and many 
      millennia, is testament to a high level of attention in practical 
      operations....
      
      “But this Acheulean gaze was not the only derived human trait that 
      appeared at this time [from 2 to 1 Mya]. Using the correlation between 
      brain and community size, Dunbar has proposed that hominins in this period 
      possessed a theory of mind and accompanying orders of intentionality. 
      Gamble has argued for the importance of behaviours that amplified the 
      strength and persistence of social bonds in such an advanced hominin 
      cognition. These would include social laughter and crying as well as other 
      mood enhancers such as collective dance and music.” Foley, Robert & C. 
      Gamble. “The ecology of social transitions in human evolution.” 2009. 
      Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: B. Pp. 3267-79. P. 3274.
      
      
      “It is generally accepted that fission-fusion is an important element of 
      chimpanzee social organization and that it may have been enhanced among 
      the earlier hominins. However, among modern humans, fission-fusion occurs 
      at a different order of magnitude. Individuals, families, bands, etc. can 
      split up for very long periods of time, and disperse over large distances, 
      while still maintaining a common social network....
      
      “A further indication of a significant change in ranging patterns comes 
      from the evidence that lithic raw materials were extracted and transported 
      over greater distances than before. [speaking of the time between 300ka 
      and 200ka ago]” Foley, Robert & C. Gamble. “The ecology of social 
      transitions in human evolution.” 2009. Philosophical Transactions of the 
      Royal Society: B. Pp. 3267-79. P. 3275.
      
      
      “At this point [200 to 10ka ago], a fundamental shift that goes beyond the 
      normal range of the socioecological model occurred. Technological 
      dependence, spatially restricted and controlled staples such as 
      domesticates, defended flocks, fields, and stores, opened the possibility 
      for greater male control over access to resources at local, regional and 
      inter-regional scales. If we take it as axiomatic to the model that female 
      reproduction is dependent upon access to resources, and males by access to 
      females, then the open-ended model becomes closed when males themselves 
      control the resources. Complex social structures that interweave marriage 
      patterns and resources, which characterize all human societies, represent 
      an entirely novel socioecology that is uniquely human.” Foley, Robert & C. 
      Gamble. “The ecology of social transitions in human evolution.” 2009. 
      Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: B. Pp. 3267-79. Pp. 
      3275-6.
      
      
      “One such point is that if the ‘community’, in the sense used to describe 
      both chimpanzee groups and human social units, was present from the last 
      common ancestor to the emergence of modern humans, the key development is 
      the addition of social structures both below–families and descent 
      groups–and above–shared political systems, segmentary lineage systems and 
      trade networks. The community, however, remains the core and the basis for 
      elaboration....” 
      
      “Human society is essentially a chimpanzee community with exploded 
      fission-fusion; a society that has achieved release from the constraints 
      of proximity that dominate the negotiation and often daily affirmation of 
      social bonds and hierarchies among primates.” Foley, Robert & C. Gamble. 
      “The ecology of social transitions in human evolution.” 2009. 
      Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: B. Pp. 3267-79. Pp. 
      3276-7.
      
      
      “Nevertheless, tradition, even post-Darwinian tradition, excludes our 
      doings from natural history. It may acknowledge our effects on the natural 
      world–at times (though less often in recent times) even celebrate them–but 
      these effects are treated as impingements, and never incorporated into our 
      conception of self-organization. Yet to put this exclusion so baldly is to 
      make its absurdity self-evident, and to invite us to challenge the entire 
      tradition on which it rests.” Fox Keller, Evelyn. 2005. “Ecosystems, 
      Organisms, and Machines.” BioScience. 55(12):1069-1074. P. 1073.
      
      
      “Indeed, Gergely & Csibra have recently elaborated an account explaining 
      why the existence of relatively ‘opaque’ cultural conventions (there is no 
      causal structure or else it is difficult to see this structure) requires 
      both that human adults be specifically adapted for pedagogy toward 
      children and that human children be specifically adapted for recognizing 
      when adults are being pedagogical–which is typically indicated by the same 
      behavioural signs as cooperative communication in general, such things as 
      eye contact, special tones of voice and so forth (and indeed teaching may 
      be seen as one manifestation of human cooperative communication in 
      general). Gergely and Csibra emphasize that when children detect pedagogy, 
      they assume that they are supposed to be learning something otherwise 
      opaque to them that applies to the world in a general way.” Tennie, 
      Claudio, J. Call & M. Tomasello. 2009. “Ratcheting up the ratchet: on the 
      evolution of cumulative culture.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
      Society: B. 364, 2405-2415. P. 2411. Reference is to Gergely, G. & G. 
      Csibra. “Sylvia’s recipe: the role of imitation and pedagogy in the 
      transmission of cultural knowledge.” From Roots of human sociality: 
      culture, cognition, and human interaction. 2006. Enfield, N. & S. Levenson, 
      Eds. Pp. 229-255. Berg Publishers. 
      
      
      “These three additional processes–teaching, social imitation and 
      normativity–represent the contribution of humans’ special forms of 
      cooperation to the process of cultural transmission across generations.” 
      Tennie, Claudio, J. Call & M. Tomasello. 2009. “Ratcheting up the ratchet: 
      on the evolution of cumulative culture.” Philosophical Transactions of the 
      Royal Society: B. 364, 2405-2415. P. 2412.
      
      
      “When distributing two parts of a task between two actors, we found that 
      each actor represented not only his or her own part of the task but also 
      the other’s part of the task. Compared with performing the same part of 
      the task alone, acting together led to increased demands on executive 
      control, as actors needed to decide whether it was their turn or the 
      other’s turn to act. Finally, using fMRI, we found evidence that acting 
      together led to increased brain activity in areas involved in self-other 
      distinction. Thus, these findings suggest that humans have a strong 
      tendency to take others’ tasks (and the related intentions) into account, 
      while at the same time possessing mechanisms to keep them apart.” Knoblich, 
      Guenther & N. Sebanz. 2008. “Evolving intentions for social interaction: 
      from entrainment to joint action.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
      Society: B. 363, 2021-31. P. 2025.
      
      
      “Combining simultaneous affordance with joint intentionality allows one to 
      address the issue of how different actors perform non-identical actions 
      upon the same object to achieve a joint goal. For example, the way people 
      lift a two-handled basket depends on whether they lift it alone or 
      together. When alone, a person would normally grasp each handle with one 
      hand. When together, one person would normally grasp the left handle with 
      his/her right hand and the other person would grasp the right handle with 
      his/her left hand. Thus, embedded in joint intentionality, simultaneous 
      affordance changes into a joint affordance, inviting two different actions 
      from two co-actors.” Knoblich, Guenther & N. Sebanz. 2008. “Evolving 
      intentions for social interaction: from entrainment to joint action.” 
      Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: B. 363, 2021-31. P. 2026.
      
      
      “The creation of enduring artefacts opened up a whole new world of 
      affordances and ways of interacting with the world in a direct manner. The 
      resulting fact that artefacts embody socially transmitted knowledge about 
      ways of interacting with objects is hardly ever acknowledged in the 
      research on object perception.” Knoblich, Guenther & N. Sebanz. 2008. 
      “Evolving intentions for social interaction: from entrainment to joint 
      action.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: B. 363, 2021-31. 
      P. 2027.
      
      
      “We hypothesize that this new social world, created by rapid cultural 
      adaptation, led to the genetic evolution of new, derived social instincts. 
      Cultural evolution created cooperative groups. Such environments favoured 
      the evolution of a suite of new social instincts suited to life in such 
      groups including a psychology which ‘expects’ life to be structured by 
      moral norms, and that is designed to learn and internalize such norms. New 
      emotions evolved, like shame and guilt, which increase the chance the 
      norms are followed. Individuals lacking the new social instincts more 
      often violated prevailing norms and experienced adverse selection. They 
      might have suffered ostracism, been denied the benefits of public goods, 
      or lost points in the mating game. Cooperation and group identification in 
      inter-group conflict set up an arms race that drove social evolution to 
      ever-greater extremes of in-group cooperation. Eventually, human 
      populations came to resemble the hunter-gathering societies of the 
      ethnographic record.” Boyd, Robert & P. Richerson. 2009. “Culture and the 
      evolution of human cooperation.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
      Society: B. 364, 3281-3288. P. 3286.
      
      
      “Universal symbiogenesis is the process whereby new entities are 
      introduced because of the interactions between (different) previously 
      independently existing entities. These interactions encompass horizontal 
      mergings and the new entities that emerge because of this are called 
      symbionts. The process is irreversible and discontinuous.” Gontier, 
      Nathalie. 2007. “Universal symbiogenesis: An alternative to universal 
      selectionist accounts of evolution.” Symbiosis. 44, 167-81. Pp. 174-5.
      
      
      “Green showed that complex systems are isomorphic to networks (nodes 
      linked to edges).” Paperin, Greg, D. Green & S. Sadedin. 2011. “Dual-phase 
      evolution in complex adaptive systems.” Journal of the Royal Society: 
      Interface. 8, 609-629. P. 610. Reference is to Green, David. 1993. 
      Emergent behavioiur in biological systems.” From Complex systems: from 
      biology to computation. Green, David & T. Bossomaier, Eds. IOS Press. Pp. 
      24-33.
      
      
      “State spaces of dynamic systems form directed networks in which the 
      states are nodes and the transitions define edges. Thus, system dynamics 
      can be modelled in terms of state-transition networks, allowing the 
      application of graph-theoretical analysis techniques. Sparse connectivity 
      of state-transition networks often implies simple behaviour, while richly 
      connected state-transition networks are associated with chaotic behaviour.” 
      Paperin, Greg, D. Green & S. Sadedin. 2011. “Dual-phase evolution in 
      complex adaptive systems.” Journal of the Royal Society: Interface. 8, 
      609-629. P. 610.
      
      
      “But it is perhaps owing to the work of Gould and Lewontin as well as 
      Goodwin that many contemporary biologists are now aware of the fallacy of 
      pure ‘selectionism’, according to which natural selection is the sole, 
      almighty sculptor of all phenotypic traits. Natural constraints in 
      organismal design, emanating from the inescapable laws of chemistry, 
      physics and even mathematics, as well as from history, present 
      prefabricated modules of high complexity for natural selection to choose 
      from. But the complexity itself is not the work of natural selection.” 
      Huang, Sui. 2011. “The molecular and mathematical basis of Waddington’s 
      epigenetic landscape: A framework for post-Darwinian biology?” Bioessays 
      34: 149-157. P. 150.
      
      
      “Network dynamics is, then, the coordinated change of the expression 
      levels, x1(t), x2(t), x3(t)..., of all the genes in a GRN [gene regulatory 
      network] as a consequence of the entirety of the regulatory interactions 
      displayed as connections (wiring) in the fixed ‘wiring diagram’. In other 
      words: strictly speaking, when talking about GRNs, there are no ‘dynamic 
      networks’. Instead, ‘network dynamics’ is a legitimate term indicating the 
      characteristic dynamic behaviour exhibited by a given network.
      
      “Thus, it is crucial to distinguish between two separate timescales: 
      network dynamics (the coordinated change of the expression levels xi(t) of 
      the genes of a given network) takes place within one organisms’ lifetime, 
      during which the wiring diagram of that network does not change. By 
      contrast, a change of the structure, or ‘rewiring’ of the network, is the 
      result of a genomic mutation (which may, for instance, affect how a 
      regulatory gene controls its target gene) and occurs at the evolutionary 
      time scale.” Huang, Sui. 2011. “The molecular and mathematical basis of 
      Waddington’s epigenetic landscape: A framework for post-Darwinian 
      biology?” Bioessays 34: 149-157. P. 153.
      
      
      “Gene network dynamics readily accounts for Waddington’s genetic 
      assimilation, the related Baldwin effect, Neo-Lamarckism and other 
      epigenetic phenomena presented by critics of Neo-Darwinism.” Huang, Sui. 
      2011. “The molecular and mathematical basis of Waddington’s epigenetic 
      landscape: A framework for post-Darwinian biology?” Bioessays 34: 149-157. 
      P. 156.
      
      
      “The heterogeneous field of systems biology can be described as the study 
      of the ‘dynamic interactions between components of a living system, 
      between living systems and their interaction with the environment.’” Drack, 
      Manfred & O. Wolkenhauer. 2011. “System approaches of Weiss and 
      Bertalanffy and their relevance for systems biology today.” Seminars in 
      cancer Biology. 21: 150-155. P. 153. Subquote is from Pastori, G., V. 
      Simons & M. Bogaert. 2008. “Systems biology in the European research 
      area.” ERASysBio Partners.
      
      
      “Systems biology has its roots in new experimental and measurement 
      methods, and aims for a dynamic understanding of the behaviour of mostly 
      small systems. Broadly speaking Weiss and Bertalanffy started from the 
      whole and saw it as a system, while systems biology started from the parts 
      and works on ever more inclusive systems.
      
      “O’Malley and Dupre distinguish two types of approaches. The first one is 
      referred to as ‘systems-theoretic biology,’ which strives for laws or 
      fundamental principles. The second is termed ‘pragmatic systems biology’ 
      of the post-genomic era, where high-tech tools and sophisticated 
      computational models are utilised to study the interplay between the parts 
      (mostly molecules) of a living system.” Drack, Manfred & O. Wolkenhauer. 
      2011. “System approaches of Weiss and Bertalanffy and their relevance for 
      systems biology today.” Seminars in cancer Biology. 21: 150-155. P. 154.
      
      
      “The system approach of Weiss and Bertalanffy must be reconciled with 
      approaches in systems biology: the former start with the whole, the latter 
      with the dynamically interacting parts.” Drack, Manfred & O. Wolkenhauer. 
      2011. “System approaches of Weiss and Bertalanffy and their relevance for 
      systems biology today.” Seminars in cancer Biology. 21: 150-155. P. 154.
      
      
      “From this discussion, tentative agreement among many geographers seemed 
      to have emerged, at least temporarily, regarding several interrelated 
      ideas about the ontological nature of scale:
      
      “1. Scales (at least those most obviously relevant to social theorists) 
      are socially produced and contested.
      “2. Consequently, scales are not known a priori, but must instead be 
      understood according to the processes producing them.
      “3. Because many causal processes operate across multiple scales, 
      comprehending most social phenomena will demand a poly-scalar approach.”
      Chapura, Mitch. 2009. “Scale, causality, complexity and emergence: 
      rethinking scale’s ontological significance.” Transactions of the 
      Institute of British Geographers. 34: 462-474. P. 463.
      
      
      “If causality can operate across multiple scales, agency can as well. As 
      with causality, we should expect our perception of agency to be 
      inextricably tied to the resolution at which we observe a panarchic 
      system.
      
      “The immune system illustrates this point well. A variety of specialised 
      cells exist to find and destroy or neutralise pathogens that have entered 
      the body. Observed at the cellular scale, the behaviour of macrophages, 
      neutrophils, and eosinophils etc. appears quite purposeful. They 
      ‘discriminate’ between different pathogens and ‘seek out’ those which they 
      may ‘attack’ and will even alter their ‘attack strategy’ so as to most 
      effectively neutralise the pathogen....
      
      “Without the proper functioning of my immune system I could not exist. Yet 
      I am not consciously aware of its actions, nor do I control the billions 
      of cells constantly at work....
      
      “Of course ‘I’ can influence my immune system, for better or for worse, by 
      eating a healthy diet, taking medications etc. Still, my ability to 
      causally influence my immune system, i.e. my agency, remains incomplete 
      and indirect. Acting to influence my immune system as a whole is not 
      equivalent to directing the complex operations of its components’ 
      seemingly purposeful behaviours. Moreover, my actions cannot be understood 
      in isolation from my semiotic and material milieux. Let us imagine, for 
      example, that, experiencing symptons of illness, I consume an antibiotic. 
      The very possibility of this action results from my participation in 
      socio-material systems larger than ‘me’. Perhaps most saliently, without 
      the narratives, practices and technologies of contemporary biomedicine, 
      including the ‘germ theory of illness’ and the consequent creation of 
      ingestible antibacterial substances, the dissemination of knowledge 
      through medical educational institutions, and the production and sale of 
      my specific antibiotic by a pharmaceutical corporation, my actions would 
      be both unintelligible and impossible....
      
      “Insofar as my immune system is both composite and component, the agency 
      in question is itself a poly-scalar phenomenon.” Chapura, Mitch. 2009. 
      “Scale, causality, complexity and emergence: rethinking scale’s 
      ontological significance.” Transactions of the Institute of British 
      Geographers. 34: 462-474. Pp. 467-8.
      
      
      “Based on Hutchinson’s general concept, the niche describes the set of 
      abiotic and biotic conditions where a species can persist. Many ecologists 
      favour a concept of the niche based on resources and species interactions 
      at the local scale (i.e. an Eltonian niche concept). On the other hand, 
      more biogeographically oriented ecologists often prefer a concept focusing 
      on the environmental conditions determining the large-scale distribution 
      of species (i.e. a Grinnellian niche concept). I consider these to 
      represent equally valid conceptualizations of different aspects of the 
      general Hutchinsonian niche concept....” Wiens, John. 2011. “The niche, 
      biogeography and species interactions.” Philosophical Transactions of the 
      Royal Society: B. 366: 2336-2350. P. 2336.
      
      
      “Species range limits are not simply set by unsuitable abiotic and biotic 
      conditions at their range margins, but also by the failure of individuals 
      to adapt to those unsuitable conditions....
      
      “Therefore, to explain large-scale biogeographic patterns, we also need to 
      explain why species do not simply adapt to the ecological conditions at 
      the margins of their geographic ranges and continue expanding their 
      ranges. Without such limits, every species could be everywhere, and again 
      there would be few non-random biogeographic patterns. Niche conservatism 
      is simply the idea that species will retain similar ecological traits over 
      time.” Wiens, John. 2011. “The niche, biogeography and species 
      interactions.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: B. 366: 
      2336-2350. P. 2338.
      
      
      “By contrast, there have been five origins of the long-tailed ecomorph [of 
      snakelike lizards], giving a somewhat clearer picture for this morph. 
      These origins exhibit a biogeographic pattern that is largely consistent 
      with the idea that the origin of one morph in a region restricts 
      subsequent origins of that same ecomorph in the same region....
      
      “Thus, even if competition may constrain the same ecomorph from evolving 
      multiple times in the same region in most regions around the world, 
      competion does not prevent the build-up of many species of the same 
      ecomorph in sympatry within a region (at least at the broad scale)....
      
      “Thus, species interactions seem to limit the rate of body-size evolution, 
      but they do not prevent co-occurrence of species with similar size.” Wiens, 
      John. 2011. “The niche, biogeography and species interactions.” 
      Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: B. 366: 2336-2350. P. 
      2344.
      
      
      “Space and time are not static containers for material objects. They are 
      ‘dynamic process manifolds’ that incorporate the interaction of 
      determinism and contingency. Scales and scaling are generated by the 
      behavior of the phenomena.” Stallins, J. Anthony. 2012. “Scale, causality, 
      and the new organism-environment interaction.” Geoforum. 3: 427-441. P. 
      430. Subquote is from Rhoads, B. 2006. “The dynamic basis of geomorphology 
      reenvisioned.” Annals of the Association of American Geographers. 96 (1): 
      1323-1340.
      
      
      “In other words, epistemology and ontology recursively influence one 
      another. How the world is verified and observed – whether through the 
      senses or indirectly through technology – contributes to the ontologies 
      that become evident in it.” Stallins, J. Anthony. 2012. “Scale, causality, 
      and the new organism-environment interaction.” Geoforum. 3: 427-441. P. 
      431.
      
      
      “Organisms may carry and even reinforce a particular set of omic 
      influences around with them. These dynamics exemplify how the causality of 
      molecular biology has aligned with geography. The landscapes of the cell 
      have a contingent, generative potential.” Stallins, J. Anthony. 2012. 
      “Scale, causality, and the new organism-environment interaction.” Geoforum. 
      3: 427-441. P. 432.
      
      
      “Health scholars now speak of the ‘diseaseome’, the interacting networks 
      of genetic, cellular, and social interactions implicated in disease.” 
      Stallins, J. Anthony. 2012. “Scale, causality, and the new 
      organism-environment interaction.” Geoforum. 3: 427-441. P. 437.
      
      
      “Scale, boundaries, and their ongoing negotiation could be considered a 
      defining feature of life. Organisms remake boundaries to promote and 
      inherit their own version of stability and predictability.” Stallins, J. 
      Anthony. 2012. “Scale, causality, and the new organism-environment 
      interaction.” Geoforum. 3: 427-441. P. 438.
      
      
      “In this article, we argue that the considerable social differences that 
      exist among different cultures affect not only their beliefs about 
      specific aspects of the world but also (a) their naive metaphysical 
      systems at a deep level, (b) their tacit epistemologies, and (c) even the 
      nature of their cognitive processes–the ways by which they know the world. 
      More specifically, we put forward the following propositions, which we 
      develop in more detail later.
      
      “1. Social organization directs attention to some aspects of the field at 
      the expense of others.
      “2. What is attended to influences metaphysics, that is, beliefs about the 
      nature of the world and about causality.
      “3. Metaphysics guides tacit epistemology, that is, beliefs about what it 
      is important to know and how knowledge can be obtained.
      “4. Epistemology dictates the development and application of some 
      cognitive processes at the expense of others.
      “5. Social organization and social practices can directly affect the 
      plausibility of metaphysical assumptions, such as whether causality should 
      be regarded as residing in the field versus the object.
      “6. Social organization and social practices can influence directly the 
      development and use of cognitive processes such as dialectical versus 
      logical ones.”
      Nisbett, Richard, K. Peng, I. Choi & A. Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and 
      Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition.” Psychological 
      Review. 108 (2): 291-310. Pp. 291-2.
      
      
      “One of the most remarkable characteristics of the ancient Greeks was the 
      location of power in the individual. Ordinary people developed a sense of 
      personal agency that had no counterpart among the other ancient 
      civilizations....” 
      
      “The ancient Chinese provide a particularly valuable contrast to the 
      Greeks. The Chinese counterpart to the Greek sense of personal agency was 
      a sense of reciprocal social obligation or collective agency.” Nisbett, 
      Richard, K. Peng, I. Choi & A. Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and Systems of 
      Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition.” Psychological Review. 108 
      (2): 291-310. P. 292.
      
      
      “In Confucianism there was no thought of knowing that did not entail some 
      consequence for action.” Munro, D. 1969. The Concept of Man in Early 
      China. Stanford University Press. P. 55. Quoted in Nisbett, Richard, K. 
      Peng, I. Choi & A. Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and Systems of Thought: 
      Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition.” Psychological Review. 108 (2): 
      291-310. P. 293.
      
      
      “The cognitive differences between ancient Chinese and Greeks can be 
      loosely grouped under the heading of holistic versus analytic thought. We 
      define holistic thought as involving an orientation to the context or 
      field as a whole, including attention to relationships between a focal 
      object and the field, and a preference for explaining and predicting 
      events on the basis of such relationships. Holistic approaches rely on 
      experience-based knowledge rather than on abstract logic and are 
      dialectical, meaning that there is an emphasis on change, a recognition of 
      contradiction and of the need for multiple perspectives, and a search for 
      the ‘Middle Way’ between opposing propositions. We define analytic thought 
      as involving detachment of the object from its context, a tendency to 
      focus on attributes of the object to assign it to categories, and a 
      preference for using rules about the categories to explain and predict the 
      object’s behavior. Inferences rest in part on the practice of 
      decontextualizing structure from content, the use of formal logic, and 
      avoidance of contradiction.” Nisbett, Richard, K. Peng, I. Choi & A. 
      Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus 
      Analytic Cognition.” Psychological Review. 108 (2): 291-310. P. 293.
      
      
      “A fundamental intellectual difference between the Chinese and the Greeks 
      was that the Chinese held the ‘view that the world is a collection of 
      overlapping and interpenetrating stuffs or substances... [This contrasts] 
      with the traditional Platonic philosophical picture of objects which are 
      understood as individuals or particulars which instantiate or ‘have’ 
      properties’ that are themselves universals.” Nisbett, Richard, K. Peng, I. 
      Choi & A. Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic 
      Versus Analytic Cognition.” Psychological Review. 108 (2): 291-310. P. 
      293. Subquote is from Hansen, C. 1983. Language and Logic in Ancient 
      China. University of Michigan Press. P. 30.
      
      
      “The relationship view versus the rule stance is well illustrated by the 
      difference between the holistic approach to medicine characteristic of the 
      Chinese and the effort to find effective rules and treatment principles in 
      the West. Surgery was common in the West from a very early period because 
      the idea that some part of the body could be malfunctioning was a natural 
      one to the analytic mind. But the idea of surgery was ‘heretical to 
      ancient Chinese medical tradition, which taught that good health depended 
      on the balance and flow of natural forces throughout the body.’” Nisbett, 
      Richard, K. Peng, I. Choi & A. Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and Systems of 
      Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition.” Psychological Review. 108 
      (2): 291-310. P. 294. Subquote is from Hadingham, E. 1994. “The mummies of 
      Xinjiang.” Discover. 15(4): 68-77. P. 77.
      
      
      “In the Chinese intellectual tradition, there is no necessary 
      incompatibility between the belief that A and not A both have merit. 
      Indeed, in the spirit of the Tao or yin-yang principle, A can actually 
      imply that not A is also the case–the opposite of a state of affairs can 
      exist simultaneously with the state of affairs itself.” Nisbett, Richard, 
      K. Peng, I. Choi & A. Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and Systems of Thought: 
      Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition.” Psychological Review. 108 (2): 
      291-310. P. 294.
      
      
      “We believe that social organization affects cognitive processes in two 
      basic ways: indirectly by focusing attention on different parts of the 
      environment and directly by making some kinds of social communication 
      patterns more acceptable than others.” Nisbett, Richard, K. Peng, I. Choi 
      & A. Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus 
      Analytic Cognition.” Psychological Review. 108 (2): 291-310. P. 294.
      
      
      “Thus the results of several studies indicate that East Asians rely less 
      on rules and categories and more on relationships and similarities in 
      organizing their worlds than do Americans. East Asians preferred to group 
      objects on the basis of relationships and similarity, whereas Americans 
      were more likely to group objects on the basis of categories and rules.” 
      Nisbett, Richard, K. Peng, I. Choi & A. Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and 
      Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition.” Psychological 
      Review. 108 (2): 291-310. P. 301.
      
      
      “Examples of rules about contradiction that have played a central role in 
      the Western intellectual tradition include the following:
      
      “1. The law of identity: A = A. A thing is identical to itself.
      
      “2. The law of noncontradiction: A =/ [not equal] not-A. No statement can 
      be both true and false.
      
      “3. The law of the excluded middle: Any statement is either true of 
      false....
      
      “Peng and Nisbet characterized dialecticism in terms of three principles.
      
      “1. The principle of change: Reality is a process that is not static but 
      rather is dynamic and changeable. A thing need not be identical to itself 
      at all because of the fluid nature of reality.
      
      “2. The principle of contradiction: Partly because change is constant, 
      contradiction is constant. Thus old and new, good and bad, exist in the 
      same object or event and indeed depend on one another for their existence.
      
      “3. The principle of relationship or holism: Because of constant change 
      and contradiction, nothing either in human life or in nature is isolated 
      and independent, but instead everything is related. It follows that 
      attempting to isolate elements of some larger whole can only be 
      misleading.” 
      Nisbett, Richard, K. Peng, I. Choi & A. Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and 
      Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition.” Psychological 
      Review. 108 (2): 291-310. P. 301. Reference is to Peng, K. & R. Nisbett. 
      1999. “Culture, dialectics, and reasoning about contradiction.” American 
      Psychologist. 54: 741-54.
      
      
      “Chinese civilization was based on agriculture, which entailed that 
      substantial cooperation with neighbors was necessary to carry out economic 
      activities in an effective way.... Social scientists since Marx have 
      observed that economic and social arrangements such as these are generally 
      associated with ‘collectivist’ or ‘interdependent’ social orientations as 
      distinguished from ‘individualistic’ or ‘independent’ social orientations 
      that are characteristic of societies with economies based on hunting, 
      fishing, trading, or the modern market economy....
      
      “The Greek ecology conspired against an agrarian base, consisting as it 
      does mostly of mountains descending to the sea. This sort of ecology was 
      more suited to herding and fishing than to large scale agriculture. The 
      sense of personal agency that characterized the Greeks could have been the 
      natural response to the genuine freedom that they experienced in their 
      less socially complex society.” Nisbett, Richard, K. Peng, I. Choi & A. 
      Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus 
      Analytic Cognition.” Psychological Review. 108 (2): 291-310. P. 303.
      
      
      “Mere inertia would not result in contemporary differences in the way 
      people think. We propose that systems of thought exist in homeostasis with 
      the social practices that surround them.” Nisbett, Richard, K. Peng, I. 
      Choi & A. Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic 
      Versus Analytic Cognition.” Psychological Review. 108 (2): 291-310. P. 
      304.
      
      
      “Perhaps the most pervasive and important of all practices that operate to 
      sustain the cognitive differences are those having to do with language and 
      writing....”
      
      “1. The basic writing system of Chinese and other East Asian languages has 
      been essentially pictographic. It can be maintained that the Western 
      alphabet is more atomistic and analytic by nature and ‘is a natural tool 
      for classifying and served as a paradigm for codified law, scientific 
      classification, and standardized weights and measures.’
      
      “2. The actual grammar of Indo-European languages encourages thinking of 
      the world as being composed of atomistic building blocks, whereas East 
      Asian languages encourage thinking of the world as continuous and 
      interpenetrating. ‘[R]ather than one-many, the Chinese language motivates 
      a part-whole dichotomy.’
      
      “3. East Asian languages are highly contextual in every sense. Because of 
      their multiple meanings, words must be understood in the context of 
      sentences. Because of the minimal nature of syntax in Sinitic languages, 
      context is important to understanding sentences. In contrast, Heath has 
      shown that language socialization for middle-class American children quite 
      deliberately decontextualizes language. Parents try to make words 
      understandable independent of verbal context and utterances understandable 
      independent of situational context.
      
      “4. Although Western toddlers learn nouns at a much more rapid rate than 
      they learn verbs, the reverse appears to be true for Chinese. Moreover, 
      Western toddlers hear more noun phrases from their mothers, whereas East 
      Asian children hear more verbs.
      
      “5. ‘Generic’ noun phrases–that is, those referring to categories and 
      kinds (e.g., ‘birds,’ ‘tools,’ as opposed to exemplars such as ‘sparrow,’ 
      ‘hammer’)–are more common for English speakers than for Chinese speakers, 
      perhaps because Western languages mark in a more explicit way whether a 
      generic interpretation of an utterance is the correct one.
      
      “6. Consistent with the above findings about category usage, Ji and 
      Nisbett found that English-speaking Chinese used relationships more and 
      categories less when they grouped words in Chinese than when they did so 
      in English.
      
      “Thus there are some good reasons to believe that social practices and 
      cognitive ones maintain each other in a state of equilibrium. Cognitive 
      practices may be highly stable because of their embeddedness in larger 
      systems of beliefs and social practices.” Nisbett, Richard, K. Peng, I. 
      Choi & A. Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic 
      Versus Analytic Cognition.” Psychological Review. 108 (2): 291-310. Pp. 
      304-5. First subquote is from Logan, R. 1986. The Alphabet Effect. Morrow. 
      P. 55. Second subquote is from Hansen, C. 1983. Language and Logic in 
      Ancient China. University of Michigan Press. P. vii. Reference on point 3 
      is to Heath, S. 1982. “What no bedtime story means: Narrative skills at 
      home and school. Language in Society. 11: 49-79. Reference on point 6 is 
      to Ji, L. & R. Nisbett. 2001. Culture, language and Categories. University 
      of Michigan unpublished manuscript.
      
      
      “The assumption of universality of cognitive processes lies deep in the 
      psychological tradition. We believe that the results discussed here force 
      consideration of the possibility that an indefinitely large number of 
      presumably ‘basic’ cognitive processes may be highly malleable.” Nisbett, 
      Richard, K. Peng, I. Choi & A. Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and Systems of 
      Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition.” Psychological Review. 108 
      (2): 291-310. P. 305.
      
      
      “It is ironic that, just as our evidence indicates that some cognitive 
      processes are highly susceptible to cultural influence, other 
      investigators are providing evidence that some cognitive content may not 
      be very susceptible to cultural influence. Naive theories of mechanics and 
      physics, naive theories of biology and naive theory of mind appear so 
      early and are apparently so widespread that it seems quite likely that at 
      least some aspects of them are largely innate and resistant to social 
      modification.” Nisbett, Richard, K. Peng, I. Choi & A. Norenzayan. 2001. 
      “Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition.” 
      Psychological Review. 108 (2): 291-310. P. 305.
      
      
      “Thus, it appears that the assumption that cognitive content is learned 
      and indefinitely malleable and the assumption that cognitive processes are 
      universally the same and biologically fixed may both be quite wrong.” 
      Nisbett, Richard, K. Peng, I. Choi & A. Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and 
      Systems of Thought: Holistic Versus Analytic Cognition.” Psychological 
      Review. 108 (2): 291-310. P. 306.
      
      
      “We are urging the view that metaphysics, epistemology, and cognitive 
      processes exist in mutually dependent and reinforcing systems of thought, 
      such that a given stimulus situation often triggers quite different 
      processes in one culture than in another.” Nisbett, Richard, K. Peng, I. 
      Choi & A. Norenzayan. 2001. “Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic 
      Versus Analytic Cognition.” Psychological Review. 108 (2): 291-310. P. 
      306.
      
      
      “The basic premise of world-systems analysis is that historical social 
      systems have lives.” Lee, Richard. 2011. “The Modern World-System: Its 
      Structures, Its Geoculture, Its Crisis and Transformations.” Pp. 27-40. 
      Palumbo-Liu, David, B. Robbins & N. Tanoukhi, Eds. Immanuel Wallerstein 
      and the Problem of the World. Duke University Press. P. 27.
      
      
      “There was a third set of structures that were just as constitutive of the 
      modern world-system as those in the arenas of production and distribution 
      (the economic), and coercion and decision-making (the political).... The 
      third arena has come to be conceptualized as that of cognition and 
      intentionality, the structures of knowledge.” Lee, Richard. 2011. “The 
      Modern World-System: Its Structures, Its Geoculture, Its Crisis and 
      Transformations.” Pp. 27-40. Palumbo-Liu, David, B. Robbins & N. Tanoukhi, 
      Eds. Immanuel Wallerstein and the Problem of the World. Duke University 
      Press. P. 29.
      
      
      “From the beginning of the long sixteenth century, the practices of 
      knowledge production took the form of a complex of processes that produced 
      over time an intellectual and institutional hierarchy, a set of 
      structures, within which legitimate knowledge was progressively defined as 
      the ‘other’ of societal and moral values. Values, the foundations on which 
      the humanities have been built, could be based on ‘authorities,’ but in 
      the end were open and contestable, and thus relative, whereas the 
      universal truths produced by what eventually became the sciences were 
      presented as singular and not open to interpretation.” Lee, Richard. 2011. 
      “The Modern World-System: Its Structures, Its Geoculture, Its Crisis and 
      Transformations.” Pp. 27-40. Palumbo-Liu, David, B. Robbins & N. Tanoukhi, 
      Eds. Immanuel Wallerstein and the Problem of the World. Duke University 
      Press. Pp. 29-30.
      
      
      “The pursuit of objectivity, that is, the view from nowhere that canceled 
      agency and history, that in fact negated subjectivity however conceived, 
      took the form of the progressive privileging of formal rationality. This 
      formal rationality moved disinterested calculation to the fore as a 
      generalized means of instrumental action, to the detriment of substantive 
      rationality, the normative pursuit of specifically situated ends.” Lee, 
      Richard. 2011. “The Modern World-System: Its Structures, Its Geoculture, 
      Its Crisis and Transformations.” Pp. 27-40. Palumbo-Liu, David, B. Robbins 
      & N. Tanoukhi, Eds. Immanuel Wallerstein and the Problem of the World. 
      Duke University Press. P. 30.
      
      
      “These then are the three analytically distinct but functionally, and 
      existentially, inseparable structural arenas of the modern world-system: 
      the axial division of labor, the interstate system, and the structures of 
      knowledge. They define a singular ‘world.’ And that world is unique in 
      human history in that from the time of its emergence it has expanded to 
      incorporate the entire globe. It is this world, then, that constitutes the 
      unit of analysis of the world-systems perspective.” Lee, Richard. 2011. 
      “The Modern World-System: Its Structures, Its Geoculture, Its Crisis and 
      Transformations.” Pp. 27-40. Palumbo-Liu, David, B. Robbins & N. Tanoukhi, 
      Eds. Immanuel Wallerstein and the Problem of the World. Duke University 
      Press. P. 32.
      
      
      “‘Utopistics’ is the name Wallerstein gives to the mode of social analysis 
      appropriate for these times; it is a mode of analysis that privileges the 
      differentiation of possible from impossible alternatives for the future. 
      World-systems analysis, as Wallerstein himself has constantly and 
      consistently maintained, has always been an interpretative approach or 
      perspective, always taking into consideration of course that it is the 
      modern world-system that is the unit with which the analyst is concerned, 
      rather than a ‘theory’ to be proven or an explanatory or causal framework 
      grounding prediction.” Lee, Richard. 2011. “The Modern World-System: Its 
      Structures, Its Geoculture, Its Crisis and Transformations.” Pp. 27-40. 
      Palumbo-Liu, David, B. Robbins & N. Tanoukhi, Eds. Immanuel Wallerstein 
      and the Problem of the World. Duke University Press. Pp. 38-9.
      
      
      “To what extent is evolution ruled by the chance of contingency, versus 
      the necessity of convergence? For Gould all is contingent; for Conway 
      Morris, the question is, would an intelligent biped still have four 
      fingers and a thumb?” Lane, Nick. 2005. Power, Sex, Suicide: Mitochondria 
      and the Meaning of Life. Oxford University Press. P. 23.
      
      
      “Dolphins and bats developed sonar navigation systems independently, and 
      we invented our own sonar system before we knew that dolphins and bats 
      took soundings in this way. All these systems are exquisitely complex and 
      beautifully adapted to needs, but the fact that each has evolved 
      independently on several occasions implies that the odds against their 
      evolution were not so very great.
      
      “If so, then convergence outweighs contingency, or necessity overcomes 
      chance. As Richard Dawkins concluded, in The Ancestors Tale: ‘I am tempted 
      by Conway Morris’s belief that we should stop thinking of convergent 
      evolution as a coulourful rarity to be remarked and marvelled at when we 
      find it. Perhaps we should come to see it as the norm, exceptions to which 
      are occasions for surprise.’” Lane, Nick. 2005. Power, Sex, Suicide: 
      Mitochondria and the Meaning of Life. Oxford University Press. P. 24. 
      Subquote is from Dawkins, Richard. 2004. The Ancestor’s Tale: A Pilgrimage 
      to the Dawn of Life. Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
      
      
      “If you divide the luminosity of the sun by its mass, each gram of solar 
      mass yields about 0.0002 milliwatts of energy, which is 0.0000002 joules 
      of energy per gram per second. Now let’s assume that you weigh 70 kg, and 
      if you are anything like me you will eat about 12600 kilojoules (about 
      3000 calories) per day. Converting this amount of energy averages 2 
      millijoules per gram per second or about 2 milliwatts per gram–a factor of 
      10000 greater than the sun. Some energetic bacteria, such as Azotobacter, 
      generate as much as 10 joules per gram per second, outperforming the sun 
      by a factor of 50 million.” Lane, Nick. 2005. Power, Sex, Suicide: 
      Mitochondria and the Meaning of Life. Oxford University Press. P. 67.
      
      
      “In an average person, ATP is produced at a rate of 9 X 1020 molecules per 
      second, which equates to a turnover rate (the rate at which it is produced 
      and consumed) of about 65 kg every day.” Lane, Nick. 2005. Power, Sex, 
      Suicide: Mitochondria and the Meaning of Life. Oxford University Press. P. 
      80.
      
      
      “So the three great energy highways of life, respiration, fermentation, 
      and photosynthesis, all generate ATP, another profound example of the 
      fundamental unity of life.” Lane, Nick. 2005. Power, Sex, Suicide: 
      Mitochondria and the Meaning of Life. Oxford University Press. P. 80.
      
      
      “In a broad sense, respiration generates energy using proton pumps. The 
      energy released by redox reactions is used to pump protons across a 
      membrane. The proton difference across the membrane corresponds to an 
      electric charge of about 150 mV. This is the proton-motive force, which 
      drives the ATPase motor to generate ATP, the universal energy currency of 
      life.
      
      “Something very similar happens in photosynthesis. In this case, the sun’s 
      energy is used to pump protons across the chloroplast membrane in an 
      analogous fashion to respiration. Bacteria, too, function in the same way 
      as mitochondria, by generating a proton-motive force across their outer 
      cell membrane. For anyone who is not a microbiologist, there is no field 
      of biology more confusing than the astonishing versatility with which 
      bacteria generate energy. They seem to be able to glean energy from 
      virtually anything, from methane, to sulphur, to concrete. This 
      extraordinary diversity is related at a deeper level. In each case, the 
      principle is exactly the same: the electrons pass down a redox chain to a 
      terminal electron acceptor. In each case the energy derived from the redox 
      reactions is used to pump protons across a membrane.
      
      “Such a deep unity is noteworthy not just for its universality, but 
      perhaps even more because it is such a peculiar and roundabout way of 
      generating energy....
      
      “It seems that pumping protons across a membrane is as much a signature of 
      life on earth as DNA. It is fundamental.” Lane, Nick. 2005. Power, Sex, 
      Suicide: Mitochondria and the Meaning of Life. Oxford University Press. P. 
      91.
      
      
      “Bacteria have dozens of membrane transporters, many of which use the 
      proton-motive force to pump nutrients into the cell, or waste products 
      out. Instead of using ATP to power active transport, bacteria use protons: 
      they hive off a little energy from the proton gradient to power active 
      transport....
      
      “In short, bacteria are basically proton-powered. Even though the ATP is 
      said to be the universal energy currency, it isn’t used for all aspects of 
      the cell. Both bacterial homeostasis (the active transport of molecules in 
      and out of the cell) and locomotion (flagellar propulsion) depend on 
      proton power rather than ATP.” Lane, Nick. 2005. Power, Sex, Suicide: 
      Mitochondria and the Meaning of Life. Oxford University Press. Pp. 92-3.
      
      
      “To me, all this [the universality of harnessing proton gradients] hints 
      at the deep antiquity of proton pumping. It is the first and foremost need 
      of the bacterial cell, its life-support machine. It is a deeply unifying 
      mechanism, common to all three domains of life, and central to all forms 
      of respiration, to photosynthesis, and to other aspects of bacterial life, 
      including homeostasis and locomotion. It is in short a fundamental 
      property of life. And in line with this idea, there are good reasons to 
      think that the origin of life itself was tied to the natural energy of 
      proton gradients.” Lane, Nick. 2005. Power, Sex, Suicide: Mitochondria and 
      the Meaning of Life. Oxford University Press. P. 93.
      
      
      “A single E. coli bacterium weighs about a trillionth of a gram. 
      Seventy-two cell divisions in a day corresponds to an amplification of 
      272, which is an increase in weight from 10-12 grams to 4000 metric tons. 
      In two days, the mass of exponentially doubling E. coli would be 2664 
      times larger than the mass of the Earth!
      
      “Luckily this does not happen, and the reason is that bacteria are 
      normally half starved.” Lane, Nick. 2005. Power, Sex, Suicide: 
      Mitochondria and the Meaning of Life. Oxford University Press. P. 114.
      
      
      “In other words, to thrive, bacteria must replicate their genome faster 
      than the competition, and to do so requires either a smaller genome or 
      more effective energy production.” Lane, Nick. 2005. Power, Sex, Suicide: 
      Mitochondria and the Meaning of Life. Oxford University Press. P. 115.
      
      
      “Konstantinos Konstantinidis and James Tiedje, at Michigan State 
      University, examined all 115 fully sequenced bacterial genomes. They found 
      that the bacteria with the largest genomes (about 9 or 10 million letters, 
      encoding 9000 genes) dominate in environments where resources are scarce 
      but diverse, and where there is little penalty for slow growth, in 
      particular the soil.” Lane, Nick. 2005. Power, Sex, Suicide: Mitochondria 
      and the Meaning of Life. Oxford University Press. P. 115. Reference is to 
      Konstandinidis, K. & J. Tiedje. “Trends between gene content and genome 
      size in prokaryotic species with larger genomes.” 2004. Proceedings of the 
      National Academy of Sciences USA. 101: 3160-3165.
      
      
      “Overall, then we see the dynamic balance of two different trends in 
      bacteria–the tendency to gene loss, which reduces the bacterial genome to 
      the smallest possible size in the prevailing conditions, and the 
      accumulation of new genes by means of lateral gene transfer, according to 
      need.” Lane, Nick. 2005. Power, Sex, Suicide: Mitochondria and the Meaning 
      of Life. Oxford University Press. P. 120.
      
      
      “The more we learn about bacteria, the harder it becomes to make valid 
      generalizations about them. In recent years, we have discovered bacteria 
      with straight chromosomes, with nuclei, cytoskeletons, and internal 
      membranes, all traits once considered to be unique prerogatives of the 
      eukaryotes. One of the few definitive differences that hasn’t evaporated 
      on closer inspection is gene number. Why is it that there are no bacteria 
      with more than 10 million DNA letters, when, as we noted in Chapter 1, the 
      single-celled eukaryote Amoeba dubia has managed to accumulate 670 billion 
      letters–67000 times more letters than the largest bacteria, and for that 
      matter 200 times more than humans? How did the eukaryotes manage to evade 
      the reproductive constraints imposed on bacteria? The answer that I think 
      gets to the heart of the matter was put forward by Tibor Vellai and Gabor 
      Vida in 1999, and is disarmingly simple. Bacteria are limited in their 
      physical size, genome content, and complexity, they say, because they are 
      forced to respire across their external cell membrane.” Lane, Nick. 2005. 
      Power, Sex, Suicide: Mitochondria and the Meaning of Life. Oxford 
      University Press. P. 121. Reference is to Vellai, T. & G. Vida. 1999. “The 
      origin of eukaryotes: The difference between prokaryotic and eukaryotic 
      cells.” Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences. 
      266: 1571-1577.
      
      
      “So bacteria are under a strong selection pressure for small size whereas 
      eukaryotes are not.... Whereas large size is penalized in bacteria, it 
      actually pays dividends in eukaryotes. For example, large size enables a 
      change in behaviour or lifestyle. A large energetic cell does not have to 
      spend all its time replicating its DNA, but can instead spend time and 
      energy developing an arsenal of protein weapons. It can behave like a 
      fungal cell, and squirt lethal enzymes onto neighbouring cells to digest 
      them before absorbing their juices. Or it can turn predator and live by 
      engulfing smaller cells whole, digesting them inside itself. Either way, 
      it doesn’t need to replicate quickly to stay ahead of the competition–it 
      can simply eat the competition.... A parallel with human society is the 
      larger communities made possible by farming: with more manpower, it was 
      possible to satisfy food production and still have enough people left over 
      to form an army, or invent lethal new weapons. The hunter-gathers [sic] 
      couldn’t sustain such a high population and were bound to lose out to the 
      numerous and specialized competition.” Lane, Nick. 2005. Power, Sex, 
      Suicide: Mitochondria and the Meaning of Life. Oxford University Press. P. 
      126.
      
      
      “Among cells, it is interesting that predation and parasitism tend to pull 
      in opposite directions. As a rule of thumb, parasites are regressive in 
      character, and in this regard the eukaryotic parasites are no exception.” 
      Lane, Nick. 2005. Power, Sex, Suicide: Mitochondria and the Meaning of 
      Life. Oxford University Press. P. 126.
      
      
      “So phagocytosis is made possible by three factors: the ability to change 
      shape (which requires losing the cell wall, then developing a far more 
      dynamic cytoskeleton); sufficiently large size to physically engulf prey; 
      and a plentiful supply of energy.” Lane, Nick. 2005. Power, Sex, Suicide: 
      Mitochondria and the Meaning of Life. Oxford University Press. P. 127.
      
      
      “In the world of replicating systems, however, a system is stable (in the 
      sense of being persistent and maintaining a presence) if it does react–to 
      make more of itself, and those replicating entities that are more 
      reactive, in that they are better at making more of themselves, are more 
      stable (in the sense of being persistent) than those that aren’t. This is 
      almost a paradox–greater stability is associated with greater reactivity. 
      We therefore call the kind of stability associated with replicating 
      systems a dynamic kinetic stability.” Pross, Addy. 2012. What is Life? How 
      Chemistry Becomes Biology. Oxford University Press. P. 73.
      
      
      “In 1989, Richard Dawkins alluded to a fundamental law of nature which 
      applies to both the biological as well as the broader physicochemical 
      world: the survival of the most stable.... Once it is evident that matter 
      is not immutable, that it is susceptible to chemical change, then it 
      necessarily follows that matter will tend to be transformed from less 
      persistent to more persistent forms, in other words, from less stable to 
      more stable.” Pross, Addy. 2012. What is Life? How Chemistry Becomes 
      Biology. Oxford University Press. P. 76. Reference is to Dawkins, Richard. 
      1989. The Selfish Gene. Oxford University Press.
      
      
      “... Darwinism did bring about a sense of unity within biology, but the 
      troubling consequence of that unification, of enormous value in itself, 
      has been a growing isolation of the subject from the physical sciences to 
      which it must necessarily connect.” Pross, Addy. 2012. What is Life? How 
      Chemistry Becomes Biology. Oxford University Press. P. 117.
      
      
      “But the chemistry-biology nexus runs much deeper. Ecology is an 
      established branch of biology and would seem to be quite unrelated to 
      chemistry. However, as Gerald Joyce, the remarkable Scripps biochemist, 
      reported in 2009, there is an intimate connection between the two. A key 
      ecological principle, termed the competitive exclusion principle, states: 
      ‘Complete competitors cannot exist’ or, expressed in its positive form: 
      ‘Ecological differentiation is the necessary condition for coexistence.’” 
      Pross, Addy. 2012. What is Life? How Chemistry Becomes Biology. Oxford 
      University Press. P. 128. Reference is to Joyce, Gerald & S. Voytek. 2009. 
      “Niche partitioning in the coevolution of two distinct RNA.” PNAS. 106: 
      7780-5.
      
      
      “But here’s the important point. Manfred Eigen and Peter Schuster 
      discovered that the population of replicating RNAs that is generated by 
      this exploration of the fitness landscape does not consist of one single 
      sequence, but rather a population of RNAs of differing sequences, centred 
      around the most successful sequence (termed the wild type) within that 
      population. This population of varied sequences was termed a quasispecies....” 
      Pross, Addy. 2012. What is Life? How Chemistry Becomes Biology. Oxford 
      University Press. P. 143. Reference is to Eigen, M. & P. Schuster. 1979. 
      The Hypercycle: A Principle of Natural Self-Organization. Springer-Verlag.
      
      
      “Thermodynamic stability is an intrinsic property of any system and is 
      measured in closed systems, in which energy and resources are continually 
      supplied. That makes comparisons of DKS [dynamic kinetic stability] highly 
      problematic....
      
      “Despite the difficulties we’ve discussed in our ability to formally 
      quantify DKS, two crude measures of DKS are actually available. These are 
      the steady-state population number for a given replicating entity and the 
      length of time that the replicating population has managed to maintain 
      itself.” Pross, Addy. 2012. What is Life? How Chemistry Becomes Biology. 
      Oxford University Press. Pp. 145-7.
      
      
      “In the case of replicating systems and their clear tendency to become 
      transformed into more effective replicating systems, the driving force can 
      now be identified as the drive toward greater DKS. In other words, the 
      biological term ‘maximizing fitness’ is just the biological expression of 
      the more fundamental and more ‘physical concept–maximizing DKS.” Pross, 
      Addy. 2012. What is Life? How Chemistry Becomes Biology. Oxford University 
      Press. P. 148.
      
      
      “... DNA does not just catalyse its own formation. Through the processes 
      of transcription into messenger RNA and the subsequent translation of the 
      messenger RNA sequence into an amino acid sequence (proteins), it also 
      acts as a catalyst, a catalyst for the synthesis of other materials.... 
      Change the DNA sequence and you end up with a different protein structure. 
      What that means therefore is that DNA is not just an autocatalyst, but 
      also a highly specific catalyst.... A moment’s thought suggests therefore 
      that the term ‘information in its biological context is just ‘specific 
      catalysis’ when considered in a chemical context.” Pross, Addy. 2012. What 
      is Life? How Chemistry Becomes Biology. Oxford University Press. Pp. 
      151-2.
      
      
      “We see then that the material world can in some sense be subdivided into 
      two parallel worlds–the ‘regular’ chemical world and the replicative 
      world.” Pross, Addy. 2012. What is Life? How Chemistry Becomes Biology. 
      Oxford University Press. P. 155.
      
      
      “In fact, the moment some non-metabolic (downhill) [he equates metabolic 
      here with energy-gathering] replicator acquired an energy-gathering 
      capability, could be thought of as the moment that life began. At that 
      moment the replicating system would be free to pursue its replicating 
      ‘agenda’ despite associated energy costs, and significantly, through the 
      incorporation of that energy-gathering system the conflicting requirements 
      of DKS and the Second Law would be accommodated.” Pross, Addy. 2012. What 
      is Life? How Chemistry Becomes Biology. Oxford University Press. P. 158.
      
      
      “... in regular chemistry matter is stable if it doesn’t react. But in the 
      world of replicating systems, matter is stable (in the sense of being 
      persistent) if it does react, to make more of itself.” Pross, Addy. 2012. 
      What is Life? How Chemistry Becomes Biology. Oxford University Press. P. 
      163.
      
      
      “Biology then is just a particularly complex kind of replicative chemistry 
      and the living state can be thought of as a new state of matter, the 
      replicative state of matter, whose properties derive from the special kind 
      of stability that characterizes replicating entities–DKS. That leads to 
      the following working definition of life: a self-sustaining kinetically 
      stable dynamic reaction network derived from the replication reaction.” 
      Pross, Addy. 2012. What is Life? How Chemistry Becomes Biology. Oxford 
      University Press. Pp. 163-4.
      
      
      “As already stated, in the world of replicators the stability that matters 
      is DKS and not thermodynamic stability. And why is it that those entities 
      that are stable in a DKS sense are invariably unstable in a thermodynamic 
      sense? Simply, because DKS depends on the system continually reacting in 
      order to replicate, to make more of itself, and that actually requires the 
      system to be reactive, to be unstable.” Pross, Addy. 2012. What is Life? 
      How Chemistry Becomes Biology. Oxford University Press. P. 168.
      
      
      “The topology of the world of replicating systems is inherently 
      divergent.” Pross, Addy. 2012. What is Life? How Chemistry Becomes 
      Biology. Oxford University Press. P. 173.
      
      
      “What we classify as individual living entities may themselves be thought 
      of as components of a network–the ever-expanding life network.” Pross, 
      Addy. 2012. What is Life? How Chemistry Becomes Biology. Oxford University 
      Press. P. 186.
      
      
      “So a biosphere that has overwhelmed our planet should not be interpreted 
      in terms of an invasion by billions of individual life forms, but by an 
      ever-expanding living network.” Pross, Addy. 2012. What is Life? How 
      Chemistry Becomes Biology. Oxford University Press. P. 189.
      
      
      “The many definitions [of “political ecology”] together suggest that 
      political ecology represents an explicit alternative to ‘apolitical’ 
      ecology, that it works from a common set of assumptions, and that it 
      employs a reasonably consistent mode of explanation.” Robbins, Paul. 2004. 
      “Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction. Blackwell Publishing. P. 5.
      
      
      “The first lesson to draw is that the dominant contemporary accounts of 
      environmental crisis and ecological change (ecoscarcity and modernization) 
      tend to ignore the significant influence of political economic forces. As 
      we shall see, this is to ignore the most fundamental problems in 
      contemporary ecology. The other lesson is that apolitical ecologies, 
      regardless of claims to even-handed objectivity, are implicitly political. 
      It is not so much that political ecology is ‘more political’ than these 
      other approaches to the environment. Rather it is simply more explicit in 
      its normative goals and more outspoken about the assumptions from which 
      its research is conducted.” Robbins, Paul. 2004. “Political Ecology: A 
      Critical Introduction. Blackwell Publishing. P. 11.
      
      
      “Indeed, as political ecologists continually emphasize, the environment is 
      not a malleable thing outside of human beings, or a tablet on which to 
      write history, but instead a produced set of relationships that include 
      people, who, more radically, are themselves produced.” Robbins, Paul. 
      2004. “Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction. Blackwell Publishing. 
      P. 209.
      
      
      “For geographers, this process of categorization (binary or otherwise) is 
      of particular interest because basic themes within our particular subject 
      matter – environment, space and place – are frequently used in creating 
      collective and personal identities. Many of us identify with places, at a 
      variety of scales – from our home, through our street and neighbourhood, 
      town and region, up to a nation-state. In part, we are who we are because 
      of what places we choose to associate with.” Cloke, Paul & R. Johnston. 
      “Deconstructing Human Geography’s Binaries.” From Cloke, Paul & R. 
      Johnston, Eds. 2005. Spaces of Geographical Thought. SAGE Publications. 
      Pp. 1-20. P. 2.
      
      
      “The aim of this book is to argue that the mind-body problem is not just a 
      local problem, having to do with the relation between mind, brain, and 
      behavior in living animal organisms, but that it invades our understanding 
      of the entire cosmos and its history.” Nagel, Thomas. 2012. Mind and 
      Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost 
      Certainly False. Oxford University Press. P. 3.
      
      
      “As the plank-moving studies illustrate, affordances are different for 
      every kind of perception-action system, whether that is a system of an 
      individual completing a task with only their body, or an individual 
      completing a task with tools, or pairs of individuals completing a task. 
      Research on tool use in solo action offers an important demonstration of 
      the consequences of embedding for the individual. When we take up a tool, 
      for instance, it becomes a part of our perception-action system, extending 
      our body’s boundaries and allowing us to capitalize on other affordances 
      of our environment.” Marsh, Kerry, L. Johnston, M. Richardson & R. 
      Schmidt. 2009. “Toward a radically embodied, embedded social psychology.” 
      European Journal of Social Psychology. 39: 1217-1225. Pp.. 1218-9.
      
      
      “We hypothesize that becoming a temporary unit of social action with 
      another person also involves creation of a new perception-action system 
      with new capabilities. The individual becomes embedded in a social unit, 
      with a reality of its own. By engaging in joint perception or joint action 
      with another, our actions serve to impact and define the social unit of 
      which we are a part, and in turn our actions are constrained and channeled 
      by participation in this relationship or group.” Marsh, Kerry, L. 
      Johnston, M. Richardson & R. Schmidt. 2009. “Toward a radically embodied, 
      embedded social psychology.” European Journal of Social Psychology. 39: 
      1217-1225. P. 1219.
      
      
      “Importantly, the patterns of behavior that occur between two individuals, 
      rocking independently in separate chairs–with no mechanical linkages, only 
      informational links–obey the same universal dynamics as coupled components 
      (arms) within a single body.” Marsh, Kerry, L. Johnston, M. Richardson & 
      R. Schmidt. 2009. “Toward a radically embodied, embedded social 
      psychology.” European Journal of Social Psychology. 39: 1217-1225. P. 
      1219.
      
      
      “The challenge to the normal way of thinking is to take rather seriously 
      that causality resides at the level of the interaction, rather than in our 
      head.” Marsh, Kerry, L. Johnston, M. Richardson & R. Schmidt. 2009. 
      “Toward a radically embodied, embedded social psychology.” European 
      Journal of Social Psychology. 39: 1217-1225. P. 1220.
      
      
      “Someone touches us on the shoulder, calls our name, or a passing stranger 
      glances at us, and this is a catalyst, a rapid switching mechanism for 
      switching from an autonomous individual mode of action to being pulled 
      temporarily into a ‘social eddy’ with another, a dynamic patterning, a 
      dance that includes rich nonverbal (and perhaps verbal) behavior, 
      responsivity, mutuality, and coordination of behavior.” Marsh, Kerry, L. 
      Johnston, M. Richardson & R. Schmidt. 2009. “Toward a radically embodied, 
      embedded social psychology.” European Journal of Social Psychology. 39: 
      1217-1225. P. 1222.
      
      
      “Converging evidence from neurophysiology, neuropsychology and 
      experimental psychology suggests that there are multiple representations 
      of space, each with its own properties, but in a simplified manner, we can 
      distinguish between three spatial representations originating from the 
      body: the space covering the surface of our body (personal space), the 
      space immediately surrounding our body (peripersonal space) and the space 
      that falls far away from our body and it is unreachable by a simple arm 
      movement (extrapersonal space).” Costantini, Marcello, E. Ambrosini, G. 
      Tieri, C. Sinigaglia & G. Committeri. 2010. “Where does an object trigger 
      an action? An investigation about affordances in space.” Exp Brain 
      Research. 207:95-103. P. 96.
      
      
      “Another feature is equally important: systems are not inherently closed. 
      They have a relative stability and thus an organizational closure, but at 
      the same time they are open for influences from their surroundings.” 
      Rosslenbroich, Bernd. 2011. “Outline of a concept for organismic systems 
      biology.” Seminars in Cancer Biology. 21: 156-164. P. 158.
      
      
      “... a system is relatively closed as well as relatively open at the same 
      time. Coincidences of this type, where two opposing principles are present 
      simultaneously, are a typical feature of organic life and can be found in 
      many other examples as well.” Rosslenbroich, Bernd. 2011. “Outline of a 
      concept for organismic systems biology.” Seminars in Cancer Biology. 21: 
      156-164. P. 158.
      
      
      “Similarly, we now understand that in terms of both numbers and genetic 
      diversity, the microbial world not only dominates the biosphere but is 
      almost impossible to sample properly. This point is, of course, even more 
      emphatically made if one includes in this calculation the virosphere, 
      which we regard as an intrinsic aspect of the microbial world, not to be 
      separated from it.” Woese, Carl & N. Goldenfeld. 2009. “How the Microbial 
      World Saved Evolution from the Scylla of Molecular Biology and the 
      Charybdis of the Modern Synthesis.” Microbiology and Molecular Biology 
      Reviews. 73(1):14-21. P. 16.
      
      
      “Biology is a study, not in being, but in becoming.... A discipline whose 
      perspective is that of classical 19th century physics is inherently 
      incapable of dealings with the problems of a nonlinear world, which is 
      nonreductionist, non-deterministic (acausal), and works in terms of fields 
      and emergent properties, not a static world of particles with linear 
      relationships among them....
      
      “Thus, in the early decades of the 20th century, molecular biology’s 
      fundamental reductionist perspective was innocuous–especially when there 
      were many problems that could benefit from a (simple) reductionist 
      approach. It was another thing altogether when molecular biology began 
      reconceptualizing biology in an exclusively reductionist fashion.” Woese, 
      Carl & N. Goldenfeld. 2009. “How the Microbial World Saved Evolution from 
      the Scylla of Molecular Biology and the Charybdis of the Modern 
      Synthesis.” Microbiology and Molecular Biology Reviews. 73(1):14-21. P. 
      17.
      
      
      “We have seen that molecular biology, the dominant biological discipline 
      of the time, did not even recognize the evolutionary process as a 
      scientific problem. Given its overview, molecular biology took evolution 
      simply as biological epiphenomenology, ‘historical accident’–which means 
      that evolutionary considerations have no bearing whatsoever on any 
      fundamental understanding of living systems.” Woese, Carl & N. Goldenfeld. 
      2009. “How the Microbial World Saved Evolution from the Scylla of 
      Molecular Biology and the Charybdis of the Modern Synthesis.” Microbiology 
      and Molecular Biology Reviews. 73(1):14-21. P. 18.
      
      
      “What makes the treatment of evolution by biologists of the last century 
      insufferable scientifically is not the modern synthesis per se. Rather, it 
      is the fact that molecular biology accepted the synthesis as a complete 
      theory unquestioningly–thereby giving the impression that evolution was 
      essentially a solved scientific problem with its roots lying only within 
      the molecular paradigm.” Woese, Carl & N. Goldenfeld. 2009. “How the 
      Microbial World Saved Evolution from the Scylla of Molecular Biology and 
      the Charybdis of the Modern Synthesis.” Microbiology and Molecular Biology 
      Reviews. 73(1):14-21. P. 18.
      
      
      “Despite the growing consensus in many disciplines about the important 
      role that the material world plays in the structuring of human cognitive 
      operations the precise question of the causal efficacy of things in the 
      human cognitive system, has, surprisingly, evoked limited collaboration 
      between archaeology, anthropology and neuroscience. This attitude of what 
      we may call ‘epistemic neglect of the object’, is symptomatic of a more 
      general tendency in the mainstream cognitive sciences to leave material 
      culture outside the cognitive equation proper. Even embodied and situated 
      perspectives in cognitive science, which explicitly recognize the 
      intrinsic relationship between brain/body and environment, often seem 
      oblivious to the actual material medium that envelops and shapes our 
      lives.” Malafouris, Lambros. 2010. “The brain-artefact interface (BAI): a 
      challenge for archaeology and cultural neuroscience.” SCAN. 5, 264-273. P. 
      265.
      
      
      “Lastly, new imaging data show that neural circuits supporting stone 
      toolmaking partially overlap with language circuits, which suggests that 
      these behaviors share a foundation in more general human capacities for 
      complex, goal-directed action and are likely to have evolved in a mutually 
      reinforcing way.” Malafouris, Lambros. 2010. “The brain-artefact interface 
      (BAI): a challenge for archaeology and cultural neuroscience.” SCAN. 5, 
      264-273. P. 267.
      
      
      “However, as Ludwik Fleck observed in 1935, ‘every new finding raises at 
      least one new problem: namely an investigation of what has just been 
      found’. New knowledge, in turn, allows for new options without delivering 
      secure criteria for how these new options need to be handled.
      
      “The contemporary explosion of knowledge or the observation that our 
      current age is the beginning of a knowledge society thus has a little 
      remarked on corollary: new knowledge also means more ignorance. Thus, 
      surprising events will occur more frequently and become more and more 
      likely. If this is the case, handling ignorance and surprise becomes one 
      of the distinctive features of decision making in contemporary society.” 
      Gross, Matthias. 2010. Ignorance and Surprise: Science, Society, and 
      Ecological Design. MIT Press. P. 1. Reference is to Fleck, Ludwick. 1935 
      (1979). Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact. University of 
      Chicago Press. P. 51.
      
      
      “I believe that both interpretations–the one that claims that precaution 
      means paralysis and the one that says that precaution must be a key 
      feature in regulatory politics–have not dealt seriously with the 
      importance of ignorance and surprise. The critics ascribe a ‘better safe 
      than sorry’ attitude to the precautionary principle and recommend turning 
      back to cost-and-benefit analyses and risk assessments based on known 
      facts, thus ignoring the inevitability of uncertainty and ignorance. 
      Proponents of the precautionary principle have not yet delivered any 
      effective strategies for determining what exactly is to be done when 
      decisions have to be made promptly and risk assessments or computer models 
      cannot help in any meaningful way.” Gross, Matthias. 2010. Ignorance and 
      Surprise: Science, Society, and Ecological Design. MIT Press. P. 4.
      
      
      “Hans-Jorg Rheinberger has argued that what makes the physical, technical, 
      and procedural basis for an experiment work is that it is deliberately 
      arranged to generate surprises.” Gross, Matthias. 2010. Ignorance and 
      Surprise: Science, Society, and Ecological Design. MIT Press. P. 5.
      
      
      “In the following, a surprising event is understood as an occurrence that 
      triggers awareness of one’s own ignorance.” Gross, Matthias. 2010. 
      Ignorance and Surprise: Science, Society, and Ecological Design. MIT 
      Press. P. 5.
      
      
      “Although there has been no consensus on a full definition for the word 
      ‘niche’, a general description of the concept illustrates the key 
      underlying idea: a niche is a (hyper-) volume in a set of dimensions which 
      expresses the capability of a species to exploit resources.” Wennekes, 
      Paul, J. Rosindell & R. Etienne. 2012. “The Neutral–Niche Debate: A 
      Philosophical Perspective.” Acta Biotheor. 60:257-271. P. 261.
      
      
      “Each species has a fundamental niche, which is the n-dimensional space in 
      which they can theoretically survive. However, most species will have 
      competitors whose niches may partially or wholly overlap their own. The 
      species that is more efficient in the overlapping part of their 
      fundamental niches will, in a process which is known as niche partitioning 
      or competitive exclusion, attempt to exclude the other species by 
      outcompeting them. This can lead to two scenarios; either one species will 
      win and the other will go extinct, or, in a reaction to the evolutionary 
      pressure, one or both species may undergo a change in specialization away 
      from the contested part (character displacement), effectively reducing the 
      niche-overlap between the two species, thus avoiding extinction. The 
      realized niche of a species is the part of their fundamental niche that 
      they actually occupy.” Wennekes, Paul, J. Rosindell & R. Etienne. 2012. 
      “The Neutral–Niche Debate: A Philosophical Perspective.” Acta Biotheor. 
      60:257-271. Pp. 261-2.
      
      
      “The biosphere is dominated, in terms of both physical abundance and 
      genetic diversity, by primitive life forms, prokaryotes and viruses. These 
      ubiquitous organisms evolve in ways unimaginable and unforeseen in 
      classical evolutionary biology.... We now think of the entire world of 
      prokaryotes as a single, huge network of interconnected gene pools, and 
      the notion of the prokaryotic pangenome is definitely here to stay.” 
      Koonin, Eugene. 2009. “The Origin at 150: is a new evolutionary synthesis 
      in sight?” Trends in Genetics. Vol 25 (11) 473-5. P. 473.
      
      
      “In general, the species concept does not apply to prokaryotes and is of 
      dubious validity for unicellular eukaryotes as well.” Koonin, Eugene. 
      2009. “The Origin at 150: is a new evolutionary synthesis in sight?” 
      Trends in Genetics. Vol 25 (11) 473-5. P. 474.
      
      
      “Like the universal genetic code, the Krebs cycle and the ATP, 
      chemiosmosis is universal to all life, and appears to have been a property 
      of the last universal common ancestor, LUCA.” Lane, Nick. 2009. Life 
      Ascending: The Ten Great Inventions of Evolution. W.W. Norton & Co. P. 31.
      
      
      “And the great advantage of a gradient is that a single reaction can be 
      repeated again and again just to generate one single ATP molecule. If one 
      particular reaction releases a hundredth of the energy needed to generate 
      one ATP, the reaction is simply repeated a hundred times, building up the 
      gradient step by step until the proton reservoir is big enough to generate 
      a single ATP. Suddenly the cell can save up; it has a pocket full of small 
      change.” Lane, Nick. 2009. Life Ascending: The Ten Great Inventions of 
      Evolution. W.W. Norton & Co. P. 32.
      
      
      “Acids are defined in terms of protons: an acid is rich in protons, an 
      alkali poor. So bubbling alkaline fluids into acidic oceans produces a 
      natural proton gradient. In other words the mineral cells in Russell’s 
      alkaline vents are naturally chemiosmotic.” Lane, Nick. 2009. Life 
      Ascending: The Ten Great Inventions of Evolution. W.W. Norton & Co. P. 32.
      
      
      “This paints an extraordinary portrait of the last common ancestor of all 
      life on earth. If Martin and Russell are right–and I think they are–she 
      was not a free-living cell but a rocky labyrinth of mineral cells, lined 
      with catalytic walls composed of iron, sulphur and nickel, and energised 
      by natural proton gradients. The first life was porous rock that generated 
      complex molecules and energy, right up to the formation of proteins and 
      DNA itself.” Lane, Nick. 2009. Life Ascending: The Ten Great Inventions of 
      Evolution. W.W. Norton & Co. P. 33. Reference is to Russell, M.J., & W. 
      Martin. 2004. “The rocky roots of the acetyl CoA pathway.” Trends in 
      Biochemical Sciences. 29:358-63.
      
      
      “Predation escalates size, of course, driving arms races between predator 
      and prey.... With oxygen, then, predation pays; and with predators size 
      pays. So oxygen makes large organisms not just feasible but also 
      probable.”
      
      “It also helps build them. The protein that gives animals their tensile 
      strength is collagen. This is the main protein of all connective tissues, 
      whether calcified in bones, teeth and shells, or ‘naked’ in ligaments, 
      tendons, cartilage and skin. Collagen is by far the most abundant protein 
      in mammals, making up a remarkable 25 per cent of total body protein.... 
      Collagen is composed of some unusual building blocks, which require free 
      oxygen to form cross-links between adjacent protein fibres, giving the 
      overall structure a high tensile strength. The requirement for free oxygen 
      means that large animals, protected with shells or strong skeletons, could 
      only evolve when atmospheric oxygen levels were high enough to support 
      collagen production ...
      
      “Is oxygen necessary to give strength or just a random ingredient that 
      happened to be incorporated and then forever remained part of the recipe? 
      We don’t really know, but it’s striking that higher plants, too, need free 
      oxygen to form their structural support, in the shape of the immensely 
      strong polymer lignin, which gives wood its flexible strength. Lignin is 
      formed in a chemically haphazard way, using free oxygen to form strong 
      cross-links between chains.” Lane, Nick. 2009. Life Ascending: The Ten 
      Great Inventions of Evolution. W.W. Norton & Co. Pp. 62-3.
      
      
      “... there is around 26,000 times more ‘dead’ organic carbon trapped in 
      the earth’s crust than in the entire living biosphere. Each atom of carbon 
      is the antithesis of a molecule of oxygen in the air.... So far, despite 
      our vainglorious efforts to burn all the known reserves of fossil fuels, 
      we have lowered the oxygen content of the air by a mere two or three parts 
      per million, or about 0.001 per cent.” Lane, Nick. 2009. Life Ascending: 
      The Ten Great Inventions of Evolution. W.W. Norton & Co. P. 64.
      
      
      “Once they had adopted the phagocytic way of life, eukaryotes were no 
      longer bound by the endless drudgery of bacterial life, and specifically 
      the need to streamline themselves for fast replication. Eukaryotes didn’t 
      have to compete with bacteria; they could just eat them and digest them 
      within, at their leisure. Freed from the need for speed, those first 
      eukaryotes could accumulate DNA and genes, giving them scope for 
      enormously greater complexity. Jumping genes helped swell eukaryotic 
      genomes up to thousands of times the normal bacterial size.” Lane, Nick. 
      2009. Life Ascending: The Ten Great Inventions of Evolution. W.W. Norton & 
      Co. P. 116.
      
      
      “What is startling is that meiosis begins by duplicating all the 
      chromosomes, to give four sets per cell. These are then mixed and 
      matched–the technical term is ‘recombined’–to generate four entirely new 
      chromosomes, each one taking a bit from here and a bit from there. 
      Recombination is the real heart of sex.” Lane, Nick. 2009. Life Ascending: 
      The Ten Great Inventions of Evolution. W.W. Norton & Co. P. 126.
      
      
      “The great advantage of sex is that it allows good genes to recombine away 
      from the junk residing in their genetic backgrounds, while at once 
      preserving a great deal of the hidden genetic variability in populations.” 
      Lane, Nick. 2009. Life Ascending: The Ten Great Inventions of Evolution. 
      W.W. Norton & Co. P. 139.
      
      
      “Intriguingly, the fossil record points to a rather abrupt change in 
      complexity following the greatest mass extinction in the history of our 
      planet, that at the end of the Permian period, 250 million years ago, when 
      95 per cent of all species are thought to have vanished. After this great 
      extinction wiped the slate clean, nothing was ever the same again.
      
      “The world was complex enough before the Permian, of course. On land there 
      were giant trees, ferns, scorpions, dragonflies, amphibians, reptiles. The 
      seas were full of trilobites, fish, sharks, ammonites, lampshells, sea 
      lilies and corals. A cursory inspection might suggest that some of these 
      ‘types’ have changed, but that the ecosystems were not so very different; 
      yet a detailed inventory says otherwise.
      
      “The complexity of an ecosystem can be estimated by the relative number of 
      species: if a handful of species dominate, and the rest carve out a 
      marginal existence, then the ecosystem is said to be simple. But if large 
      numbers of species coexist together in similar numbers, then the ecosystem 
      is far more complex, with a much wider web of interactions between 
      species. By totting up the number of species living together at any one 
      time in the fossil record, it’s possible to come up with an ‘index’ of 
      complexity, and the results are somewhat surprising. Rather than a gradual 
      accrual of complexity over time, it seems there was a sudden gearshift 
      after the great Permian extinction. Before the extinction, for some 300 
      million years, marine ecosystems had been split roughly fifty-fifty 
      between the simple and complex; afterwards, complex systems outweighed 
      simple ones by three to one, a stable and persistent change that has 
      lasted another 250 million years to this day. So rather than gradual 
      change there was a sudden switch. Why?
      
      “According to palaeontologist Peter Wagner, at the Field Museum of Natural 
      History in Chicago, the answer is the spread of motile organisms. The 
      shift took the oceans from a world that was largely anchored to the 
      spot–lampshells, sea lilies, and so on, filtering food for a meagre 
      low-energy living–to a new, more active world, dominated by animals that 
      move around, even if as inchingly as snails, urchins and crabs. Plenty of 
      animals moved around before the extinction, of course, but only afterwards 
      did they become dominant. Why this gearshift took place after the Permian 
      mass extinction is unknown, but might perhaps relate to the greater 
      ‘buffering’ against the world that comes with a motile lifestyle. If you 
      move around, you often encounter rapidly changing environments, and so you 
      need greater physical resilience. So it could be that the more motile 
      animals had an edge in surviving the drastic environmental changes that 
      accompanied the apocalypse. The doomed filter feeders had nothing to 
      cushion them against the blow.” Lane, Nick. 2009. Life Ascending: The Ten 
      Great Inventions of Evolution. W.W. Norton & Co. Pp. 145-6.
      
      
      “So motility brings with it a need to deal with rapidly changing 
      environments, more interactions between plants and other animals, new 
      lifestyles like predation, and more complex ecosystems. All these factors 
      encouraged the development of better senses and a faster pace of 
      evolution, simply to keep up, not just among animals, but among many 
      plants too.” Lane, Nick. 2009. Life Ascending: The Ten Great Inventions of 
      Evolution. W.W. Norton & Co. P. 147.
      
      
      “Sight is quite a rarity. Eyes are absent, at least in a conventional 
      sense, from the plant kingdom, as well as from the fungi, algae and 
      bacteria. Even in the animal kingdom eyes are not at all common property. 
      There are said to be thirty-eight fundamentally different models of body 
      plan – phyla – in the animal kingdom, yet only six of them ever invented 
      true eyes....
      
      “If we add them all up, we find that 95 per cent of all animal species 
      have eyes: the handful of phyla that did invent eyes utterly dominates 
      animal life today.” Lane, Nick. 2009. Life Ascending: The Ten Great 
      Inventions of Evolution. W.W. Norton & Co. P. 172.
      
      
      “For now let’s just note that sight gives far more information about the 
      world than smell, hearing, or touch possibly can, for the earth is 
      drenched in light, and we can hardly avoid being seen. Many of the most 
      marvellous adaptations of life are a response to being seen, whether 
      strutting for sex in the case of a peacock or a flower, parading the great 
      armoured plates of a stegosaurus, or careful concealment in the world of a 
      stick insect.” Lane, Nick. 2009. Life Ascending: The Ten Great Inventions 
      of Evolution. W.W. Norton & Co. P. 173.
      
      
      “The human retina consumes even more oxygen than the brain, per gram, 
      making it the most energetic organ in the body,...” Lane, Nick. 2009. Life 
      Ascending: The Ten Great Inventions of Evolution. W.W. Norton & Co. P. 
      175.
      
      
      “The cost of living for a mammal in the cold is a hundred times that of a 
      lizard. Even in temperate conditions, say around 20° C, a pleasant spring 
      day in much of Europe, the gap is huge, around thirtyfold. To support such 
      a prodigious metabolic rate, the mammal must burn up thirty times more 
      food than a reptile. It must eat as much in a single day, every single 
      day, as a lizard eats in a whole month. Given that there’s no such thing 
      as a free lunch, that’s a pretty serious cost.
      
      “So there it is: the cost of being a mammal or a bird starts at around ten 
      times the cost of being a lizard and is often far higher. What do we get 
      for our expensive lifestyle? The obvious answer is niche expansion. While 
      hot blood may not pay in the desert, it enables nocturnal foraging, or an 
      active existence over winter in temperate climates, both of which are 
      denied to lizards.” Lane, Nick. 2009. Life Ascending: The Ten Great 
      Inventions of Evolution. W.W. Norton & Co. P. 209.
      
      
      “The onset of hot-bloodedness in the development of animals today lends 
      support to the idea that hot blood is more about turbocharging visceral 
      organs than heat production.” Lane, Nick. 2009. Life Ascending: The Ten 
      Great Inventions of Evolution. W.W. Norton & Co. P. 214.
      
      
      “It is then most significant that one of the things that the cosmologies 
      of Plato and Newton have in common is that they lack the notion of 
      evolution, in either the biological or the astronomical sense. Stuck with 
      a universe in which past and future cannot fundamentally differ from each 
      other, we see how those things that we now understand as born and bound in 
      time are instead set as timeless oppositions. Thus, both Plato’s myth [The 
      Statesman, pilot of the universe with hand on the rudder] and Newton’s 
      universe are framed in terms of a duality in which the intelligence of a 
      god who exists outside the universe is forever opposed to the imagined 
      tendency of material things to disintegrate to chaos.” Smolin, Lee. 1997. 
      The Life of the Cosmos. Oxford University Press. P. 143.
      
      
      “In biology textbooks one reads that a living thing is something that 
      shares the characteristics of metabolism, reproduction, and growth. There 
      are, however, two problems with such a definition. The first is that it is 
      not very insightful; it tells us nothing, for example, about why those 
      characteristics are often found together, or about why things with these 
      characteristics exist in the universe. The second problem is that any 
      definition of life that may be applied to a single organism gives the 
      false impression that a solitary living thing could exist in our 
      universe.” 
      
      “In the first chapter, we examined the image of the warm, living Earth in 
      the midst of a cold and dead cosmos, and we have since seen the extent to 
      which this is an absurd idea. The same problems hold, even more strongly 
      and clearly for the notion of a living thing in isolation. Certainly on 
      Earth we never find a tree or an animal living alone on an otherwise dead 
      island. Instead, we know of no place on or even near the surface of the 
      Earth that does not contain life of some kind. Thus, the one planet we 
      know which is not dead is not just a rock decorated with life in a few 
      corners. It is a planet teeming with life.
      
      “Of course, we don’t have access to any other life except on our own 
      planet. But it is impossible that a single individual of any of the 
      species with which we are familiar could live alone on any planet. It is 
      almost equally difficult to imagine a planet populated by only one 
      species. The reason is that each species plays a role in the great cycles 
      that circulate material around the biosphere. We breath in oxygen and 
      exhale carbon monoxide. Plants do the opposite, freeing the oxygen in 
      carbon dioxide for our later use. We could not survive very long without 
      plants for the elementary reason that all of the free oxygen now in the 
      biosphere was rather recently produced by them.
      
      “This holds, not only for the oxygen we breath, but for the nutrients we 
      eat, and for the other gases in the atmosphere: the nitrogen, carbon, and 
      so forth. The life of any plant or animal cannot then be usefully 
      conceived, except as embedded in the great system of the biosphere. This 
      is particularly true if what we are interested in is a conception of life 
      that could be useful for our project of understanding why life exists from 
      the framework of physics and cosmology.” Smolin, Lee. 1997. The Life of 
      the Cosmos. Oxford University Press. Pp. 145-6.
      
      
      “For example, when a species becomes extinct, those that eat it are in big 
      trouble, as are those that live in it, while those it eats are suddenly in 
      a different situation. In many cases, this is all; only a few other 
      species are affected by the extinction. But in some cases many species 
      will be affected, for example, if that species produced a waste product, 
      like oxygen, that is necessary for the life of many other species.
      
      “By modeling the effects of mutations and extinctions in such a complex 
      network of relationships, Bak, Kauffman, and others have found that 
      collective effects dominate the patterns of extinction and successful 
      mutations, so that the evolution of the biosphere can only be understood 
      as a single, coupled system.” Smolin, Lee. 1997. The Life of the Cosmos. 
      Oxford University Press. P. 150.
      
      
      “We may then turn to the first part of the definition [of life: “A living 
      system is a self-organized non-equilibrium system ...”] and ask what 
      conditions are necessary for the universe to contain self-organized, 
      non-equilibrium systems. The answer is that either their existence is 
      transitory, so that sooner or later the whole universe will come to 
      equilibrium, or the universe as a whole must itself be a self-organized, 
      non-equilibrium system. The reason for this is that it is impossible to 
      have a self-organized, non-equilibrium system which exists permanently 
      inside of a larger system which is itself in thermal equilibrium. It is 
      not hard to see why. Part of the definition of a self-organized, 
      non-equilibrium system is that it has a flow of energy through it. The 
      energy enters the system at one point from the outside, which we may call 
      the source, and leaves at another, which we may call the sink. Now, it 
      follows from elementary ideas about heat that the source and the sink must 
      be at different temperatures; in particular the source must be hotter than 
      the sink. This is because of the simple fact that heat flows from hot 
      regions to cold regions.
      
      “This means that the source and the sink cannot themselves be parts of a 
      single system in thermal equilibrium because, if they were, they would be 
      at the same temperature and no heat would flow. As the source and the sink 
      are parts of the environment surrounding our self-organized, 
      non-equilibrium system, this means that the environment cannot itself be 
      in equilibrium.”
      
      “This is the case with every living organism on Earth. We live because we 
      can take in energy that is at a higher temperature than the heat that we 
      relinquish to our environments.” Smolin, Lee. 1997. The Life of the 
      Cosmos. Oxford University Press. P. 158.
      
      
      “We look around and see that our universe is beautiful and that, with its 
      enormous variety of phenomena spread out over every scale from the nuclear 
      to the cosmological, it resembles more the ancient city than the modern 
      shopping center. Could this beautiful universe be the result of the 
      construction of a single planner? Certainly, it is difficult to imagine 
      any human planner choosing the laws of nature carefully enough to result 
      in a universe with such a variety of phenomena. Indeed, as we saw in 
      earlier chapters, to choose the laws of physics so that such a variety of 
      phenomena results, let alone so that the universe is not simply a gas in 
      equilibrium, requires that many parameters be finely tuned, some to as 
      many as sixty decimal places. Of course, God is imagined to have infinite 
      power, and we cannot limit what might be possible for him. But exactly for 
      this reason, if we believe in the picture of a universe made by the 
      providential choice of an eternal and fundamental theory, must we not also 
      believe in God?
      
      “On the other hand, perhaps for the first time in human history, we know 
      enough to imagine how a universe like ours might have come to be without 
      the infinite intelligence and foresight of a god. For is it not 
      conceivable that the universe is as we find it to be because it made 
      itself; because the order, structure and beauty we see reflected at every 
      scale are the manifestations of a continual process of self-organization, 
      of self-tuning, that has acted over very long periods of time? If such a 
      picture can be constructed, it may be possible to understand the fact that 
      the universe has structure and phenomena at every scale, not as some 
      enormous accident or coincidence requiring the fundamental theory to be so 
      finely tuned, but merely as evidence that the maker of the universe is 
      nothing more or less than the random and statistical process of its own 
      self-organization.” Smolin, Lee. 1997. The Life of the Cosmos. Oxford 
      University Press. P. 176.
      
      
      “How is it possible for us to discover any truth that is true always? The 
      only reasonable answer to this question, which really just emphasizes 
      Kant’s point in a different way, is that mathematical and logical truths 
      may be true for all time because they are not really about anything that 
      exists. They are only about possible relations. Thus, it is a mistake–a 
      kind of category error–to imagine that the theorems of mathematics are 
      about some ‘other’ or ‘Platonic’ realm that exists outside of time. The 
      theorems of mathematics are outside of time because they are not about the 
      real. On the contrary, anything that exists must exist inside of time.
      
      “If we insist that existence means existence bounded by time, we can 
      reverse the trap that the old metaphysics imposed on us, in which all that 
      really exists–the true Being–exists only eternally, while those things 
      that exist in time are only appearances, only faint reflections of what is 
      really real. If existence requires time, then there is no need and no 
      place for Being, for the absolute and transcendent Platonic world. That 
      which exists is what we find in the world. And that which exists is bound 
      by time, because to exist something must be created by processes that act 
      in time to create the novel out of what existed before.” Smolin, Lee. 
      1997. The Life of the Cosmos. Oxford University Press. P. 188.
      
      
      “To be bothered by this [liar’s paradox, Goedel’s theorem], we must think 
      of mathematics as some timeless reality, such that anything that is true 
      about it is true forever. If we stick to the view that logic and 
      mathematics are about nothing, and that all that exists is bound in time, 
      then these difficulties may be seen in a different light. If we construct 
      a real system, say a computer or a living thing, that is capable of 
      self-reference, then what we have done is to construct a feedback loop. 
      Self-reference in a real entity must exactly be the possibility that its 
      state at the next moment is a function of its state now. In a real system, 
      which can have only one state at a time, self-reference must be understood 
      as something that happens in time.
      
      “As we saw in the last few chapters, feedback is an essential element of 
      any process of self-organization. And processes of self-organization are 
      what gives our world structure. Thus, self-reference, which leads to 
      paradox when we try to envision knowledge as timeless, leads instead to 
      structure and organization when it is realized as a real process that acts 
      over time in the real world.” Smolin, Lee. 1997. The Life of the Cosmos. 
      Oxford University Press. P. 189.
      
      
      “Thus, belief in a final theory shares with a belief in a god the idea 
      that the ultimate cause of things in this world is something that does not 
      live in the world but has an existence that, somehow, transcends it. This 
      is why the belief in god and belief in the existence in a final theory are 
      both related to the metaphysical idea that what is really true about the 
      world is true about a timeless transcendent realm and not about the world 
      of the things we see around us.
      
      “There is still another issue that arises if we aim to give up on the idea 
      that the goal of physics is the discovery of a final theory, in which the 
      properties of the elementary particles are fixed by first principles, 
      independent of the history of the universe. For it might seem that if we 
      give up on the idea that there is a single final theory, we may also be 
      giving up on the possibility of gaining a complete and objective 
      description of the world. Is it possible then to have objective knowledge, 
      if that knowledge does not tell us how the world of appearances is 
      constructed out of what ultimately exists?
      
      “I would like to argue that the answer to this question is, in fact, yes. 
      It is, to begin with, not really the case that the aspiration to discover 
      the final theory, or apprehend the true Being, has really helped the 
      project of gaining objective knowledge. It is true that it is often 
      presumed that objective knowledge, to the extent that it is possible, is 
      knowledge of some absolute reality that lies beyond the subjective 
      appearances. But it seems to me that to equate the world of appearances 
      with the subjective is to make a kind of category error. What we have 
      given to us, from which we will deduce all possible knowledge, is nothing 
      other than the appearances of the world. If objective knowledge exists at 
      all, must it not be knowledge about the world of appearances? Must it not 
      then be possible to construct or deduce any real knowledge from the 
      appearances alone? Do we, as observers who live in the world, have any 
      other choice?
      
      “The idea that objective knowledge must be about something other than the 
      appearances carries with it a presumption that it is possible to imagine a 
      view or a picture of the world that is somehow more true than the views of 
      human observers. Such a view would not be limited to the incomplete and 
      incompletely reliable views of observers present in the world. It might be 
      a view of the world in its entirety, as it is.
      
      “But such a view cannot be the view of any real observer living in the 
      world. It could only be the view of some imagined being who is outside the 
      world. In this way the idea that there is a world behind the appearances, 
      an absolute Being, a world as it is, carries with it, in every context in 
      which it appears, the dream that there is a view of the world from outside 
      of it. And if one subscribes to this dream, then it is clear that the 
      ultimate justification for objective knowledge must lie not in any 
      incomplete view from inside the world, but in this all encompassing view 
      from the outside. Thus, if one believes in the possibility of this view 
      from outside the world, one is led to identify objective knowledge with 
      knowledge of the absolute world behind the appearances. All other 
      knowledge is at best incomplete and tainted by subjectivity.
      
      “If such a view were possible, then we would certainly like to aspire to 
      it, for we would all like to have a kind of knowledge which is liberated 
      from our situation, just as, indeed, we would all like not to die. The 
      questions is then, is such a view possible? Or, at least, is it 
      conceivable?
      
      “I do not think that such a view can be achieved; we can learn this from 
      both relativity theory and quantum theory.” Smolin, Lee. 1997. The Life of 
      the Cosmos. Oxford University Press. Pp. 199-200.
      
      
      “Thus the metaphor of the universe we are trying now to imagine, which I 
      would like to set against the picture of the universe as a clock, is an 
      image of the universe as a city, as an endless negotiation, an endless 
      construction of the new out of the old. No one made the city, there is no 
      city-maker, as there is a clock-maker. If a city can make itself, without 
      a maker, why can the same not be true of the universe?” Smolin, Lee. 1997. 
      The Life of the Cosmos. Oxford University Press. P. 299.
      
      
      “Given a network of catalyzed chemical reactions, a (sub)set R of such 
      reactions is called:
      
      “1. Reflexively autocatalytic (RA) if every reaction in R is catalyzed by 
      at least one molecule involved in any of the reactions in R;
      
      “2. F-generated (F) if every reactant in R can be constructed from a small 
      ‘food set’ F by successive application of reactions from R;
      
      “3. Reflexively autocatalytic and F-generated (RAF) if it is both RA and 
      F.”
      Hordijk, Wim, J. Hein & M. Steel. 2010. “Autocatalytic Sets and the Origin 
      of Life.” Entropy. 12, 1733-1742. P. 1735.
      
      
      “Thus, autocatalytic cycles, hypercycles, and collectively autocatalytic 
      sets can all be seen as particular instances of RAF sets.” Hordijk, Wim, 
      J. Hein & M. Steel. 2010. “Autocatalytic Sets and the Origin of Life.” 
      Entropy. 12, 1733-1742. P. 1736.
      
      
      “Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the RAF framework has provided 
      strong support for the claim that autocatalytic sets indeed have a high 
      probability of occurrence, even with very moderate levels of catalysis. 
      Our computational results in [previous journal article] indicate that only 
      a linear growth in catalytic activity (with system size) is necessary for 
      RAF sets to appear with high likelihood in Kauffman’s binary polymer 
      model. This was subsequently verified analytically. The level of catalysis 
      necessary for RAF sets to occur in our simulations is between 1 and 2 
      reactions per molecule, a number which is (bio)chemically quite realistic, 
      especially for proteins. This is in stark contrast to the exponential 
      growth required in Kauffman’s original argument, and therefore re-instates 
      his claim that in ‘sufficiently complex chemical reaction systems’ 
      autocatalytic sets will arise almost inevitably. Moreover, we have 
      provided a formal way of quantifying ‘sufficiently complex’, in terms of 
      the level of catalysis required. These results, combined with existing 
      experimental evidence, make autocatalytic sets a serious and plausible 
      candidate for consideration in origin of life scenarios.” Hordijk, Wim, J. 
      Hein & M. Steel. 2010. “Autocatalytic Sets and the Origin of Life.” 
      Entropy. 12, 1733-1742. P. 1738. Reference is to Hordijk, W. & M. Steel. 
      “Detecting autocatalytic, self-sustaining sets in chemical reaction 
      systems.” J. Theor. Biol. 2004, 227, 451-461.
      
      
      “Mimicry is a form of convergent evolution in which one species 
      independently evolves a morphology very similar to that of another species 
      simply in order to fool a third species.” McGhee, George. 2011. Convergent 
      Evolution: Limited Forms Most Beautiful. MIT Press. P. 8.
      
      
      “Mimicry is similar to camouflage, where species evolve morphologies that 
      converge on the form of either a living or a nonliving model in order to 
      blend into the surroundings so that the camouflaged species cannot be 
      seen.” McGhee, George. 2011. Convergent Evolution: Limited Forms Most 
      Beautiful. MIT Press. P. 8.
      
      
      “Hansell identifies five architectural behaviors found in nest-building 
      birds, listed here in terms of increasing behavioral complexity: stacking, 
      entangling, Velcro-fastening, stitching, and weaving.” McGhee, George. 
      2011. Convergent Evolution: Limited Forms Most Beautiful. MIT Press. P. 
      213. Reference is to Hansell, M. 2005. Animal Architecture. Oxford 
      University Press.
      
      
      “We can easily visualize a universe in which every species is 
      morphologically different from every other species, and in which each 
      species has its own unique ecological role, or niche, in nature. That 
      universe does not exist. Instead, we live in a universe where convergence 
      in evolution is rampant at every level, from the external forms of living 
      organisms down to the very molecules from which they are constructed, from 
      their ecological roles in nature to the way in which their minds 
      function.” McGhee, George. 2011. Convergent Evolution: Limited Forms Most 
      Beautiful. MIT Press. Pp. 245-6.
      
      
      “The hypothetical universe in which every species has its own unique 
      functional morphology, is morphologically different from every other 
      species, does not exist.” McGhee, George. 2011. Convergent Evolution: 
      Limited Forms Most Beautiful. MIT Press. Pp. 250-1.
      
      
      “In modeling the evolution of the development of multicellular organisms, 
      Newman et al. start with four different kinds of physical and chemical 
      patterning mechanisms: diffusion gradients, sedimentation gradients, 
      reaction-diffusion mechanisms, and chemical oscillation mechanisms. Most 
      importantly, these four patterning mechanisms are found in nonliving as 
      well as living chemical systems. Then Newman et al. add two basic cell 
      properties: differential adhesion and cell ppolarity.” McGhee, George. 
      2011. Convergent Evolution: Limited Forms Most Beautiful. MIT Press. P. 
      258. Reference is to Newman, S., G. Forgacs & G. Mueller. 2006. “Before 
      programs: The physical origination of multicellular forms.” International 
      Journal of Developmental Biology. 50:289-299.
      
      
      “In an extended study, Newman argues that nine ‘dynamical patterning 
      modules’ (or DPMs) in particular exist within the spectrum of hypothetical 
      developmental forms, and that ‘the DPMs, in conjunction with 
      cell-type-defining and switching networks, transformed simple, spherical 
      topologically solid cell clusters into hollow, multilayered, elongated, 
      segmented, folded, and appendage-bearing structures. They thus founded the 
      pathways that evolved into the developmental programs of modern animals.’
      
      “In conclusion, Newman et al. and Newman suggest that the evolution of 
      development on Earth may have been a two-stage process: metazoans 
      originated from multicellular forms and structures first assembled by 
      predominantly physical mechanisms, and then subsequently evolved genetic 
      mechanisms to perpetuate the functionally successful morphologies formed 
      in the first stage.” McGhee, George. 2011. Convergent Evolution: Limited 
      Forms Most Beautiful. MIT Press. P. 259. References are: Newman, S., G. 
      Forgacs & G. Mueller. 2006. “Before programs: The physical origination of 
      multicellular forms.” International Journal of Developmental Biology. 
      50:289-299; Newman, S. 2010. “Dynamical patterning modules.” From 
      Evolution: The Extended Synthesis. Edited by M. Pigliucci & G. Mueller. 
      Pp. 281-306. MIT Press.
      
      
      “Bodies can ‘express ecology’ by being sufficiently plastic, by taking on 
      different structure, form or composition in different environments. Part 
      of the phenotypic variation between organisms, especially differences 
      between isolated populations and unrelated individuals, may be fixed and 
      reflect differences in genetic make-up. Some of the variation develops in 
      interaction with the particularities of the environment in which an 
      organism finds itself. This part, indicated by the term phenotypic 
      plasticity, can be further subcategorized on the basis of whether 
      phenotypic changes are reversible and occur within a single individual, 
      and whether the changes occur, or do not occur, in seasonally predictable, 
      cyclical ways. The non-reversible phenotypic variation between genetically 
      similar organisms that originates during development, developmental 
      plasticity, has attracted much empirical and theoretical attention, 
      including the publication of several monographs. In contrast, the 
      subcategory of phenotypic plasticity that is expressed by single 
      reproductively mature organisms throughout their life, phenotypic 
      flexibility–reversible within-individual variation–has remained little 
      explored and exploited in biology. This is surprising, because, as we 
      shall discover, intra-individual variation most readily provides insights 
      into the links between phenotypic design, ecological demand functions 
      (performance) and fitness.” Piersma, Theunis, & J. van Gils. 2011. The 
      Flexible Phenotype: A Body-Centred Integration of Ecology, Physiology, and 
      Behaviour. Oxford University Press. P. 3.
      
      
      “The field that studies the balance between the elemental make-up of 
      animals and their food is called ‘ecological stoichiometry’, an area of 
      research that has flourished over the last decade. One of the best-known 
      applications of stoichiometric principles to ecology is the Redfield 
      ratio, named after Alfred C. Redfield, an oceanographer from Harvard and 
      the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute. He discovered a remarkably 
      constant ratio between carbon (C), nitrogen (N), and phosphorus (P), both 
      in the world’s oceans and in the phytoplankton living in them, and which 
      he explained by the continuous degradation of phytoplankton keeping this 
      ratio in the water column constant. In more recent times, larger datasets 
      and more precise measurements have yielded some small modifications here 
      and there, but overall they still support the generality of the magic 
      ratio 106:16:1 in the offshore ocean.” Piersma, Theunis, & J. van Gils. 
      2011. The Flexible Phenotype: A Body-Centred Integration of Ecology, 
      Physiology, and Behaviour. Oxford University Press. P. 26.
      
      
      “The term symmorphosis comes from Greek, as technical biological terms 
      tend to, with ‘morphosis’ meaning ‘formation’ and ‘symmorphosis’ 
      literallly meaning ‘balanced formation’ (think of symmetry). In 1981, 
      Taylor and Weibel provided the following definition: ‘state of structural 
      design commensurate to functional needs resulting from regulated 
      morphogenesis, whereby the formation of structural elements is regulated 
      to satisfy but not exceed the requirements of the functional system’. 
      Symmorphosis thus predicts that all structural elements of a body, or at 
      the least its subsystems, are fine-tuned to each other and to overall 
      functional demand. Because a serial system is as strong as the weakest 
      link, any element in the chain that would be stronger than the weakest 
      would be wasteful.” Piersma, Theunis, & J. van Gils. 2011. The Flexible 
      Phenotype: A Body-Centred Integration of Ecology, Physiology, and 
      Behaviour. Oxford University Press. P. 36. Reference is to Taylor, C. & E. 
      Weibel. 1981. “Design of the mammalian respiratory system. I. Problem and 
      strategy.” Respiratory Physiology. 44:1-10.
      
      
      “Symmorphosis, the principle that evolved body designs avoid excess 
      capacity, e.g. in cascades of serial physiological processes, such as the 
      respiratory chain, is now widely accepted as a useful, heuristic design 
      principle. As we will see later in the book, like other criteria used in 
      optimality-driven evaluations of organismal performance, symmorphosis is 
      better seen as a useful null hypothesis, than as a hypothesis with very 
      precise and rigid criteria for rejection. The discussion of safety factors 
      has demonstrated how an evaluation of cases where simple, economy-based 
      expectations are not upheld, develops our biological insight.” Piersma, 
      Theunis, & J. van Gils. 2011. The Flexible Phenotype: A Body-Centred 
      Integration of Ecology, Physiology, and Behaviour. Oxford University 
      Press. P. 49.
      
      
      “So, if animals are pushed very hard, under some conditions, they can 
      raise the ceiling from working at 5 times BMR [basal metabolic rate] to 
      working at 7 times BMR. As we have seen, endurance athletes in energy 
      balance can push their performance levels to 5 times BMR, but not further. 
      We have also seen that free-living birds, except in the case of marathon 
      migrants, generally do not work harder than 4 times BMR. The considerable 
      gap between the maximum sustained working level of 4 times BMR that 
      hard-working parent birds are prepared to give, and the physiological 
      maxima of 5-7 times BMR that can be achieved under exceptional conditions, 
      makes evolutionary sense if working hard comes at a survival cost. If very 
      hard work precipitously increases the likelihood of death (e.g. because of 
      free-radical derived oxidative DNA and tissue damage), without leading to 
      compensatory increases in reproductive output, evolutionary trade-offs 
      would select for animals that are not prepared to work harder than what we 
      can call the ‘optimal working capacity’.” Piersma, Theunis, & J. van Gils. 
      2011. The Flexible Phenotype: A Body-Centred Integration of Ecology, 
      Physiology, and Behaviour. Oxford University Press. P. 67.
      
      
      “Highly predictable changing environments would select for polyphenism in 
      short-lived organisms and life-cycle staging in long-lived organisms. The 
      lower the predictability of environmental variation, the better it is for 
      organisms to respond opportunistically, rather than seasonally scheduled. 
      Developmental plasticity would then describe the kind of variable 
      responses: organisms encountering unpredictably variable environments in 
      the course of their life would benefit from plasticity being reversible, 
      i.e. showing phenotypic flexibility. If environmental variation cannot be 
      predicted, organisms might go into bet hedging (generating differently 
      adaptive phenotypes at random) in shorter-lived organisms. In theory at 
      least, especially longer-lived animals could also cope with extravagant 
      changeability of the environment by not adjusting the phenotype at all, 
      i.e. show robustness.” Piersma, Theunis, & J. van Gils. 2011. The Flexible 
      Phenotype: A Body-Centred Integration of Ecology, Physiology, and 
      Behaviour. Oxford University Press. P. 94.
      
      
      “If animals can combine prior information about the environment with new 
      information about a current option (be it a patch, a prey, a mate, or 
      whatever), they can markedly improve their assessment of the value of the 
      current option, and thus improve fitness. This is the essence of 
      ‘Bayesian’ updating, named after Thomas Bayes (1702-61), an Anglican 
      priest interested in probability theory. Just to give you a simple example 
      of Bayesian updating in practice: imagine a patch in which a forager has 
      found two prey items during the first minute of search. Should it continue 
      searching or should it leave this patch? If the environment is structured 
      such that a patch can only contain two prey items at most, then the 
      forager should definitely move on. By contrast, if patches can contain 
      many more than just two items, then the forager should stay, especially if 
      it took little time to find these two items. Thus, knowing your 
      environment (in a statistical, probabilistic sense) greatly improves your 
      assessment abilities; without knowledge about your environment, it is much 
      harder to make the right choices. A popular example of Bayesian updating 
      in humans is the so-called ‘Monty Hall problem’, named after an American 
      quizmaster. Imagine you are participating in a TV game in which you have 
      to select one out of three closed doors. Behind one of these doors stands 
      a car, behind each of the other two doors stands a goat. You will take 
      home either a car or a goat, depending on which door you choose. Once you 
      have selected your door, the friendly quizmaster, who knows what stands 
      behind each door, helps you by opening one of the other two doors for you, 
      with a goat behind it. Knowing this, or, in Bayesian terms, updating your 
      prior expectation with new sampling information, should you switch to the 
      other closed door? The answer is yes; by switching, your chance of winning 
      the car increases from 1 in 3 to 2 in 3. The intuitive, but incorrect, 
      answer is that there is no need to switch doors, since your chances would 
      only increase from 1 in 3 to 1 in 2, irrespective of whether you switch or 
      not!” Piersma, Theunis, & J. van Gils. 2011. The Flexible Phenotype: A 
      Body-Centred Integration of Ecology, Physiology, and Behaviour. Oxford 
      University Press. Pp. 122-3.
      
      
      “In this book we have offered a progression of ideas that support the view 
      that, although bodies and environments are recognizable entities, they 
      really are inseparable. In this final chapter we extend this view to 
      evolution–the inheritance of, and selection for, randomly variable 
      phenotypic traits across generations. What we find is that evolutionary 
      change needs systems of inheritance, but we also find that the genetic 
      system that we all work with is just one of five such possible inheritance 
      systems. Since organisms not only provide the beginnings and nurture of 
      their offspring, but also build the environments in which they and their 
      offspring live, there are very tight feedbacks of reciprocal causation, 
      both in the development of organisms and in the relationships between the 
      developing organism and their environments. Bodies are earth, and we would 
      do well to acknowledge that in the ways that we study them.” Piersma, 
      Theunis, & J. van Gils. 2011. The Flexible Phenotype: A Body-Centred 
      Integration of Ecology, Physiology, and Behaviour. Oxford University 
      Press. P. 184.
      
      
      “It turns out there is something very special about the nanoscale when it 
      comes to converting different forms of energy into each other. 
      Intriguingly, only at the nanoscale are many types of energy, from elastic 
      to mechanical to electrostatic to chemical to thermal, roughly of the same 
      magnitude. This creates the exciting possibility that the molecules in our 
      bodies can spontaneously convert different types of energy into one 
      another. Molecules and small, nanoscale particles can have substantial 
      fluctuations in energy as they take energy from the molecular storm 
      (thermal energy), use it to convert, for example, chemical energy to 
      electrical energy, and then release the energy again into the surrounding 
      chaos. By contrast, smaller structures, such as atoms or nuclei, have 
      binding energies that are too large to allow thermal energy fluctuations, 
      unless the temperature (along with thermal energy) is extremely high 
      (thousands or millions of degrees). At such high temperatures, molecules 
      are unstable and the formation of complex structures needed for life is 
      impossible. On the other hand, at scales much larger than a nanometer, 
      mechanical and electrical energies are too high to be subject to thermal 
      fluctuations. At this scale, everything becomes deterministic, and objects 
      do not spontaneously change shape or assemble themselves–which are 
      attributes needed for life.
      
      “Thus, the nanoscale is truly special. Only at the nanoscale is the 
      thermal energy of the right magnitude to allow the formation of complex 
      molecular structures and assist the spontaneous transformation of 
      different energy forms (mechanical, electrical, chemical) into one 
      another.” Hoffmann, Peter. 2012. Life’s Ratchet: How Molecular Machines 
      Extract Order from Chaos. Basic Books. Pp. 122-4.
      
      
      “The hallmark of a tightly coupled molecular motor is that it goes through 
      well-defined cycles, using up a fixed number of ATP molecules during each 
      step. Nevertheless, random motion is the drive behind the motor’s 
      locomotion, as it ultimately moves the legs of the motor forward–of 
      course, rectified by the allosteric interaction of the motor’s legs with 
      ATP.
      
      “Loosely coupled motors, by contrast, rely more heavily on random motion 
      and have no fixed step cycle.” Hoffmann, Peter. 2012. Life’s Ratchet: How 
      Molecular Machines Extract Order from Chaos. Basic Books. P. 162.
      
      
      “As demonstrated, kinesin, a tightly coupled motor, uses the molecular 
      storm to push its feet forward. The allosteric tilting of the molecule 
      helps bias the movement in the forward direction, but where does the tilt 
      come from? Any change in shape of a molecule is ultimately the result of 
      the molecular storm’s pushing the molecule in the direction of reduced 
      energy, that is, into a valley of its energy landscape. A molecular motor 
      will simply not work if the temperature is too low to provide sufficient 
      random thermal motion. Even the most tightly controlled motor needs the 
      chaos of the thermal dance to traverse transition states and find its way 
      on an every-changing energy landscape.” Hoffmann, Peter. 2012. Life’s 
      Ratchet: How Molecular Machines Extract Order from Chaos. Basic Books. Pp. 
      167-8.
      
      
      “In our cells, directed motion, ‘purposeful’ activity, is created by the 
      action of molecular ratchets–molecular machines, enzymes, and motors, 
      which by degrading free energy and due to their asymmetric structures, can 
      rectify the random motions of the molecular storm to create order.” 
      Hoffmann, Peter. 2012. Life’s Ratchet: How Molecular Machines Extract 
      Order from Chaos. Basic Books. P. 225.
      
      
      “For our purposes, a shared lexicon is a consensus on a set of 
      distinctions.” Hutchins, Edwin & B. Hazlehurst. “How to invent a shared 
      lexicon: the emergence of shared form-meaning mappings in interaction.” 
      From Goody, Esther (Ed.) 1995. Social Intelligence and Interaction: 
      Expressions and Implications of the Social Bias in Human Intelligence. 
      Cambridge University Press. P. 55.
      
      
      “Virtually all work in connectionist modelling today models aspects of the 
      cognition of individuals. Our theoretical stance suggests that it might be 
      useful to consider the properties of communities of networks. Of 
      particular interest here is the fact that in traditional connectionist 
      modelling, the programmer constructs the world of experience from which 
      the networks learn. In a community of networks the behaviour of other 
      networks might also be an important source of structure from which each 
      network could learn. Connectionist programmers refer to the output 
      patterns to be learned as the ‘teachers’ for their networks. With a 
      community of networks, we can let an important part of the teaching be 
      embodied in the behaviour of other networks. Thus, where traditional 
      network modelling is concerned only with the relation of structure in the 
      environment to internal structure, a model of interactions in a community 
      of networks adds the universe of communicational artifacts to the 
      picture.”
      
      “It is easy to show that consensus among two networks can be achieved by 
      taking the output of each as the teacher for the other.” Hutchins, Edwin & 
      B. Hazlehurst. “How to invent a shared lexicon: the emergence of shared 
      form-meaning mappings in interaction.” From Goody, Esther (Ed.) 1995. 
      Social Intelligence and Interaction: Expressions and Implications of the 
      Social Bias in Human Intelligence. Cambridge University Press. P. 59.
      
      
      “The hand and mouth are the two most complex and flexible effectors of the 
      human body and are regulated by neighbouring or even partialy overlapping 
      neural circuits.” Stout, Dietrich & T. Chaminade. 2009. “Making Tools and 
      Making Sense: Complex, Intentional Behaviour in Human Evolution.” 
      Cambridge Archaeological Journal. 19(1): 85-96. P. 86.
      
      
      “Functional brain imaging results suggest that meaningful correspondences 
      do exist between language and ESA (early stone age) tool-making, and 
      furthermore that that [sic] these correspondences are to be found at 
      increasingly higher levels of organization in more sophisticated stone 
      technologies.” Stout, Dietrich & T. Chaminade. 2009. “Making Tools and 
      Making Sense: Complex, Intentional Behaviour in Human Evolution.” 
      Cambridge Archaeological Journal. 19(1): 85-96. P. 86.
      
      
      “Kinematic studies reveal that grasping movements with the hand affect 
      concurrent movements of the mouth, with larger manual target objects being 
      associated with wider, faster opening of the mouth and with increased 
      power of the voice spectrum during syllable pronunciation. PMv [frontal 
      lobe ventral premotor cortex] has thus been characterized as producing an 
      ‘action vocabulary’ across a wide array of different behaviours, 
      reflecting a more general role in processing sequentially structured 
      events.” Stout, Dietrich & T. Chaminade. 2009. “Making Tools and Making 
      Sense: Complex, Intentional Behaviour in Human Evolution.” Cambridge 
      Archaeological Journal. 19(1): 85-96. P. 87.
      
      
      “Overlapping PMv [frontal lobe ventral premotor cortex] contributions to 
      phonological processing and object manipulation provide evidence of a 
      specific neurobehavioural correspondence between language and manual 
      action involving this region. In particular, this correspondence is found 
      at the level where discrete articulatory and prehensile elements are 
      assembled into short goal directed action units, such as grasping an 
      object or pronouncing an intonational phrase.” Stout, Dietrich & T. 
      Chaminade. 2009. “Making Tools and Making Sense: Complex, Intentional 
      Behaviour in Human Evolution.” Cambridge Archaeological Journal. 19(1): 
      85-96. P. 88.
      
      
      “It is nothing new to propose an evolutionary link between language and 
      tool-making. In 1871, Darwin himself argued that ‘To chip a flint into the 
      rudest tool... demands the use of a perfect hand... the structure of the 
      hand in this respect may be compared with that of the vocal organs’. In 
      more recent years, however, many archaeologists have instead stressed the 
      dissimilarities between language and stone tool-making. Brain-imaging 
      studies of ESA [early stone age] tool-making provide important new 
      empirical support for the early intuitions of Darwin, as well as for more 
      recent proposals regarding the co-evolution of language and technology.” 
      Stout, Dietrich & T. Chaminade. 2009. “Making Tools and Making Sense: 
      Complex, Intentional Behaviour in Human Evolution.” Cambridge 
      Archaeological Journal. 19(1): 85-96. Pp. 91-2. Reference is to Darwin, 
      Charles. 2004 (1871). Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex. 
      Penguin Books. P. 69.
      
      
      “The conclusions we may draw from these observations are that humans are 
      generally oblivious to rates and proportions (which are transitory) and 
      that they constantly search for causal relations (which are invariant).” 
      Pearl, Judea. Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference. 2000. Cambridge 
      University Press. P. 182.
      
      
      “The word ‘counterfactual’ is a misnomer, since it connotes a statement 
      that stands contrary to facts or, at the very least, a statement that 
      escapes empirical verification. Counterfactuals are in neither category; 
      they are fundamental to scientific thought and carry as clear an empirical 
      message as any scientific law.” Pearl, Judea. Causality: Models, 
      Reasoning, and Inference. 2000. Cambridge University Press. P. 217.
      
      
      “These possibilities trigger an important basic question: “is 
      ‘explanation’ a concept based on general causes (e.g., ‘Drinking hemlock 
      causes death’) or singular causes (e.g., ‘Socrates’ drinking hemlock 
      caused his death’)? Causal effect expressions P(y |do(x)) belong to the 
      first category whereas counterfactual expressions P(Yx’ = y’ | x,y) belong 
      to the second, since conditioning on x and y narrows down world scenarios 
      to those compatible with the most specific information at hand: X = x and 
      Y = y.” Pearl, Judea. Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference. 2000. 
      Cambridge University Press. P. 222.
      
      
      “If, on the other hand, we base explanations solely on singular-event 
      considerations (i.e., necessary causation), then various background 
      factors that are normally present in the world would awkwardly qualify as 
      explanations. For example, the presence of oxygen in the room would 
      qualify as an explanation for the fire that broke out, simply because the 
      fire would not have occurred were it not for the oxygen. That we judge the 
      match struck, not the oxygen, to be the actual cause of the fire indicates 
      that we go beyond the singular event at hand (where each factor alone is 
      both necessary and sufficient) and consider situations of the same general 
      type–where oxygen alone is obviously insufficient to start a fire. 
      Clearly, some balance must be struck between the necessary and the 
      sufficient components of causal explanation, and the present chapter 
      illuminates this balance by formally explicating the basic relationships 
      between these two components.” Pearl, Judea. Causality: Models, Reasoning, 
      and Inference. 2000. Cambridge University Press. P. 285.
      
      
      “Yet despite its ubiquity in natural thoughts, actual causation is not an 
      easy concept to formulate. A typical example considers two fires advancing 
      toward a house. If fire A burned the house before fire B, we (and many 
      juries nationwide) would surely consider fire A ‘the actual cause’ for the 
      damage, though either fire alone is sufficient (and neither one was 
      necessary) for burning the house. Clearly, actual causation requires 
      information beyond that of necessity and sufficiency; the actual process 
      mediating between the cause and the effect must enter into consideration.” 
      Pearl, Judea. Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference. 2000. Cambridge 
      University Press. P. 309.
      
      
      “Thus, the distinction between type and token claims is a matter of degree 
      in the structural account. The more episode-specific evidence we gather, 
      the closer we come to the ideals of token claims and actual causes.” 
      Pearl, Judea. Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference. 2000. Cambridge 
      University Press. P. 311.
      
      
      “The overriding ideas in this solution [to the second riddle of causation 
      – figuring out what difference it makes to know that something is causal] 
      are:
      
      “First – treating causation as a summary of behavior under interventions; 
      and
      
      “Second – using equations and graphs as a mathematical language within 
      which causal thoughts can be represented and manipulated.
      
      “And to put the two together, we need a third concept: Treating 
      interventions as a surgery over equations.” Pearl, Judea. Causality: 
      Models, Reasoning, and Inference. 2000. Cambridge University Press. P. 
      344.
      
      
      “In summary, intervention amounts to a surgery on equations (guided by a 
      diagram) and causation means predicting the consequences of such a 
      surgery.” Pearl, Judea. Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference. 2000. 
      Cambridge University Press. P. 347.
      
      
      “Changes in size are not a consequence of changes in shape, but the 
      reverse: changes in size often require changes in shape. To put it another 
      way, size is a supreme regulator of all matters biological. No living 
      entity can evolve or develop without taking size into consideration. Much 
      more than that, size is a prime mover in evolution. There is abundant 
      evidence for the natural selection of size, for both increases and 
      decreases. Those size changes have the remarkable effect that they guide 
      and encourage novelties in the structure of all organisms. Size is not 
      just a by-product of evolution, but a major player.” Bonner, John Tyler. 
      2006. Why Size Matters: From Bacteria to Blue Whales. Princeton University 
      Press. P. 2.
      
      
      “The rules [“correlations in which various properties of organisms vary 
      with size”] are as follows:
      
      “RULE 1 Strength varies with size.
      
      “RULE 2 Surfaces that permit diffusion of oxygen, of food, and of heat in 
      and out of the body, vary with size.
      
      “RULE 3 The division of labor (complexity) varies with size.
      
      “RULE 4 The rate of various living processes varies with size, such as 
      metabolism, generation time, longevity, and the speed of locomotion.
      
      “RULE 5 The abundance of organisms in nature varies with their size.”
      Bonner, John Tyler. 2006. Why Size Matters: From Bacteria to Blue Whales. 
      Princeton University Press. P. 5.
      
      
      “... a larger animal could not even exist unless its cells had a reduced 
      rate of metabolism. It would either starve or burst into flames, or both.” 
      Bonner, John Tyler. 2006. Why Size Matters: From Bacteria to Blue Whales. 
      Princeton University Press. P. 124.
      
      
      “There is good evidence that a tree starts declining in its growth when it 
      becomes so tall that the water and nutrients can no longer effectively 
      reach the growing tips of the outer stems.” Bonner, John Tyler. 2006. Why 
      Size Matters: From Bacteria to Blue Whales. Princeton University Press. P. 
      133.
      
      
      “The present research examined a dynamic way in which cognition may be 
      shaped and maintained by culture and found evidence that culturally 
      specific patterns of attention may be at least partially afforded by the 
      perceptual environment.” Miyamoto, Yuri, R. Nisbett & T. Masuda. 2006. 
      “Culture and the Physical Environment.” Psychological Science. Vol. 17, 
      No. 2, Pp. 113-9. P. 118.
      
      
      “The present research suggests a dynamic process through which attention 
      can be shaped and sustained by the perceptual environment. Given the fact 
      that such perceptual environments have been historically constructed and 
      maintained by people repeatedly exposed to a culturally specific 
      perceptual environment, we believe that the current exploration sheds 
      light on possible processes of mutual constitution of cognitive processes 
      and sociocultural environment.” Miyamoto, Yuri, R. Nisbett & T. Masuda. 
      2006. “Culture and the Physical Environment.” Psychological Science. Vol. 
      17, No. 2, Pp. 113-9. P. 118.
      
      
      “Cells are characterized by the presence of genetic information, of a 
      metabolism and of compartments; there has been an ongoing debate on the 
      features that came first. This debate has also been complicated by an 
      excessive simplification of positions. But the simultaneous requirement of 
      two or all of the sub-systems can be considered a likely possibility as 
      well. Independent of that choice, a metabolic contribution cannot be 
      precluded as the presence of genetic material or that of membrane 
      components requires synthetic pathways supporting, for example, a 
      preparatory metabolism variant of the genetic polymer first option. 
      Therefore, the chemical free energy released or used in these pathways 
      represents an essential component in the majority of the hypotheses on the 
      origin of life.” Pascal, Robert & L. Boiteau. 2011. “Energy flows, 
      metabolism and translation.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
      Society: B. 366, 2949-2958. P. 2949.
      
      
      “A trait has high ‘broad sense’ heritability in a population to the extent 
      that the existing variation for that trait in the population is due to 
      genetic variation. If variance in a trait is entirely due to genetic 
      variance, broad sense heritability is 1.0; if it is entirely due to 
      variance in non-genetic factors, broad sense heritability is 0.0.” Bateson, 
      Patrick & P. Gluckman. 2011. Plasticity, Robustness, Development and 
      Evolution. Cambridge University Press. P. 13.
      
      
      “The developmental biologist Frederik Nijhout has proposed a formal 
      approach to robustness in which he suggests that the developing organism 
      is robust if it is unable to detect changes in the environment or is 
      resistant to them.” Bateson, Patrick & P. Gluckman. 2011. Plasticity, 
      Robustness, Development and Evolution. Cambridge University Press. P. 21. 
      Reference is to Nijhout, H.F. 2002. “The nature of robustness in 
      development.” Bioessays. 24, 553-563.
      
      
      “William Homan Thorpe brought together the insights of European ethology 
      and holistic psychology with the vast corpus of work on the various 
      mechanisms of learning from American and Russian laboratories, as well as 
      those from psychology departments worldwide. Thorpe classified learning 
      into five categories: habituation, classical conditioning, instrumental 
      conditioning, latent learning and insight learning. Some forms of learning 
      such as behavioural imprinting, which Thorpe discussed in his chapter on 
      insight learning, and the acquisition of song in birds may be restricted 
      to early development, but most can take place throughout life.
      
      “One of the most primitive changes in behaviour in response to experience 
      is non-specific. Sensitisation usually results from exposure to an 
      alarming stimulus (such as a blow-up toy snake suddenly becoming 
      inflated), which elicits a variety of defensive or aversive reactions from 
      the animal. Subsequently, many other potentially aversive stimuli (such as 
      loud sounds) will have the same effect even though this would not have 
      been the case had the animal not been previously sensitised.” Bateson, 
      Patrick & P. Gluckman. 2011. Plasticity, Robustness, Development and 
      Evolution. Cambridge University Press. Pp. 39-40. Reference is to Thorpe, 
      W. H. 1956. Learning and Instinct in Animals. Methuen.
      
      
      “DNA sequences that do not code for proteins were previously called ‘junk 
      DNA’ and comprise the bulk of the mammalian genome. However, much of this 
      codes for RNAs that are not translated into proteins. The recognition of 
      the critical biological significance of these sequences has been one of 
      the major discoveries of recent years. Many non-coding RNA molecules act 
      as regulatory factors either by association with intra-nuclear proteins or 
      by binding to the DNA. They are likely to play a major role in conferring 
      specificity to these epigenetic processes.” Bateson, Patrick & P. Gluckman. 
      2011. Plasticity, Robustness, Development and Evolution. Cambridge 
      University Press. Pp. 57-8.
      
      
      “Unlike the forms of plasticity that occur early in development, much of 
      the capacity to learn can occur throughout life.” Bateson, Patrick & P. 
      Gluckman. 2011. Plasticity, Robustness, Development and Evolution. 
      Cambridge University Press. P. 76.
      
      
      “Various mechanisms that generate robustness and are involved in 
      plasticity coexist to allow the development of an integrated phenotype or 
      a variety of alternative phenotypes. Successful lineages of sexually 
      reproducing organisms require compatibility between the genomic 
      architecture and the phenotypes at a number of levels. This requires a 
      level of robustness in development. But organisms living within variable 
      environments also require plasticity to cope with environmental change. To 
      ensure their utility, these mechanisms must be integrated with those that 
      maintain the species’ characteristics.” Bateson, Patrick & P. Gluckman. 
      2011. Plasticity, Robustness, Development and Evolution. Cambridge 
      University Press. P. 79.
      
      
      “Two fundamental issues have remained in bridging the gap between the 
      neo-Darwinist camp and those who seek to emphasise the importance of 
      development in evolution. The first has been the need to provide molecular 
      mechanisms that would explain the role of development in evolutionary 
      processes. The second has been the need to demonstrate the generality of 
      developmental processes impacting on evolution.” Bateson, Patrick & P. 
      Gluckman. 2011. Plasticity, Robustness, Development and Evolution. 
      Cambridge University Press. P. 82.
      
      
      “For example, robustness due to insensitivity to the environment might 
      simply reflect a species having been stable in an unchanging ecological 
      niche over evolutionary time; plasticity would have had relatively little 
      utility. Alternatively, where sensitivity to environmental cues might 
      induce harm, mechanisms to render the developing organism insensitive to 
      the environment may be under active Darwinian selection. Viviparity in 
      some reptiles and fish, the firm eggshell of birds, and the placental 
      barrier of mammals all represent evolved systems to create environmental 
      insensitivity.” Bateson, Patrick & P. Gluckman. 2011. Plasticity, 
      Robustness, Development and Evolution. Cambridge University Press. P. 85.
      
      
      “These terms [“nature and nurture”] refer to different domains and should 
      not be contrasted directly; one is a state and the other a process. 
      Nature, we argued, should refer to the fully developed characteristics of 
      an organism, and nurture to the ways in which those characteristics were 
      derived.” Bateson, Patrick & P. Gluckman. 2011. Plasticity, Robustness, 
      Development and Evolution. Cambridge University Press. P. 124.
      
      
      “A robust phenotype is often supposed to be one produced by processes that 
      are difficult to disrupt (developmental non-malleability), and one that is 
      difficult to modify once it has developed (post-developmental 
      non-malleability). However, as we have seen in Chapter 3, developmental 
      and post-developmental robustness do not necessarily go together and are 
      not based on unitary processes. A trait that is robust with respect to its 
      development may not also be robust with respect to its continuance, and 
      vice versa. As noted in Chapter 3, developmental malleability may be 
      followed by non-malleability, as in many examples of alternative 
      phenotypes found throughout the animal kingdom. The same is true for 
      humans, as in the case of sexual differentiation or differentiation of the 
      visual pathway. Conversely developmental non-malleability may be followed 
      by considerable malleability, as in the case of the human smile, which 
      reliably appears in infants during the fifth or sixth week after birth and 
      is successively greatly modified by social interactions and cultural 
      influences.” Bateson, Patrick & P. Gluckman. 2011. Plasticity, Robustness, 
      Development and Evolution. Cambridge University Press. Pp. 125-6.
      
      
      “The realisation that the many processes of development interact and are 
      intertwined is crucial in order to make progress in biology and cognitive 
      science.” Bateson, Patrick & P. Gluckman. 2011. Plasticity, Robustness, 
      Development and Evolution. Cambridge University Press. P. 129.
      
      
      “Robustness and plasticity are complementary and intertwined and must be 
      considered together.” Bateson, Patrick & P. Gluckman. 2011. Plasticity, 
      Robustness, Development and Evolution. Cambridge University Press. P. 130.
      
      
      “Disturbance can be thought of as any more or less sudden environmental 
      circumstance which makes resources newly available for exploitation. It is 
      often caused by human beings. Fire, toxic pollutants, extreme weather 
      conditions, wave action and ploughing all provide examples of ‘destructive 
      disturbance’ which eliminate established biological communities or parts 
      of communities. By contrast, taking the lid off a pot of jam, pruning a 
      tree, and burying animal or plant remains in soil are examples of 
      ‘enrichment disturbance’ which adds or exposes resources to living 
      systems.
      
      “Disturbance therefore results in temporary plenty. In so doing it causes 
      what is known as ‘R’- or ‘r’-selection. This kind of selection favours 
      open-bounded entities that are quick to arrive on the scene, exploit the 
      most readily assimilable resources and then reproduce as supplies become 
      restricted. Such entities are competitive with respect to arrival and 
      exploitation, i.e. in terms of ‘primary resource capture’. They also have 
      relatively unspecialized requirements for resources and little need to 
      adjust to heterogeneous conditions other than by reproducing. Regenerative 
      processes are therefore emphasized, allowing very rapid rates of 
      proliferation and dissemination of reproductive units through space and 
      time. Variation produced by recombinatorial, developmental or behavioural 
      mechanisms tends to be minimized.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees of Freedom: 
      Living in Dynamic Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College Press. Pp. 187-8.
      
      
      “After the goldrush [a disturbance], increased access to resources by any 
      one entity or group can only be achieved by means of trade or takeover. 
      The ability of each entity to retain or gain resources now depends on 
      mechanisms affecting the self-integration and degeneration of contextual 
      boundaries.... For the moment, their [mechanisms] main significance lies 
      in the fact that they result in the ‘combative’ and ‘collaborative’ 
      ecological strategies of entities that develop in circumstances where 
      there is a potentially high incidence of competitors. Such circumstances 
      cause ‘C’-selection.
      
      “Since C-selected entities inhabit heterogeneous environments over 
      relatively long time intervals, during which they may have a wide variety 
      of close encounters with others, they tend to possess a high degree of 
      versatility. This versatility is associated with an emphasis on 
      conversional processes–which permit retention of resources, and 
      distributive processes–which enable invasion of hostile territory. 
      Recycling processes that enable redistribution to defensive or invasive 
      ‘battlefronts’ are often also important. The formation of co-operative 
      networks and partnerships allows new capabilities that can also enhance 
      combative prowess. C-selected entities can be expected to be genetically 
      variable at the population level of organization and developmentally or 
      behaviourally variable at the individual level.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees of 
      Freedom: Living in Dynamic Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College Press. Pp. 
      188-9.
      
      
      “Stress or adversity can be thought of as any more or less continuously 
      imposed kind of environmental extreme, other than a high incidence of 
      competitors, which inhibits the proliferation of the majority of entities 
      under consideration. Particularly in terrestrial environments, many stress 
      factors may ultimately operate by compromising the mechanisms that 
      circumvent or protect from oxygen toxicity.
      
      “Those relatively few ‘S’- or ‘A’-selected entities which can tolerate, or 
      indeed develop best in the relative absence of competitors under stressed 
      conditions, do so because they have specialized attributes. For example, 
      organisms inhabiting deserts have attributes which protect them from 
      desiccation and extremes of temperature.
      
      “S-selection, like C-selection, is a feature of relatively stable 
      environments (hence both C- and S-selection represent different aspects of 
      K-selection) and especially favours attributes associated with protective, 
      conversional processes. Co-operative interactions and distributive 
      processes that allow emigration can also be an asset. Purely S-selected 
      entities, in being highly specialized, tend to lack versatility. However, 
      S-selection is often associated with individual life cycle stages or 
      alternative phenotypes of versatile organisms.” Rayner, Alan. Degrees of 
      Freedom: Living in Dynamic Boundaries. 1997. Imperial College Press. P. 
      189